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In situations of declining or depleted fish stocks, exploiters seem to have fallen prey to the Tragedy of the Commons, which occurs when the maximisation of short-term self-interest produces outcomes leaving all participants worse off than feasible alternatives would. Standard economic theory predicts that in social dilemmas, such as fishing from a common resource, individuals are not willing to cooperate and sacrifice catches in the short term, and that, consequently, the resource is overharvested. However, over the last decades, a multitude of research has shown that humans often achieve outcomes that are 'better than rational' by building conditions where reciprocity, reputation, and trust help to overcome the temptations of short-term self-interest. The evolution of the natural human tendency to cooperate under certain conditions can be explained, and its neuro-physiological and genetic bases are being unravelled. Nevertheless, fisheries management still often deploys top-down regulation and economic incentives in its aim to regulate fisher behaviour, and under-utilizes the potential for spontaneous responsible fisher behaviour through setting conditions that enhance natural cooperative tendencies. Here I introduce this body of knowledge on how to overcome the Tragedy of the Commons to the audience of fisheries scientists, hoping to open up novel ways of thinking in this field. I do this through a series of thought experiments, based on actual published experiments, exploring under what conditions responsible and cooperative fisher behaviour can be expected. Keys include reputation-building and indirect reciprocity, face-to-face communication, knowledge on the state of the resource, and self-decision on rules and sanctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies have shown (1) that stickleback males enjoy increased mating success when their nest is concealed, (2) that males reduce their courtship in the face of predation risk to a lesser extent when their nest is concealed, and (3) that eggs in concealed nests have higher hatching chances. Here we test the prediction that male sticklebacks prefer to establish a territory at a site with a macrophyte under which they can conceal their nest. We planted macrophytes at half of the potential nest sites at two depths, in a section of a channel in which sticklebacks naturally occur. Subsequently, we found significantly more nests with eggs at the sites concealed by macrophytes than at the control sites, suggesting that wild sticklebacks preferred to build their nests at sites that offer concealment. At the shallow depth, males occupying a site with a macrophyte were larger and redder than males at control sites, but not at the deeper level. This suggests that males of higher competitive ability and greater conspicuousness were more likely to settle at shallow sites where predation risk by the grey heron is high. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bycatch of seabirds and marine mammals in gillnet fisheries is a major hazard for conservation globally. Measures for bycatch mitigation in fisheries management mostly base on technological and ecological findings and they generally assume fishers as a homogenous group that is supposed to apply new technology or act according to the latest ecological insights. There is often a lack of knowledge about the heterogeneity of fishers′ actions and drivers, despite its importance for effective fisheries management. For the specific case of the German gillnet fleet in the Baltic Sea a qualitative social-science research approach was chosen to generate knowledge that can inform management. In applying the concept of agency , three types of fishers′ actions are distinguished: projective (future-oriented), evaluative (present-oriented) and iterational (past-oriented). Fishers′ attitude towards incidental bycatch differed between viewing bycatch as a normal part of the daily routine or as a disturbing event. These findings are discussed in the context of management instruments, such as closed fishing zones and seasons, brought up during an expert workshop. It is concluded that considering fishers′ agency may be an important contribution to design effective management instruments to mitigate bycatch of seabirds and marine mammals in gillnet fisheries. • The documentary method is used to identify different types of fishers′ agency. • German gillnet fishers can act projective, evaluative or iterational. • Fishers′ discourse on bycatch differed between normalizing and non-normalizing. • This can help develop informed management instruments to mitigate bycatch. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]