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We analyze securities trading by banks and the associated spillovers to the supply of credit. Empirical analysis has been elusive due to the lack of securities register for banks. We use a unique, proprietary dataset that has the investments of banks at the security level for 2005-2012 in conjunction with the credit register from Germany. Analyzing data at the security level for each bank in each period, we find that during the crisis, banks with higher trading expertise increase their overall investments in securities, especially in those that had a larger price drop. The quantitative effects are largest for trading-expertise banks with higher capital and in securities with lower rating and long-term maturity. In fact, there are no differential effects for triple-A rated securities. Moreover, banks with higher trading expertise reduce their overall supply of credit in crisis times – i.e., for the same borrower at the same time, trading-expertise banks reduce lending relative to other banks. This effect is more pronounced for trading-expertise banks with higher capital, and the credit reduction is binding at the firm level. Finally, these differential effects for trading-expertise banks are not present outside the crisis period

By providing liquidity to depositors and credit-line borrowers, banks can be exposed to double-runs on assets and liabilities. For identification, we exploit the 2007 freeze of the European interbank market and the Italian Credit Register. After the shock, there are sizeable, aggregate double-runs. In the cross-section, credit-line drawdowns are not larger for banks more exposed to the interbank market; however, they are larger when we condition on the same firms with multiple credit lines. We show that, ex-ante, more exposed banks actively manage their liquidity risk by granting fewer credit lines to firms that run more during crises.

The transmission of monetary policy to credit aggregates and the real economy can be impaired by weaknesses in the contracting environment, shallow financial markets, and a concentrated banking system. We empirically assess the bank lending channel in Uganda during 2010–2014 using a supervisory dataset of loan applications and granted loans. Our analysis focuses on a short period during which the policy rate rose by 1,000 basis points and then came down by 1,200 basis points. We find that an increase in interest rates reduces the supply of bank credit both on the extensive and intensive margins, and there is significant pass-through to retail lending rates. We document a strong bank balance sheet channel, as the lending behavior of banks with high capital and liquidity is different from that of banks with low capital and liquidity. Finally, we show the impact of monetary policy on real activity across districts depends on banking sector conditions. Overall, our results indicate significant real effects of the bank lending channel in developing countries.

To identify the credit channel we disentangle loan supply and demand shocks by using the answers from the confidential Euro area Bank Lending Survey and the U.S. Senior Loan Officer Survey. Embedding this information within a VAR model, we find that: (1) The credit channel of monetary policy is operational through the balancesheets of both banks and non-financial borrowers, and for business, mortgage, and consumer loans. (2) The impact of a monetary policy shock on GDP growth is higher through loan supply than through loan demand, whereas the latter affects more inflation. (3) The bank lending channel is stronger than the balance-sheet channel for firms, whereas the latter is stronger for households. (4) During the recent financial crisis, bank capital and liquidity problems had a strong negative impact on GDP growth by reducing loan supply to businesses. At the same time, the current expansionary monetary policy stance has reduced output decline in the Euro area.

We analyze the impact of financial crises and monetary policy on the supply of wholesale funding liquidity, and also on the compositional supply effects through cross-border and relationship lending. For empirical identification, we draw on the proprietary bank-to-bank European interbank dataset extracted from Target2 and also exploit the Lehman and sovereign crisis shocks as well as the main Eurosystem non-standard monetary policy measures. The robust results imply that the crisis shocks lead to worse access, volumes and spreads (in both the overnight and longer-term maturities). The quantitative impact on interbank access and volume is stronger than on spreads. Liquidity supply restrictions are exacerbated for cross-border lending after the Lehman failure; for banks headquartered in periphery countries, the impact is quantitatively stronger in the sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, the interbank market – unlike other credit markets – allows to exploit the price dispersion from different lenders on identical credit contracts, i.e. overnight uncollateralized loans in the same morning for the same borrower. This price dispersion increases massively with the crisis, and even more for riskier borrowers. Cross-border and previous relationship lenders charge higher prices for identical contracts in the crisis. Importantly, this price dispersion substantially decreases when the Eurosystem promises unlimited access to liquidity at a fixed price in October 2008 and announces the 3-year LTRO in December 2011, with economically stronger effects for borrowers in weaker countries.

