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Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-psp-10.1177_01461672221148396 for Autonomous Motives Foster Sustained Commitment to Action: Integrating Self-Determination Theory and the Social Identity Approach by Lisette Yip, Emma F. Thomas, Catherine Amiot, Winnifred R. Louis and Craig McGarty in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

We examine whether the types of motivation outlined in self-determination theory can predict opinion-based group identification and continued engagement in collective action after experiencing a setback or failure. We will use random intercept cross lagged panel models to analyse data collected at three timepoints during the 2017 marriage equality plebiscite in Australia.

Collective action refers to action taken by a group to enhance their situation, or to achieve a common outcome (Elster, 1985). Collective action may take the form of conventional or radical action. Conventional collective action describes actions that adhere to social norms (Louis, 2009) and radical collective action describes actions that go against general social norms, and may be violent in nature (Louis et al., 2021). There has been much research into what may motivate and increase the intentions of individuals to engage in collective action, where moral conviction (Skitka & Bauman, 2008; van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2012; Lizzio-Wilson et al., 2021) has been linked to collective action intentions. Moral conviction describes strong and absolute stances on moralised issues that are resistant to change (Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005). Moreover, it is proposed that one’s intention to engage in either conventional or radical collective action is impacted by whether collective change is perceived to be possible or not. This links to the concept of collective gridlock. Collective gridlock refers to prolonged, divisive intergroup stalemates that renders collective groups unable to address urgent matters (Louis et al., 2022-2024). The concept of gridlock is drawn from research that investigates intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007), polarisation (Finkel et al., 2020) and mutual radicalisation (Moghaddam, 2018). Thus, it is suggested that gridlock occurs when the structures and/or policies surrounding an issue are rigid and resistant to change, leading to an increased sense of threat or conflict. This, in turn, is suggested to lead to radical or violent responses, which may lead to increased conflict and unrest. Moreover, these behavioural responses are proposed to lead to opponent counter-mobilisation, rendering groups of stakeholders unable to engage in effective collective action to resolve the urgent issue. Climate change can be perceived to be in a state of gridlock, as climate change movements are subject to acrimony, contestation, and delay, significantly affecting collective attempts to respond to the climate crisis (Louis et al., 2022-2024). Investigations into how meaningful collective change can be created when movements are in this state of gridlock are limited. Given this, it is important to investigate potential mechanisms of collective action whereby gridlock is likely to be exerting an effect. In this study, we will examine the psychological phenomena of gridlock and moral convictions surrounding climate change. Specifically, we will investigate how moral conviction impacts the relationship of gridlock on both conventional and radical collective action intentions. Gridlock will be manipulated by presenting participants with narratives that describe the climate change movement. To do this, we will provide participants with information about the urgent threat climate change poses, and how countries have responded to this threat. Participants will either be presented with a narrative that describes responses to climate change as stalemated (gridlock), will receive no text (control), or that these responses are progressing (momentum). Moral conviction has previously been seen to explain collective action intentions and conflict resolution. Specifically, research has demonstrated that stronger moral convictions lead individuals to engage in behaviours that affirm their moral beliefs (Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Zaal et al., 2017). However, it has also been discovered that persistent failure and threat can have a moralising effect, where moral convictions increase as threat increases (Louis et al., 2021; Lizzio-Wilson et al., 2021). As threat is a core aspect of gridlock, the current study will assess moral conviction as a consequence of gridlock, as well as a moderator of the impact of gridlock. Hence, we will examine whether gridlock heightens moral convictions, flowing on to increase action intentions, and whether higher (pre-measured) moral convictions increase the impact of gridlock on action outcomes. The context of this study will be the global climate crisis, where participants will be those who self-identify as supporters of taking action to address the issue of climate change. The aims of this study are to add to the literature on climate change and collective action, and to fill a gap in our knowledge about the psychological processes underpinning collective gridlock. Such knowledge is critical for understanding how conflict may be sustained and challenged, and thus, is a vital aid in mitigating and managing environmental crises.

