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The US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) recently published voluntary guidelines for human embryonic stem (hES) cell research. The NAS guidelines propose two levels of oversight. AT the local level, research institutions are to create Embryonic Stem Cell Research Oversight (ESCRO) committees with a mandate to assess the scientific merit and ethical acceptability of hES cell research. At the national level, a new committee is to be created, not to review specific research proposals, but rather to periodically assess, and as needed revise, the NAS guidelines. In this article, we critically assess this proposal. In particular, we review the benefits and limitations of local research review. On this basis, we argue that local review is insufficient for hES cell research and that while there are obvious pragmatic and political reasons for the NAS to favor local research review, there are more compelling reasons for the NAS to have recommended national review of hES cell research proposals.

As compared with conventional vaccine production systems, plant-made vaccines (PMVs) are said to enjoy a range of advantages including cost of production and ease of storage for distribution in developing countries. In this article, we introduce the science of PMV production, and address ethical issues associated with development and clinical testing of PMVs within three interrelated domains: PMVs as transgenic plants; PMVs as clinical research materials; and PMVs as agents of global health. We present three conclusions: first, while many of the ethical issues raised by PMVs are familiar, PMVs add a new dimension to old issues, and raise some novel issues for ethicists and policy-makers; secondly, it is premature to promise broad applicability of PMVs across the developing world without having demonstrated their feasibility; thirdly, in particular, proponents of PMVs as a solution to global health problems must, as a condition of the ethical conduct of their research, define the commercial feasibility of PMVs for distribution in the developing world.

The National Academy of Sciences recently issued voluntary guidelines to govern human embryonic stem cell research. Among other restrictions, these guidelines prohibit certain kinds of combinations of human and nonhuman animal cells, and call for ethics review and oversight of any protocol involving the transfer of human embryonic stem cells into nonhuman animals. In this essay, I discuss the history of and scientific rationales for combining human cells with cells of nonhuman animals, and critically assess the most recent attempts to limit such research on moral grounds--and find them lacking. Nonetheless, as I show, this research remains scientifically and morally contested. I then explore whether and how the NAS's recommended Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Oversight committees will allow for scientifically well-informed moral assessment of this controversial, but possibly important, research.

This article proposes that an assessment of commercial feasibility should be integrated as a prerequisite for human clinical testing to improve the quality and relevance of materials being investigated, as an ethical aspect for human subject protection, and as a means of improving accountability where clinical development is funded on promises of successful translational research. A commercial feasibility analysis is not currently required to justify human clinical testing, but is assumed to have been conducted by industry participants, and use of public funds for clinical trials should be defensible in the same manner. Plant-made vaccines (PMVs) are offered in this discussion as a model for evaluating the relevance of commercial feasibility before human clinical testing. PMVs have been proposed as a potential solution for global health, based on a vision of immunizing the world against many infectious diseases. Such a vision depends on translating current knowledge in plant science and immunology into a potent vaccine that can be readily manufactured and distributed to those in need. But new biologics such as PMVs may fail to be manufactured due to financial or logistical reasons--particularly for orphan diseases without sufficient revenue incentive for industry investment--regardless of the effectiveness which might be demonstrated in human clinical testing. Moreover, all potential instruments of global health depend on translational agents well beyond the lab in order to reach those in need. A model compromising five criteria for commercial feasibility is suggested for inclusion by regulators and ethics review boards as part of the review process prior to approval of human clinical testing. Use of this model may help to facilitate safe and appropriate translational research and bring more immediate benefits to those in need.

Some psychiatrists anticipate a revolution in psychiatric nosology, on the basis of emerging data from genetics and genomics. There are, however, good empirical and conceptual reasons to resist any such revolution. Basing an understanding of psychiatric entities on one of multiple biological (not to mention sociocultural and psychological) considerations is a specious method of approaching the project of psychiatric taxonomy. A classification system that lacks sufficient consensus on the phenomenology of those classified cannot be adequately buttressed by exclusively genetic accounts. This paper advocates a more diversely informed nosology that, in turn, fosters attention to broader diagnostic considerations. We explore more plausible ways in which genetics and genomics, in conjunction with neuroscience and other biological disciplines, can help to shape diagnostic classification in psychiatry. There are, of course, differing views on the degree of prominence that genetics should take in psychiatric diagnosis and classification. We outline these accounts in illustration of this continuum. Drawing on Wimsatt's work on robustness analysis, we dismiss optimistic scenarios about the potential nosological advantages of psychiatric genetics and genomics, and offer a novel defense of realism about psychiatric entities. We also briefly sketch an integrative methodology for psychiatric research and classification., (Copyright 2005 S. Karger AG, Basel.)