We study the credit supply effects of the unexpected freeze of the European interbank market, using exhaustive Portuguese loan-level data. We find that banks that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease their credit supply more during the crisis. The credit supply reduction is stronger for firms that are smaller, with weaker banking relationships. Small firms cannot compensate the credit crunch with other sources of debt. Furthermore, the impact of illiquidity on the credit crunch is stronger for less solvent banks. Finally, there are no overall positive effects of central bank liquidity, but higher hoarding of liquidity.

We study the international transmission of shocks from the banking to the real sector during the global financial crisis. For identification, we use matched bank-firm level data, covering mainly small and medium-sized firms in Eastern Europe and Turkey, and exploit the Lehman failure. We find that internationally-borrowing domestic and especially foreign-owned banks contract their credit more during the crisis than locally-funded domestic banks do. Firms dependent on credit and with a relationship with internationally-borrowing domestic or foreign banks suffer more in their financing and real performance; especially when single-bank, small or with limited tangible assets. Moreover, firms in countries with lower financial development, more reliance on foreign funding and slower contract enforcement are more affected. Overall our results suggest the existence of spillovers to the real sector through an international banking channel but with heterogeneous effects across firms and countries.

We analyze the impact of the countercyclical capital buffers held by banks on the supply of credit to firms and their subsequent performance. Countercyclical ‘dynamic’ provisioning that is unrelated to specific loan losses was introduced in Spain in 2000, and modified in 2005 and 2008. These policy experiments which entailed bank-specific shocks to capital buffers, combined with the financial crisis that shocked banks according to their available pre-crisis buffers, underpin our identification strategy. Our estimates from comprehensive bank-, firm-, loan-, and loan application-level data suggest that countercyclical capital buffers help smooth credit supply cycles and in bad times have positive effects on firm credit availability, assets, employment and survival. Our findings therefore hold important implications for theory and macroprudential policy.

To study the impact of macroprudential policy on credit supply cycles and real effects, we analyze dynamic provisioning, which implies pro-cyclical bank capital regulation. Introduced in Spain in 2000, revised four times and tested in its counter-cyclicality during the crisis, it affected banks differentially. Accessing an exhaustive credit register, we find that dynamic provisioning smooths credit supply cycles and, in bad times, supports firm performance. A policy-induced one-percentage point (pp) increase in capital buffers extends credit to firms by 9 pp, increasing firm employment (6 pp) and survival (1 pp). Moreover, there are important compositional effects in credit supply related to risk and regulatory arbitrage by non-regulated and regulated-but-less-affected banks.

Credit supply and demand changes are mostly unobserved, thus identifying completely the transmission of monetary policy through the credit channel is unfeasible. Bank lending surveys by central banks, however, contain reliable quarterly information on changes in loan conditions due to bank, firm and household balance sheet strength and on changes in loan demand. Using the U.S. and the unique Euro area surveys, we find that the credit channel amplifies a monetary policy shock on GDP and prices, through the balance-sheets of households, firms and banks. For corporate loans, amplification is highest through the bank lending and the borrower's balance sheet channel; for households, demand is the strongest channel.

For policy and academia it is crucial to quantify the real effects of the bank lending channel. We analyze the impact of securitization of real estate assets on the supply of credit to non real-estate firms, including risk-taking, and the associated real effects. For identification, we use the credit register of Spain, matched with firm- and bank-level balance-sheet data, and generalize the Khwaja and Mian (2008)’s loan-level estimator to firm-level in order to identify the real aggregate effects of the bank lending channel. The robust results suggest a strong impact on credit supply to non real-estate firms of banks’ ability to securitize real-estate assets. However, this strong loan-level credit channel is neutralized by firm-level equilibrium dynamics in good times. In consequence, we find no real and credit effects at the firm-level. Importantly, securitization implies higher bank risk-taking, both by relaxing lending standards of existing borrowers – cheaper and less collateralized credit with longer maturity – and by a credit expansion on the extensive margin to first-time bank borrowers that substantially default more.

While banks may change their credit supply due to bank balance-sheet shocks (the local lending channel), firms can react by adjusting their sources of financing in equilibrium (the aggregate lending channel). We provide a methodology to identify the aggregate (firm-level) effects of the lending channel and estimate the impact of banks’ ability to securitize real estate assets on credit supply for non real-estate firms in Spain over 2000-2010. We show that firm-level equilibrium dynamics nullify the strong local (bank-level) lending channel of securitization on credit quantity for firms with multiple banking relationships. Credit terms however become softer, but there are no real effects. Securitization implies a credit expansion on the extensive margin towards first-time bank clients, which are more likely to default. Finally, the 2008 securitization collapse reverses the local lending channel.

