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Roughly 20 years of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have investigated the neural correlates underlying engagement in social cognition (e.g. empathy and emotion perception) about targets spanning various social categories (e.g. race and gender). Yet, findings from individual studies remain mixed. In the present quantitative functional neuroimaging meta-analysis, we summarized across 50 fMRI studies of social cognition to identify consistent differences in neural activation as a function of whether the target of social cognition was an in-group or out-group member. We investigated if such differences varied according to a specific social category (i.e. race) and specific social cognitive processes (i.e. empathy and emotion perception). We found that social cognition about in-group members was more reliably related to activity in brain regions associated with mentalizing (e.g. dorsomedial prefrontal cortex), whereas social cognition about out-group members was more reliably related to activity in regions associated with exogenous attention and salience (e.g. anterior insula). These findings replicated for studies specifically focused on the social category of race, and we further found intergroup differences in neural activation during empathy and emotion perception tasks. These results help shed light on the neural mechanisms underlying social cognition across group lines., (© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press.)

There has been extensive discussion about gender gaps in representation and career advancement in the sciences. However, psychological science itself has yet to be the focus of discussion or systematic review, despite our field's investment in questions of equity, status, well-being, gender bias, and gender disparities. In the present article, we consider 10 topics relevant for women's career advancement in psychological science. We focus on issues that have been the subject of empirical study, discuss relevant evidence within and outside of psychological science, and draw on established psychological theory and social-science research to begin to chart a path forward. We hope that better understanding of these issues within the field will shed light on areas of existing gender gaps in the discipline and areas where positive change has happened, and spark conversation within our field about how to create lasting change to mitigate remaining gender differences in psychological science.

What role does language play in emotion? Behavioral research shows that emotion words such as "anger" and "fear" alter emotion experience, but questions still remain about mechanism. Here, we review the neuroscience literature to examine whether neural processes associated with semantics are also involved in emotion. Our review suggests that brain regions involved in the semantic processing of words: (i) are engaged during experiences of emotion, (ii) coordinate with brain regions involved in affect to create emotions, (iii) hold representational content for emotion, and (iv) may be necessary for constructing emotional experience. We relate these findings with respect to four theoretical relationships between language and emotion, which we refer to as "non-interactive," "interactive," "constitutive," and "deterministic." We conclude that findings are most consistent with the interactive and constitutive views with initial evidence suggestive of a constitutive view, in particular. We close with several future directions that may help test hypotheses of the constitutive view., Competing Interests: Conflict of InterestOn behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest., (© The Society for Affective Science 2021.)

Although peer influence is a strong predictor of adolescents' risk-taking behaviors, not all adolescents are susceptible to their peer group. One hundred and thirty-six adolescents (M age  = 12.79 years) completed an fMRI scan, measures of perceived peer group norms, and engagement in risky behavior. Ventral striatum (VS) sensitivity when anticipating social rewards and avoiding social punishments significantly moderated the association between perceived peer norms and adolescents' own risk behaviors. Perceptions of more deviant peer norms were associated with increased risky behavior, but only for adolescents with high VS sensitivity; adolescents with low VS sensitivity were resilient to deviant peer norms, showing low risk taking regardless of peer context. Findings provide a novel contribution to the study of peer influence susceptibility., (Published 2020. This article is a U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA.)

Bodily sensations are closely linked to emotional experiences. However, most research assessing the body-emotion link focuses on young adult samples. Inspired by prior work showing age-related declines in autonomic reactivity and interoception, we present 2 studies investigating age-related differences in the extent to which adults (18-75 years) associate interoceptive or internal bodily sensations with emotions. Study 1 ( N = 150) used a property association task to assess age effects on adults' tendencies to associate interoceptive sensations, relative to behaviors or situations, with negative emotion categories (e.g., anger, sadness). Study 2 ( N = 200) used the Day Reconstruction experience sampling method to assess the effect of age on adults' tendencies to report interoceptive sensations and emotional experiences in daily life. Consistent with prior literature suggesting that older adults have more muted physiological responses and interoceptive abilities than younger adults, we found that older adults' mental representations (Study 1) and self-reported experiences (Study 2) of emotion are less associated with interoceptive sensations than are those of younger adults. Across both studies, age effects were most prominent for high arousal emotions (e.g., anger, fear) and sensations (e.g., racing heart) that are often associated with peripheral psychophysiological concomitants in young adults. These findings are consistent with psychological constructionist models and a "maturational dualism" account of emotional aging, suggesting additional pathways by which emotions may differ across adulthood. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

What is the relationship between language and emotion? The work that fills the pages of this special issue draws from interdisciplinary domains to weigh in on the relationship between language and emotion in semantics, cross-linguistic experience, development, emotion perception, emotion experience and regulation, and neural representation. These important new findings chart an exciting path forward for future basic and translational work in affective science., Competing Interests: Conflict of InterestThe corresponding author states there is no conflict of interest., (© The Society for Affective Science 2021.)

