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في إطار منهج التحليل اللغوي للدلالة الذي انتهجه "سکوت سومScott Soames (1946 )" تأثر بفلاسفة مثل "فريجه Gottlob Frege(1848-1925)"، "لودفيج فتجنشتين Ludwig Wittgenstein(1889-1951)"، و"فريديناند دوسوسير Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913)"، وعارض "برتراند رسل Bertrand Russell(1872 – 1970)"، قدم "سومز" للمعنى من خلال محتواه الدلالي، موضحا أهم العوامل التي أدت إلى الخلط والغموض الذي وقع فيه مفسرو فلسفته، تکلم عن نظرية "المشير القاطع rigid designator" التي قال بها "کريبک"، فرفض قطعية الحدود العامة مرجحا استخدام الحد في جملة حسب تغير الزمان والمکان، وحسب محتواه الدلالي، مؤکدا على أهمية الجانب السيکولوجي في تفسير دلالة المعنى، کما عرض للأوصاف المحددة وغير المحددة من خلال المحتوى الدلالي الذي قال به ردا على فکرة قطعية المعنى حسب استخدامه في سياق، والذي يجعل الأوصاف تامة وغير تامة، کانت آراؤه مثار جدل فلسفي في أوساط المهتمين بالفلسفة والمنطق خاصة فلاسفة التحليل اللغوي، والمنطق، فقد قدم تصورا جديدا للترادف المراد به الهوية، وکيف يبدو أمام الناس وفي نظر بعض الفلاسفة أن أسماء الأعلام مشيرات أو محددات قاطعة. Abstract: In the context of the linguistic analysis of Scott Soames (1946- ), he was influenced by philosophers such as "Gottlob Frege(1848-1925)", "Ludwig Wittgenstein(`889-1951)",”Ferdinand de Saussure(1857-1913)”,and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970). He presented the meaning through its semantic content, explaining the most important factors which led to confusion and ambiguity in which the interpreters of his philosophy, spoke about the theory of “Rigid Designator” of “Saul Kripke”, He refused the rigidity of The General Terms, He emphasis to The use of the term in a sentence according to the change of time and place, according to its semantic content, emphasizes the importance of the psychological side in interpreting the semantics of meaning. He also presented the definite and indefinite descriptions through the semantic content he said in response to the idea of of the meaning determinating as used in context, which makes the descriptions complete and incomplete. His views were a philosophical debate among philosophers and philosophers, especially philosophers of linguistic analysis and logic. He presented a new conception of the synonym for identity, and how it appeared to the people and for some philosophers that the proer names is Rigid Designators.

The semantics of complex demonstratives is one of the most important and controversial topics in philosophy of language which has never been ceased to attract philosophers’ interest and attention. In this article, we will examine the most fundamental problems regarding complex demonstratives including the question of whether complex demonstratives are rigid designators and directly referential or rather, are quantified expressions. We will also examine the question that in a demonstrative like “That F”, does F play any role in a successful designation of the demonstrative. The last question is whether F has any share in the proposition of the content of the sentence in which the complex demonstrative has been used. Our answer to the first question is that complex demonstratives are directly referential and rigid designators. In response to the second question we will defend the idea that having the property F is a necessary condition for the referent if the complex demonstrative is to successfully refer to it, otherwise it won’t refer to anything. Lastly, our answer to the third question is that F has no share in the proposition or the content of the sentence.

Standard semantic theories predict that non-deictic readings for complex demonstratives should be much more widely available than they in fact are. If such readings are the result of a lexical ambiguity, as Kaplan (in: Almog, Perry, Wettstein (eds) Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977) and others suggest, we should expect them to be available wherever a definite description can be used. The same prediction follows from ‘hidden argument’ theories like the ones described by King (Complex Demonstratives: a Quantificational Account, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2001) and Elbourne (Situations and Individuals, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005). Wolter (That’s That; the Semantics and Pragmatics of Demonstrative Noun Phrases. Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Santa Cruz, 2006), however, has shown that complex demonstratives admit non-deictic interpretations only when a precise set of structural constrains are met. In this paper, I argue that Wolter’s results, properly understood, upend the philosophical status quo. They fatally undermine the ambiguity theory and demand a fundamental rethinking of the hidden argument approach.

Many in the Christian tradition affirm two things: (1) that Jesus Christ descended to Hades/Limbus Patrum on Holy Saturday and (2) that the human nature of Jesus is a hylemorphic compound, the unity of a human soul and prime matter. I argue that (1) and (2) are incompatible; for the name ‘Jesus’, ‘Christ’, and ‘Jesus Christ’ rigidly designates a human being. But, given a certain view of hylemorphism, the human being, Jesus, ceased to exist in the time between his death and resurrection. So, Jesus did not descend to Hades/Limbus Patrum, even if God the Son did.

The musical signifier is a rigid trope, comparable to what modal logic defines as a rigid designator: it carries a fixed, definite, and exclusive meaning. But it is less like an element in a system than like an item in a catalogue. Most of the catalogue entries are so-called musical topics: formations for signifying a galloping horse, a pastoral pipe, a funeral procession, each one immediately recognizable. The rigidity of the signifier, musical or otherwise, severely limits its uses. Fullness of meaning—the rhythmic flux of import, and feeling—comes primarily from fluid, not from rigid, tropes. Modest Il’ich. Tchaikovsky elevates the signifier by inserting music of one genre into music of another. The musical depiction retains the impulse to extravagant display but sublimates the emphasis. Francis Poulenc’s music signifies the sound of the guillotine for each offstage death.

In this paper certain aspects of rigidity are studied through Hintikka’s work in modal semantics. The paper surveys Hintikka’s extraordinary struggles with rigidity from the late 50’s to this millennium. I argue that Hintikka’s many ambivalent remarks concerning rigidity become more comprehensible if, first, three different variants of rigidity are distinguished and, second, Hintikka’s largely implicit doctrine of semantic neo-Kantianism is made explicit.

Rigid expressionism is the view that all natural kind terms and many other kind terms are rigid designators. Rigid expressionists embrace the ‘overgeneralization’ of rigidity, since they hold that not just natural kind terms but all unstructured kind terms are rigid designators. Unfortunately overgeneralization remains a defeating problem for rigid expressionism. It runs together natural kind terms and nominal kind terms in a way that enforces a false semantic uniformity. The Kripke/Putnam view of natural kind terms minus the claim of rigidity is correct, but a traditional descriptivist theory is appropriate for nominal kind terms. None of them should be thought of as either rigid or non-rigid, however.

We rely on a recent puzzle by Alex Blum to offer a new argument for the old Fitch’s thesis that what we learn a posteriori in Kripkean identity statements like ‘Tully is Cicero’ is contingent and what is not contingent in such statements is analytical, hence hardly a posteriori.

In this paper, I will show that typical formal semantic reconstructions of the rigidity of proper names neglect the important aspect that the rigidity of names is determined by our ordinary use of a name relative to the actual world. This fact was clearly pointed out by Kripke, but overlooked by the subsequent discussion concerning this topic. Based on this diagnosis, I will distinguish three different actualized notions of rigidity. Firstly, I will introduce two different new varieties of known versions of rigidity; namely, actualized persistent and actualized obstinate rigidity. Secondly, I will make use of the tools provided by free logic and introduce a new and overlooked version of rigidity, which I will call actually restricted rigidity. Against this background, I will argue that we have different options to formally model the rigidity of proper names in natural languages. Which option we choose, mainly depends on our philosophical background assumptions. For someone who believes in non-existent objects and the possibility of naming such objects, it is the best choice to hold that proper names are actually obstinately rigid designators. For someone who rejects non-existent objects and the possibility of naming such objects, actually restricted rigidity is a better choice than actualized persistent rigidity.

The question of transtemporal identity of objects in general and persons in particular is an important issue in both philosophy and psychology. While the focus of philosophers traditionally was on questions of the nature of identity relation and criteria that allow to settle ontological issues about identity, psychologists are mostly concerned with how people think about identity, and how they track identity of objects and people through time. In this article, we critically engage with widespread use of inferring folk judgments of identity from study participants’ use of proper names in response to experimental vignettes. We provide reasons to doubt that using this method one can reliably infer judgments of numerical identity over time and transformations. We also critically examine allegedly-Kripkean justification of this method and find it lacking. Merely assuming that names are rigid designators will not help. A study participant’s use of proper names can be taken to track the participant’s identity judgments only if supported by the participant’s belief that names used in the scenario are used rigidly.

