Moran, Daniel J., Yost, David S., Kline, Jeffrey E., Russell, James A., Anderson, David L., National Security Affairs (NSA), Kelley, Stephen A., Moran, Daniel J., Yost, David S., Kline, Jeffrey E., Russell, James A., Anderson, David L., National Security Affairs (NSA), and Kelley, Stephen A.
This study examines the evolution of American security policy in the Persian Gulf from 1969 to the Gulf War of 1991. Its research question is: why, and with what consequences, did American security policy evolve from an arm’s-length approach that leveraged other powers to a hands-on approach whereby the United States became the unilateral guarantor of regional security? This study argues that the Carter administration departed from the practice of the Nixon and Ford administrations and viewed the region more narrowly than their predecessors, through a Cold War lens. This perspective continued through the Reagan and Bush administrations and resulted in American security policy being shaped by three interrelated beliefs that narrowed the range of plausible U.S. policy options to one: direct American involvement in any Persian Gulf security crisis. They shaped the Reagan and Bush administrations’ Persian Gulf security policies, and when self-generated pressure to demonstrate American credibility to friendly Gulf states was added, robust American military involvement in Persian Gulf security matters became a realistic and desirable prospect. The evolution of American security policy from arm’s length to hands on culminated in the 1991 Gulf War, which initiated sustained and direct U.S. military involvement in the region that continues through the present day., Commander, United States Navy, Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited