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Many governments in developing countries contemplate the possibility of increasing the flexibility of their exchange rates despite having accumulated substantial dollar-denominated debt. Using a model of corporate dollar debt in which the future exchange rate is uncertain, this paper studies the financial risks that might arise as a consequence of increased exchange rate flexibility. Since a firm may default on its debt either because its dollar income is too low or because investors refuse to roll over its debt, the measure of the overall risk of default should take into account both factors, as well as their interaction. Solving the model for the no-default rational expectations equilibrium, we find that a small risk of insolvency may bring about a substantial risk of illiquidity.

This paper analyses the European central bank (ECB) monetary policy over the period 1999–2006, with a special emphasis on the recent years. The first part of the paper underlines the declared goals, decision variables and procedures, as can be inferred from various speeches of Jean-Claude Trichet, the President of the ECB. These statements are then weighted against the data, mainly through estimates of possible ECB interest rate rules. While in many respects the bank has performed reasonably well, several issues may be raised, mainly because the inflation objective has not been reached during the last period and monetary developments are not in line with economic stability. Policy recommendations follow, built on a renewed monetarist tradition: the reduction of the weight of real activity in the conduct of monetary policy, while further emphasising money via a money growth intermediate target.

This paper analyses data collected in 2012 and 2013 at the ESSEC Business School from Kallystée, a proprietary mass-attendance business game. Company boards are simulated by groups of five students selected at random. We manipulate the gender composition of the management teams to allow for all possible gender combinations. We show that all-men and mixed teams with four women perform significantly better than all-women teams. However, when controlling for the average tolerance to risk of the teams, the performance advantage of all-men teams vanishes, while the “residual” economic performance of mixed-gender teams with a majority of women is still positive and strong. Further analysis of “actual” risk-taking behavior shows that in these mixed-gender teams a “risk shift” mechanism is at play, as they take risks beyond what their total tolerance to risk as a group would suggest.

The paper reports results from an Ultimatum Game experiment with asymmetric information where Proposers can send to Responders misleading information about their endowment. We allow for all possible gender combinations in the Proposer-Responder pairs. Proposer messages that underestimate the actual amount are quite widespread. The frequency of lying is slightly higher in mixed groups. Conditional on lying, men tend to state bigger lies than women. On the other hand, women tend to tell smaller lies when paired with men, than when paired with women. In general, women present higher acceptance rates than men.

International audience; We design an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (i.e., to pledge) increases their actual donation. Individuals’ endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely, private, public and irrevocable, which differ in terms of the cost to the individual for not keeping the promise. We show that in absence of endowment uncertainty, private and public pledges are associated with lower donations as compared to donations in the no-pledge case: private pledges slightly reduce donations and public pledges reduce them more significantly. Donations increase with uncertainty (in terms of increased endowment dispersion) for both private and public pledge situations, although donations with private pledges remain higher than donations with public pledge.

This paper analyses data collected in 2012 and 2013 at the ESSEC Business School from Kallystee, a proprietary mass-attendance business game. Company boards are simulated by groups of five students selected at random. We manipulate the gender composition of the management teams to allow for all possible gender combinations. We show that all-men and mixed teams with four women perform significantly better than all-women teams. However, when controlling for the average tolerance to risk of the teams, the performance advantage of all-men teams vanishes, while the “residual” economic performance of mixed-gender teams with a majority of women is still positive and strong. Further analysis of “actual” risk-taking behavior shows that in these mixed-gender teams a “risk shift” mechanism is at play, as they take risks beyond what their total tolerance to risk as a group would suggest.

This paper reports results from a three-player variant of the ultimatum game in which the Proposer can delegate to a third party his decision regarding how to share his endowment with a Responder with a standard veto right. However, the Responder cannot verify whether the delegation is effective or the third party merely plays a “scapegoat” role, while the decision is made by the Proposer himself. In this uncertain attribution setting, the Proposer can send an unverifiable message declaring his delegation strategy. One possible strategy is “false delegation”, in which the Proposer makes the decision but claims to have delegated it. In our sample, the recourse to false delegation is significant, and a significant number of potential Delegates accept serving in the scapegoat role. However, there are many honest Proposers, and 20% of all Delegates will refuse to be the accomplices of a dishonest Proposer. Responders tend to more readily accept poor offers in a setup that permits lying about delegation; the acceptance rate of the poor offer is the highest when Delegates can refuse the scapegoat role.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, European governments adopted a hands‐off policy towards the defence industrial base, in an attempt to increase the sector’s efficiency and reactivity. In this context, one topical issue is how to motivate defence firms to apply for private rather than public finance. Since banks have no prior experience with European defence firms, a problem of asymmetric information may block this transition. The problem is analysed within the framework of a game between defence firms and banks. It is shown that the Bayesian Equilibrium might correspond to a situation where low‐risk firms prefer the state‐financed scheme; yet, in a perfect information set‐up, the same firms would apply for bank credit. In order to facilitate the transition to private finance, the government might decide to subsidize investors who agree on financing defence firms; the state aid should be made available during a transitory learning period. *This research has benefited from the financial support of the Obs...