Kripke holds the thesis that identity statements containing natural kind terms are if true, necessarily true; these statements can be denominated theoretical identities. Kripke alleges that the necessity of theoretical identities grounds on the linguistic feature that natural kind terms are rigid designators. Nevertheless, I argue that the conception of natural kind terms as rigid designators, in one of their most natural views, hinders the establishment of the truth of theoretical identities and thus of their necessity. However, in Kripke’s works another proposal, not linguistic but metaphysical, is found to justify the presumed necessity of theoretical identities; it grounds on essentialism concerning natural kinds. In this regard, I question some of Kripke’s main claims, focusing on one of the main examples of theoretical identities put forward by Kripke, i.e., “Water is H $$_2$$ O”. I challenge his a priori claims concerning what should be the essence of a natural kind like water. Furthermore, I adduce that the character of that theoretical identity is not that claimed by Kripke, since in the term flanking the right side of the identity sign it has to be resorted to the notion of similarity or it should have the form of a disjunction of a cluster of substances.

Saussurean concept of signifie-signifiant agnation can be used to explain the EU law product-nomenclature referrals. The CJEU has an especially important role in developing detailed rules of product nomenclature interpretation in cases where ambiguities emerge. In its jurisprudence, the CJ pursues preservation of the predominant intuitive model of that interpretation even in cases involving composite products. Only in cases where the composition can easily be identified, the Court relies on the concept of the defining element—i.e. it takes the dominant element of the product as a product nomenclature determining one. With respect to novel products, the CJ applies the same general penchant. Therefore, with respect to such products, the Court attempts to establish their signifie-signifiant match by referring to analogous features and characteristics of already existing products. Such an approach is an evidence of the CJ’s self-constraint of its otherwise Demiurgic power concerning the product nomenclature. This argumentation implies that even the CN classification offers a catalogue of relatively rigid designators and that their rigidity is respected by the CJ. The CN designators are not perfectly rigid because the CJ takes into account not only the logical values of respective CN positions, but also the practical aspects (including transactional costs) of the CN classification, as well as the general objectives of EU rules underlying the CN position identification.

Este trabajo se propone contribuir a la comprensión crítica de las políticas del nombre propio y del lugar que ocupan en relación con la regulación estatal del binarismo género. Partiremos de una indagación de la violencia implícita en la relación del nombre propio con aquello que nombra, tal y como la conciben diferentes aproximaciones en el terreno de la Filosofía del Lenguaje. Destacaremos la lectura del nombre propio como performativo de género, según la formulación de Butler. Consecuentemente, abordaremos la legislación y las prácticas administrativas en el caso del Estado español para exponer el carácter disciplinario de las políticas del nombre propio y, en particular, la violencia administrativa que, como la tematiza Spade, acompaña los procesos de transición de género. This paper aims to contribute to the critical comprehension of the politics of the proper name and their role in relation with state regulation of gender. We depart from an exploration of the violence involved in the relationship between the proper name and its referent, following different approaches from the philosophy of language. We make use, specifically, of Judith Butler’s understanding of proper names as gender performatives. Finally, we address the recent history of legislation and administrative practices in Spain in order to expose the disciplinary character of state naming policies and, in particular, the administrative violence that, as Dean Spade puts it, accompanies processes of gender transitioning.