We report the first functional neuroimaging meta-analysis on age-related differences in adult neural activity during affect. We identified and coded experimental contrasts from 27 studies (published 1997-2018) with 490 older adults (55-87 years, M age  = 69 years) and 470 younger adults (18-39 years, M age  = 24 years). Using multilevel kernel density analysis, we assessed functional brain activation contrasts for older vs. younger adult affect across in-scanner tasks (i.e., affect induction and perception). Relative to older adults, younger adults showed more reliable activation in subcortical structures (e.g., amygdala, thalamus, caudate) and in relatively more posterior aspects of specific brain structures (e.g., posterior insula, mid- and posterior cingulate). In contrast, older adults exhibited more reliable activation in the prefrontal cortex and more anterior aspects of specific brain structures (e.g., anterior insula, anterior cingulate). Meta-analytic coactivation network analyses further revealed that in younger adults, the amygdala and mid-cingulate were more central, locally efficient network nodes, whereas in older adults, regions in the superior and medial prefrontal cortex were more central, locally efficient network nodes. Collectively, these findings help characterize age differences in the brain basis of affect and provide insights for future investigations into the neural mechanisms underlying affective aging., Competing Interests: Conflict of InterestsThe authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest., (© The Society for Affective Science 2020.)

Redox dysregulation and oxidative stress are final common pathways in the pathophysiology of a variety of psychiatric disorders, including schizophrenia. Oxidative stress causes dysfunction of GABAergic parvalbumin (PV)-positive interneurons (PVI), which are crucial for the coordination of neuronal synchrony during sensory and cognitive processing. Mitochondria are the main source of reactive oxygen species (ROS) in neurons and they control synaptic activity through their roles in energy production and intracellular calcium homeostasis. We have previously shown that in male mice transient blockade of NMDA receptors (NMDARs) during development [subcutaneous injections of 30 mg/kg ketamine (KET) on postnatal days 7, 9, and 11] results in long-lasting alterations in synaptic transmission and reduced PV expression in the adult prefrontal cortex (PFC), contributing to a behavioral phenotype that mimics multiple symptoms associated with schizophrenia. These changes correlate with oxidative stress and impaired mitochondrial function in both PVI and pyramidal cells. Here, we show that genetic deletion ( Ppif -/-) of the mitochondrial matrix protein cyclophilin D (CypD) prevents perinatal KET-induced increases in ROS and the resulting deficits in PVI function, and changes in excitatory and inhibitory synaptic transmission in the PFC. Deletion of CypD also prevented KET-induced behavioral deficits in cognitive flexibility, social interaction, and novel object recognition (NOR). Taken together, these data highlight how mitochondrial activity may play an integral role in modulating PVI-mediated cognitive processes. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Mitochondria are important modulators of oxidative stress and cell function, yet how mitochondrial dysfunction affects cell activity and synaptic transmission in psychiatric illnesses is not well understood. NMDA receptor (NMDAR) blockade with ketamine (KET) during development causes oxidative stress, dysfunction of parvalbumin (PV)-positive interneurons (PVI), and long-lasting physiological and behavioral changes. Here we show that mice deficient for the mitochondrial matrix protein cyclophilin D (CypD) show robust protection from PVI dysfunction following perinatal NMDAR blockade. Mitochondria serve as an essential node for a number of stress-induced signaling pathways and our experiments suggest that failure of mitochondrial redox regulation can contribute to PVI dysfunction., (Copyright © 2020 the authors.)