This project aims to investigate the effects of perceived gridlock on psychological responses, such as activism burnout, and how these responses propel different action intentions (conventional and radical action). Gridlock is characterised by prolonged, divisive, intergroup stalemates, where conflict between groups of stakeholders renders individuals unable to address problems that are recognised as urgent, mitigate costs that are recognised as unnecessary, or achieve goals that are mutually shared (Louis et al., 2022-2024). However, there is currently limited theoretical explanation for how the psychological processes of gridlock play out and amplify over time. Research suggests that gridlock is likely to be associated with decreased conventional action intentions and increased radical action intentions (Louis et al., 2022-2024; Lizzio-Wilson et al., 2021). This project will aim to provide empirical support for this theory, where gridlock will be explored in an anti-racism context. This project seeks to develop a more thorough understanding of how gridlock exerts itself in this context, and to explore how the consequential psychological and behavioural effects of gridlock can be mitigated. Considering this, the psychological ramifications of gridlock on one’s outlook on collective action (activism burnout) will be analysed, in addition to their potential novel mediating effects on action intentions. Through this lens, innovative findings on how such variables interrelate in ways that sustain hostile conflict can be made. Moreover, this study will be one of the first to quantitatively analyse activism burnout in an anti-racism context. Previous literature has investigated causes of activism burnout in a qualitative manner, where it has been found that there are many underlying causes of burnout (Gorski, 2019). Other studies found that activism burnout results in the deterioration of one’s well-being, as well as feelings of disillusionment and hopelessness (Gorski & Chen, 2015). As such, this project proposes that activism burnout will act as a product of gridlock and a mediator of the impact of gridlock. That is, we examine whether gridlock heightens burnout, flowing on to increase action intentions. By providing a better understanding of the psychology of collective gridlock, it will be possible to identify best practices for stimulating breakthroughs. This knowledge is crucial for understanding how conventional collective action is stalled and why activism burnout is sustained.

The aim of this study is to obtain information from individuals to identify psychological processes that affect decision-making in the climate context. Our analyses focus on the perception of gridlock or momentum in those contexts as well as individual and collective experiences and perceptions of strategies to move forward with the debates on climate change. More specifically, we aimed to examine the effects of perceived gridlock on participants' willingness to participate in collective radical action in the climate change context. This study is being conducted by a team led by Professor Winnifred Louis of the University of Queensland (contactable at w.louis@psy.uq.edu.au or +61 733469515). The data also will support student projects for honours (4th year) psychology students at the University of Queensland in 2023. In this study, participants were either simply asked to complete the measures of psychological variables including perceived gridlock in the debates of climate change that connect with these research questions. Due to the large amount of large literature on collective action already, we controlled for many other variables that have been found to be important in past research. For example, group-based emotions, efficacy, group identification, gender, age, education level, religiosity, and political orientation were all collective. This particular study focuses on collectively perceived gridlock and radical action intention in the climate change context. Radical action refers to actions that reject general social norms and maybe often be violent or law-breaking in nature (Louis et al., 2021). There has been much research into what may motivate and increase the intentions of individuals to engage in collective radical action, and there is evidence that perceived failure predicted intentions to engage in collective radical action (Louis et al., 2021). Moral convictions, defined as one's feelings about a given attitude are based on one's beliefs about right and wrong and that having moral conviction means having an attitude with moral significance. In past research, moral conviction (Skitka & Bauman, 2008; van Zomeren, 2012; Lizzio-Wilson et al., 2021) has been linked to collective radical action intentions. It is proposed that one’s intention to engage in radical collective action is impacted by perceived failure, and radical action participation is influenced by whether individuals believe the climate change movement to a moral issue or not and whether they believe in an inherited social hierarchy. and absolute stances on moralised issues that are resistant to change (Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005). It is proposed that one’s intention to engage in radical collective action is impacted by perceived failure, and radical action participation is influenced by whether individuals believe the climate change movement to a moral issue or not and whether they believe in an inherited social hierarchy. Research further supports that political ideology influences individuals participation in climate change activism and discussions, as a meta-analysis found that people with higher social dominance attitudes were less likely to support the climate change movements and engage in progressive political action (Stanley & Wilson, 2019). Social dominance orientation (SDO) describes one’s belief that is and needs to be the social hierarchy and also describes the extent to which they desire their in-group to be superior to out-groups (Saeri et al., 2015; Stanley & Wilson, 2019) This study’s overall aim is to investigate the moderating effect of moral conviction and social dominance orientation on perceived gridlock and radical action.