Projekt finansowany w ramach programu Ministra Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego, w latach 2019-2022, nr projektu 028/RI/2018/19 kwota finansowania 11 742 000 zł Planetoidy to jeden z głównych celów badawczych astronomii planetarnej, ale zarazem terra incognita w filozofii. Poznaniu naukowemu tych obiektów praktycznie nie towarzyszy refleksja filozoficzna. Tymczasem jest wiele problemów, które z powodzeniem mogłyby być eksplorowane nie tylko przez filozofię nauki czy metodologię poznania naukowego, ale także przez filozofię języka czy ontologię przyrodniczą. W niniejszej pracy, z pespektywy poznawczej epistemologii historycznej, podejmowane są takie zadania jak precyzacja pojęcia śmiałej hipotezy, egzemplifikowanie dystynkcji pojęciowej pomiędzy atrybutywnym i referencyjnym użyciem deskrypcji określonych, czy poszukiwanie adekwatnego ujęcia klasycznej problematyki indywiduów na gruncie praktyki badawczej astronomii planetarnej. Głównym problemem analizowanym w niniejszej pracy jest zagadnienie synchronicznej i diachronicznej identyczności planetoid. Nadrzędnym celem było jednak ukazanie (potencjalnej) roli filozofii w lepszym (rozumiejącym) uchwyceniu historycznego i współczesnego poznania naukowego, ale także w dostarczaniu nauce narzędzi służących do precyzacji stosowanego w nauce aparatu konceptualnego. W pierwszym rozdziale pracy popperowskie pojęcie śmiałej hipotezy jest analizowane w kontekście akceptacji w astronomii drugiej połowy XX wieku hipotezy istnienia księżyca planetoidy (532) Herculina. Chociaż teza o istnieniu tego obiektu została ostatecznie odrzucona, to jednak hipoteza o istnieniu księżyców planetoid została zaakceptowana. Sądzę, że do wprowadzonych przez Poppera warunków 1) bogatej treści empirycznej i 2) względnego sukcesu empirycznego, które miały charakteryzować śmiałą hipotezę należy dodać trzeci warunek minimalizowania błędu drugiego rodzaju (w ujęciu zaproponowanym przez Neymana i Pearsona). W drugim rozdziale pracy planetoidy były analizowane jako indywidua czasoprzestrzenne. W nawiązaniu do klasycznych prac Strawsona, ale także do nowszej tradycji rozwijanej w ramach współczesnej filozofii analitycznej została udzielona odpowiedź na pytanie, czy nazwy własne planetoid można interpretować jako derywaty deskrypcji, czy jako tzw. sztywne desygnatory? W trzecim rozdziale został ukazany historyczno-filozoficzny kontekst wypracowanego jeszcze w ramach XVII-wiecznej astronomii kryterium identyczności genetycznej dla komet. Kryterium to polega na wykorzystaniu parametrów keplerowskich orbity komety jako czynników identyfikujących dany obiekt. Sześć parametrów określanych symbolicznie jako: T, e, i , q, ω, Ω można zinterpretować jako elementy konstytuujące identyczność genetyczną planetoid. Asteroids are one of the main research goals of planetary astronomy, and a terra incognita in philosophy. Philosophical reflection accompanying scientific research of those objects is practically non-existent. However, there are many problems that could be explored successfully not only by philosophy of science or the scientific method, but also by the philosophy of language and ontological analysis. This work tackles such tasks as precision of the notion of a bold hypothesis, exemplification of the notional distinction between attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions, and a search for an adequate approach to the classical problems of individuals on the grounds of research practice of planetary astronomy, all these from the cognitive perspective of historical epistemology. The main problem analysed in this work is a question of numerical identity of asteroids (synchronic criteria of identity and diachronic criteria of identity). However, the overarching goal was to portray the (potential) role of philosophy in a better approach to historiography of contemporary science, and also the provision of tools for fine tuning the conceptual toolbox of science. In the first chapter of the work, Popper’s notion of bold hypothesis is studied in the context of the astronomy of the latter half of the 20th century, namely accepting the moon of (532) Herculina hypothesis. Even though the claim about the existence of that object was finally rejected, nonetheless, the asteroid satellites hypothesis was finally accepted. I believe that the conditions introduced by Popper 1) rich empirical content, and 2) relative empirical success to describe a bold hypothesis, should be supplemented with the third condition of minimising the type II error (as proposed by Neyman and Pearson). The second chapter analyses asteroids as space-time individuals. Following classical works by Strawson, and also a more modern tradition developed within the framework of contemporary analytical philosophy, an answer to the question whether the proper names of asteroids may be interpreted as derivatives of descriptions, or as what is known as “rigid designators”. The third chapter portrays the historical and philosophical context of the criterion of identity over time for comets, developed back in 16th-century astronomy. That criterion uses Keplerian parameters of a comet’s orbit as factors identifying a given body. The six parameters symbolically denoted as T, e, i, q, ω, and Ω can be interpreted as elements constituting the identity over time for asteroids. Ministerstwo Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego program "Regionalna Inicjatywa Doskonałości"

Having drawn the distinction between logic as a discipline and logic as organon, this short paper focuses on the latter, the purpose of which is twofold. First, it highlights the importance of second-order logic and modal logic in ontology. To this aim, the role of second-order logic is illustrated in formalizing realist ontology committing to the existence of properties. It is also emphasized how quantified modal logic helps clarify de re/de dicto distinction that implicitly takes place in ordinary language. Secondly, the paper concentrates on the significance of modal logic in the philosophy of language. In pursuing this goal, we considered Kripke’s notions of rigid designator, necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori statements. Given the definition of rigid designator, it is possible to prove in quantified modal logic that an identity between proper names, like “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus”, if true, is necessarily true. But the truth of the identity statement “Hesperus = Phosphorus” is known a posteriori. Therefore, there are necessary a posteriori truths. There are also contingent a priori true statements like “The length of stick S at time t0 = one meter”, as there exists a possible world in which this statement is false.

