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We use a unique design feature of a survey of Italian firms to study the causal effect of inflation expectations on firms' economic decisions. In the survey, a randomly chosen subset of firms is repeatedly treated with information about recent inflation (or the European Central Bank's inflation target) whereas other firms are not. This information treatment generates exogenous variation in inflation expectations. We find that higher inflation expectations on the part of firms leads them to raise their prices, increase their utilization of credit, and reduce their employment. However, when policy rates are constrained by the effective lower bound, demand effects are stronger, leading firms to raise their prices more and no longer reduce their employment.

We implement a survey of Dutch households in which random subsets of respondents receive information about inflation. The resulting exogenously generated variation in inflation expectations is used to assess how expectations affect subsequent monthly consumption decisions relative to those in a control group. The causal effects of elevated inflation expectations on non-durable spending are imprecisely estimated but there is a sharp negative effect on durable spending. We provide evidence that this is likely driven by the fact that Dutch households seem to become more pessimistic about their real income as well as aggregate spending when they increase their inflation expectations. There is little evidence to support the idea that the degree to which respondents change their beliefs or their spending in response to information treatments depends on their level of cognitive or financial constraints.

We address how using different censoring thresholds and imputation procedures affects the baseline results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015). Higher censoring thresholds introduce measure ment error and outliers that generate wide variability in results across weighting schemes, but methods that explicitly control for outliers confirm the results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015) for all censoring thresholds. We also illustrate how the BLS’s approach to imputing missing prices can introduce a cyclical bias into measures of posted price inflation when store-switching is present in the data. (JEL D12, E31, E32, L25, L81)

Countries rarely hit the zero lower bound (ZLB) on interest rates, but when they do, these episodes tend to be very long-lived. These two features are difficult to incorporate jointly into macroeconomic models using typical representations of shock processes. We introduce a regime-switching representation of risk premium shocks into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model to generate a realistic distribution of ZLB durations. We discuss what different calibrations of this model imply for optimal inflation rates.

Author(s): Coibion, O; Gorodnichenko, Y; Ulate, M | Abstract: The fact that declines in output since the Great Recession have been parlayed into equivalent declines in measures of potential output is commonly interpreted as implying that output will not return to previous trends. We show that real-time estimates of potential output for the United States and other countries respond gradually and similarly to both transitory and permanent shocks to output. Observing revisions in measures of potential output therefore tells us little about whether changes in actual output will be permanent. Some alternative methodologies to estimate potential output can avoid these shortcomings. These approaches suggest a much more limited decline in potential output since the Great Recession.

We study survey data of inflation and exchange rate expectations in Ukraine. These data are available for households, firms and professional forecasters. We document some unique properties of these data as well as some limitations and discuss the longer run prospects for inflation expectations in Ukraine given the National Bank of Ukraine’s desire to adopt an inflation target in the future.

Author(s): Coibion, Olivier; Gorodnichenko, Yuriy; Koustas, Dmitri | Abstract: We document a decline in the frequency of shopping trips in the United States since 1980 and consider its implications for the measurement of consumption inequality. A decline in shopping frequency as households stock up on storable goods (i.e., inventory behavior) will lead to a rise in expenditure inequality when the latter is measured at high frequency, even when underlying consumption inequality is unchanged. We find that most of the recently documented rise in expenditure inequality in the United States since the 1980s can be accounted for by this phenomenon. Using detailed micro data on spending, which we link to data on club/warehouse store openings, we directly attribute much of the reduced frequency of shopping trips to the rise in club/warehouse stores. (JEL D12, D31, D63, D91, E21)

This study examines the predictive content of futures prices for energy, agricultural, precious and base metal commodities. In particular, we examine whether futures prices are (1) unbiased and/or (2) accurate predictors of subsequent prices. We document significant differences both across and within commodity groups. Precious and base metals fail most tests of unbiasedness and are poor predictors of subsequent price changes but energy and agricultural futures fare much better. We find little evidence that these differences reflect liquidity conditions across markets. In addition, we document a broad decline in the predictive content of commodity futures prices since the early 2000s. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 34:607–636, 2014

We study the effects of positive steady-state inflation in New Keynesian models subject to the zero bound on interest rates. We derive the utility-based welfare loss function taking into account the effects of positive steady-state inflation and solve for the optimal level of inflation in the model. For plausible calibrations with costly but infrequent episodes at the zero-lower bound, the optimal inflation rate is low, typically less than two percent, even after considering a variety of extensions, including optimal stabilization policy, price indexation, endogenous and state- dependent price stickiness, capital formation, model-uncertainty, and downward nominal wage rigidities. On the normative side, price level targeting delivers large welfare gains and a very low optimal inflation rate consistent with price stability. These results suggest that raising the inflation target is too blunt an instrument to efficiently reduce the severe costs of zero-bound episodes.