Climate change deliberations have resulted in a stalemate between opponents of reform and environmental activists, leading to collective gridlock. This phenomenon, observed in various debates from nuclear arms proliferation to global trade agreements, is characterised by a standstill in negotiations, hampering progress, compromise and consensus between groups (Hale & Held, 2018; Ramiah & Hewstone, 2013). The persistence of gridlock reinforces negative consequences such as multipolarity, fragmentation, increased hostility towards opposing groups and radicalisation (Hale & Held, 2018; Louis et al., 2020; Moghaddam, 2018). Understanding the psychological effects of collective gridlock is crucial to finding a path through the climate change debate and addressing the urgent challenge of global warming. The study aims to test the hypothesis that perceiving collective gridlock in an issue individuals support can trigger a variety of emotional reactions, ultimately resulting in an unwillingness to compromise. This study is primarily exploratory as previous literature has not explicitly examined the link between collective gridlock and willingness to compromise. However, it is grounded in logical reasoning derived from related research where, the terminology differs, but the underlining variables are synonymous. For example, previous research has found that intractable conflicts, characterized by persistent, violent, and deeply rooted gridlocks originating in a society's religious, cultural, or political beliefs, are associated with a decrease in compromise (Gayer et al., 2009; Halperin et al., 2013). We hypothesise this relationship will also be evident in the increasingly salient issue of climate change policy in Australia and may be mediated by increased mutual radicalisation and decreased compassion. Mutual radicalisation is a dynamic where perceived radicalisation of the outgroup contributes to extremism on both sides, resulting in decreased willingness compromise (Moghaddam, 2018). The concept has been referred to by various terms in the literature, including cumulative extremism (Eatwell, 2006), counter-terrorism (Crelinstein, 2010), and co-radicalisation (Pratt, 2015; Busher & Macklin, 2015). However, it has been widely accepted as "Mutual Radicalisation" in the book by Gulliver et al. (2021), building upon the seminal work of Moghaddam (2018) in his book, Mutual Racialisation. For the purpose of this study, mutual radicalisation is operationalised as 'perceived outgroup radicalisation,' which encompasses hostility, personal radical intentions, and a decreased willingness to compromise, as described by Moghaddam (2018) and Gulliver et al. (2021). Compassion is a positive predictor of compromise with outgroups, as it promotes prosocial behaviour and reconciliation in various social dilemmas (Singer & Steinbeis, 2009). Research in emotion psychology, neuroscience, and economics supports this relationship (Klimecki, 2019; Kirk et al., 2016; Li et al., 2018). Although the direct link between gridlock and compassion has not been studied, compassion fatigue research suggests that prolonged frustration and exhaustion can decrease empathy towards outgroups (Zhang et al., 2018). Given the established connection between compassion and the ability to reach compromises (Klimecki, 2019), understanding how collective gridlock affects compassion towards outgroups could provide valuable insights into breaking the cycle of gridlock. Climate change is a significant debate of our time, and tensions are escalating as opponents spread misinformation and doubt, while activists have resorted to violent protests due to frustration with slow policy changes (Hale et al., 2013; Spadaro, 2020). Investigating the mechanisms underlying the rejection of compromise in the climate change debate is crucial for navigating the current state of gridlock.