This essay is intended to engage some of the controversies that have emerged in legal philosophy concerning the theory of linguistic meaning we should adopt with reference to the law. In particular, I will focus on two theories of linguistic meaning that have opposing positions both on the nature of meaning, and the consequences this might have for law and legal objectivity. The first can be called plain meaning view. The plain meaning theory claims that the meaning of legal terms is a settled thing, and it is the duty of legal officials, especially judges, to simply apply that meaning to a given case in hand. In modern American jurisprudence, the plain meaning theory is often associated with various originalist figures, most notably the late Antonin Scalia who called his iteration of the plain meaning theory &ldquo, textualism.&rdquo, For this reason, I will largely be focusing on Justice Scalia&rsquo, s account. The second theory of linguistic meaning I will be examining can be called the indeterminate theory. The indeterminate theory holds that there is no set or foundational meaning to any semantic term in the law which can be objectively applied by legal practitioners.

Although it is common to claim that certain general terms or kind terms are rigid designators and that their rigidity helps explain their behavior in modal contexts, it has turned out to be surprisingly difficult to define an adequate notion of rigidity for general terms. Such definitions tend, as argued in particular by Scott Soames, to lead to a type of overgeneralization that leaves the purported rigidity of general terms explanatorily inert. In recent years, several attempts have been made to circumvent the problem, and the present article focuses on a particular and potentially powerful strategy developed by Joseph LaPorte in his recent book Rigid Designation and Theoretical Identities for blocking one of the core inferences in Soames’s case against general term rigidity. I argue that the type of response LaPorte promotes is bound to fail; though it might initially appear to circumvent the threat of trivialization described by Soames, it is susceptible to a different and arguably even worse kind of trivialization challenge. In conclusion, Soames’s arguments remain a significant obstacle to identifying a non-trivializing definition of kind term rigidity, and we have good reasons to think that an explanation for the modal status of theoretical identity statements must be sought elsewhere.

Though it is often claimed that some general terms are rigid designators, it has turned out to be difficult to give a satisfying definition that (1) avoids making all general terms rigid (the overgeneralization problem), and (2) even if a non-rigid reading is available, makes that non-rigid reading matter (the trivialization problem). Several authors have attempted to develop examples that meet the trivialization challenge, with Marti and Martinez-Fernandez providing what is, perhaps, the most convincing strategy. I show that the type of example Marti and Martinez-Fernandez offer nevertheless fails to meet the trivialization challenge and, accordingly, that we should still have serious doubts about whether continuing the search for a non-trivial definition of general term rigidity would be fruitful.

Rigid designators designate whatever they do in all possible worlds. Mathematical definite descriptions are usually considered paradigmatic examples of such expressions. The main aim of the present paper is to challenge this view. It is argued that mathematical definite descriptions cannot be rigid in the same sense as ordinary empirical definite descriptions because—assuming that mathematical facts are not determined by goings on in possible worlds—mathematical descriptions designate whatever they do independently of possible worlds. Nevertheless, there is a widespread practice of treating mathematical definite descriptions as rigid. Apart from this, there might be theoretical reasons for admitting that they are rigid in some sense (though not in the same sense as ordinary empirical definite descriptions). The second part of the paper suggests a way out. Borrowing from ideas proposed by Kit Fine, it develops and defends an extended notion of rigidity, which can be applied to mathematical definite descriptions. Importantly, this notion is fully compatible with the claim that mathematical facts are independent of possible worlds.

This chapter examines the critique of three medieval negative theologians with regard to the Name. It begins by illustrating the efforts of R. Bahya Ibn Paqudah and R. Abraham Ibn Daud to abolish the status of YHWH as a proper name. I show how these two thinkers interpreted YHWH as either a common name or a homonym (Ibn Daud), or a mere arbitrary sign (Ibn Paqudah). The chapter then contrasts these views to Maimonides’ audacious proposal in chapters 61–63 in part I of The Guide for the Perplexed. By denying YHWH any grammatical connections to natural language, Maimonides gave this name the status of a Kripkean “rigid designator”. As a rigid designator, the name YHWH succeeds in pointing directly at the named entity—God—without describing Him.

This chapter explores how understanding YHWH as a “rigid designator” or means to address God is reinforced through religious practice. It focuses on the rabbinic decree to mandate invoking the Name in every liturgical act, thus disseminating the most potent of temple rituals in daily life. As a result of this decree, ordinary worshipers were equated with high priests who can summon the divine presence along with its accompanying abundance. The significance of this rabbinic move is demonstrated by juxtaposing it to that of Hekhalot mystics and Second Temple sects such as the “morning bathers” (tovley shacharin) and Qumran scribes. The chapter also compares the rabbinic understanding of invoking the name to that of Philo, showing that for the rabbis, liturgy became a form of theophany, thanks to the presence of the Name.