A lot. We derive common and conflicting predictions from models in which agents face information constraints and then assess their validity using surveys of consumers, firms, central bankers, and professional forecasters. We document that mean forecasts fail to completely adjust on impact to shocks, leading to statistically and economically significant deviations from the null of full information. The dynamics of forecast errors after shocks are consistent with the predictions of models with information rigidities. The conditional responses of forecast errors and disagreement among agents can also be used to differentiate between some of the most prominent models of information rigidities.

We consider a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) in which firms follow one of four price-setting regimes: sticky prices, sticky information, rule of thumb, or full-information flexible prices. The parameters of the model, including the fraction of each type of firm, are estimated by matching the moments of the observed variables of the model to those found in the data. We find that sticky price firms and sticky information firms jointly account for over 80% of firms in the model. We compare the performance of our hybrid model to pure sticky price and sticky information models along various dimensions, including monetary policy implications. © 2011 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Empirical studies find substantial differences in demand elasticities and associated markups among products of different quality. This paper analyzes the theoretical determinants of such variation. We present a simple model that allows for horizontal and vertical differentiation and accounts for endogenous entry. We find that most economic forces in our model, such as consumers' price sensitivity, the scope for product differentiation, and sunk costs of entry, are likely to induce lower equilibrium demand elasticities for higher quality products. In contrast, other economic forces, such as marginal cost of production and the distribution (across consumers) of the willingness to pay for quality, may induce the opposite pattern. These results provide an organizing framework through which empirical findings may be interpreted, and may also help to predict variation in demand elasticities for markets in which empirical estimates of elasticities are unavailable or infeasible to obtain.

Using a new survey of firm managers, we investigate whether inflation expectations in New Zealand are anchored or not. In spite of 25 years of inflation targeting by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, firm managers display little anchoring of such expectations. We document this finding along a number of dimensions. Managers are unaware of the identities of central bankers or of central banks’ objectives, and they are generally poorly informed about recent inflation dynamics. Their forecasts of future inflation reflect high levels of uncertainty and are extremely dispersed, and they are volatile along both short-run and long-run horizons. Similar results can be found for the United States using currently available surveys.

We implement a new survey of firms’ macroeconomic beliefs in New Zealand and document a number of novel stylized facts from this survey. Despite nearly twenty-five years under an inflation targeting regime, there is widespread dispersion in firms’ beliefs about both past and future macroeconomic conditions, especially inflation, with average beliefs about recent and past inflation being much higher than those of professional forecasters. Much of the dispersion in beliefs can be explained by firms’ incentives to collect and process information, i.e. rational inattention motives. Using experimental methods, we find that firms update their beliefs in a Bayesian manner when presented with new information about the economy. But few firms seem to think that inflation is important to their business decisions and therefore they tend to devote few resources to collecting and processing information about inflation.

We evaluate explanations for the absence of disinflation during the Great Recession and find popular explanations to be insufficient. We propose a new explanation for this puzzle within the context of a standard Phillips curve. If firms' inflation expectations track those of households, then the missing disinflation can be explained by the rise in their inflation expectations between 2009 and 2011. We present new econometric and survey evidence consistent with firms having similar expectations as households. The rise in household inflation expectations from 2009 to 2011 can be explained by the increase in oil prices over this time period. (JEL D84, E24, E32, E52, E58, Q35)

