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Background: QTc interval prolongation can occur as a result of treatment with both conventional and novel antipsychotic medications and is of clinical concern because of its association with the potentially fatal ventricular arrhythmia, torsade de pointes. Methods: One case is described in which a patient with schizophrenia, who was being treated for dyslipidemia, developed a prolonged QTc interval while taking quetiapine and lovastatin. Results: QTc returned to baseline when the lovastatin dose was reduced. Conclusions: QTc prolongation associated with antipsychotic medication occurs in a dose-dependent manner. We therefore hypothesize that the addition of lovastatin caused an increase in plasma quetiapine levels through competitive inhibition of the cytochrome P 450 (CYP) isoenzyme 3A4. Our case highlights the potential for a drug interaction between quetiapine and lovastatin leading to QTc prolongation during the management of dysipidemia in patients with schizophrenia.

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article will take up the first two questions. With the first question, invited commentators express a range of opinion regarding the nature of psychiatric disorders, loosely divided into a realist position that the diagnostic categories represent real diseases that we can accurately name and know with our perceptual abilities, a middle, nominalist position that psychiatric disorders do exist in the real world but that our diagnostic categories are constructs that may or may not accurately represent the disorders out there, and finally a purely constructivist position that the diagnostic categories are simply constructs with no evidence of psychiatric disorders in the real world. The second question again offers a range of opinion as to how we should define a mental or psychiatric disorder, including the possibility that we should not try to formulate a definition. The general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.