A la fin des annees 90, de nombreuses economies en voie de developpement presentaient un important endettement en dollars. Dans ce contexte, l’adoption d’un regime de flottement pur constitue-t-il un choix economiquement raisonnable? Nous proposons un modele dans lequel des generations successives de preteurs internationaux doivent decider s’ils souscrivent ou non aux emissions en dollars d’une firme du secteur prive. En regime de changes flexibles, les fluctuations du cours de la monnaie nationale influencent la valeur des dettes en dollars et induisent un risque d’insolvabilite. Nous montrons alors que ce risque d’insolvabilite, d’ordre de grandeur negligeable a priori, induit en revanche un tres fort risque d’illiquidite. Pour eviter ce risque, une firme produisant un bien destine au seul marche domestique devrait renoncer a quasiment tout financement en monnaie internationale.

This paper analyzes the production of fundamental research as a coordination game played by scholars. In the model, scholars decide to adopt a new idea only if they believe that a critical mass of peers is following a similar research strategy. If researchers observe only a noisy idiosyncratic signal of the true scientifi…c potential of a new idea, we show that the game presents a single threshold equilibrium. In this environment, fundamental research proceeds with large structural breaks followed by long periods of time in which new ideas are unsuccessful. The likelihood of a new idea emerging depends on various parameters, including the rewards of working in the old paradigm, the critical mass of researchers required to create a new school of thought and scholars’ ability to properly assess the scientifi…c value of new ideas.

During the US Internet bubble (1995-2001), several top executives dismissed both the law and ethical norms transferring large chunks of company wealth into their own hands. This paper investigates the key economic factors that brought about the proliferation of dishonest managerial behaviour, focussing on the weak internal control, perverse incentives related to managers' compensation schemes and conflicts of interest in the banking and auditing sectors. In order to prevent further abuses, the US administration imposed several regulatory changes, mainly through the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002; we argue why some of its provisions might be taken one step further.

This paper presents estimates of the European Central Bank (ECB)'s interest rate rule using monthly data for the period of the Willem F. Duisenberg presidency (from January 1999 to October 2003). Our results show that, like the US Federal Reserve, the ECB appears to be concerned with fluctuations in economic activity. It increases its short-term interest rate if inflation deviates from target, this reaction being stronger if based on future inflation and weaker if based on current inflation. The seemingly soft response to current inflation derives from a concern for exchange rate stability and may reflect the Bank's forecast of future inflation. The ECB also appears to smooth its interventions in the money market.

Sometimes homogenous goods trade at different prices and some other times different qualities trade at the same price. This paper analyses such deviations from the “Law of One Quality–One Price” within the framework of an equilibrium search model. On the supply side, firms decide on both the price and the complexity index of a unit good. On the demand side, consumers search for the best offer in a sequential way. By assumption, only some “expert” consumers need the new feature incorporated into the complex item. In equilibrium, consumers’ searching strategy and firms’ price–quality optimal choice are mutually consistent. Non-degenerated equilibrium price and/or quality distributions emerge, in keeping with the proportion of expert consumers in total consumer population.

According to a well-established economic principle, any public debt that does not exceed the discounted stream of future primary surpluses should find buyers. This paper argues why this principle may not hold if the government has only imperfect control over its net income flow. A small risk of unsustainability appears to be at the origin of a much larger risk of illiquidity. Solving the model for the rational expectations equilibrium, we find that the maximum debt level that investors are willing to hold may be much lower than the commonly used sustainable level.