This paper considers whether the sticky information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) can robustly deliver inflation inertia. I find that four features of the model play a key role in determining inflation inertia: the frequency of information updating, the degree of real rigidities, the nature and persistence of monetary policy, and the presence or not of information stickiness elsewhere in the economy. Real rigidities serve to dampen firms’ desired price changes and are a critical element in delivering inflation inertia. The type of monetary policy, money-growth vs. interest rate rules, also matters, with Taylor rules making inflation inertia less likely than under money growth rules. Adding sticky information in consumption to the model yields a more gradual adjustment of output, thereby decreasing the incentive for firms to change prices on impact and increasing the inertia of inflation. I also explore the implications of using random versus fixed durations of information rigidity and argue that with the latter, the choice of the policy rule has a smaller effect on the qualitative response of inflation. These results allow us to sort out some conflicting conclusions on inflation inertia in sticky information models and suggest that inertia is more sensitive to parameter choices than previously thought.

Guided by a macroeconomic model in which non-energy commodity prices are endogenously determined, we apply a new factor-based identification strategy to decompose the historical sources of changes in commodity prices and global economic activity. The model yields a factor structure for commodity prices and identification conditions through which factors have economic interpretations: one factor captures the combined contribution of shocks that affect commodity markets only through general equilibrium forces. Applied to a cross-section of commodity prices since 1968, the theoretical restrictions are consistent with the data and yield structural interpretations of the common factors in commodity prices. Commodity-related shocks have contributed modestly to global economic fluctuations.

One suggested hypothesis for the dramatic rise in household borrowing that preceded the financial crisis is that low-income households increased their demand for credit to finance higher consumption expenditures in order to "keep up" with higherincome households. Using household level data on debt accumulation during 2001-2012, we show that low-income households in high-inequality regions accumulated less debt relative to income than their counterparts in lower-inequality regions, which negates the hypothesis. We argue instead that these patterns are consistent with supply-side interpretations of debt accumulation patterns during the 2000s. We present a model in which banks use applicants' incomes, combined with local income inequality, to infer the underlying type of the applicant, so that banks ultimately channel more credit toward lower-income applicants in low-inequality regions than high-inequality regions. We confirm the predictions of the model using data on individual mortgage applications in high- and low-inequality regions over this time period.

One suggested hypothesis for the dramatic rise in household borrowing that preceded the financial crisis is that low-income households increased their demand for credit to finance higher consumption expenditures in order to "keep up" with higher- income households. Using household level data on debt accumulation during 2001-2012, we show that low-income households in high-inequality regions accumulated less debt relative to income than their counterparts in lower-inequality regions, which negates the hypothesis. We argue instead that these patterns are consistent with supply-side interpretations of debt accumulation patterns during the 2000s. We present a model in which banks use applicants' incomes, combined with local income inequality, to infer the underlying type of the applicant, so that banks ultimately channel more credit toward lower-income applicants in low-inequality regions than high-inequality regions. We confirm the predictions of the model using data on individual mortgage applications in high- and low-inequality regions over this time period.

The persistence of U.S. unemployment has risen with each of the last three recessions, raising the specter that future U.S. recessions might look more like the “Eurosclerosis” experience of the 1980s than like the traditional V-shaped recoveries of the past. We revisit several explanations for this rising persistence, decomposing them into three possible sources: business cycle fluctuations, changing policy responses, and propagation mechanisms. First, we find that financial shocks do not systematically lead to more persistent unemployment than monetary policy shocks, casting doubt on the hypothesis that different drivers of business cycles are the primary explanation. Second, we find that changing monetary and fiscal policy responses account for approximately one-third of the rise in unemployment persistence. Third, after examining three propagation mechanisms we find that jointly they cannot account for any rising persistence of unemployment. The three propagation mechanisms we focus on—declining labor mobility, changing age structures, and the decline in trust among Americans—are consistent with four other cyclical patterns that have evolved since the early 1980s: a rising cyclicality in long-term unemployment, lower regional convergence after downturns, rising cyclicality in disability claims, and missing disinflation. We exploit regional variation in labor market outcomes across Western Europe and North America during 1970–91 to assess the predictive capacity of each propagation mechanism for unemployment persistence. In summary, two-thirds of the rise in unemployment persistence is unexplained.