While banks may change their supply of credit due to bank balance sheet shocks (the local lending channel), firms can react by adjusting their sources of financing in equilibrium (the aggregate lending channel). We formalize a methodology for separately estimating these effects. We estimate the local and aggregate lending channel effects of the banks' ability to securitize real estate assets on non-real estate firms in Spain. We show that equilibrium dynamics nullify the strong local lending channel effect on credit quantity for firms with multiple banking relationships. However, credit terms for these firms become significantly more favorable due to securitization. Securitization also leads to an expansion in credit on the extensive margin towards first-time bank clients, and these borrowers are significantly more likely to end up in default. Finally, the 2008 collapse in securitization leads to a reversal in local lending channel.

While banks may change their supply of credit due to bank balance sheet shocks (the local lending channel), firms can react by adjusting their sources of financing in equilibrium (the aggregate lending channel). We formalize a methodology for separately estimating these effects. We estimate the local and aggregate lending channel effects of the banks' ability to securitize real estate assets on non-real estate firms in Spain. We show that equilibrium dynamics nullify the strong local lending channel effect on credit quantity for firms with multiple banking relationships. However, credit terms for these firms become significantly more favorable due to securitization. Securitization also leads to an expansion in credit on the extensive margin towards first-time bank clients, and these borrowers are significantly more likely to end up in default. Finally, the 2008 collapse in securitization leads to a reversal in local lending channel.

Includes supplementary materials: Internet appendix for “Value and momentum everywhere” We analyze the impact of financial globalization on business cycle synchronization using a proprietary database on banks’ international exposure for industrialized countries during 1978 to 2006. Theory makes ambiguous predictions and identification has been elusive due to lack of bilateral time‐varying financial linkages data. In contrast to conventional wisdom and previous empirical studies, we identify a strong negative effect of banking integration on output synchronization, conditional on global shocks and country‐pair heterogeneity. Similarly, we show divergent economic activity due to higher integration using an exogenous de‐jure measure of integration based on financial regulations that harmonized EU markets.

We investigate the effect of financial integration on the degree of international business cycle synchronization. For identfication, we use a confidential database on banks' bilateral exposure over the past three decades and employ a novel bilateral country-pair panel instrumental vari- ables approach. First, we show that conditional on global shocks and country-pair fixed factors countries that become more financially integrated over time have less synchronized growth pat- terns, in line with the standard theories of output fluctuations. Second, to isolate the one-way impact of financial integration on output co-movement and account for measurement error in the financial integration measure, we exploit variation in the transposition dates of the European Union-wide legislative acts (the "Directives") from the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). These laws are designed to harmonize regulation of financial markets in the European Union. We find that increases in financial integration stemming from regulatory-legislative harmoniza- tion policies in capital markets are followed by more divergent output cycles, even when we condition on monetary unification. Our results contrast with those of the previous empirical studies. We reconcile the different results by showing that the earlier estimates suffer from the standard identification problems.

To identify credit availability we analyze the extensive and intensive margins of lending with loan applications and all loans granted in Spain. We find that during the period analyzed both worse economic and tighter monetary conditions reduce loan granting, especially to firms or from banks with lower capital or liquidity ratios. Moreover, responding to applications for the same loan, weak banks are less likely to grant the loan. Our results suggest that firms cannot offset the resultant credit restriction by turning to other banks. Importantly the bank-lending channel is notably stronger when we account for unobserved time-varying firm heterogeneity in loan demand and quality.

We analyze the root causes of the current crisis by studying the determinants of bank lending standards in the Euro Area using the answers from the confidential Bank Lending Survey, where national central banks request quarterly information on the lending standards banks apply to customers. We find that low short-term interest rates soften lending standards for both businesses and households and, by exploiting crosscountry variation of Taylor-rule implied rates, that rates too low for too long soften standards even further. The softening is over and above the improvement of borrowers’ creditworthiness and all the relevant lending standards are softened, thus implying that banks’ appetite for (loan) risk increases. In addition, high securitization activity and weak banking supervision standards amplify the positive impact of low short-term interest rates on bank risk-taking, even when we instrument securitization. Moreover, short-term rates – directly and in conjunction with securitization activity and supervision standards – have a stronger impact on bank risk-taking than long-term interest rates. These results help shed light on the origins of the current crisis and have important policy implications. We obtain similar results using data from the Senior Loan Officer Survey from the United States, which will be incorporated in the next version of the paper.

