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As a general concept and despite being oversold, the Single Market escapes serious criticism. But when it comes to putting the freedoms into practice, the gap between legislating for centralised [...]

Data-hungry applications are central to the largest online platforms. Using a novel approach that leverages data science to inform the economics, we demonstrate how data is a source of market power. We highlight the importance of data heterogeneity, whereby small feature differences translate into large value differences. We examine how concept drift, the existence of a nonstationary relationship between the predictive and target variables, implies that access to a continuous stream of data is competitively advantageous. We analyze how an information bottleneckand high sample complexityin existing applications lead to increasing returns to data. Finally, we show how user interaction controlenables personalization that raises switching costs. The combined effect is a potent data barrier to entry that endows substantial market power to only the largest online platforms. Competition policy should focus on enabling entrants unfettered access to vast continuous data streams similar to those available to platform incumbents.

Vertical mergers are known to potentially create an incentive for the merged firm to raise the price of inputs it supplies to its rivals (raising rivals’ cost [RRC]). At the same time, vertical mergers are known to create efficiencies in the form of elimination of double marginalization (EDM). Competitive effects of vertical mergers are evaluated as the net effect of RRC and EDM. Conventional antitrust techniques treat the two effects—RRC and EDM—as separable and analyze each in isolation before evaluating their net effect. We show that in an equilibrium treatment, RRC and EDM are not separable; instead, they are inseparably linked because the size of EDM is an important determinant of the strength of the RRC incentive. When the link between EDM and RRC is taken into account, predicted price effects of a vertical merger can turn out to be significantly different relative to those predicted by conventional techniques. Under certain commonly used assumptions, a vertical merger may even create an incentive for the merged firm to lower its rivals’ cost. The precise price effect depends on two things: the shape of demand and the bargaining power of the upstream input supplier in its price negotiations with downstream firms.

Why does the European Union (EU) law allow for special treatment of the agricultural sector? Which exceptions exist in applying the EU competition rules in this sphere, and how has their interpretation evolved? How do these derogations address the fragmented nature of the agricultural sector and strengthen farmers’ bargaining powers, and what are the justifications for doing so? These are the questions that the current article seeks to answer, by analyzing the specific constitutional constellation of the EU’s agricultural policy alongside its competition rules. This article critically analyzes how derogations in the field of agriculture have developed in a market-oriented way, yet an unresolved tension remains with the objectives of the Treaty’s competition rules. This article revisits this tension and its underlying legal framework by taking account of the risk of political capture as well as of relevant socioenvironmental externalities, most notably environmental and social sustainability, which could shape its transformation in the future.

The criminalization of cartel behavior in the UK turned attention to the criminal wrong at the heart of cartels. An understanding of the true nature of the cartel problem can also be used to develop a better understanding of Art 101 TFEU. This article uses the literature on the wrongfulness of cartels to examine how cartel behavior has the “object” of restricting competition within the terms of Art 101 TFEU. It pays particular attention to cases at the periphery of cartel behavior. The literature focuses on the importance of free markets as public institutions. Cartels are perceived as being a species of “cheating” which deserves opprobrium as it goes against the legitimate expectations of market participants. A reexamination of the cartel periphery cases involving information exchange and cartel facilitation using this lens shows a novel understanding of how these cases fit within the Art 101 TFEU “object box.”

If a group of horizontal rivals gets together to agree on a way to structure efficient production, are they violating competition law? The issue could arise where a group of producers of agricultural products gets together to form a cooperative or even where professionals in the same field get together in a partnership. On the face of it, each supply agreement between the producer and the cooperative or partnership is vertical, but the design of the collective rules, which govern for all, involves horizontal coordination. This article takes as the starting point the example of dairy cooperatives as they emerged in the later part of the nineteenth century as a solution to a challenge offered by new technology. We use the landmark contract law case of McEllistrim v. Ballymacelligott Cooperativeto illustrate the ways in which competition law could be engaged when cooperatives are formed. Comparisons of Ireland and Denmark in the period leading up to the decision suggest that not only might the restraint be ancillary, but if not, it reduced costs, increased quality, and was welcomed by consumers (though these were in England rather than in Denmark or Ireland). The restraint also appears essential in some form, suggesting that either ancillarity or the application of Art. 101(3) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union would have allowed the restraint to be used.

The machine learning capabilities of new technologies raise provocative questions and challenges for the development of competition law within the digital economy. Academic discussions have focused on how antitrust law should avoid, anticipate, and respond to such behavior. The predominant emerging narrative is that antitrust law, in its current form, is unable to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable algorithmic collusion. The purpose of this article is to challenge that claim in the context of Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (EU). The reference within Article 101 TFEU to “associations of undertakings” plays a crucial role in that regard and offers a promising tool to better identify and regulate forms of unacceptable algorithmic collusion. Against that background, this article will propose an alternative compliance-focused way forward that could be set up without requiring modifications to the EU legal framework.

The prohibition of cartels embodies arguably the sole universal norm of global competition law. Yet a precise understanding of what constitutes a cartel remains elusive, a problem that is exacerbated in the context of Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by the Commission’s administrative enforcement procedures and the expansive approach to the “by object” category of restraints. This article aims to provide a more precise characterization of the hard core cartel concept as reflected in EU competition case law and practice and to explore why such conduct continues to constitute the “supreme evil” of contemporary antitrust enforcement.

In meetings of the European Council in Luxembourg, Cardiff and Cologne a series of processes have been designed to achieve an appropriate economic policy mix in the European Union. At [...]