We present a simple macroeconomic model with a continuum of primary commodities used in the production of the final good, such that the real prices of commodities have a factor structure. One factor captures the combined contribution of all aggregate shocks which have no direct effects on commodity markets other than through general equilibrium effects on output, while other factors represent direct commodity shocks. Thus, the factor structure provides a decomposition of underlying structural shocks. The theory also provides guidance on how empirical factors can be rotated to identify the structural factors. We apply factor analysis and the identification conditions implied by the model to a cross-section of real non-energy commodity prices. The theoretical restrictions implied by the model are consistent with the data and thus yield a structural interpretation of the common factors in commodity prices. The analysis suggests that commodity-related shocks have generally played a limited role in global business cycle fluctuations.

The persistence of U.S. unemployment has risen with each of the last three recessions, raising the specter that future U.S. recessions might look more like the Eurosclerosis experience of the 1980s than traditional V-shaped recoveries of the past. In this paper, we revisit possible explanations for this rising persistence. First, we argue that financial shocks do not systematically lead to more persistent unemployment than monetary policy shocks, so these cannot explain the rising persistence of unemployment. Second, monetary and fiscal policies can account for only part of the evolving unemployment persistence. Therefore, we turn to a third class of explanations: propagation mechanisms. We focus on factors consistent with four other cyclical patterns which have evolved since the early 1980s: a rising cyclicality in long-term unemployment, lower regional convergence after downturns, rising cyclicality in disability claims, and missing disinflation. These factors include declining labor mobility, changing age structures, and the decline in trust among Americans. To determine how these factors affect unemployment persistence, this paper exploits regional variation in labor market outcomes across Western Europe and North America during 1970-1990, in contrast to most previous work focusing either on cross-country variation or regional variation within countries. The results suggest that only cultural factors can account for the rising persistence of unemployment in the U.S., but the evolution in mobility and demographics over time should have more than offset the effects of culture.

We investigate the source of the high persistence in the Federal Funds Rate relative to the predictions of simple Taylor rules. While much of the literature assumes that this reflects interest-smoothing on the part of monetary policy-makers, an alternative explanation is that it represents persistent monetary policy shocks. Applying real-time data of the Federal Reserve’s macroeconomic forecasts, we document that the empirical evidence strongly favors the interestsmoothing explanation. This result obtains in nested specifications with higher order interest smoothing and persistent shocks, a feature missing in previous work. We also show that policy inertia is present in response to economic fluctuations not driven by exogenous monetary policy shocks. Finally, we argue that the predictability of future interest rates by Greenbook forecasts supports the policy inertia interpretation of historical monetary policy actions.

We study the effects and historical contribution of monetary policy shocks to consumption and income inequality in the United States since 1980. Contractionary monetary policy actions systematically increase inequality in labor earnings, total income, consumption and total expenditures. Furthermore, monetary shocks can account for a significant component of the historical cyclical variation in income and consumption inequality. Using detailed micro-level data on income and consumption, we document the different channels via which monetary policy shocks affect inequality, as well as how these channels depend on the nature of the change in monetary policy.

We study the effects and historical contribution of monetary policy shocks to consumption and income inequality in the United States since 1980. Contractionary monetary policy actions systematically increase inequality in labor earnings, total income, consumption and total expenditures. Furthermore, monetary shocks can account for a significant component of the historical cyclical variation in income and consumption inequality. Using detailed micro-level data on income and consumption, we document the different channels via which monetary policy shocks affect inequality, as well as how these channels depend on the nature of the change in monetary policy.

This paper studies the estimated effects of monetary policy shocks from standard VAR’s, which are small, and those from the approach of Romer and Romer (2004), which are large. The differences appear to be driven by three factors: a) the contractionary impetus associated with each shock, b) the period of non-borrowed reserves targeting and c) lag length selection. Accounting for these factors, the real effects of monetary policy shocks are consistent across approaches and are most likely medium: a one-hundred basis point innovation to the Federal Funds Rate lowers production by 2-3% and raises the unemployment rate by approximately 0.50% points. In addition, alternative measures of monetary policy shocks from estimated Taylor rules also yield medium-sized real effects and indicate that the historical contribution of monetary policy shocks to real fluctuations has been non-trivial, particularly during the 1970s.

