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The centenary of Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathology was recognised in 2013 with the publication of a volume of essays dedicated to his work (edited by Stanghellini and Fuchs). Leading phenomenological-psychopathologists and philosophers of psychiatry examined Jaspers notion of empathic understanding and his declaration that certain schizophrenic phenomena are 'un-understandable'. The consensus reached by the authors was that Jaspers operated with a narrow conception of phenomenology and empathy and that schizophrenic phenomena can be understood through what they variously called second-order and radical empathy. This article offers a critical examination of the second-order empathic stance along phenomenological and ethical lines. It asks: (1) Is second-order empathy (phenomenologically) possible? (2) Is the second-order empathic stance an ethically acceptable attitude towards persons diagnosed with schizophrenia? I argue that second-order empathy is an incoherent method that cannot be realised. Further, the attitude promoted by this method is ethically problematic insofar as the emphasis placed on radical otherness disinvests persons diagnosed with schizophrenia from a fair chance to participate in the public construction of their identity and, hence, to redress traditional symbolic injustices.

Introduction: Cultural congruence is the idea that to the extent a belief or experience is culturally shared it is not to feature in a diagnostic judgement, irrespective of its resemblance to psychiatric pathology. This rests on the argument that since deviation from norms is central to diagnosis, and since what counts as deviation is relative to context, assessing the degree of fit between mental states and cultural norms is crucial. Various problems beset the cultural congruence construct including impoverished definitions of culture as religious, national or ethnic group and of congruence as validation by that group. This article attempts to address these shortcomings to arrive at a cogent construct., Results: The article distinguishes symbolic from phenomenological conceptions of culture, the latter expanded upon through two sources: Husserl's phenomenological analysis of background intentionality and neuropsychological literature on salience. It is argued that culture is not limited to symbolic presuppositions and shapes subjects' experiential dispositions. This conception is deployed to re-examine the meaning of (in)congruence. The main argument is that a significant, since foundational, deviation from culture is not from a value or belief but from culturally-instilled experiential dispositions, in what is salient to an individual in a particular context., Conclusion: Applying the concept of cultural congruence must not be limited to assessing violations of the symbolic order and must consider alignment with or deviations from culturally-instilled experiential dispositions. By virtue of being foundational to a shared experience of the world, such dispositions are more accurate indicators of potential vulnerability. Notwithstanding problems of access and expertise, clinical practice should aim to accommodate this richer meaning of cultural congruence.

Psychiatrists encounter persons from diverse cultures who profess experiences (e.g., communicating with spirits) that evoke intuitions of abnormality. This view might not be shared with the person or her/his cultural peers, raising questions concerning the justification of such intuitions. This article explores three positions relevant to the process of justification. The relativist position transfers powers of judgment to the subject's peers yet neglects individual values and operates with a discredited holistic view of culture. The clinical-ethnographic position remedies this by suspending judgment subject to understanding the individual in a sociocultural context yet finds objections with the universalist-scientific position: objective standards exist and could justify intuitions of abnormality cross-culturally. This article argues that the claim to objectivity is value-laden, reflecting instead a brand of normality and relationship to reality further upheld through epistemological utility and valued technological progress. In conclusion, it is suggested that the clinical-ethnographic position takes personal values and context seriously, both of which are crucial for responsible clinical practice.

A total of 1600 Egyptian school children from primary and preparatory schools aged from 9 to less than 13 years were included in the study. Oral hygiene was assessed in high and low socioeconomic levels among boys and girls using the simplified oral hygiene index simplified (OHI-S) recommended by green and vermillion. The results showed that all children has debris scores (DI-S), the mean (DI-S) increases by age with the exception of age group 12 < 13 years. No significant difference in the mean (DI-S) scores between high and low socioeconomic level. The least scores were reported in low socioeconomic groups of girls. The mean (DI-S) scores were higher in boys than in girls. Calculus was scarce among 9- < 13-years-old children.

The antihypertensive effect of two adrenergic blocking agents (Alprenolol and Propranolol) have been studied in a group of 107 patients with essential hypertension. A significant reduction of 20 mmHg in the systolic blood pressure was recorded for the group using Alprenolol and 25 mmHg in the group using Propranolol. The corresponding decrease of 7-10 mmHg in the diastolic blood pressure for the entire group was also significant. These two drugs may be of therapeutic value in essential hypertension, independently or in combination with other antihypertensive drugs.