Understanding emotion words is vital to understanding, regulating, and communicating one's emotions. Yet, little work examines how emotion words are acquired by children. Previous research in linguistics suggests that children use the sentence frame in which a novel word is presented to home in on the meaning of that word, in conjunction with situational cues from the environment. No research has examined how children integrate these cues to learn the meaning of emotion adjectives (e.g., "happy," "sad," "mad"). We conducted 2 studies examining the role of sentence frame and situational context in children's (ages 3-5) understanding of the meanings of novel words denoting emotions. In Study 1 ( N = 135) children viewed a conversation wherein a novel "alien" word was presented in 1 of 3 sentence frames that varied in how likely the word was to denote an emotion (i.e., is daxy, feels daxy, or feels daxy about ). Children selected the image that represented the meaning of the word in a picture-pointing task. Images depicted aliens experiencing an emotion, a physical state, or performing an action. In Study 2 ( N = 113) situational context was added via cartoons depicting an emotional scenario. Findings suggest that children are more likely to associate emotion images with a novel word with increasing age, more informative sentence frames, and when the situational context implies that an emotion is present. This provides important insight on how educational and clinical settings can use language and situational context to aide in emotion understanding. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Experiences of discrete emotion play important roles in a variety of psychological domains. Yet, current measures of discrete emotion face significant limitations. Biological and behavioral measures often do not capture subjective experiences related to discrete emotions, while self-reports are susceptible to reporting biases. An indirect measure of discrete emotions would help address the limitations of existing measures; however, few such measures exist. Across 4 studies, we offer an indirect measure of discrete emotion. Our results provide evidence that our measure can distinguish between participants' experiences of same-valenced emotions (Study 1), is relatively less susceptible to deliberate attempts to suppress emotional responses (Studies 2 and 3), and is also relatively less susceptible to the influence of social norms (i.e., gender stereotypes) in self-reported discrete emotions than an explicit measure (Study 4). Overall, these findings demonstrate that our measure of discrete emotions can capture discrete emotional responses above and beyond affective valence, is indirect, and measures affective processes contributing to discrete emotional responses. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Many human languages have words for emotions such as "anger" and "fear," yet it is not clear whether these emotions have similar meanings across languages, or why their meanings might vary. We estimate emotion semantics across a sample of 2474 spoken languages using "colexification"-a phenomenon in which languages name semantically related concepts with the same word. Analyses show significant variation in networks of emotion concept colexification, which is predicted by the geographic proximity of language families. We also find evidence of universal structure in emotion colexification networks, with all families differentiating emotions primarily on the basis of hedonic valence and physiological activation. Our findings contribute to debates about universality and diversity in how humans understand and experience emotion., (Copyright © 2019 The Authors, some rights reserved; exclusive licensee American Association for the Advancement of Science. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.)

Emotions are often assumed to manifest in subcortical limbic and brainstem structures. While these areas are clearly important for representing affect (e.g., valence and arousal), we propose that the default mode network (DMN) is additionally important for constructing discrete emotional experiences (of anger, fear, disgust, etc.). Findings from neuroimaging studies, invasive electrical stimulation studies, and lesion studies support this proposal. Importantly, our framework builds on a constructionist theory of emotion to explain how instances involving diverse physiological and behavioral patterns can be conceptualized as belonging to the same emotion category. We argue that this ability requires abstraction (from concrete features to broad mental categories), which the DMN is well positioned to support, and we make novel predictions from our proposed framework., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Neurobiological models of adolescent decision-making emphasize developmental changes in brain regions involved in affect (e.g., ventral striatum) and cognitive control (e.g., lateral prefrontal cortex). Although social context plays an important role in adolescent decision-making, current models do not discuss brain regions implicated in processing social information (e.g., dorsomedial prefrontal cortex). We conducted a coordinate-based meta-analysis using the Multilevel peak Kernel Density Analysis (MKDA) method to test the hypothesis that brain regions involved in affect, cognitive control, and social information processing support adolescent decision-making in social contexts (N = 21 functional neuroimaging studies; N = 1292 participants). Results indicated that dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus/insula and ventral striatum are consistently associated with adolescent decision-making in social contexts. Activity within these regions was modulated by the type of social context and social actors involved. Findings suggest including brain regions involved in social information processing into models of adolescent decision-making. We propose a 'constructionist' model, which describes psychological processes and corresponding neural networks related to affect, cognitive control, and social information processing., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Many people feel emotional when hungry-or "hangry"-yet little research explores the psychological mechanisms underlying such states. Guided by psychological constructionist and affect misattribution theories, we propose that hunger alone is insufficient for feeling hangry. Rather, we hypothesize that people experience hunger as emotional when they conceptualize their affective state as negative, high arousal emotions specifically in a negative context. Studies 1 and 2 use a cognitive measure (the affect misattribution procedure; Payne, Hall, Cameron, & Bishara, 2010) to demonstrate that hunger shifts affective perceptions in negative but not neutral or positive contexts. Study 3 uses a laboratory-based experiment to demonstrate that hunger causes individuals to experience negative emotions and to negatively judge a researcher, but only when participants are not aware that they are conceptualizing their affective state as emotions. Implications for emotion theory, health, and embodied contributions to perception are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Negative affect toward outgroup members has long been known to predict discriminatory behavior. However, psychological constructionist theories of emotion suggest that negative affect may not always reflect antipathy for outgroup members. Rather, the subjective experience depends on how negative affect is conceptualized as specific discrete emotions (e.g., fear vs. sympathy). Our current research integrates theories of implicit bias with psychological constructionist theories of emotion to understand the implications of negative affect toward outgroup members. Across 3 studies, we find evidence that conceptualization of negative affect toward Black Americans as sympathy, rather than fear, mitigates the relationship between negative affect and fear of Black Americans on self-report and perceptual measures, and reduces racial bias on a psychophysiological measure. These studies provide evidence that conceptualization of negative affect can shape reactions to outgroup members. We discuss the implications of these findings and ground them in theories of implicit bias, social cognition, and affective science. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).)