This article tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages. For identification, we exploit an idiosyncratic, sudden shock caused by a large-bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures. First, we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals. Second, the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals. Third, interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock. Finally, we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects. These results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications. (JEL G01, G21, G28, E58) “Since the onset of the financial turmoil, increased uncertainty, reflected particularly in counterparty risk, has led banks to hoard liquidity. This has resulted in a significant decline of trading in the interbank money markets.” Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, December 2008

We investigate the impact of the stance and path of monetary policy on the level of credit risk of individual bank loans and on lending standards. We employ the Credit Register of the Bank of Spain that contains detailed monthly information on virtually all loans granted by all credit institutions operating in Spain during the last twenty-two years - generating almost twenty-three million bank loan records in total. Spanish monetary conditions were exogenously determined during the entire sample period. Using a variety of duration models we find that lower short-term interest rates prior to loan origination result in banks granting more risky new loans. Banks also soften their lending standards - they lend more to borrowers with a bad credit history and with high uncertainty. Lower interest rates, by contrast, reduce the credit risk of outstanding loans. Loan credit risk is maximized when both interest rates are very low prior to loan origination and interest rates are very high over the life of the loan. Our results suggest that low interest rates increase bank risk-taking, reduce credit risk in banks in the very short run but worsen it in the medium run. Risk-taking is not equal for all type of banks: Small banks, banks with fewer lending opportunities, banks with less sophisticated depositors, and savings or cooperative banks take on more extra risk than other banks when interest rates are lower. Higher GDP growth reduces credit risk on both new and outstanding loans, in stark contrast to the differential effects of monetary policy.

We analyse the impact of monetary policy on bank risk-taking and pricing. Bolivia provides us with an excellent experimental setting to identify this impact. Its small economy is not synchronized with the US economy but its banking system is almost fully dollarized. Consequently the US federal funds rate is the appropriate measure of monetary policy. We study the impact of the federal funds rate on the riskiness and pricing of new bank loans granted in Bolivia between 1999 and 2003, a period of significant variation in the federal funds rate. We find robust evidence that a decrease in the US federal funds rate prior to loan origination raises the monthly probability of default on individual bank loans. We also find that initiating loans with a subprime credit rating or loans to riskier borrowers with current or past non-performance become more likely when the federal funds rate is low. However, loan spreads do not increase, seemingly even decrease, in changes in the probability of default. Hence banks do not seem to price the additional risk taken. Furthermore, banks with more liquid assets and less funds from foreign financial institutions take more risk when the federal funds rate is low, and reduce loan spreads more despite the additional risk they seemingly take.

International business transactions pose the problem of deterring bribing of public officials by foreign firms. We first analyse a convention styled after the OECD's 'Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions', which requires signatory countries to proceed against firms that have bribed public officials of any foreign country. We then study the case in which the convention requires signatory countries to proceed against firms that have bribed public officials of signatory countries only. We argue that the second type of convention is more likely to ensure the enforcement of penalties. Marco Celentani gratefully acknowledges the financial support of Fundacion BBVA, Fundacion Ramon Areces, and MCYT (Spain) under project BEC2002 03715. Juan Jose-Ganuza gratefully acknowledges the financial support of MCYT (Spain) under project BEC2000 1026, and fellowship Ramon y Cajal Publicado

We analyze the impact of different types of international conventions that require signatory countries to penalize domestic firms that are found to have bribed foreign public officials. We analyze enforcement of penalties under a convention styled after the OECD's 'Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions', in which signatory countries commit to prosecuting firms that have bribed public officials of any foreign country. We compare the results with the case in which the convention requires signatory countries to commit to prosecuting firms that have bribed public officials of signatory countries only. We argue that the second type of convention is more likely to ensure enforcement of penalties on firms found to have bribed foreign public officials.