Euro candidates are expected to maintain the value of their currency within the fluctuation band of the new exchange rate mechanism for at least two years. This paper highlights some unpleasant macroeconomic effects that could occur during this interval. The problem is cast as a two-stage sequential game between private agents and the government of the applicant country. The policy-maker decides whether to devaluate the domestic currency or not at two distinct dates; it makes a last choice just before accession to the monetary union. Under an assumption of incomplete information of private agents about the government's priorities on inflation and economic activity, the game presents a hybrid perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In the pooling configuration, an initial policy of zero devaluation does not signal the final devaluation decision. As private agents cannot completely rule out the risk of a ‘last devaluation’, a premium adds to interest rates and entails a systematic output loss.

In the late eighties, many developing countries followed the example of the most advanced countries and opened their capital account (K.A.) in an attempt to reap new gains from increased integration with the world economy. Currently, after the wave of financial and currency crises that hurt the global economy over the last decade, enthusiasm about K.A. liberalization has greatly faded. First, the relationship between development and capital account liberalization did not come out to be as solid as initially expected; second, the greater capital mobility has brought about new forms of financial instability. This paper points to some risks that might be associated with undifferentiated deregulation of international movements of capital in connection with developing economies. It argues in favor of proper sequencing: liberalization should proceed in parallel with progress when it comes to macroeconomic stability, building market competition and the creation of a sound, internal financial system. A separate section analyzes this issue in the special context of transition economies.

To various degrees, Central and Eastern European countries increased their participation to the world economy over the last ten years. In particular, they accepted the challenge of trade openness and attracted significant foreign direct investment. This paper assesses the impact of these major changes on output growth in this region. Results of a panel data analysis suggest that increased EU integration and openness as well as reduced import duties were favourable to development. There is also evidence that increased FDI inflows may be associated with better output performances. Comparative Economic Studies (2002) 44, 119–136; doi:10.1057/ces.2002.22

The possibility of facing dishonest local managers is an important factor explaining foreigners’ hesitations about investing in developing countries. The first part of the paper analyses the optimal decision rule of a manager who is able to transfer into his own hands a part of the output of the firm. It is shown that in a two-period framework with incomplete information about the nature of the manager, a rational expectations equilibrium exists where managers’ behaviour and investors’ expectations are mutually consistent. In particular, some young managers may aim at building a reputation of an honest person, then behave dishonestly when getting old. The global performance of an economy hosting a large number of managers is investigated in the second part of the paper, where analysis is cast in an overlapping generation framework. The frequency of dishonest managers, development prospects and global profitability appear to depend on the duration of the relationship between investors and managers.

In the model, a group of investors are invited to participate to a high-yield collective project. The project succeeds only if a minimum participation rate is reached. Before taking their decision, investors receive a vague statement about the outcome of a past investment decision. If investors believe that the message has an impact on the beliefs of the others, the problem can be analyzed as a typical global game and would present a threshold equilibrium. If not, in theory both an equilibrium where all invest and an equilibrium where no one invests can occur. In a Lab experiment, a large number of subjects adopt switching strategies consistent with the threshold equilibrium and appear to respond to the orientation of the message. Insights apply to contagion and market manipulation episodes.

This paper develops a simple model showing how banks can increase the access to finance of small, risky firms by mitigating coordination problems among investors. If investors observe a biased signal about the true implementation cost of real sector projects, the model can be solved for a switching equilibrium in the classical global games approach. We show that the socially optimal interest rate that maximizes the probability of success of the firm is higher than the risk-free rate. Yet if banks maximize investors' expected return, they would choose an interest higher than the socially optimal one. This gives rise to a form of credit rationing, which stems from the funding constraints of the banks., Nous étudions le financement des PME par les banques dans un modèle de type "global games". Il apparait que le taux d'intérêt d'équilibre dans une économie décentralisée avec secteur bancaire concurrentiel est supérieur au taux d'intérêt qui assure le plus grand taux de réussite des projets.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, European citizens shared the belief according to which an economically integrated Europe would prevent European peoples from fighting each other again. If this argument still remains valid, many younger European citizens, who did not go through the war atrocity, are supporting the European project insofar as it associated to an image of modernity, openness, and, ultimately, higher living standards.

Experience shows that developing countries or regions that vary little with respect to their fundamentals sometimes follow different growth paths. Such puzzling facts may occur if less informed international investors imitate those who are well informed about profit opportunities instead of acquiring the relevant information themselves. This paper analyses how the type of mimetic behaviour influences the development pattern of an economy where the lack of infrastructure is the main constraint on development. Possible outcomes may be stationary growth, divergent growth or cycles in development.