Situation selection involves choosing situations based on their likely emotional impact and may be less cognitively taxing or challenging to implement compared to other strategies for regulating emotion, which require people to regulate their emotions "in the moment"; we thus predicted that individuals who chronically experience intense emotions or who are not particularly competent at employing other emotion regulation strategies would be especially likely to benefit from situation selection. Consistent with this idea, we found that the use of situation selection interacted with individual differences in emotional reactivity and competence at emotion regulation to predict emotional outcomes in both a correlational (Study 1; N = 301) and an experimental field study (Study 2; N = 125). Taken together, the findings suggest that situation selection is an effective strategy for regulating emotions, especially for individuals who otherwise struggle to do so.

Across 3 studies we show that emotion words support the acquisition of conceptual knowledge for emotional facial actions that then biases subsequent perceptual memory for later emotional facial actions. In all studies, participants first associated emotional facial actions with a word during a learning phase or completed a control task. In a target phase, participants studied slightly different category exemplars. During a final test phase, participants identified which face the individual had been making during the target phase (i.e., the learned face, the target face, or a morphed combination). Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that pairing never-before-seen "alien" facial actions with nonsense words during the learning phase biases perceptual memory for facial actions subsequently viewed during the target phase. Study 3 replicates these findings with the familiar emotion categories fear and anger. Across all 3 studies, participants were more likely to choose the face that had been linked with a word during the learning phase than the face actually studied in the target phase. These findings suggest that pairing facial actions with words can shape later perceptual memory for emotional facial actions. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).)

Background: An estimated 40% to 70% of individuals treated for a substance use disorder relapse within one year following treatment (Walitzer and Dearing, 2006). Relapse is often driven by the need to cope with intense negative affect (Koob, 2013). Emotion differentiation, defined as the ability to distinguish among various emotion states, has been linked to better behavioral control in the face of negative affect (Kashdan et al., 2015). The aim of the current study was to determine if higher levels of emotion differentiation are associated with the risk of experiencing an initial lapse following entry into residential substance use treatment., Methods: A total of 213 substance users (69.5% male, 94.4% African American, M age=43.01±11.35years) entering residential treatment were assessed on study variables at pre- and post-treatment, and at 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-month post-treatment. Emotion differentiation was calculated using ratings on five negative affect items derived from the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) at five assessment points., Results: A Cox proportional-hazards regression model adjusting for age and negative affect intensity demonstrates that for every unit increase in emotion differentiation, there is a 27% reduction in the likelihood of initial lapse on any given day (OR=0.73; 95% CIs [0.56, 0.95])., Conclusions: The ability to differentiate among negative emotion states protects against initial lapse following treatment., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

In this manuscript, I briefly outline contemporary psychological constructionist approaches to the study of emotion, which hypothesize that language is an 'ingredient' in the creation of emotional perceptions and experiences. I then review recent neuroimaging, behavioral, and lesion evidence that emotion words ('anger,' 'disgust,' 'fear') are crucial to the perception and experience of emotions. Finally, I look to future directions for more causal evidence that language is important in emotion., (Copyright © 2017. Published by Elsevier Ltd.)

There is debate about whether emotional granularity , the tendency to label emotions in a nuanced and specific manner, is merely a product of labeling abilities, or a systematic difference in the experience of emotion during emotionally evocative events. According to the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion (CAT) (Barrett, 2006), emotional granularity is due to the latter and is a product of on-going temporal differences in how individuals categorize and thus make meaning of their affective states. To address this question, the present study investigated the effects of individual differences in emotional granularity on electroencephalography-based brain activity during the experience of emotion in response to affective images. Event-related potentials (ERP) and event-related desynchronization and synchronization (ERD/ERS) analysis techniques were used. We found that ERP responses during the very early (60-90 ms), middle (270-300 ms), and later (540-570 ms) moments of stimulus presentation were associated with individuals' level of granularity. We also observed that highly granular individuals, compared to lowly granular individuals, exhibited relatively stable desynchronization of alpha power (8-12 Hz) and synchronization of gamma power (30-50 Hz) during the 3 s of stimulus presentation. Overall, our results suggest that emotional granularity is related to differences in neural processing throughout emotional experiences and that high granularity could be associated with access to executive control resources and a more habitual processing of affective stimuli, or a kind of "emotional complexity." Implications for models of emotion are also discussed.