In this article I want to show that trans-world identification is based on a naming relation, requires deictic referents of situations for its description, and can be expressed using de re terms. The theory of rigid designators is not adequate to either the cognitive foundations of identification or linguistic practice, and operates not with the names of objects, but with complex concepts. I analyze such concepts in Montague’s intensional logic. It is also used to describe the logic of the naming relation. Using the indexing of situations and agents, it is possible to show under what circumstances the cases of transparent and opaque naming are selected when reporting the attitudes of agents. In particular, the idiolectal de re of the attitude holder must be replaced by a transparent naming of the reporter as well as the idiolectal de dicto. Opaque naming is appropriate only pragmatically, namely, in cases when it is required to interact with the idiolect speaker without addressing the specification and correction of naming, as well as when using sign complexes explicitly, i.e. in combination with the predicates “to name”, “to designate”, etc. This is also shown by the example of counterfactual naming, in which the dynamic effect of modifying the language convention arises. Identification based on the cognitive interaction of an agent with an object is considered as an irreducible basis for a naming relation., В статье я хочу показать, что трансмировая идентификация основывается на отношении именования, требует для своего описания дейктических референтов ситуаций и может быть выражена с использованием термов de re. Теория жёстких десигнаторов не адекватна ни когнитивным основаниям идентификации, ни лингвистической практике, и оперирует не именами объектов, а сложными концептами. Я даю анализ таким концептам в интенсиональной логике Монтегю. Она используется и при описании логики отношения именования. С помощью индексации ситуаций и агентов удаётся показать, при каких обстоятельствах выбираются случаи прозрачного и непрозрачного именования при передаче установок агентов. В частности, идиолектное de re носителя установки должно замещаться прозрачным именованием передающего, как и идиолектное de dicto. Непрозрачное именование уместно лишь прагматически, а именно, в случаях, когда требуется осуществить взаимодействие с носителем идиолекта, не обращаясь к уточнению и коррекции именования, а также при использовании знаковых комплексов явно, т. е. в сочетании с предикатами «именовать», «обозначать» и пр. Это показано и на примере контрафактического именования, в ходе которого возникает динамический эффект модификации языковой конвенции. Идентификация на основании когнитивного взаимодействия агента с объектом рассматривается как нередуцируемое основание отношения именования.

Translating the titles of narrative texts is a sui generis operation in the sense that the ontological conditions and pragmatic functions of a title considerably predetermine the translator"s task. The title is a privileged place where we can observe the horizon of expectations with regard to the actualization and reception of a work. This article intends to give an account of the internal and external factors which intervene in the act of translating a title (historicity; elliptical and nominal style norms; referential, intratextual, intertextual, paratextual, hypertextual relations; communicative dimension, functions and effects; and socio-cultural aspects). It especially seeks to shed light on the three functions of a title - designative, metalinguistic and seductive (the title as rigid designator or dense texture of meaning, synecdoche or interpretative key, and whetting the reader’s appetite or advertising). If the designative function of a title is oriented to the work as a referential object, the metalinguistic function is oriented to the text as an interpretative object. As for the seductive function, it looks outside the text, or in other words, to the public. In the case of a translation or retranslation of a title, these three functions come into play at the same time, but one function can get the upper hand on the other two. This approach will demonstrate why translators often adopt practices of translation which differ from that of equivalence.

This essay is devoted to an analysis of the semantic significance of a fashionable view of proper names, the Predicate Theory of names (PT), typically developed in the direction of the Metalinguistic Theory of names (MT). According to MT, ‘syntactic evidence supports the conclusion that a name such as ‘Kennedy’ is analyzable in terms of the predicate (general term) ‘individual named ‘Kennedy’’. This analysis is in turn alleged to support a descriptivist treatment of proper names in designative position, presumably in contrast with theories of names as ‘directly referring rigid designators’. The main aim of this essay is that of questioning the significance of PT and MT as theories of designation: even granting for the argument’s sake that names are analyzable as (metalinguistic) predicates, their designative occurrences may be interpreted in consonance with the dictates of Direct Reference—indeed, in consonance with the radically anti-descriptivist version of Direct Reference I call Millianism.

