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It is assumed that we recruit cognitive control (i.e., attentional adjustment and/or inhibition) to resolve 2 conflicts at a time, such as driving toward a red traffic light and taking care of a near-by ambulance car. A few studies have addressed this issue by combining a Simon task (that required responding with left or right key-press to a stimulus presented on the left or right side of the screen) with either a Stroop task (that required identifying the color of color words) or a Flanker task (that required identifying the target character among flankers). In most studies, the results revealed no interaction between the conflict tasks. However, these studies include a small stimulus set, and participants might have learned the stimulus-response mappings for each stimulus. Thus, it is possible that participants have more relied on episodic memory than on cognitive control to perform the task. In 5 experiments, we combined the 3 tasks pairwise, and we increased the stimulus set size to circumvent episodic memory contributions. The results revealed an interaction between the conflict tasks: Irrespective of task combination, the congruency effect of 1 task was smaller when the stimulus was incongruent for the other task. This suggests that when 2 conflicts are presented concurrently, the control processes induced by 1 conflict source can affect the control processes induced by the other conflict source. (PsycINFO Database Record

Working memory (WM) is a limited-capacity system requiring an interference-control process to avoid being cluttered from irrelevant information. Recently, it has been suggested that this “housekeeping” mechanism can be attributed to an item-wise removal process serving to actively remove irrelevant information from WM. It has been theorized that this active removal process serves to facilitate both WM maintenance in the face of distraction as well as the updating of outdated information. An alternate view, however, is that interference control in WM relies on an inhibitory process that suppresses the activation of distractors against competing, task-relevant representations. This study is the first to assess the extent to which removal and inhibition represent the same cognitive process. One-hundred and thirty-eight undergraduate students from the University of Western Australia (M = 20.42, SD = 3.09) completed a novel removal task battery in addition to an inhibition task battery. Data were analysed using a hybrid path analytic and structural equation model. The modelling found that there was unique variance associated with the removal latent variable, and estimated that only approximately 9 % of the variance in the removal latent variable could be accounted for by the inhibition tasks, providing tentative support that removal should not be considered a process of cognitive inhibition. The findings support previous claims that removal is an independent WM updating process. The findings are also consistent with a class of computational WM models proposing that removal and inhibition operate on different levels.

When switching tasks, occasionally responding to bivalent stimuli (i.e., stimuli with relevant features for two different tasks) slows performance on subsequent univalent stimuli, even when they do not share relevant features with bivalent stimuli. This performance slowing is labelled the bivalency effect. Here, we investigated whether the bivalency effect results from an orienting response to the infrequent stimuli (i.e., the bivalent stimuli). To this end, we compared the impact of responding to infrequent univalent stimuli to the impact of responding to infrequent bivalent stimuli. For the latter, the results showed a performance slowing for all trials following bivalent stimuli. This indicates a long-lasting bivalency effect, replicating previous findings. For infrequent univalent stimuli, however, the results showed a smaller and shorter-lived performance slowing. These results demonstrate that the bivalency effect does not simply reflect an orienting response to infrequent stimuli. Rather it results from the conflict induced by bivalent stimuli, probably by episodic binding with the more demanding context created by them.

Inhibition is often conceptualized as a unitary construct reflecting the ability to ignore and suppress irrelevant information. At the same time, it has been subdivided into inhibition of prepotent responses (i.e., the ability to stop dominant responses) and resistance to distracter interference (i.e., the ability to ignore distracting information). The present study investigated the unity and diversity of inhibition as a psychometric construct, and tested the hypothesis of an inhibition deficit in older age. We measured inhibition in young and old adults with 11 established laboratory tasks: antisaccade, stop-signal, color Stroop, number Stroop, arrow flanker, letter flanker, Simon, global-local, positive and negative compatibility tasks, and n-2 repetition costs in task switching. In both age groups, the inhibition measures from individual tasks had good reliabilities, but correlated only weakly among each other. Structural equation modeling identified a 2-factor model with factors for inhibition of prepotent responses and resistance to distracter interference. Older adults scored worse in the inhibition of prepotent response, but better in the resistance to distracter interference. However, the model had low explanatory power. Together, these findings call into question inhibition as a psychometric construct and the hypothesis of an inhibition deficit in older age. (PsycINFO Database Record

In the last two decades, individual-differences research has put forward 3 cognitive psychometric constructs: executive control (i.e., the ability to monitor and control ongoing thoughts and actions), working memory capacity (WMC, i.e., the ability to retain access to a limited amount of information in the service of complex tasks), and fluid intelligence (gF, i.e., the ability to reason with novel information). These constructs have been proposed to be closely related, but previous research failed to substantiate a strong correlation between executive control and the other two constructs. This might arise from the difficulty in establishing executive control as a latent variable and from differences in the way the 3 constructs are measured (i.e., executive control is typically measured through reaction times, whereas WMC and gF are measured through accuracy). The purpose of the present study was to overcome these difficulties by measuring executive control through accuracy. Despite good reliabilities of all measures, structural equation modeling identified no coherent factor of executive control. Furthermore, WMC and gF-modeled as distinct but correlated factors-were unrelated to the individual measures of executive control. Hence, measuring executive control through accuracy did not overcome the difficulties of establishing executive control as a latent variable. These findings call into question the existence of executive control as a psychometric construct and the assumption that WMC and gF are closely related to the ability to control ongoing thoughts and actions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Encountering a cognitive conflict not only slows current performance, but it can also affect subsequent performance, in particular when the conflict is induced with bivalent stimuli (i.e., stimuli with relevant features for two different tasks) or with incongruent trials (i.e., stimuli with relevant features for two response alternatives). The post-conflict slowing following bivalent stimuli, called "bivalency effect", affects all subsequent stimuli, irrespective of whether the subsequent stimuli share relevant features with the conflict stimuli. To date, it is unknown whether the conflict induced by incongruent stimuli results in a similar post-conflict slowing. To investigate this, we performed six experiments in which participants switched between two tasks. In one task, incongruent stimuli appeared occasionally; in the other task, stimuli shared no feature with the incongruent trials. The results showed an initial performance slowing that affected all tasks after incongruent trials. On further trials, however, the slowing only affected the task sharing features with the conflict stimuli. Therefore, the post-conflict slowing following incongruent stimuli is first general and then becomes conflict-specific across trials. These findings are discussed within current task switching and cognitive control accounts.