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The main objective of this article is to understand Hegelian understanding of freedom through a comparison of its Kantian counterpart. I set up this investigation with a consideration of the debate between liberals and communitarians. In the history of political thought, many political thinkers have been occupied by the questions about the priority of right over good and of universal over particular. In order to answer these questions, one needs to have a clear conception of freedom since the claims of freedom and equality are universally accepted political values which should reflect our political institutions contextually. To accomplish this task, first, I will introduce a brief account of Kant’s idea of freedom. It is crucial to know Kantian idea of freedom and how this idea reflects to his political philosophy to understand Hegel’s emphasis on ethical order and particularly state institutions. Second, I will give a brief account of Hegel’s idea of freedom by giving references to his book titled Philosophy of Right. Third, I will introduce two major criticisms that Hegel poses to the Kantian idea of freedom. Finally, I will introduce how Hegel tries to overcome the problems of Kantian idea of freedom through the dialectical construction of the concepts of spirit, freedom and ethnical order. Bu makalenin esas amacı, Kant ve Hegel’in özgürlük anlayışları karşılaştırmalı olarak analiz etmektir. Bu analiz toplum ve birey arasındaki ilişkiyi liberal ve komüniteryan perspektiflerin arasındaki tartışma dikkate alınarak kurgulanmıştır. Siyasal düşünce tarihinde, birçok düşünür, “haklar ile iyi hayatın” ve “evrensel ile pratiğin” arasında seçim yapmak zorunda kalmış ve bu ikilikler arasında hangisinin önceliği olduğu hakkında çözülmesi bir hayli zor sorularla meşgul olmuştur. Bu sorulara cevap verebilmek için, özgürlük anlayışının kesin hatlarla çizilmesi gerekir çünkü özgürlük ve eşitlik siyasi kurumlarımızı yansıması gereken normatif ve evrensel değerlerdir. Bu makalede, ilk olarak, Hegel'in etik düzene ve özellikle devlet kurumlarına yaptığı vurguyu anlamak için Kantçı özgürlük anlayışını ve bunun siyaset felsefesine nasıl yansıdığını bilmek gerektiğinden, Kant’ın özgürlük fikrinin kısa bir açıklamasını sunacağım. İkinci olarak, Hegel’in özgürlük anlayışı Hukuk Felsefesi kitabından atıfla anlatılacaktır. Üçüncü olarak, Hegel'in Kantçı özgürlük fikrine sunduğu iki büyük eleştiri tartışılacaktır. Son olarak, Hegel'in Kantçı özgürlük anlayışının yol açtığı temel eleştirileri; ruh, özgürlük ve etik düzen kavramlarının diyalektik inşası yoluyla nasıl aşmaya çalıştığı gösterilecektir.

This paper explores Whitehead’s concept of law as an immanent order, arguing that it can be successfully used to cover the whole semantic field denoted as ‘law’, and especially law in its juridical sense. After showing the features that make it more plausible and more desirable than the opposing view of law as a transcendent imposition, law will be defined as the expression of the modes of existence of individuals within their environment. It will then be tested as a key for understanding the link between life and law and showing the inadequacy of Foucault and Agamben’s biopolitical reflections: if law is an immanent order, then life is identical with its own inherent normativity. Finally, drawing on Deleuze’s philosophy of right, the fundamental features of an immanent practice of law, a “speculative jurisprudence” which confirms the binding between law, life, and immanence, will be sketched as a proposal for a practical philosophy consistent with Whitehead’s process cosmology., Questo testo esplora il concetto di legge come ordine immanente elaborato da Whitehead, sostenendo che esso possa essere usato per coprire l’intero campo semantico denotato dalla parola ‘legge’, e in particolare la sua accezione giuridica. Dopo aver illustrato le caratteristiche che lo rendono più plausibile e desiderabile dell’opposta concezione della legge come un’imposizione trascendente, la legge sarà definita come l’espressione del modo d’esistenza degli individui all’interno del loro ambiente. Questo concetto sarà poi testato come chiave per comprendere il legame tra vita e diritto, e mostrare l’inadeguatezza delle riflessioni biopolitiche di Foucault e Agamben: se la legge è un ordine immanente, allora la vita dev’essere identica alla propria normatività inerente. Infine, anche attraverso la filosofia del diritto di Deleuze, si delineeranno le caratteristiche fondamentali di una pratica immanente del diritto, una “giurisprudenza speculativa” che reintegri il diritto la legge e la vita all’immanenza, come proposta per una filosofia pratica coerente con la cosmologia processuale di Whitehead.

