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This article examines Israel's sales of advanced arms and technology as a middle-power foreign policy tool. By way of doing so it discusses the nature and characteristics of this policy, as well as its various components, and assesses the extent of its success in achieving its goals. It concludes that despite Washington's occasional opposition to its arms export policies, Israel's strategy has proved highly successful and can serve as a model for middle powers seeking to improve their status and prestige in the contemporary international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains Turkey's hard power usage in Syria, Azerbaijan, and Libya. We argue that gaining a respected status forms the basis of Turkish foreign policy and the main cause of Turkey's hard power usage was the failure of Turkey's previous status-seeking strategy. Turkey had followed a cooperationist strategy since the early 1990s by pursuing membership in the EU, strengthening ties with the West, and leading regional mediation efforts. However, this strategy failed due to the changing the security environment in the early 2010s and the discord between the interests of West and Turkey. This led Turkey to be more prone to using hard power, through which Turkey could achieve status and influence in multiple regions. This study provides an insight into the status-seeking strategies of Turkey, as an emerging middle power, by unpacking its priorities and contributes to the ongoing debates on Turkey's foreign policy under Erdoğan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of middle powers have been trying to solve its definitional issues and some progress has been made in the systemic approach. This article shows that further advancement may be gained by employing neoclassical realism in studying middle powers’ foreign policy behaviour. This done by analysing Poland’s policy towards Russia in 2005–2007. It is widely accepted in academic literature that Poland in 2005–2007, during the rule of the Law and Justice Party, pursued a confrontational policy towards Russia. However, this article challenges such widespread views. It demonstrates that Poland’s policy towards Russia was actually simultaneously based on balancing and engagement. Using a neoclassical realist framework and data gathered from interviews with Poland’s main foreign policymakers at that time, this article shows that the balancing was caused by the power asymmetry and differing interests between Russia and Poland, whereas the engagement – by the Polish policymakers’ attempts to influence Russia’s intentions towards Poland and by their perceived situation in the European balance of power.

East Asia has been dominated in theory and practice by state-centric policy considerations heavily influenced by the great powers. This perspective is threatened by the rise of non-traditional security (NTS) challenges and undermined by great power irresponsibility. These challenges can also, however, represent avenues of opportunity for other actors. The central research question addressed by this article, therefore, is what role can and should be played by newly empowered or recognized actors in addressing NTS challenges, according to policy prescription from more reflectivist approaches to international relations theory? This article utilizes social constructivism and related perspectives to identify how regional middle powers and civil societies can be empowered as agents with a responsibility to innovate in the construction of institutions responsive to NTS challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Set amidst growing global challenges and great power politics, this article asks how middle powers might best promote global collective action. Adopting a historical approach, it explores four case studies on middle power multilateralism in (1) post-1974 UN New International Economic Order; (2) post-1989 Bretton Woods institutions; (3) post-1992 European Union expansion; and (4) post-2003 UN South-South cooperation. These inform a policy framework and an ensuing alternative termed "resilient multilateralism." Adopting a foreign policy standpoint, this alternative entails principles on context specificity, complementarity, consensus building, and non-confrontation. By opening space for global action, it offers a timely approach to countering future shocks and coordination failures--whether wrought through nature or through hands of our own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study illustrates collaborative platforms and diversifying partnerships for South-South and triangular cooperation in development. The English School's pluralism-solidarism spectrum is applied as a tool to explain transformative features of the changing international society in times of crisis. The study focuses on the intermediary pluralist-solidarism phase that shows dynamics of middle power coalitions using nation branding and collaborative governance as key strategies. The transitional phase is exemplified by two approaches. One is the bilateral approach to coalition shown through the case of China, whereas the other is the inclusivemultilateral approach demonstrated through the case of South Korea. Implications are given toward relatively loose networks that have the potential to evolve into platforms with institutional grounds, especially for middle powers seeking opportunities in the new normal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differentiation is a foundational premise in the study of middle powers, as evident in the way that the relevant literature distinguishes these states from the great powers and smaller states. Despite the underlying assumption of differentiation, the middle power literature has rarely engaged theoretically with the concept. This paper seeks to make more explicit this basis of differentiation in the study of middle powers, by advancing a new framework for middle power behavior that draws on differentiation theory. The framework makes the case that it is the differentiated structure in international politics – a departure from the dominant neorealist understanding of structure – that enables the behavior of middle powers. The effects of this differentiated structure are activated by the relative, relational, and social power politics that middle powers engage in, in a particular time and place. Through this process, middle powers are able to leverage their 'middlepowerness' in international politics by weakening stratification particularly where the great powers are concerned, and strengthening functional differentiation through taking on key and distinctive roles. By putting differentiation at the core of a framework for middle power behavior, the paper strives to make a constructive contribution to the theorizing of middle powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that middle power theories can be tested by looking at the practice of negotiating multilateral treaties on conventional weapons. Three recent treaties are noteworthy, regulating landmines, cluster munitions and the arms trade. They are noteworthy because they were negotiated through multilateral diplomacy by coalitions of countries often identified as middle powers, and resulted in humanitarian, effects-based regulations. Canada and Australia actively participated in all three and are regularly cited as exemplars of middle powers. On landmines and the arms trade, both behaved as middle power