Voucher privatization implies a significant wealth transfer from state to private agents who, in turn, would increase consumption. This paper investigates the consequences of this wealth effect on the macroeconomic equilibrium in a high unemployment economy. The model builds on a two-stage sequential game between the government and private agents. We verify the existence of a pooling equilibrium in which private agents cannot guess whether a policy of fast privatization will be continued in the future or not. This configuration presents an endogenous probability of privatization slowdown; as a consequence, the wealth effect is moderated and the genuine fast privatizer government bears an “undue” credibility cost in terms of employment

This paper develops two stylised models of the transition economy that challenge, to some extent, the conventional approach to policy reforms. In the first model, the absence of market-oriented institutions is responsible for the occurrence of a non-cooperative equilibrium, where the amount of public services provided by the state is too low, which, in turn, adversely affects the global performance of the economy. In the second model, a benevolent government will choose a taxation level that pushes too many firms out of the market; hence global supply falls below its optimal level. In both models, disruptions specific to transitional systems lead to abnormal responses to standard fiscal policy.

This paper aims to provide a simple trade union model which highlights some of the distinctive institutional features of French unionism. The model focuses on the determinants of militancy and membership in a frictionless economy. It brings into the picture three types of agents and their specific behaviour: firms accept to pay a premium in order to avoid strikes, individuals participate in the union in order to maximise their expected income and union leadership seeks to maximise his/her net personal gain. By adapting militancy—broadly defined as hard stance during the annual wage bargaining—the union leader may achieve a unionisation rate consistent with his/her own objectives. It is shown that a non-Walrasian labour market equilibrium exists wherein real wages, employment, union size and militancy are jointly determined. In comparative statics, the model predicts a negative relationship between militancy and membership; recent evolutions of the main French union confederations tend to support this conclusion.

We investigate the dynamics of cooperation in public good games when contributions to the public good are immediately redistributed across contributors (intra-temporal transfers) and when contributions to the public good by the current group are transferred over time to a future group (inter-temporal transfers). We show that people are more cooperative in inter-temporal contexts than in intra-temporal contexts. We also find that subjects invest more on average in public goods when they know in advance their inheritance from the past., Nous étudions un jeu du bien public avec transferts inter temporels. Les résultats indiquent une forme d'altruisme intergénérationnel.

This paper reports the results from a real-effort team production experiment, where best performers can impose either tacit or explicit sanctions on their less-performing partners. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs from one condition to another. When explicit sanctions are not allowed, good performers reduce their effort in response to the advantageous difference in scores; when they can impose sanctions, their change in effort is no longer related to the difference in scores. To some extent, a mechanism of explicit sanctions allows good performers to focus on their own performance. Not sanctioning an opponent who under-performs, what we refer to as forgiveness, prompts the latter to improve his performance, but applying the sanction has a stronger effect., L'article propose une étude expérimentale appliquée au problème du travail d'équipe. La tache consiste à compter le nombre d'occurrences du chiffre 7 dans des blocs de chiffre. Les équipes sont composées de deux joueurs. A chaque tour, le joueur qui fait le meilleur score peut appliquer une sanction à l'autre. Nous étudions les stratégies et les comportements des deux joueurs, dans une interaction qui dure quatre tours.

International audience; Gladiatorial combat was in reality a lot less lethal than it is depicted in the cinema. This short paper highlights how cooperative strategies could have prevailed in the arenas, which is generally what happened during the Games. Cooperation in the arena corresponded to a situation of the professionalization of gladiators, who been trained in gladiatorial schools. This case provides an analogy of the conditions under which cooperation occurs in a context of competition between rival companies.

Economic profit is produced by entrepreneurs, those special individuals able to detect and seize as yet unexploited market opportunities. In general capitalist firms manage to deliver positive profits even in the most competitive environments. They can do so thanks to internal entrepreneurs, a subset of their employees able to drive change and develop innovation in the workplace. This paper argues that the goal of profit maximization is fully consistent with the corporation doing good for society. However, there is little justification for corporations to transfer the whole economic profit to shareholders. Economic agents entitled to receive the economic profit are precisely those who create this profit, namely the internal entrepreneurs.

This policy paper aims at presenting the key facts related to the Euro sovereign debt crisis that occurred in the interval 2010-2012. It points out some main coordination failures that are at the origin of the crisis, and comments on the effectiveness of various stabilization measures undertook by governments and the EU institutions.