Resumen En este artículo defiendo la postura según la cual el republicanismo -en comparación con otras nociones o motivos centrales- no se ha interpretado como uno de los rasgos que caracteriza a la filosofía jurídica y política de Kant como un todo. Una posible razón es que el republicanismo kantiano no ha ocupado un lugar destacado dentro de las narrativas republicanas, ya sea históricas o sistemáticas, que son más dominantes en las discusiones contemporáneas. A mi parecer, esto es así porque hay características innovadoras en la empresa republicana kantiana que se encuentran en tensión con otros proyectos republicanos de otra índole. Aquí discuto algunos de los rasgos distintivos del proyecto de Kant en lo que atañe a concepciones suyas sobre el estado de derecho, la ciudadanía, la autoridad política, la libertad de expresión y el derecho internacional, con el fin de señalar que estas son parte integral de una teoría política y legal que todavía es atractiva y sugerente. Abstract In this paper, I defend the stance that republicanism -in comparison to other central notions- has not been interpreted as one of the main traits that characterize Kant’s legal and political philosophy. A plausible reason for this is that Kantian republicanism has not occupied a prominent place in the republican narratives, historiographical or systematic, that are dominant in contemporary discussions. To my mind, the reason for this is that some innovative characteristics in the Kantian republican enterprise are at odds with other republican philosophical projects. Here I discuss some distinctive traits of Kant’s project regarding his conceptions of the rule of law, citizenship, political authority, free speech, and international law with the aim of showing that they are an integral part of a political and legal theory that is still attractive and compelling.

Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (PhR) can be analyzed whether independently from the Science of Logic or on the basis of the metaphysical premises developed in the latter work. In the present paper we enumerate different positions about this question, and we classify a number of attempts which were recently carried out in order to actualize the PhR. the differentiation of five levels of analysis of the articulation of the ethical and the logical in the PhR allows us to conclude that both the thesis on the dependence and the thesis of the independence can be compatible, since they refer to different levels of analysis. La Filosofía del Derecho (PhR) de Hegel puede ser analizada, o bien con independencia de la Ciencia de la Lógica, o bien en base a las premisas metafísicas desarrolladas en esta última obra. en el presente artículo se enumeran las diferentes posiciones sobre esta cuestión y se agrupan los diversos intentos que en los últimos a.os se han llevado a cabo para actualizar la PhR. La distinción de cinco niveles de análisis de la articulación entre lo ético y lo lógico en la PhR nos permite concluir que tanto la tesis de la dependencia como la tesis de la independencia pueden ser compatibles entre sí dado que refieren a niveles distintos de análisis.

This paper intends to answer the question ¿What is Hegel’s Philosophy of right? In this book Hegel studies the fundamental concepts of modern philosophy, removing its metaphysicalabstract character in order to expose them from the current concrete historical content point of view. The paper concludes that the promising and progressive modern philosophy concepts are self-dissolutive and self-denying. Then, they lose their initial critical range. Hence: “When philosophy paints its grey on grey, one form of life has become old, and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only knows. The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering Este artículo intenta responder a la pregunta ¿de qué trata la Filosofía del derecho de Hegel? a partir de un estudio al prólogo a la obra (Vorrede). Al someter a estudio los fundamentales conceptos de la filosofía moderna, Hegel elimina el carácter metafísicoabstracto para exponerlos desde su contenido histórico actual y concreto. Se concluye que el propio aliento promisorio y progresista de estos depara la autodisolución y autonegación, perdiendo así su alcance crítico inicial. De allí que “Cuando la filosofía pinta su gris sobre gris, entonces ha envejecido una figura de la vida y, con gris sobre gris, no se deja rejuvenecer, sino sólo conoce; el búho de Minerva sólo levanta su vuelo al romper el crepúsculo”.

This article intends to analyze the dialectic development of the concept of free will in Hegel's thought. This concept, that just becomes comprehensible with its practical effectiveness among social institutions, that mean, Abstract Right Morality and Ethics, will be presented here firstly in its subjective moment, in that it remains abstract. Thus we seek to show what dialectical moments lead the will to realize its self determination. O presente artigo pretende analisar o desenvolvimento dialético da ideia de vontade livre. Esta categoria, que só se faz compreensível em sua efetivação prática nas instituições sociais, a saber, Direito Abstrato, Moralidade e Eticidade, será aqui abordada ainda em seu momento subjetivo, no qual ainda é abstrata. Assim, pretende-se analisar os momentos dialéticos que levam a vontade à sua autodeterminação.