Recent behavioral and neuroimaging studies demonstrate that labeling one's emotional experiences and perceptions alters those states. Here, we used a comprehensive meta-analysis of the neuroimaging literature to systematically explore whether the presence of emotion words in experimental tasks has an impact on the neural representation of emotional experiences and perceptions across studies. Using a database of 386 studies, we assessed brain activity when emotion words (e.g. 'anger', 'disgust') and more general affect words (e.g. 'pleasant', 'unpleasant') were present in experimental tasks vs not present. As predicted, when emotion words were present, we observed more frequent activations in regions related to semantic processing. When emotion words were not present, we observed more frequent activations in the amygdala and parahippocampal gyrus, bilaterally. The presence of affect words did not have the same effect on the neural representation of emotional experiences and perceptions, suggesting that our observed effects are specific to emotion words. These findings are consistent with the psychological constructionist prediction that in the absence of accessible emotion concepts, the meaning of affective experiences and perceptions are ambiguous. Findings are also consistent with the regulatory role of 'affect labeling'. Implications of the role of language in emotion construction and regulation are discussed., (© The Author (2016). Published by Oxford University Press.)

Gervais & Fessler argue that contempt is a natural kind and that its experience cannot be explained by a constructionist account of emotion. We dispute these claims and offer a positive constructionist model of contempt that accounts for the existing evidence and unifies conflicting findings in the literature on contempt.

The ability to experience pleasant or unpleasant feelings or to represent objects as "positive" or "negative" is known as representing hedonic "valence." Although scientists overwhelmingly agree that valence is a basic psychological phenomenon, debate continues about how to best conceptualize it scientifically. We used a meta-analysis of 397 functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography studies (containing 914 experimental contrasts and 6827 participants) to test 3 competing hypotheses about the brain basis of valence: the bipolarity hypothesis that positive and negative affect are supported by a brain system that monotonically increases and/or decreases along the valence dimension, the bivalent hypothesis that positive and negative affect are supported by independent brain systems, and the affective workspace hypothesis that positive and negative affect are supported by a flexible set of valence-general regions. We found little evidence for the bipolar or bivalent hypotheses. Findings instead supported the hypothesis that, at the level of brain activity measurable by fMRI, valence is flexibly implemented across instances by a set of valence-general limbic and paralimbic brain regions., (© The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Negative stimuli do not only evoke fear or disgust, but can also evoke a state of 'morbid fascination' which is an urge to approach and explore a negative stimulus. In the present neuroimaging study, we applied an innovative method to investigate the neural systems involved in typical and atypical conceptualizations of negative images. Participants received false feedback labeling their mental experience as fear, disgust or morbid fascination. This manipulation was successful; participants judged the false feedback correct for 70% of the trials on average. The neuroimaging results demonstrated differential activity within regions in the 'neural reference space for discrete emotion' depending on the type of feedback. We found robust differences in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex comparing morbid fascination to control feedback. More subtle differences in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex were also found between morbid fascination feedback and the other emotion feedback conditions. This study is the first to forward evidence about the neural representation of the experimentally unexplored state of morbid fascination. In line with a constructionist framework, our findings suggest that neural resources associated with the process of conceptualization contribute to the neural representation of this state., (© The Author (2015). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Morality and emotions are linked, but what is the nature of their correspondence? Many "whole number" accounts posit specific correspondences between moral content and discrete emotions, such that harm is linked to anger, and purity is linked to disgust. A review of the literature provides little support for these specific morality-emotion links. Moreover, any apparent specificity may arise from global features shared between morality and emotion, such as affect and conceptual content. These findings are consistent with a constructionist perspective of the mind, which argues against a whole number of discrete and domain-specific mental mechanisms underlying morality and emotion. Instead, constructionism emphasizes the flexible combination of basic and domain-general ingredients such as core affect and conceptualization in creating the experience of moral judgments and discrete emotions. The implications of constructionism in moral psychology are discussed, and we propose an experimental framework for rigorously testing morality-emotion links., (© 2015 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.)

Decades ago, the "New Look" movement challenged how scientists thought about vision by suggesting that conceptual processes shape visual perceptions. Currently, affective scientists are likewise debating the role of concepts in emotion perception. Here, we utilized a repetition-priming paradigm in conjunction with signal detection and individual difference analyses to examine how providing emotion labels-which correspond to discrete emotion concepts-affects emotion recognition. In Study 1, pairing emotional faces with emotion labels (e.g., "sad") increased individuals' speed and sensitivity in recognizing emotions. Additionally, individuals with alexithymia-who have difficulty labeling their own emotions-struggled to recognize emotions based on visual cues alone, but not when emotion labels were provided. Study 2 replicated these findings and further demonstrated that emotion concepts can shape perceptions of facial expressions. Together, these results suggest that emotion perception involves conceptual processing. We discuss the implications of these findings for affective, social, and clinical psychology., ((c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).)