A. Intro The present research has three specific goals. It aims at investigating the impact of outcomes of democratic processes on i) perceptions of others’ opinions in the society (i.e., societal norm perceptions; Cialdini et al., 1991) and ii) the psychological well-being of sexual minorities. Finally, it aims at iii) exploring how these changes in perceptions of others’ opinions explain potential changes in psychological well-being. To address these goals, we rely on a longitudinal study in Switzerland, which consists of data that were collected before and after the national voting on extending protection against discrimination to sexual minorities. B. Hypotheses This research aims at providing a better understanding of the impact of outcomes of democratic processes on individuals’ lives. First, because democratic processes are a direct indicator of public support for different issues, this research seeks to investigate how outcomes of democratic processes about sexual minorities impact perceptions of others’ opinions (i.e., perceived societal norms) Research Question 1: How do outcomes of democratic processes about sexual minorities impact perceptions of societal norms toward different sexual minorities’ issues? Initial evidence in the literature suggests that new rights influence perceptions of societal norms (e.g., Eisner et al., 2020; Tankard & Paluck, 2017). Yet, this research also shows that the shift in perceived norms does not necessarily spread to other issues (e.g., a new law on step-child adoption in Switzerland impacted perceived norms toward same-sex parenting but not toward same-sex marriage; Eisner et al., 2020). Based on this evidence, we expect that: The outcome of democratic processes will influence societal norm perceptions. More specifically, we expect that outcomes of democratic processes in favor of sexual minority rights will positively (i.e., consistent with the direction of change) influence norm perceptions by sexual minorities (H1.1). This might, in particular, be the case for norms related to the object of the referendum. Second, this research aims to investigate whether outcomes of democratic processes in favor of sexual minorities impact individuals’ psychological well-being: Research Question 2: How do outcomes of democratic processes about sexual minorities impact the psychological well-being of sexual minorities? Sexual minorities will report experiencing a higher level of psychological well-being following outcomes of democratic processes (H2.1). This effect should be stronger for sexual minorities who highly identify with people who support LGBTIQ+ rights (H2.2) Finally, bringing these goals together, this research aims at understanding the mechanisms behind changes in people’s psychological well-being following outcomes of democratic processes: Research Question 3: To what extent do changes in perceived societal norms in the population explain changes in the psychological well-being of sexual minorities following democratic processes? According to the minority stress framework (Meyer, 2003; see also Hatzenbuehler, 2009), stigmatized minorities’ exposure to unique stressors such as discrimination and rejection lead to detrimental health outcomes and lower psychological well-being. The minority stress model suggests that the effect of distal stressors (e.g., laws or political campaigns) on mental health outcomes is mediated by proximal stressors such as perceived hostile social norms (Hatzenbueler, 2009). Based on the minority stress model, one would expect that sexual minorities experience less detrimental health outcomes following a supportive public ruling, as it should decrease their expectation of rejection by others in the society (e.g., perception of a less intolerant societal norm). Changes in psychological well-being will be partially explained by the shift in norm perceptions (perception of the status quo in the society) for sexual minorities (H3.1), especially those who highly identify with supporters of sexual minorities' rights (H3.2). C. Swiss Study To investigate the impact of outcomes of democratic processes on perceptions of societal norms among sexual minorities, their psychological well-being, and the mechanisms behind these effects, we will rely on Swiss data that were collected among sexual minority members around a public referendum on discrimination. On the 9th of February 2020, 63.1% of Swiss citizens voted in favor of ‘adding protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the Swiss law’. We will use the results of this public referendum as a natural experiment – relying on data collected before (December 2019 to early February 2020) and one month after the public referendum (data collection started on the 9th of March 2020). It may be noted that this second data collection coincides with the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in Switzerland – the first semi-lockdown was implemented on the 16th of March 2020, one week after the start of the data collection. For this reason, it is possible that the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic impacted participants’ psychological well-being as well (particularly if they participated after the 9th of March 2020). Thus, a question about