Focusing on Greece, this essay aims to contribute to a philosophical understanding of Europe’s current financial crisis and, more generally, of the aporetic implications of the modern determination of freedom as such. One the one hand, I draw on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in order to argue that modernity entails a potential conflict between a market economy and a state that is supposed to further the interests of the society as a whole. On the other hand, I draw on Sophocles’ Oedipus the King as well as on Hegel’s account of tragedy in the Phenomenology of Spirit to reinterpret the conflict between the spheres of civil society and the state as a tragic conflict. Modernity threatens to undermine itself from within, I maintain, because the simultaneous development of capitalism and democracy makes it very hard to prevent the sphere of particular interests from encroaching upon the sphere of politics.

En este artículo, tal como se anuncia desde su título, me propongo tratar acerca de los vestigios de la idea de la en los testimonios originales que nos quedan de la época arcaica del mundo y del pensamiento heleno y cómo estos orígenes, de una u otra forma, determinan lo que más técnicamente podríamos llamar una filosofía del derecho en el marco de una reflexión posterior acerca de la filosofía política, cuyo horizonte también hay que situarlo en el propio mundo heleno. In this article, as its title announces, I intend to deal with the remains of the idea of in the original testimonies which we have from the archaic epoch of the world and of Hellenic thought, and how these origins, in one way or another, determine what more technically we could call a philosophy of right within the frame of a later reflection on political philosophy, whose horizon must also be located in the same Hellenic world.

Submitted by SILVANA COLOMBO DE ALMEIDA null (sil_colal@hotmail.com) on 2016-10-10T01:50:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Texto Dissertação.pdf: 634445 bytes, checksum: 7bcf6851346fb596f0c58ff201c6e6f4 (MD5) Approved for entry into archive by Ana Paula Grisoto (grisotoana@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-10-11T17:00:17Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 almeida_sc_me_mar.pdf: 634445 bytes, checksum: 7bcf6851346fb596f0c58ff201c6e6f4 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2016-10-11T17:00:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 almeida_sc_me_mar.pdf: 634445 bytes, checksum: 7bcf6851346fb596f0c58ff201c6e6f4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-09-16 Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) O intuito do presente trabalho é analisar possíveis contribuições que o desenvolvimento dialético especulativo da Filosofia hegeliana, sobremaneira a Filosofia do Espírito Objetivo, traz à compreensão acerca dos direitos humanos e seu desenvolvimento da modernidade à contemporaneidade. Defende-se que as ideias contidas na filosofia hegeliana sejam uma possibilidade de se ultrapassar alguns limites existentes nas discussões tradicionais a respeito do tema, embasadas principalmente nas filosofias modernas do direito natural. Para tanto, optou-se por analisar a relação dos direitos humanos com a filosofia do direito natural, seguindo-se para a crítica hegeliana ao jusnaturalismo e, consequentemente, encerrando-se com sua compreensão de reconhecimento e sua influência na Filosofia do Direito e no estabelecimento das relações éticas na Sittlichkeit. The purpose of this academic writting is to analyse the possible contributions that the dialectical speculative development of Hegel’s Philosophy, moreover the Philosophy of Objective Spirit, brings to light regarding human rights and its development from modernity to the present day. It is argued that the ideas contained in Hegel’s Philosophy are a possibility of overcoming some existing limits in traditional discussions in regard with this topic, mainly based on modern philosophies of the Natural Rights. In order to do so, it has been opted to analyse the relation of human rights with the philosophy of natural rights, followed by Hegel’s critic to Natural Rights, and as a result, closing with its understanding of the recognition and its influence in the Philosophy of Right and on the establishment in ethic relation in Sittlichkeit.

The present paper examines Fichte’s concepts of Anerkennung, Aufforderung and Selbstschränkung, solely according to their development in Fichte’s philosophy of natural right of 1796. The aim of the paper is to show that, for Fichte, ‘recognition’ is not a formal concept, but a praxis that has to be understood as a constituing experience of the selbstaffirmation each individual as such is striving for.

The word “ethics” is commonly taken to be a synonym for morality. In more formal contexts it serves as the name for codified conduct that governs individuals by virtue of their voluntary membership of particular institutions or professions. Although both of these significances are encompassed within Hegel’s conception of ethics he intends a yet broader meaning for it. The German word Hegel uses is Sittlichkeit, a word that is sometimes translated into English as morality as well as ethics. The stem of Sittlichkeit is Sitte, meaning customs and suggesting practices that partly form ongoing ways of life. In Hegel’s philosophy the sphere of ethics concerns both the actions of the individual moral agent and the normative environment that gives those actions their moral value. Considerations of ethics in its moral philosophical and its political institutional contexts cannot therefore be adequately treated in isolation from each other. It is of crucial importance in understanding Hegel’s ethics that his claim about the inextricability of the moral agent from its ethical environment runs much deeper than the notion that the community simply furnishes the agent with sets of approved or disapproved options. It says that we are constitutively communal beings whose judgments about the preferability of one choice over another are already influenced by our communal situation.