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263 results on '"Optimal contract"'

51. Adverse Selection

Author

Cvitanić, Jakša, Zhang, Jianfeng, Avellaneda, M., editor, Barone-Adesi, G., editor, Broadie, M., editor, Davis, M.H.A., editor, Derman, E., editor, Klüppelberg, C., editor, Schachermayer, W., editor, Cvitanić, Jakša, and Zhang, Jianfeng

Published
2013
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52. Special Cases and Applications

Author

Cvitanić, Jakša, Zhang, Jianfeng, Avellaneda, M., editor, Barone-Adesi, G., editor, Broadie, M., editor, Davis, M.H.A., editor, Derman, E., editor, Klüppelberg, C., editor, Schachermayer, W., editor, Cvitanić, Jakša, and Zhang, Jianfeng

Published
2013
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54. The General Risk Sharing Problem

Author

Cvitanić, Jakša, Zhang, Jianfeng, Avellaneda, M., editor, Barone-Adesi, G., editor, Broadie, M., editor, Davis, M.H.A., editor, Derman, E., editor, Klüppelberg, C., editor, Schachermayer, W., editor, Cvitanić, Jakša, and Zhang, Jianfeng

Published
2013
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55. Single-Period Examples

Author

Cvitanić, Jakša, Zhang, Jianfeng, Avellaneda, M., editor, Barone-Adesi, G., editor, Broadie, M., editor, Davis, M.H.A., editor, Derman, E., editor, Klüppelberg, C., editor, Schachermayer, W., editor, Cvitanić, Jakša, and Zhang, Jianfeng

Published
2013
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56. Principal–Agent Problem

Author

Cvitanić, Jakša, Zhang, Jianfeng, Avellaneda, M., editor, Barone-Adesi, G., editor, Broadie, M., editor, Davis, M.H.A., editor, Derman, E., editor, Klüppelberg, C., editor, Schachermayer, W., editor, Cvitanić, Jakša, and Zhang, Jianfeng

Published
2013
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61. COSTRUCTION OF EFFECTIVE RECRUTMENT MECHANICM UNDER THE ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM.

Author

Borisov, Ivan and Sharapova, Valentina

Subjects
*EMPLOYEE recruitment, *PERSONNEL management, *WORKFORCE planning, *LABOR market, *HUMAN resource planning
Abstract

The article deals with the actual labor market problem of creating an effective recruitment mechanism. It presents the key parameters of recruitment strategies. The best solutions of the problemar are considered in the context of asymmetric information. The article presents alternative models of recruitment, the principal-agent problem in each type of model and considers the key features of each agent's behavior. In addition the opportunities of optimal contract between recruiter and employer and the optimal compensation scheme for recruiter are presented. Then the differences are identified in costs and efficiencies of the alternative recruitment models and the key conclusions are made on possible lower or higher effectiveness of optimal contract. The authors make the conclusion about choice of the optimal recruitment model in the labor market. The article can be useful for the researchers who specialize in the labor market and the asymmetric information models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2017
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63. Combinatorial Agency of Threshold Functions

Author

Jain, Shaili, Parkes, David C., Hutchison, David, Series editor, Kanade, Takeo, Series editor, Kittler, Josef, Series editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., Series editor, Mattern, Friedemann, Series editor, Mitchell, John C., Series editor, Naor, Moni, Series editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, Series editor, Pandu Rangan, C., Series editor, Steffen, Bernhard, Series editor, Sudan, Madhu, Series editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, Series editor, Tygar, Doug, Series editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., Series editor, Weikum, Gerhard, Series editor, and Persiano, Giuseppe, editor

Published
2011
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64. The Cooperative Game Theory Foundations of Network Bargaining Games

Author

Bateni, MohammadHossein, Hajiaghayi, MohammadTaghi, Immorlica, Nicole, Mahini, Hamid, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Abramsky, Samson, editor, Gavoille, Cyril, editor, Kirchner, Claude, editor, Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm, editor, and Spirakis, Paul G., editor

Published
2010
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65. The joy of flying: Efficient airport PPP contracts.

Author

Engel, Eduardo, Fischer, Ronald, and Galetovic, Alexander

Subjects
*BUSINESS revenue, *PRESENT value, *INFRASTRUCTURE (Economics), *CONSTRUCTION projects, *TRANSPORTATION
Abstract

We derive the optimal concession contract for an airport where the concessionaire’s effort impacts either non-aeronautical revenue (shops, restaurants, parking lots and hotels) or aeronautical revenues (passenger and airline fees). Our first model assumes that demand for the infrastructure is exogenous whereas demand for non-aeronautical services depends both on passenger flow and on the concessionaire’s effort and diligence. We show that the optimal principal-agent contract separates exogenous and endogenous risks. First, the term of the concession varies inversely with passenger flow, so that the concessionaire bears no exogenous demand risk. Second, the concessionaire bears part or all of non-aeronautical risk, which fosters effort. We also study a model where the concessionaire’s effort affects demand for aeronautical services and focus on the case where the contract includes a demand trigger for investment as an incentive. Both optimal contracts can be implemented with a Present-Value-of-Revenue (PVR) auction in which firms bid on the present value of aeronautical revenue and the concession ends when the bid is collected. PVR auctions have been used to auction airport PPP contracts in Chile, and demand triggers for investment have been used both in Brazil and Chile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2018
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66. Optimal R&D outsourcing.