the perceived impact of Covid-19 is included as a control variable for well-being. Measures We assessed the following variables for the postulated model. We included additional variables for exploratory analyses and research unrelated to the current project. The complete questionnaire can be found online on OSF. Dependent variable Psychological Well-being. Psychological well-being was assessed using measures of positive and negative emotions. Six items adapted from Diener et al. (1985; see also Branscombe et al., 1999) were assessed on a 7-point-Likert scale (1 = very rarely, 7 = very frequently). Participants rated the extent to which they experienced different negative and positive emotions in the last month: (a) sadness, (b) helplessness, (c) shame, (d) enthusiasm, (e) happiness, and (f) pride. Independent Variables Perceived Societal Norm. The perceived societal norm was assessed using three sets of items. First, participants indicated their perception of how freely sexual minorities can disclose their sexual orientation in Switzerland, on a 7-point-Likert scale (1 = not at all, 7 = totally). Then, participants indicated their perception of the general climate toward sexual minorities in Switzerland (1 = very negative, 7 = very positive). Finally, we used two items adapted from the European Social Survey (2006). These items have been assessed on a 7-point-Likert scale (1 = would totally disapprove, 7 = would totally approve). Participants rated their perception of most Swiss people’s opinion toward (a) improving the rights of sexual minorities and (b) same-sex marriage (i.e., “If a same-sex couple wants to get married, most people in Switzerland would…”). Campaign. In the pre-referendum survey, we assessed campaign awareness: Participants indicated whether they had recently seen a political campaign related to the 9th of February voting on adding protection from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The response categories were “1 = Yes, I have seen a campaign from the side which is against adding protection from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the law”, “2 = Yes, I have seen a campaign from the side which is in favor of adding protection from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the law”, “3 = Yes, I have seen campaigns from both sides”, “4 = No, I did not see any campaign”. In the analyses below these measures are coded as two dummy codes for sight of pro-protection campaign (0 = no, 1 = yes) and sight of anti-protection campaign (0 = no, 1 = yes). In the post-referendum survey only, we assessed campaign toxicity with the following item: Participants indicated the extent to which they think that the campaign “against extending the discrimination law” used tactics that could have negative consequences for LGBTIQ+ people and their families. This item has been assessed on a 7-point-Likert scale (1 = not at all, 7 = totally). Identification with Opinion-based Groups. Two items (one item, past-referendum) were assessed on a 7-point-Likert scale (1 = not at all, 7 = totally). In both surveys, participants rated the extent to which they: (a) identify with people who support the rights of sexual minorities. In the pre-referendum survey only, participants rated the extent to which they: (b) feel strong ties with people who support the rights of sexual minorities. Potential Mediators Minority Stress. We assessed several items commonly used in the minority stress literature. These items have been assessed on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Participants indicated whether they: (a) worry a lot about what others think about them being a sexual minority member, (b) think very carefully before coming out to someone, (c) are very open about their sexual identity (this item will be reversed), (d) ever avoid expressing your sexual orientation for fear of a negative reaction from others (this item was only assessed in the pre-referendum survey). Feeling of Inclusion. Feeling of inclusion was assessed using a set of two items. These items have been assessed on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = totally). Participants indicated the extent to which they (a) feel that they are included in the Swiss society, (b) feel that they are part of the Swiss society (this item was only assessed in the pre-referendum survey). Covid-19 Control Variable Impact of Covid-19. In the post-referendum survey only, participants indicated the extent to which their psychological well-being has been affected in the past month by different factors (e.g., political change, climate change) and the outbreak of viruses (i.e., covid-19). The Covid-19 item is included as a control variable, assessed on a 7-point scale (1 = very negatively affected, 4 = not affected, 7 = very positively affected). Sample and Exclusion Criteria We recruited members of sexual (e.g., lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals) minorities living in Switzerland through online platforms (e.g., social networking sites, snowball sampling, and contacting relevant organizations in Switzerland) and on university campuses. Approximately 400 sexual minorities participated in the pre and in the post referendum survey. We will include participants for our