This paper presents an extension of Putnam's account of how substance terms such as ‘water’ and ‘gold’ function and of how a posteriori necessary truths concerning the underlying microstructures of such kinds may be derived. The paper has three aims. (1) I aim to refute a familiar criticism of Putnam's account: that it presupposes what Salmon calls an ‘irredeemably metaphysical, and philosophically controversial, theory of essentialism’. I show how all of the details of Putnam's account—including those that Salmon believes smuggle in such essentialist commitments—can be squared with a rejection of any such essentialist metaphysics. (2) I aim to reveal why Steward is wrong to suppose that, by helping himself to the claim that ‘H2O’ is a rigid designator of a substance, Kripke, too, presupposes something controversially ‘metaphysical’. (3) I aim to show how my proposed account also sidesteps a variety of objections raised by Needham and others who argue that Kripke's and Putnam's accounts of how ‘water’ and...

One reason to think that names have a predicate-type semantic value is that they naturally occur in count-noun positions: ‘The Michaels in my building both lost their keys’; ‘I know one incredibly sharp Cecil and one that's incredibly dull’. Predicativism is the view that names uniformly occur as predicates. Predicativism flies in the face of the widely accepted view that names in argument position are referential, whether that be Millian Referentialism, direct-reference theories, or even Fregean Descriptivism. But names are predicates in all of their occurrences; they are predicates that are true of their bearers. When a name appears as a bare singular in argument position, it really occupies the predicate position of what in this essay is called a denuded definite description: a definite description with an unpronounced definite article. Sloat provided good evidence for this. The definite article is sometimes pronounced with names in the singular: ‘The Ivan we all love doesn't feel well’. Sloat proposed a disjunctive generalization of when the definite article must be pronounced with a singular name. This essay shows that by slightly revising Sloat's generalization, we arrive at a simple, nondisjunctive, syntactic rule that governs the overt appearance of the definite article with singular names. But Ivan does not necessarily bear the name ‘Ivan’, so one might worry that the sentence “Ivan might not have had ‘Ivan’ as a name” would incorrectly be predicted false. This essay shows that Predicativism does not have this consequence by showing that incomplete definite descriptions in general and incomplete denuded descriptions, such as ‘Øthe Ivan’, in particular are rigid designators.

Hendrickson argues that the coarse-grained account of action individuation is unwittingly committed to the metaphysical thesis that all causation is deterministic. I show that the argument does not succeed. On one of the interpretations, all the argument shows is that the minimalists are committed to deterministic causation in a manner of speaking, which is quite compatible with sui generis indeterministic causation. On another, the problem is that minimalism is taken to be committed to a necessary identity claim where the view is only committed to a contingent identity claim. I explore other strategies of saving the argument. In particular, I consider whether the argument will succeed if the designators in question are rigid. I argue that there are principled reasons for thinking that such a strategy must fail. The heyday of the debate on action individuation seems to be over. In fact the debate has satiated philosophical appetites to such an extent that even some participants (notably, Ginet 1990) declared that not much depends on its resolution. Hendrickson (2003) disagrees. He takes the action individuation debate to be significant as it is after all a debate about the nature of action. In his paper, he constructs an interesting novel argument against the coarse-grained theory of action individuation. He argues that the minimalists 1 are unwittingly committed to the metaphysical thesis that all causation is deterministic. Since Hendrickson holds that we should leave room for indeterministic causation, he takes his argument to be a reductio ad absurdum of minimalism. The aim of the paper is to show that Hendrickson’s argument against the coarse-grained account does not succeed. After some conceptual and notational preliminaries (§I) and a brief reminder of the relevant commitments of minimalism (§II), I reconstruct Hendrickson’s argument (§III) and argue that it does not show that minimalism is committed to deterministic causation. Although Hendrickson’s original argument is invalid (see Appendix), it is possible to offer two valid interpretations of the argument. On one of the interpretations (§III.C), all the argument shows is that the minimalist is committed to deterministic causation in a manner of speaking, which is quite compatible with sui generis indeterministic causation. The problem with the other interpretation (§III.B) is that it takes minimalism to be committed to a necessary identity claim where the view is only committed to a contingent identity claim. However, the latter interpretation opens up a possible way of developing Hendrickson’s argument. In §IV, I consider the question whether one could employ the argument against the minimalist if both identity terms are rigid designators, in which case the identity claim would indeed be necessary. I argue, however, that the very set-up of Hendrickson’s argument precludes this sort of response. I. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION One of the problems with understanding Hendrickson’s original argument is that he adopts a rather cumbersome notation. In addition, he adopts conventions which he does not always keep. As a result, the argument as it is laid out in his paper is invalid (see Appendix). In what 1 I will refer to the coarse-grained theorists of action individuation also as “minimalists.” Hendrickson understands “fine-grained” accounts quite broadly as encompassing such views as Goldman’s (1970) maximalism as well as moderationism (e.g. Ginet’s 1990; Thalberg 1972 and 1977; Thompson 1977).