This paper analyzes how faculty members dynamically allocate their efforts between improving their research and teaching skills, taking into account the organizational structures and incentives implemented by academic institutions. The model builds on the assumption that organizational structures have an impact on the nature of spillover effects between teaching and research competencies. We analyze the dynamic equilibrium under unilateral and bilateral spillovers, using the no-spillover case as a benchmark. The bilateral spillover case is the most appealing as it achieves the highest overall performance; however, the nature of the equilibrium and the career paths can be quite different depending on the parameters of the problem such as the obsolescence of competencies or the strength of the spillover effect. This finding provides interesting insights on what could be the most productive configuration of a higher education institution.

This paper proposes a two-country model of migration in a transferable skill sector, where workers’ education is provided free of charge by governments. We study firstly the non-cooperative equilibrium where the poor country decides on the education level and the rich country decides on the quota of skilled migrants. Additional migration raises earnings prospects in the source country and attracts more talented people to that profession, what we refer to as the sector-specific brain gain effect. This game presents a single stable equilibrium with positive migration. Compared to the cooperative equilibrium, in the non-cooperative equilibrium the poor country systematically under-invests in education. Whether migration is too strong or too weak depends on the size of the brain gain effect. Furthermore, the size of the welfare gain to be reaped by moving from non-cooperative to the cooperative organization of migration also depends on the strength of the sector-specific brain gain.

Le riforme verso l’economia di mercato, poste in essere nei Paesi ex-socialisti dell’Europa Centrale e Orientale, comportano dei costi, sia in termini di disoccupazione, sia in termini di alti tassi di inflazione, soprattutto all’inizio della fase di transizione. Inoltre, nelle economie in transizione, la mancanza di esperienza di mercato implica una struttura imperfetta delle informazioni ed un alto grado di incertezza economica. Nell’analisi dei fattori strutturali che incidono sull’occupazione nelle economie in transizione, assume rilievo la distinzione di due settori principali dell’economia: il settore statale, costituito dalle imprese ex-socialiste, ed il settore privato, formato dalle nuove piccole e medie imprese emergenti. Il livello dell’occupazione si determina attraverso una contrattazione tra i lavoratori e i proprietari. Dato che il tasso di inflazione decresce al diminuire del potere contrattuale dei lavoratori, le privatizzazioni dovrebbero determinare un più basso tasso di inflazione. Questi fatti portano a concludere che le privatizzazioni e la lotta all’inflazione sono obiettivi compatibili.

Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game involving informed proposers and uninformed responders, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about their endowment. If there are some intrinsically honest proposers, a simple message game shows that the rest of them are likely to declare a lower-than-actual endowment to the responders. In the second part of the paper, we report on an experiment testing this game. On average, 88.5% of the proposers understate the actual endowment by 20.5%. Regression analysis shows that a one-dollar gap between the actual and declared amounts prompts proposers to reduce their offer by 19 cents. However, responders appear not to take such claims seriously, and thus the frequency of rejections should increase. The consequence is a net welfare loss, that is specific to such a "free-to-lie" environment.

Humans can lie strategically in order to leverage on their negotiation power. For instance, governments can claim that a "scapegoat" third party is responsible for reforms that impose higher costs on citizens, in order to make the pill sweeter. This paper analyzes such communication strategy within a variant of the ultimatum game. The first player gets an endowment, and the second player can impose a tax on it. The former can reject the allocation submitted by the tax-setter. A third party is then allowed to levy its own tax, and its intake is private information to the tax-setter. In a frameless experiment, 65% of the subjects in the tax-setter role overstate the tax levied by the third party in order to manipulate taxpayer's expectations and submit less advantageous offers; on average, for every additional currency unit of lie, measured by the gap between the claimed and the actual tax, they would reduce their offer by 0.43 currency units.

Les jeux de gladiateurs ont constitué un élément majeur sous l’influence romaine et ce jusqu’à la fin du IVe siècle. L’organisation de ces jeux provoquait un coût considérable et les gladiateurs étaient eux-mêmes pour une bonne partie des professionnels issus d’écoles de gladiature qu’il fallait entretenir. Le recouvrement de l’ensemble de ces coûts était assuré par les Magistrats qui les organisaient. Pour attirer les spectateurs, la qualité du spectacle était indispensable. De ce point de vue, la personne clé dans la perpétration des jeux était le Président qui arbitrait les affrontements. Par le pouvoir de sanction qui lui était conféré sur la vie ou la mort des combattants, il exerçait une incitation à la qualité du spectacle. Gladiator games constituted a major element under roman influence, which lingered on until the fourth century AD. The organization of these games was very expensive, and gladiators were to a large extent professionals, trained in gladiator schools. The overall costs were covered by fees paid by the Roman Magistrates who organized these shows. In order to attract them, the quality of the show was essential. From this point of view, the key person in the process of preparation of the show was the President who was granted the right to decide over life and death of the defeated gladiator. The judge’s strategy had a major impact on the quality of the show.