Author

Leoni, Patrick L.

Subjects
TECHNOLOGICAL innovations, CONTRACTING out, RESEARCH & development, COMPENSATION (Law), SCIENTIFIC & technical services industry
Abstract

We study optimal contracts when R&D is outsourced to another company. We find that, when a realistic assumption holds, the optimal contract always leads in equilibrium to low chances of having a successful technical innovation, given announced compensations. This assumption is significantly different from those used in the literature, and it is necessary for the result to hold. Our work shows that R&D outsourcing typically performs poorly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2018
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67. Computing Optimal Contracts in Series-Parallel Heterogeneous Combinatorial Agencies

Author

Emek, Yuval, Feldman, Michal, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Leonardi, Stefano, editor

Published
2009
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68. Not-So Hidden Information : Optimal Contracts for Undue Influence in E2E Voting Systems

Author

Clark, Jeremy, Hengartner, Urs, Larson, Kate, Hutchison, David, Series editor, Kanade, Takeo, Series editor, Kittler, Josef, Series editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., Series editor, Mattern, Friedemann, Series editor, Mitchell, John C., Series editor, Naor, Moni, Series editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, Series editor, Pandu Rangan, C., Series editor, Steffen, Bernhard, Series editor, Sudan, Madhu, Series editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, Series editor, Tygar, Doug, Series editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., Series editor, Weikum, Gerhard, Series editor, Ryan, Peter Y. A., editor, and Schoenmakers, Berry, editor

Published
2009
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75. Agency theory: Forecasting agent remuneration at insurance companies

Author

Turrado García, Fernando, Sandoval Orozco, Ana Lucila, García Pineda, M. Pilar, García Villalba, Luis Javier, Turrado García, Fernando, Sandoval Orozco, Ana Lucila, García Pineda, M. Pilar, and García Villalba, Luis Javier

Abstract

CRUE-CSIC (Acuerdos Transformativos 2022), The principal–agent problem occurs when one entity (the ‘‘agent’’), is able to make decisions and/or take actions on behalf of another person or entity (the ‘‘principal’’). The agent earnings are regulated under a contract designed by the principal. Under the principal’s point of view, the main goal while designing said contract (and the payment rules incorporated on it) is to align the actions made by the agent to the principal’s own goals. So, in this paper we will define a method that will allow the principal to forecast the remuneration obtained by the agent under an established contract in the insurance sector., Depto. de Economía Financiera y Actuarial y Estadística, Depto. de Ingeniería de Software e Inteligencia Artificial (ISIA), Fac. de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Fac. de Informática, TRUE, pub

Published
2022

78. Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency : (Extended Abstract)

Author

Babaioff, Moshe, Feldman, Michal, Nisan, Noam, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Dough, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Spirakis, Paul, editor, Mavronicolas, Marios, editor, and Kontogiannis, Spyros, editor

Published
2006
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79. Capacity-Option Pricing Model

Author

Beckmann, M., editor, Künzi, H. P., editor, Fandel, G., editor, Trockel, W., editor, Basile, A., editor, Drexl, A., editor, Dawid, H., editor, Inderfurth, K., editor, Kürsten, W., editor, Schittko, U., editor, and Hellermann, Rolf

Published
2006
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94. Outsourcing Internet Security: Economic Analysis of Incentives for Managed Security Service Providers

Author

Ding, Wen, Yurcik, William, Yin, Xiaoxin, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Dough, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Deng, Xiaotie, editor, and Ye, Yinyu, editor

Published
2005
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100. Other-regarding principal and moral hazard: The single-agent case.

Author

Banerjee, Swapnendu and Sarkar, Mainak

Subjects
MORAL hazard, INFORMATION asymmetry, CONTRACTS, ECONOMICS, WEALTH
Abstract

Using the classic moral hazard problem with limited liability, we characterize the optimal incentive contracts when first an other-regarding principal interacts with a self-regarding agent. The optimal contract differs considerably when the principal is "inequity averse" vis-à-vis the self-regarding case. Also the agent is generally (weakly) better-off under an "inequity averse" principal compared to a "status seeking" principal. Then we extend our analysis and characterize the optimal contracts when both other-regarding principal and other-regarding agent interact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2017
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