analyses who participated in both waves of data collection and with less than 20% missing data on relevant items. We will further examine the patterns of missingness. Main Analyses Data analysis will follow the standard procedure to estimate moderation and mediation using within-participants designs (Judd et al., 2001) and recent recommendations to test for indirect effects (see Montoya & Hayes, 2017; Yzerbyt et al., 2018). First, we will examine the impact of the public voting on people’s perceptions of the norms (Research Question 1). To do so, we will match participants’ answers to the pre-voting and the post-voting study. Because it is possible that only norms closer to the topic of the referendum (i.e., extending the anti-discrimination law) will be affected by it (e.g., general climate), we will begin by comparing the impact of the voting on perceptions of norms toward different issues (e.g., same-sex marriage, rights in general, general climate) using one sample t-tests in an exploratory manner (we will correct for multiple-testing). If we find similar patterns and high correlation among the items, we will combine the measures of perceived norms. We will run a confirmatory factor analysis to test whether our decision fits the data well. Next, we will investigate the impact of the public voting on people’s psychological well-being (Research Question 2). Using a similar methodological approach, we will test for the difference in reported psychological well-being in the past month before and after the public voting. We will first run a confirmatory factor analysis to test whether negative and positive emotions load, as expected, on two factors as in previous studies. If not, we will construct one factor. Because research mostly either focuses on negative or positive emotions, it is not clear if the effects will be the same or different for positive and negative emotions. Depending on this decision, we will conduct one or two one sample t-test(s). We will further look at whether participants’ level of identification at Time 1 (i.e., pre-referendum survey) moderates the relationship between the public voting and psychological well-being. Finally, we will test for the impact of changes in norm perceptions on changes in psychological well-being (Research Question 3). To do so, we will create difference scores between perceived norms at Time 1 (T1) and Time 2 (T2) and well-being at T1 and T2. We will then regress changes in norms on changes in well-being using these difference scores (see Judd et al., 2001; Yzerbit et al., 2018). In line with past research, we will also include the sum of perceived norms (T1 and T2) in the model to account for the fact that the effect of perceived norms on well-being can differ between T1 and T2 (see Judd et al., 2001; Montoya & Hayes, 2017). We will further add participants’ level of identification at Time 1 in the model to test for the moderation effect of identification. This last set of analyses (i.e., addressing Research Question 3) is contingent on the results of the first two research questions – that is whether there are differences in both norm perceptions and psychological well-being between Time 1 and Time 2. First, we will create scores for the different variables on the basis of factorial analyses. The analyses would examine whether norm changes affect all psychological well-being indicators equally, or whether some are more closely affected, and whether the spillover of the norm change to broader perceptions of a more favorable climate also broadens the impact on psychological well-being. Additional Exploratory Analyses As additional exploratory analyses, we will also test the possible roles of exposure to the pro- and anti-campaigns as a source of perceived norm changes or well-being and as moderators of the associations between changes in norms and psychological well-being. Because data for the post-voting survey were collected right at the beginning of the rise of Covid-19 in Switzerland, participants’ psychological well-being might have been altered. In particular, the first semi-lockdown in Switzerland was implemented one week after the start of the data collection of the post-referendum survey. While many participants participated before the implementation of the semi-lockdown, it is unclear whether their psychological well-being had already been impacted by Covid-19. We assessed the impact of Covid-19 on participants’ psychological well-being using a direct question. For this reason, we will run additional exploratory analyses (e.g., by including this additional construct in the model). Besides investigating the impact of the campaign and Covid-19 on changes in psychological well-being, we will also explore whether characteristics among the participants (i.e., age, gender, sexual orientation) and/or contextual variables (i.e., language-speaking region) affect the findings. Further, to address our last Research Question, we will run an additional exploratory model including items of minority stressors as additional mediators. In addition, if our findings support our hypothesis H3.1, we will additionally explore whether “feeling of inclusion” mediates the impact of perceived norms on psychological well-being (see Badgett, 2011).