In this study, Kripke's claim, that within the framework of the possible worlds argument, the identification of mental processes by being reduced to physical events doesn't have an imperative base is addressed. Theories of physicalism and identity aims to explain the mental processes in a thoroughly physical way, thus trying to reduce it to the physical one, through brain events. According to Kripke, there must be an imperativeness for the identification of mental states with physical states. According to him, however, it is not possible to show that physical events necessarily reveal mental processes. According to Kripke, in order to be imperatively correct for one statement, it must be correct in all possible worlds. Kripke uses the concept of "rigid designator" to describe this situation. According to Kripke, the thesis of identity between rigid designators must be metaphysically imperative correct. This situation does not apply to mental events. So then, the aim of this article is to reveal why the thesis of identity proposed in the explanation of physical and mental situations in terms of Kripke is not valid.

In this paper I am concerned with the problem of applying the notion of rigidity to general terms. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke has clearly suggested that we should include some general terms among the rigid ones, namely, those common nouns semantically correlated with natural substances, species and phenomena, in general, natural kinds -'water', 'tiger', 'heat'- and some adjectives -'red', 'hot', 'loud'. However, the notion of rigidity has been defined for singular terms; after all, the notion that Kripke has provided us with is the notion of a rigid designator. But general terms do not designate single individuals: rather, they apply to many of them. In sum, the original concept of rigidity cannot be straightforwardly applied to general terms: it has to be somehow redefined in order to make it cover them. As is known, two main positions have been put forward to accomplish that task: the identity of designation conception, according to which a rigid general term is one that designates the same property or kind in all possible worlds, and the essentialist conception, which conceives of a rigid general term as an essentialist one, namely, a term that expresses an essential property of an object. My purpose in the present paper is to defend a particular version of the identity of designation conception: on the proposed approach, a rigid general term will be one that expresses the same property in all possible worlds and names the property it expresses. In my opinion, the position can be established on the basis of an inference to the best explanation of our intuitive interpretation and evaluation, relative to counterfactual circumstances, of statements containing different kinds of general terms, which is strictly analogous to our intuitive interpretation and evaluation, relative to such circumstances, of statements containing different kinds of singular ones. I will argue that it is possible to offer a new solution to the trivialization problem that is thought to threaten all versions of the identity of designation conception of rigidity. Finally, I will also sketch a solution to the so-called 'over-generalization and under-generalization problems', both closely related to the above-mentioned one. Fil: Orlando, Eleonora Eva. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Departamento de Filosofía; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina

Translating the titles of narrative texts is a sui generis operation in the sense that the ontological conditions and the pragmatic functions of the title considerably predetermine the translator’s task. This article intends to give an account of the three functions of a title – designative, metalinguistic and seductive (the title as rigid designator or dense texture of meaning; synecdoche or interpretative key; whetting the appetite or advertising) – that shed light on the pragmatic issues encountered in translating titles. If the designative function of a title is oriented to the work as a referential object, the metalinguistic function is oriented to the text as an interpretive object. As for the seductive function, it turns to the outside, or in other words, to the public. In the case of translation or retranslation of a title, three functions come into play at the same time, but one of the functions can get the upper hand on the other two.

The source, status, and significance of the derivation of the necessity of identity at the beginning of Kripke’s lecture “Identity and Necessity” is discussed from a logical, philosophical, and historical point of view.

Names are rigid designators, but what kind of rigidity do they exhibit? Both “obstinately” and “persistently” rigid designators pick out O at every world at which they pick out anything at all. They differ in that obstinately rigid designators also pick out O at worlds at which O fails to exist; persistently rigid designators have no extension whatsoever at worlds at which O fails to exist. The question whether names are obstinate or persistent arises in two contexts: in arguments against rigidified descriptivism (on the grounds that names and rigidified descriptions exhibit different kinds of rigidity) and in considerations about what it means for an expression to be “directly referential.” This paper contends that names are persistent, not obstinate. The position thus clarifies the relationship between Millian theories of names and rigid designation, in addition to undermining attempts to rehabilitate the modal argument against rigidified descriptivism.