When governments loose investors' confidence, additional public spending and the resulting increase in public debt would push-up risk-adjusted interest rates in a more aggressive way. A regression model on a panel of 26 EU countries over the period 1996-2011 shows that a 10 percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is connected to a slowdown in annual growth rates of 0.28 percentage point. Furthermore, the effectiveness of fiscal spending is adversely affected by the amount of public debt; for a debt-to-GDP ratio above 150% the impact on growth of the fiscal stimulus turns negative.

Like all human beings, migrants may have a concern about their prestige or social status in the eyes of left home family and friends. They can remit money in order to signal their economic success and increase their status. We show that, if migrants' income is private information, unsuccessful migrants might accept a worsening of their living conditions and send back home large amounts of remittances only in order to make residents believe that they are successful. In some cases, successful migrants can signal their true favorable economic situation by remitting an even larger amount., L'article étudie les transferts des migrants en tant que moyen pour signaler leur situation économique aux yeux des résidents. En information imparfaite, les migrants pauvres peuvent transférer plus que normal, pour se faire passer pour des migrants ayant réussi. Les migrants riches peuvent adopter des stratégies de signalisation plus agressives encore.

Many observers argue that the abnormal accumulation of risk by banks has been one of the major causes of the 2007-2009 financial turmoil. But what could have pushed banks to engage in such a risk race? The answer brought by this paper builds on the classical signaling model by Spence. If banks' returns can be observed while risk cannot, less efficient banks can hide their type by taking more risks and paying the same returns as the efficient banks. The latter can signal themselves by taking even higher risks and delivering bigger returns. The game presents several equilibria that are all characterized by excessive risk taking as compared to the perfect information case., L'article explique l'accumulation excessive de risque par les banques avan la crise de 2007-2009 par un mecanisme de signalisation en information imparfaite.

The coexistence of a predominantly poor opinion of free markets and lack of education in economics are two documented features of France. In this paper, we use data collected through an Internet-based survey conducted in December 2009 in order to test whether this situation is more than a mere coincidence. A first regression model allows us to study how personal characteristics, general and economics education, occupation and personal interest in economics affect knowledge in economics. We then apply factor analysis in order to build an aggregate indicator of opinion on promarket reforms. This opinion indicator becomes the dependent variable in a second multiple regression model; it turns out that knowledge in economics contributes by 3.5% to explain the favorable opinion on pro-market reforms.

Given the myriad of journal titles in economics and business administration, scholars can sometimes target the wrong journal. This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic publications that brings into the picture this type of informational friction. The key modelling device is a paper-tojournal matching function, similar to the matching function traditional in labor economics. An equilibrium is defined as a situation where both editors and authors implement their optimal publication strategies. The model is then solved for the equilibrium submission fee, desk rejection rate and ratio between the number of editors and the number of authors., L'article propose un modèle d'appariement pour étudier le fonctionnement du marché des publications académiques. Il permet d'analyse le phénomène de "desk-rejection" et propose une explication pour la montée en puissance de droits de soumission d'articles.

This paper analyzes international migration when migrants invest part of their income in their country of origin. We show that a non-total migratory equilibrium exists. Exogenous shocks, such as an increase in migrant income, lead to an increase in optimal invested remittances per migrant, and a higher wage in the country of origin. Yet the net effect on the equilibrium number of migrants is positive. Hence, in equilibrium, emigrants' optimal invested remittances and number of migrants are positively related. We use data from twenty five countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in 2000 to test for this implication of our model. OLS and bootstrap estimates reveal a positive elasticity of the number of migrants with respect to estimated invested remittances per migrant in the range of [0.3; 0.7].

This paper shows that if a very small, exogenously given probability of terminating the exchange is introduced in an elementary investment game, more reciprocators will choose the defection strategy. Everything happens as if they “hide behind probabilities” in order to break the trust relationship. Investors do not alter their behavior in a significant way, at least not for a very small external risk. Financial assets all come with a predetermined and contractual probability that by the time when the buyer has to receive the reward for his investment, “bad luck” might have brought the asset value down to zero. In the light of the experimental findings, such trades would not provide a favorable environment for building trust.