We examine how social contacts and feelings of solidarity shape experiences of loneliness during the COVID-19 lockdown in early 2020. From the PsyCorona database, we obtained longitudinal data from 23 countries, collected between March and May 2020. The results demonstrated that although online contacts help to reduce feelings of loneliness, people who feel more lonely are less likely to use that strategy. Solidarity played only a small role in shaping feelings of loneliness during lockdown. Thus, it seems we must look beyond the current focus on online contact and solidarity to help people address feelings of loneliness during lockdown. Finally, online contacts did not function as a substitute for face-to-face contacts outside the home—in fact, more frequent online contact in earlier weeks predicted more frequent face-to-face contacts in later weeks. As such, this work provides relevant insights into how individuals manage the impact of restrictions on their social lives.

Cross-societal differences in cooperation and trust among strangers in the provision of public goods may be key to understanding how societies are managing the COVID-19 pandemic. We report a survey conducted across 41 societies between March and May 2020 (N = 34,526), and test pre-registered hypotheses about how cross-societal differences in cooperation and trust relate to prosocial COVID-19 responses (e.g., social distancing), stringency of policies, and support for behavioral regulations (e.g., mandatory quarantine). We further tested whether cross-societal variation in institutions and ecologies theorized to impact cooperation were associated with prosocial COVID-19 responses, including institutional quality, religiosity, and historical prevalence of pathogens. We found substantial variation across societies in prosocial COVID-19 responses, stringency of policies, and support for behavioral regulations. However, we found no consistent evidence to support the idea that cross-societal variation in cooperation and trust among strangers is associated with these outcomes related to the COVID-19 pandemic. These results were replicated with another independent cross-cultural COVID-19 dataset (N = 112,136), and in both snowball and representative samples. We discuss implications of our results, including challenging the assumption that managing the COVID-19 pandemic across societies is best modeled as a public goods dilemma.

BackgroundThe effective implementation of government policies and measures for controlling the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic requires compliance from the public. This study aimed to examine cross-sectional and longitudinal associations of trust in government regarding COVID-19 control with the adoption of recommended health behaviours and prosocial behaviours, and potential determinants of trust in government during the pandemic.MethodsThis study analysed data from the PsyCorona Survey, an international project on COVID-19 that included 23 733 participants from 23 countries (representative in age and gender distributions by country) at baseline survey and 7785 participants who also completed follow-up surveys. Specification curve analysis was used to examine concurrent associations between trust in government and self-reported behaviours. We further used structural equation model to explore potential determinants of trust in government. Multilevel linear regressions were used to examine associations between baseline trust and longitudinal behavioural changes.ResultsHigher trust in government regarding COVID-19 control was significantly associated with higher adoption of health behaviours (handwashing, avoiding crowded space, self-quarantine) and prosocial behaviours in specification curve analyses (median standardised β = 0.173 and 0.229, p < 0.001). Government perceived as well organised, disseminating clear messages and knowledge on COVID-19, and perceived fairness were positively associated with trust in government (standardised β = 0.358, 0.230, 0.056, and 0.249, p < 0.01). Higher trust at baseline survey was significantly associated with lower rate of decline in health behaviours over time (p for interaction = 0.001).ConclusionsThese results highlighted the importance of trust in government in the control of COVID-19.

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-nvs-10.1177_08997640221093799 for An Investigation of Factors Influencing Environmental Volunteering Leadership and Participation Behaviors by Robyn E. Gulliver, Kelly S. Fielding and Winnifred R. Louis in Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly

During the initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. conservative politicians and the media downplayed the risk of both contracting COVID-19 and the effectiveness of recommended health behaviors. Health behavior theories suggest perceived vulnerability to a health threat and perceived effectiveness of recommended health-protective behaviors determine motivation to follow recommendations. Accordingly, we predicted that—as a result of politicization of the pandemic—politically conservative Americans would be less likely to enact recommended health-protective behaviors. In two longitudinal studies of U.S. residents, political conservatism was inversely associated with perceived health risk and adoption of health-protective behaviors over time. The effects of political orientation on health-protective behaviors were mediated by perceived risk of infection, perceived severity of infection, and perceived effectiveness of the health-protective behaviors. In a global cross-national analysis, effects were stronger in the U.S. (N = 10,923) than in an international sample (total N = 51,986), highlighting the increased and overt politicization of health behaviors in the U.S.