We tested two competing models for the brain basis of emotion, the basic emotion theory and the conceptual act theory of emotion, using resting-state functional connectivity magnetic resonance imaging (rs-fcMRI). The basic emotion view hypothesizes that anger, sadness, fear, disgust and happiness each arise from a brain network that is innate, anatomically constrained and homologous in other animals. The conceptual act theory of emotion hypothesizes that an instance of emotion is a brain state constructed from the interaction of domain-general, core systems within the brain such as the salience, default mode and frontoparietal control networks. Using peak coordinates derived from a meta-analysis of task-evoked emotion fMRI studies, we generated a set of whole-brain rs-fcMRI 'discovery' maps for each emotion category and examined the spatial overlap in their conjunctions. Instead of discovering a specific network for each emotion category, variance in the discovery maps was accounted for by the known domain-general network. Furthermore, the salience network is observed as part of every emotion category. These results indicate that specific networks for each emotion do not exist within the intrinsic architecture of the human brain and instead support the conceptual act theory of emotion., (© The Author (2015). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Common sense suggests that emotions are physical types that have little to do with the words we use to label them. Yet recent psychological constructionist accounts reveal that language is a fundamental element in emotion that is constitutive of both emotion experiences and perceptions. According to the psychological constructionist Conceptual Act Theory (CAT), an instance of emotion occurs when information from one's body or other people's bodies is made meaningful in light of the present situation using concept knowledge about emotion. The CAT suggests that language plays a role in emotion because language supports the conceptual knowledge used to make meaning of sensations from the body and world in a given context. In the present paper, we review evidence from developmental and cognitive science to reveal that language scaffolds concept knowledge in humans, helping humans to acquire abstract concepts such as emotion categories across the lifespan. Critically, language later helps individuals use concepts to make meaning of on-going sensory perceptions. Building on this evidence, we outline predictions from a psychological constructionist model of emotion in which language serves as the "glue" for emotion concept knowledge, binding concepts to embodied experiences and in turn shaping the ongoing processing of sensory information from the body and world to create emotional experiences and perceptions.

Language can certainly communicate emotions, but growing research suggests that language also helps constitute emotion by cohering sensations into specific perceptions of "anger," "disgust," "fear," etc. The powerful role of language in emotion is predicted by a constructionist approach, which suggests that emotions occur when sensations are categorized using emotion category knowledge supported by language. We discuss the accumulating evidence from social cognitive, neuropsychological, cross-cultural, and neuroimaging studies that emotion words go beyond communication to help constitute emotional perceptions, and perhaps even emotional experiences. We look forward to current directions in research on emotional intelligence, emotion regulation, and psychotherapy.

Several studies have investigated the neural basis of effortful emotion regulation (ER) but the neural basis of automatic ER has been less comprehensively explored. The present study investigated the neural basis of automatic ER supported by 'implementation intentions'. 40 healthy participants underwent fMRI while viewing emotion-eliciting images and used either a previously-taught effortful ER strategy, in the form of a goal intention (e.g., try to take a detached perspective), or a more automatic ER strategy, in the form of an implementation intention (e.g., "If I see something disgusting, then I will think these are just pixels on the screen!"), to regulate their emotional response. Whereas goal intention ER strategies were associated with activation of brain areas previously reported to be involved in effortful ER (including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), ER strategies based on an implementation intention strategy were associated with activation of right inferior frontal gyrus and ventro-parietal cortex, which may reflect the attentional control processes automatically captured by the cue for action contained within the implementation intention. Goal intentions were also associated with less effective modulation of left amygdala, supporting the increased efficacy of ER under implementation intention instructions, which showed coupling of orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala. The findings support previous behavioural studies in suggesting that forming an implementation intention enables people to enact goal-directed responses with less effort and more efficiency.

Background: The hyperinsulinemic euglycemic clamp is the gold standard for assessment of insulin resistance and requires frequent, accurate measurements of blood glucose concentrations, typically utilizing the YSI 2300 STAT Plus™ glucose analyzer (YSI, Inc., Yellow Springs, OH). Despite its accuracy, the YSI has several limitations, including its cost, lengthy run time, need for trained personnel, frequent maintenance, and large blood volumes. Simpler hospital-grade hand-held glucose meters are now available but have not been validated for use in pediatric clamp settings. Our objective was to evaluate the accuracy, precision, and reliability of the StatStrip(®) (SS) hospital glucose monitoring system (Nova Biomedical, Waltham, MA) relative to the YSI 2300 STAT glucose analyzer in pediatric hyperinsulinemic euglycemic clamps., Subjects and Methods: Four hundred sixty blood specimens drawn from 11 pediatric patients undergoing hyperinsulinemic euglycemic clamps were simultaneously analyzed by SS and YSI. Outcome measures included SS bias relative to YSI and glucose measurement precision on SS and YSI., Results: The SS showed a slight positive bias of 0.75 ± 2.83 mg/dL versus the YSI. Percentage coefficients of variance for SS and YSI were 9.53% and 9.25%, respectively. Using a Bland-Altman plot, the limits of agreement were ± 5.7 mg/dL. The coefficient of repeatability for SS was 6.63; the coefficient of individual agreement between the YSI and SS was 0.995., Conclusions: The SS is a suitable replacement for the YSI in pediatric hyperinsulinemic euglycemic clamp studies, is easier to use, more cost-effective, and faster, and requires less blood. Future euglycemic clamp studies can consider utilizing this methodology.