The dominant approach to monetary policy builds on simple linear policy rules, assumed to describe the systematic response of central banks to various shocks. The last financial crisis has shown that in difficult times central banks follow more sophisticated strategies. We argue in this paper that such responses can be defined as optimal responses of the policymaker and not as deviations from a simple linear rule. For so doing, we propose an alternative approach inspired by the financial management literature. The central bank is represented as a portfolio manager that gears the policy instrument in order to achieve multiple policy goals in a stochastic continuous-time setting. Possible asymmetries in the reaction function are considered, translated in the form of calls and puts. The optimization program solution is interpreted in the light of the principles governing the portfolio manager optimal behavior. A novel result is also provided as to the necessity to incorporate the stock price stabilization term in the central bank decision rule.

Subject to a huge and growing number of journal titles in business and economics, scholars sometimes target the wrong journal. Editors resort more and more to paper pre-screening, and desk reject those that do not fit well to the editorial line. This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic publications that brings into the picture these matching frictions. The key modelling device is a paperjournal matching function, similar to the matching function traditional in labor economics. Our main endogenous variables are the submission fee and the tension in the publication market, itself directly related to the number of journal titles., De plus en plus souvent les éditeurs de revues académiques procèdent à une vérification préalable des articles soumis et rejettent d'office ceux qui ne correspondent pas à la ligne éditoriale de leur revue. Nous étudions ce phénomène nouveau à l'aide d'un modèle d'appariement, inspiré des travaux en économie du travail.

The main driving force of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was a rapid deterioration of the trust of private agents in the quality of financial institutions. In turn, this loss of confidence entailed the collapse of several key asset markets and a sharp decline in the other asset prices. This paper surveys the critical moments of the crisis, puts forward some of the shock amplifying mechanisms and comments on the effectiveness of various policy measures. The conclusion opens the debate on what structural changes in the existing financial architecture are required to contain such crises in the future., L'article retrace les moments critiques de la crise financière 2007-2009, etudie les mecanismes de propagation des chocs, evalue les politiques économiques mises en oeuvre pour faire face à cettre crise.

This paper analyzes international migrations when migrants invest part of their income in their origin country. This investment contributes to increase capital intensity and wages in the origin country, thus reducing the scope for migrating. We show that a non-total migratory equilibrium can exist if the foreign wage is not too high, and/or migratory and transfer costs are not too low. Exogenous shocks, such as an increase in the foreign wage, lead to an increase in optimal remittances per migrant, and a higher wage in the origin country. Yet the net effect on the equilibrium number of migrants is positive. Hence, in equilibrium, optimal remittances and number of migrants are positively related. We use data from twenty five countries from Eastern Europe and Central Asia in 2000 in order to test for this implication of our model. OLS and bootstrap estimates put forward a positive elasticity of the number of migrants with respect to remittances per migrant. Policy implications follow., L'article étudie la migration économique dans le cadre d'un modèle où les migrants peuvent investir une partie de leur épargne dans le pays d'origine. En particulier, un équilibre avec migration partielle est faisable. Dans ce cas, on démontre et teste empiriquement une relation positive entre nombre de migrants et le montant du transfert par migrant.

ED EPS; This paper analyzes the interaction between migrants income and remittances and between remittancesand the labor supply of residents. The model is cast as a two-period game with imperfect informationabout the residents' real economic situation. Residents subject to a good economic situation may behave as if they were in a poor economic situation only in order to manipulate remitters' expectations. The latter, being aware of this risk, reduce the remitted amount accordingly. Therefore, in the equilibrium, residents who really are victims of the bad economic outlook, are penalized as compared to the perfect information set-up. In some circumstances, they can signal their type by drastically cutting working hours, thus further enhancing their precarity right when their economic situation is the worst.

This paper analyzes the decision of a migrant to return or stay within the framework of a signaling model withexogenous migratory costs. If employers have only imperfect information about the type of a worker and goodworkers migrate, bad workers might copy their strategy in order to get the same high wage as the good workers.Employers will therefore reduce the wage they pay to migrants and good workers incur a loss compared to theperfect information setup. In one hybrid equilibrium of the game, the more bad workers migrate, the higher theincentive for good workers to come back. Policy implications follow.