theories would anticipate, embracing multilateralism and seeking a principled outcome. On cluster munitions, neither country conformed to expectations and instead unsuccessfully sought an incremental approach in line with their US ally. These cases therefore offer promising terrain to test claims around middle powers, multilateralism, and principled approaches to world affairs. This article sheds light on these inconsistencies by identifying the contextual changes behind these differing postures through a 'contexts of diplomacy' framework. This article also highlights the strategies and tactics of Canada and Australia. This serves two purposes. First, it helps address some of the issues raised in middle power theories. Second, it helps identify modes of middle power diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Can cyber deterrence work? Existing scholarly works argue that deterrence by punishment using cyberattacks is ineffective because the difficulty of attributing the origin of cyberattacks makes the threat of future attacks less credible. However, these works have told us relatively little about the deterrence ability of public cyberinstitutions (PCIs), defined as publicly observable proactive efforts aimed at signaling a country's level of cyber offensive and defensive capability. This research shows that middle powers (that have scarce cyber arsenals) can use PCIs to deter cyber attacks that cause significant damage to their economy and prosperity; however, this deterrent capability is rather limited. Using an incomplete-information model, we demonstrate that PCIs only deter adversaries that are susceptible to the costs created by these institutions. Despite this limited deterrence ability, middle powers tend to over-invest resources in these cyberinstitutions: Weak cyber states tend to over-invest to convince strong cyber adversaries that they are strong, whereas strong cyber states over-invest so that adversaries do not believe that they are weak states pretending to be strong. By doing so, states reduce their overall cybercapacity. We establish the empirical plausibility of these results using election interference campaigns as examples of strategic attacks. Our focus on the strategic use of PCIs as a deterrent represents a departure from existing literature—which has focused only on cyberoperations—and has important policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conventional literature on the role of middle powers emphasises the importance of soft power, niche diplomacy and coalition building. This article explores a case of unusual middle power activism with a focus on recent Turkish foreign policy behaviour. It demonstrates how the interaction of domestic politics and external dynamics produced an unusual degree of foreign policy activism, going well beyond conventional middle power behaviour, with the government increasingly employing coercive diplomacy and militaristic methods. We demonstrate that unusual middle power activism in a shifting international order yielded 'populist dividends' to the ruling elite in the short run but led to a 'triple governance crisis' in the economy, politics and foreign policy, with each element feeding into the others in a path-dependent fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article makes the argument that India's cricket authorities moved the sport away from being a semi-amateurish game to one which met the commercial criteria for a globalised sport. Further, while cricket was a game dominated by the Western nations, it was only after the game was taken over by India that it was opened up to a broader set of nations and not based on racial and cultural preferences. While the sport has been reformed, India has still to bring the game to global financial standards or to be able to use the soft power of cricket to enhance its international status. This is because India has exhibited the behaviour of a middle power in international politics by fitting into and exploiting a particular niche in international sports which is of dominating a game that is multinational rather than truly global. Instead, the Chinese, in their forays into the international sports market, are not only taking the steps to increase their soft power but, also, showing that their relative power status in the international system is reflected in their ability to use sporting events to shape their soft power advantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Middle powers tend to display their expertise in areas where they possess a significant advantage, and this results in the creation of new international norms, especially on non-security issues. Disaster response is one area of international relations where middle powers project their images as good international citizens. This article discusses how middle power South Korea has displayed good international citizenship through its various contributions to global disaster response, such as participation in search and rescue operations, management and coordination of relief operations, and funding for humanitarian emergencies. South Korea's involvement in disaster response is a middle power behaviour that demonstrates good international citizenship by allocating resources for global public goods. South Korea has utilized disaster response as part of its public diplomacy to promote its identity as a middle power and in seeking recognition as a reliable contributor to international development and stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most economic forecasts made after the trans-Atlantic fi nancial crisis of 2008 – 2009 have suggested that by 2030 China and India will overtake the United States to become the world’s largest and second-largest economies, respectively. This is why India is viewed as a global power, graduating from its regional role. The COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing “Cold War” between the United States and China could present new challenges and open up new opportunities for India. While dealing with short-term economic and geopolitical challenges, India will continue to carve out its path in its relations with the world that is defi ned by its civilizational inheritance, its core national interests and its economic performance and capabilities. This article discusses why, given India’s focus on its economic development and growth, the country seeks a regional and global economic and security environment that would be conducive to attaining these objectives. The author suggests fi rst, that as a rising power, India has remained committed to multilateralism in both the economic and security fi elds. It has adhered to the discipline of existing multilateral regimes, including in trade, fi nance and nuclear non-proliferation. India has also actively supported a global solution to the challenge of global warming and climate change. Second, that even as India pursues a policy of multi-alignment in a world marked by a multipolar balance of power, the viability of its policy will hinge upon how China responds to India’s rise and its core national security concerns. Finally, that as Big Power rivalries return and a new Cold War may be in the offi ng, India will have to reassess its options given its developmental aspirations. An assertive China seeking hegemonic dominance in Asia could reduce India’s options and encourage it to build new alliances that are aimed at enhancing national security and ensuring a more balanced distribution of power.