For decades, psychologists and neuroscientists have hypothesized that the ability to perceive emotions on others' faces is inborn, prelinguistic, and universal. Concept knowledge about emotion has been assumed to be epiphenomenal to emotion perception. In this article, we report findings from 3 patients with semantic dementia that cannot be explained by this "basic emotion" view. These patients, who have substantial deficits in semantic processing abilities, spontaneously perceived pleasant and unpleasant expressions on faces, but not discrete emotions such as anger, disgust, fear, or sadness, even in a task that did not require the use of emotion words. Our findings support the hypothesis that discrete emotion concept knowledge helps transform perceptions of affect (positively or negatively valenced facial expressions) into perceptions of discrete emotions such as anger, disgust, fear, and sadness. These findings have important consequences for understanding the processes supporting emotion perception.

Many scientific models of emotion assume that emotion categories are natural kinds that carve nature at its joints. These beliefs remain strong, despite the fact that the empirical record on the issue has remained equivocal for over a century. In this research, the authors examined one reason for this situation: People essentialize emotion categories by assuming that members of the same category (e.g., fear) have a shared metaphysical essence (i.e., a common causal mechanism). In Study 1, the authors found that lay people essentialize emotions by assuming that instances of the same emotion category have a shared essence that defines them, even when their surface features differ. Study 2 extended these findings, demonstrating that lay people tend to essentialize categories the more a category is of the body (vs. the mind). In Study 3, we examined the links between emotion essentialism and the complexity of actual emotional experiences. In particular, we predicted and found that individuals who hold essentialist beliefs about emotions describe themselves as experiencing highly differentiated emotional experiences but do not show evidence of stronger emotional differentiation in their momentary ratings of experience in everyday life. Implications for the science of emotion are discussed., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved.)

For the last century, there has been a continuing debate about the nature of emotion. In the most recent offering in this scientific dialogue, Lench, Flores, and Bench (2011) reported a meta-analysis of emotion induction research and claimed support for the natural kind hypothesis that discrete emotions (e.g., happiness, sadness, anger, and anxiety) elicit specific changes in cognition, judgment, behavior, experience, and physiology. In this article, we point out that Lench et al. (2011) is not the final word on the emotion debate. First, we point out that Lench et al.'s findings do not support their claim that discrete emotions organize cognition, judgment, experience, and physiology because they did not demonstrate emotion-consistent and emotion-specific directional changes in these measurement domains. Second, we point out that Lench et al.'s findings are in fact consistent with the alternative (a psychological constructionist approach to emotion). We close by appealing for a construct validity approach to emotion research, which we hope will lead to greater consensus on the operationalization of the natural kind and psychological construction approaches, as well as the criteria required to finally resolve the emotion debate., ((PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved).)

The 'faculty psychology' approach to the mind, which attempts to explain mental function in terms of categories that reflect modular 'faculties', such as emotions, cognitions, and perceptions, has dominated research into the mind and its physical correlates. In this paper, we argue that brain organization does not respect the commonsense categories belonging to the faculty psychology approach. We review recent research from the science of emotion demonstrating that the human brain contains broadly distributed functional networks that can each be re-described as basic psychological operations that interact to produce a range of mental states, including, but not limited to, anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and so on. When compared to the faculty psychology approach, this 'constructionist' approach provides an alternative functional architecture to guide the design and interpretation of experiments in cognitive neuroscience., (Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Scientists have traditionally assumed that different kinds of mental states (e.g., fear, disgust, love, memory, planning, concentration, etc.) correspond to different psychological faculties that have domain-specific correlates in the brain. Yet, growing evidence points to the constructionist hypothesis that mental states emerge from the combination of domain-general psychological processes that map to large-scale distributed brain networks. In this paper, we report a novel study testing a constructionist model of the mind in which participants generated three kinds of mental states (emotions, body feelings, or thoughts) while we measured activity within large-scale distributed brain networks using fMRI. We examined the similarity and differences in the pattern of network activity across these three classes of mental states. Consistent with a constructionist hypothesis, a combination of large-scale distributed networks contributed to emotions, thoughts, and body feelings, although these mental states differed in the relative contribution of those networks. Implications for a constructionist functional architecture of diverse mental states are discussed., (Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

In our response, we clarify important theoretical differences between basic emotion and psychological construction approaches. We evaluate the empirical status of the basic emotion approach, addressing whether it requires brain localization, whether localization can be observed with better analytic tools, and whether evidence for basic emotions exists in other types of measures. We then revisit the issue of whether the key hypotheses of psychological construction are supported by our meta-analytic findings. We close by elaborating on commentator suggestions for future research.

Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories are constructed of more general brain networks not specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. We review both locationist and psychological constructionist hypotheses of brain-emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses. Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories.

People believe they see emotion written on the faces of other people. In an instant, simple facial actions are transformed into information about another's emotional state. The present research examined whether a perceiver unknowingly contributes to emotion perception with emotion word knowledge. We present 2 studies that together support a role for emotion concepts in the formation of visual percepts of emotion. As predicted, we found that perceptual priming of emotional faces (e.g., a scowling face) was disrupted when the accessibility of a relevant emotion word (e.g., anger) was temporarily reduced, demonstrating that the exact same face was encoded differently when a word was accessible versus when it was not. The implications of these findings for a linguistically relative view of emotion perception are discussed., ((PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).)

This study examined the hypothesis that emotion is a psychological event constructed from the more basic elements of core affect and conceptual knowledge. Participants were primed with conceptual knowledge of fear, conceptual knowledge of anger, or a neutral prime and then proceeded through an affect-induction procedure designed to induce unpleasant, high-arousal affect or a neutral affective state. As predicted, only those individuals for whom conceptual knowledge of fear had been primed experienced unpleasant core affect as evidence that the world was threatening. This study provides the first experimental support for the hypothesis that people experience world-focused emotion when they conceptualize their core affective state using accessible knowledge about emotion.

For almost 5 decades, the scientific study of emotion has been guided by the assumption that categories such as anger, sadness, and fear cut nature at its joints. Barrett (2006a) provided a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence from the study of emotion in humans and concluded that this assumption has outlived its usefulness. Panksepp and Izard have written lengthy papers (published in this issue) containing complementary but largely nonover lapping criticisms of Barrett (2006a). In our response, we address three of their concerns. First, we discuss the value of correlational versus experimental studies for evaluating the natural-kind model of emotion and refute the claim that the evidence offered in Barrett (2006a) was merely correlational. Second, we take up the issue of whether or not there is evidence for "coherently organized neural circuits for natural kinds of emotions in the mammalian brain and counter the claim that Barrett (2006a) ignored crucial evidence for existence of discrete emotions as natural kinds. Third, we address Panksepp and Izard's misconceptions of an alternative view, the conceptual act model of emotion, that was briefly discussed in Barrett (2006a). Finally, we end the article with some thoughts on how to move the scientific study of emotion beyond the debate over whether or not emotions are natural kinds., (© 2007 Association for Psychological Science.)

In the blink of an eye, people can easily see emotion in another person's face. This fact leads many to assume that emotion perception is given and proceeds independently of conceptual processes such as language. In this paper we suggest otherwise and offer the hypothesis that language functions as a context in emotion perception. We review a variety of evidence consistent with the language-as-context view and then discuss how a linguistically relative approach to emotion perception allows for intriguing and generative questions about the extent to which language shapes the sensory processing involved in seeing emotion in another person's face.

A conducting media is necessary when using an electric pulp tester (EPT). The objective of this study was to observe differences in conductance through various media. We hypothesized that variations in current conductance through different media exist. The pulp chamber of a freshly extracted premolar was exposed, and the cathode of a voltmeter was inserted into the pulpal tissue. The anode was coupled to the EPT handpiece. The measurement taken during dry (no interface media) EPT tip-to-tooth contact was 0 V, which served as negative control. EPT tip directly touching the cathode measured 3.9V and served as positive control. A number of media readily available in the dental office were tested. Data was analyzed using single factor ANOVA. Listerine (3.3) conducted the most voltage (p<0.5). Of nonliquids, K-Y Brand UltraGel and Crest Baking Soda & Peroxide Whitening Tartar Control toothpaste recorded significantly (p<0.05) higher voltage readings (1.4 V).

Three studies assessed the relationship between language and the perception of emotion. The authors predicted and found that the accessibility of emotion words influenced participants' speed or accuracy in perceiving facial behaviors depicting emotion. Specifically, emotion words were either primed or temporarily made less accessible using a semantic satiation procedure. In Studies 1 and 2, participants were slower to categorize facial behaviors depicting emotion (i.e., a face depicting anger) after an emotion word (e.g., "anger") was satiated. In Study 3, participants were less accurate to categorize facial behaviors depicting emotion after an emotion word was satiated. The implications of these findings for a linguistically relative view of emotion perception are discussed.