While the degree of policy inertia in central banks' reaction functions is a central ingredient in theoretical and empirical monetary economics, the source of the observed policy inertia in the U.S. is controversial, with tests of competing hypotheses such as interest-smoothing and persistent-shocks theories being inconclusive. This paper employs real time data; nested specifications with flexible time series structures; narratives; interest rate forecasts of the Fed, financial markets, and professional forecasters; and instrumental variables to discriminate competing explanations of policy inertia. The presented evidence strongly favors the interest-smoothing explanation and thus can help resolve a key puzzle in monetary economics.

Author(s): Coibion, Olivier; Gorodnichenko, Yuriy; Wieland, Johannes | Abstract: We study the effects of positive steady-state inflation in New Keynesian models subject to the zero bound on interest rates. We derive the utility-based welfare loss function taking into account the effects of positive steady-state inflation and show that steady-state inflation affects welfare through three distinct channels: steady-state effects, the magnitude of the coefficients in the utility-function approximation, and the dynamics of the model. We solve for the optimal level of inflation in the model and find that, for plausible calibrations, the optimal inflation rate is low, less than two percent, even after considering a variety of extensions, including price indexation, endogenous price stickiness, capital formation, model uncertainty, and downward nominal wage rigidities. On the normative side, price level targeting delivers large welfare gains and a very low optimal inflation rate consistent with price stability.

This paper examines the relationship between spot and futures prices for a broad range of commodities, including energy, precious and base metals, and agricultural commodities. In particular, we examine whether futures prices are (1) an unbiased and/or (2) accurate predictor of subsequent spot prices. While energy futures prices are generally unbiased predictors of future spot prices, there is much stronger evidence against the null for other commodity markets. This difference appears to be driven in part by the depth of each market. We find that over the last five years, it is much harder to reject the null of futures prices being unbiased predictors of future spot prices than in earlier periods for almost all commodities. In addition, futures prices do approximately as well as a random walk in forecasting future spot prices, and vastly outperform a reduced form empirical model.

This paper assesses both the support for and the properties of informational rigidities faced by agents. Specifically, we track the impulse responses of mean forecast errors and disagreement among agents after exogenous structural shocks. Our key contribution is to document that in response to structural shocks, mean forecasts fail to completely adjust on impact, leading to statistically and economically significant deviations from the null of full information: the half life of forecast errors is roughly between 6 months and a year. Importantly, the dynamic process followed by forecast errors following structural shocks is consistent with the predictions of models of informational rigidities. We interpret this finding as providing support for the recent expansion of research into models of informational rigidities. In addition, we document several stylized facts about the conditional responses of forecast errors and disagreement among agents that can be used to differentiate between some of the models of informational rigidities recently proposed. We use a variety of structural shocks, expectation surveys, and robustness checks to establish these facts about informational rigidities.

We propose a new approach to test the full-information rational expectations hypothesis which can identify whether rejections of the null arise from information rigidities. This approach quantifies the economic significance of departures from the null and the underlying degree of information rigidity. Applying this approach to U.S. and international data of professional forecasters and other agents yields pervasive evidence consistent with the presence of information rigidities. These results therefore provide a set of stylized facts which can be used to calibrate imperfect information models. Finally, we document evidence of state-dependence in the expectations formation process.

With positive trend inflation, the Taylor principle is not enough to guarantee a determinate equilibrium. We provide new theoretical results on restoring determinacy in New Keynesian models with positive trend inflation and combine these with new empirical findings on the Federal Reserve’s reaction function before and after the Volcker disinflation to find that 1) while the Fed likely satisfied the Taylor principle in the pre-Volcker era, the US economy was still subject to self-fulfilling fluctuations in the 1970s, 2) the US economy moved from indeterminacy to determinacy during the Volcker disinflation, and 3) the switch from indeterminacy to determinacy was due to the changes in the Fed’s response to macroeconomic variables and the decline in trend inflation during the Volcker disinflation.

We consider a DSGE model in which firms follow one of four price-setting regimes: sticky prices, sticky-information, rule-of-thumb, or full-information flexible prices. The parameters of the model, including the fractions of each type of firm, are estimated by matching the moments of the observed variables of the model to those found in the data. We find that sticky-price firms and sticky-information firms jointly account for over 80% of firms in the model, with the rest largely accounted for by rule-of-thumb firms. We compare the performance of our hybrid model to pure sticky-price and sticky-information models along various dimensions, including monetary policy implications.