Although middle powers are expected to behave as supporters of international organisations, cooperation, and as promoters of norms and ethics, as well as providers of international public goods, they are not immune to current global 'de-democratisation' processes. The authoritarian turn challenges the patterns of behaviour of middle powers. This article discusses the changes of middlepowermanship engagement by presenting an analysis of middle powers' foreign policy and their narratives thereof. We analyse whether and how middle powers experiencing democracy backsliding have changed their language of political communication and contribution to international relations. We argue that the redefinitions of middle powers' foreign policy remain in line with their broadly understood foreign policy culture, that is that a middle power embedded within consensus-oriented domestic political context is less likely to change its foreign policy than a middle power embedded within conflict-oriented domestic political context. The argument is substantiated by an analysis of political behaviour of Indonesia, representing the former, and Brazil, representing the latter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nigeria has the largest Muslim population and economy in terms of gross domestic product in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation among other political, economic, or cultural groupings. Thus, especially in good economic times, Nigeria has a great deal of influence not only on the continent of Africa, but also beyond that geographical region as a middle power. Domestically, Muslims constitute a slight majority in Nigeria's population with almost all the remainder being Christian. Although Nigeria's constitution prohibits an official religion, twelve of the country's thirty-six states (located in the north) follow sharia, or Islamic law. Before Britain's colonization in the nineteenth century, the northern regions of Nigeria constituted parts of two Sunni Muslim political entities, the Sokoto Caliphate and the Bornu Empire. Although Nigeria's military and civilian presidents have sometimes acted on their own whims with regard to foreign policy toward the Middle East, in most cases Nigeria's economic development and internal security have been their overriding concerns. This article addresses Nigeria's relations with Muslim countries in the Middle East, among them Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, which are also middle powers. Nigeria, through a balanced approach, has been able to avoid getting involved in Middle Eastern regional squabbles and disputes, while at the same time benefiting from economic investment from countries in that region. Nevertheless, corruption and inefficiency have precluded any real benefit for the vast majority of Nigeria's population from the revenues derived from the export of hydrocarbons. All the while the country has been affected adversely by the actions of both Sunni and Shi'i indigenous jihadist groups, which have been inspired at least in part by developments in the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considering middle powers' potential to address new demands worldwide and their propensity to contribute to new forms of institution-building in global governance, arrangements between them consist of interesting opportunities to promote sustainable development. However, some have shown to be more effective than others in this regard. When observing two of these partnerships' outcomes between 2015 and 2018, India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA) Trilateral Forum has demonstrated more effectiveness than Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia (MIKTA) New Innovative Partnership. To understand why, this study analyses specialized literature, with special attention to Koenig-Archibugi's (2002) framework on global governance arrangements' effectiveness. Arguing that middle power arrangements that address sustainable development are more effective when benefiting from greater functional specialization and that diversified power access also plays a role, this study raises awareness about middle powers' relevance in addressing new global demands. The study points out the nascent research on these informal partnerships and the causal relations between these arrangements' structures and effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current challenges facing the liberal international order suggest there is greater need for reassessing the roles that different categories of states may perform in support of this order. Middle powers appear as leading candidates for a supportive role to the liberal order due to their historical commitment to internationalism, coalition building with like-minded democracies and activism within multilateral institutions. Such orientation, however, is questionable for Southern middle powers that often appear ambivalent in their foreign policies, restricted in their collaboration with other democracies and selective in their multilateral initiatives. This article discusses the cases of Brazil and South Africa to examine the current options for Southern middle powers and concludes that despite certain limitations, South Africa is, overall, closer to assuming a supportive stance towards the liberal international order and its institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to correlate Indonesia's global maritime fulcrum (GMF) as Indonesia's middle power strategy to its response to the two geopolitical strategies of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of China and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) of the Quad (the United States, India, Japan and Australia). This article used the process-tracing method to examine the information sourced from journal articles, news media outlets, government press releases and other resources. The article unfolds in four sections. The first explains the background of why the global maritime fulcrum was chosen as Indonesia's middle power strategy response tothe BRI and FOIP. The second explains how Indonesia uses the GMF as its middle power strategy. The third part explores how the middle power strategy through the GMF policy responds tothe BRI. The last part elaborates on Indonesia's strategy when responding to the FOIP. It concludes that it is prevalent that Indonesia uses the GMF as its middle power strategy when responding to the BRI and FOIP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considering middle powers’ potential to address new demands worldwide and their propensity to contribute to new forms of institution-building in global governance, arrangements between them consist of interesting opportunities to promote sustainable development. However, some have shown to be more effective than others in this regard. When observing two of these partnerships’ outcomes between 2015 and 2018, India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA) Trilateral Forum has demonstrated more effectiveness than Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia (MIKTA) New Innovative Partnership. To understand why, this study analyses specialized literature, with special attention to Koenig-Archibugi’s (2002) framework on global governance arrangements’ effectiveness. Arguing that middle power arrangements that address sustainable development are more effective when benefiting from greater functional specialization and that diversified power access also plays a role, this study raises awareness about middle powers’ relevance in addressing new global demands. The study points out the nascent research on these informal partnerships and the causal relations between these arrangements’ structures and effectiveness.