Dealing primarily with implications rather than foundations, and focusing downstream at the expense of upstream prevention, mainstream bioethics is at a toxic watershed. Through an extended analysis of the Environmental Genome Project (EGP), we offer new tools from the philosophy of science and from critical epidemiology to help bioethics to move ahead. Our aim in this paper is not to resolve the moral and conceptual problems we reveal, but rather to outline ways to prevent such problems from arising in future research.

Stem cell scientists and ethicists have focused intently on questions relevant to the developmental stage and developmental capacities of stem cells. Comparably less attention has been paid to an equally important set of questions about the nature of stem cells, their common characteristics, their non-negligible differences and their possible developmental species specificity. Answers to these questions are essential to the project of justly inferring anything about human stem cell biology from studies in non-human model systems--and so to the possibility of eventually developing human therapies based on stem cell biology. After introducing and discussing these questions, I conclude with a brief discussion of the creation of novel model systems in stem cell biology: human-to-animal embryonic chimeras. Such novel model systems may help to overcome obstacles to extrapolation, but they are also scientifically and ethically contentious.

We outline a number of ethical objections to genetic technologies aimed at enhancing human capacities and traits. We then argue that, despite the persuasiveness of some of these objections, they are insufficient to stop the development and use of genetic enhancement technologies. We contend that the inevitability of the technologies results from a particular guiding worldview of humans as masters of the human evolutionary future, and conclude that recognising this worldview points to new directions for ethical thinking about genetic enhancement technologies.

Many scientists and philosophers of science are troubled by the relative isolation of developmental from evolutionary biology. Reconciling the science of development with the science of heredity preoccupied a minority of biologists for much of the twentieth century, but these efforts were not corporately successful. Mainly in the past fifteen years, however, these previously dispersed integrating programmes have been themselves synthesized and so reinvigorated. Two of these more recent synthesizing endeavours are evolutionary developmental biology (EDB, or "evo-devo") and developmental systems theory (DST). While the former is a bourgeoning and scientifically well-respected biological discipline, the same cannot be said of DST, which is virtually unknown among biologists. In this review, we provide overviews of DST and EDB, summarize their key tenets, examine how they relate to one another and to the study of epigenetics, and survey the impact that DST and EDB have had (and in future should have) on biological theory and practice., (Copyright 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.)

Despite countless research efforts to demonstrate the precise developmental and evolutionary nature of homeobox genes, we are far from consensus on the role of this class of genes in development and evolution. This essay attempts to clarify the debate and to nip some problematic interpretations in the bud, by exploring metaphors of homeobox gene function in development and evolution.

I begin by examining how genetics drives schizophrenia research, and raise both familiar and relatively novel criticisms of the evidence putatively supporting the genetic basis of schizophrenia. In particular, I call attention to a set of concerns about the effects of placentation on concordance rates of schizophrenia in monozygotic twins, which further weakens the case for schizophrenia's so-called strong genetic component. I then underscore two critical points. First, I emphasize the importance of taking seriously considerations about the complexity of both ontogenesis and the development of hereditary diseases. The recognition of developmental constraints and supports is crucial, for attention to development exposes the naivete of too many models of gene action in the aetiology of disease. Secondly, I attend to those schizophreniologists who ignore methodological criticisms and thus presume a genetic basis for schizophrenia, and then seek the 'schizophrenic genotype' lacking an adequate phenotype. In response I attempt to demonstrate the necessity of a sustained effort at characterizing the phenotype of schizophrenia as an enabling condition for the whole enterprise of psychiatric genetics--and for psychiatry itself. Without the organism-level phenotype, research at the level of genes will remain unproductive--assuming of course that research at the genetic level is appropriate at all.