Copyright of EurAmerica is the property of EurAmerica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has undergone significant changes in its organisation since 1948. A new global environment established by the end of Cold War, elevated the Police Division to a more pronounced role in international peace as an essential pillar of UN peacekeeping missions. Nonetheless, despite the increased role of police in international missions, research on police contributions to peacekeeping remains limited. This article addresses this gap in literature by highlighting the case of Turkey's contribution to UN international police peacekeeping missions. The article confirms empirically that the Turkish police contribution has increased since the 2000s by relying on quantitative data offered by the TUBAKOV dataset designed to collect data on international peacekeeping missions of Turkey. The paper contends that, besides global trends, the increased participation of Turkey in UN-led missions reflects its internal political dynamics. First, under the JDP rule, Turkey's Cold War era subtle foreign policy was transformed to a proactive policy in global politics. Second, since the 2000s, the transformation of civil–military relations has ended the system of military tutelage, and this has had a considerable impact on foreign policy. Civilian authority, by abolishing military dominance, has become the primary actor in foreign policy decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hyper forms of globalization have contributed to the diffusion and de-institutionalization of state power (Chin and Mittelman, 1997) and to growing populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism in Europe that have questioned the liberal international order’s effectiveness, legitimacy and authority. What has come under threat is not only the order itself, but the economic prosperity, security, peace, and normative foundations that has nurtured it. In this context of a emerging world order we examine what function so-called middle powers on both sides of the Atlantic could play? While often overseen in recent years, middle powers are important units of analysis to study because during the times of the ‘old’ order in the aftermath of WWII they had benefitted most of the stable liberal international order, and as a result they have the most to lose today in case that order changes dramatically or even disappears. In looking back at middle power’s presence at creation of the liberal international world order in the aftermath of WWII, we suggest, helps us to comprehend what function middle powers could play in this current wave of changing transatlantic orders. Especially their intraalliance bridgebuilding function is important in this regard that in the past helped to balance the interests of the major powers. Canada is discussed as a case study.

States have many functions. The core one should be keeping its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Diplomacy and international law cannot guarantee their security. An armed force is an inherent part of each state that wants to be truly independent. Small states and middle powers have more difficulties when recruiting manpower for the military service compared to the great powers. The aim of this article is to find out what kind of recruitment model is the most suitable for small states and middle powers, focusing on the example of European democratic states. The article concludes that the best military recruitment system is based on a strong link between armed forces and society. National defence education is also of high importance. Regular armed forces should be composed of highly trained professionals backed by reserves

This article examines Saudi Arabia's decision in recent years to use novel and hitherto unexplored informal alliance formats, which we term multinational security coalitions (MSCs). This development was initiated by the new Saudi political leadership under King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who have a much greater inclination to pursue proactive foreign and security policies than their predecessors. However, it will be highlighted that beyond the priorities of individual personalities, this shift in Saudi Arabia's behaviour occurred against the backdrop of significant changes in the existing security environment, including the perceived withdrawal of the United States from the security affairs of the region during the presidency of Barack Obama, and crucially also Saudi Arabia's frustration over the failure of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to develop into a viable security mechanism. The article begins with the introduction of the key ideas relating to institutional design, the conceptual framework for this study. Section two outlines the most important reasons for Saudi Arabia's choice of the MSC format. The third section examines the strengths of the MSC format—especially informality, the resulting low entry-thresholds and the low risk of entrapment—that provided Saudi Arabia with partial and temporary success in recruiting coalition partners and thus bolstering its leadership role. The final section demonstrates, however, that ultimately MSCs are not a panacea. The informality of MSCs that makes it easy for the pivotal state to assemble a coalition also makes it hard for it to forge, and enforce, a common vision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]