Banking crises are recurrent phenomena, often induced by excessive bank risk-taking, which may be due to behavioural reasons (over-optimistic banks neglecting risks) and to conflicts of interest between bank shareholders/managers and debtholders/taxpayers (banks exploiting moral hazard). We test whether US banks' stock returns in the 2007-08 financial crisis are associated with bank insiders' sales of their own bank’s shares in the period prior to 2006Q2 (the peak and reversal in real estate prices). We find that top-five executives' sales of shares predict bank performance during the crisis. Interestingly, effects are insignificant for the sales of independent directors and other officers. Moreover, the top-five executives' impact is stronger for banks with higher exposure to the real estate bubble, where a one standard deviation increase of insider sales is associated with a 13.33 percentage point drop in stock returns during the crisis period. Finally, even though bankers in riskier banks sold more shares (furthering their own interests), they did not change their bank’s policies, e.g. by reducing bank-level exposure to real estate. The informational content of bank insider trading before the crisis suggests that insiders knew that their banks were taking excessive risks, which has important implications for theory, public policy, and the understanding of crises, as well as a supervisory tool for early warning signals. José M. Marín acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (project ECO2015-69205). This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 648398). José-Luis Peydró also acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through grant ECO2012-32434 and through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563).

We show that negative monetary policy rates induce systemic banks to reach‐for‐yield. For identification, we exploit the introduction of negative deposit rates by the European Central Bank in June 2014 and a novel securities register for the 26 largest euro area banking groups. Banks with more customer deposits are negatively affected by negative rates, as they do not pass negative rates to retail customers, in turn investing more in securities, especially in those yielding higher returns. Effects are stronger for less capitalized banks, private‐sector (financial and nonfinancial) securities and dollar‐denominated securities. Affected banks also take higher risk in loans. This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 648398). Peydró also acknowledges financial support from the PGC2018‐102133‐B‐I00 (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE) grant and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV‐2015‐0563). The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank, Deutsche Bundesbank, or the Eurosystem.

Includes supplementary data: online appending Recent studies of monetary policy in developing countries document a weak bank lending channel based on aggregate data. In this paper, we bring new evidence using Uganda's supervisory credit register, with microdata on loan applications, volumes and rates, coupled with unanticipated variation in monetary policy. We show that a monetary contraction reduces bank credit supply—increasing loan application rejections and tightening loan volume and rates—especially for banks with more leverage and sovereign debt exposure. There are associated spillovers on inflation and economic activity—including construction permits and trade—and even social unrest. José-Luis Peydró acknowledges financial support from project ECO2015-68182-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and the European Research Council Grant (project 648398).

In this paper we analyze financial crises and the interactions of macroprudential policy and credit. Financial crises are recurrent systemic phenomena, often triggering deep and long-lasting recessions with large reductions in aggregate welfare, output and employment. Importantly for policy, systemic financial crises are typically not random events triggered by exogenous events, but they tend to occur after periods of rapid, strong credit growth. Moreover, a credit crunch tends to follow in a financial crisis with negative aggregate real effects. Macroprudential policy softens the credit supply cycles, with important positive effects on the aggregate real economy in crisis times. I thank the Editor for helpful comments and acknowledge financial support from project ECO2012-32434 of the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness and the European Research Council Grant (project 648398).

The paper studies the international transmission of shocks from the banking to the real sector during the global financial crisis. For identification, it uses matched bank-firm-level data, covering mainly small and medium-sized firms in Eastern Europe and Turkey, and exploits the Lehman failure. The paper finds that internationally borrowing domestic and especially foreign owned banks contract their credit more during the crisis than locally funded domestic banks do. Firms dependent on credit and with a relationship with internationally borrowing domestic or foreign banks suffer more in their financing and real performance, especially when single-bank, small or with limited tangible assets. Moreover, firms in countries with lower financial development, more reliance on foreign funding and slower contract enforcement are more affected. Overall the results suggest the existence of spillovers to the real sector through an international banking channel but with heterogeneous effects across firms and countries. Peydró acknowledges financial support from project ECO2012-32434 of the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness.

We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: TARP. In politically‐connected banks, insider buying during the pre‐TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank‐specific TARP announcement; for unconnected banks, trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold across insiders within the same bank and are stronger for finance‐related government connections. Through a FOIA request we obtained the previously undisclosed TARP funds requested; the ratio of received to requested funds correlates both with abnormal returns and insider buying behavior in connected banks. Christian Fons‐Rosen acknowledges financial support by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2014–55555–P).José‐Luis Peydró acknowledges financial support from both ECO2015‐68182‐P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and the European Research Council Grant (project 648398).

We analyze the determinants of real estate and credit bubbles using a unique borrower-lender matched dataset on mortgage loans in Spain. The dataset contain real estate credit and price conditions (loan principal and spread, and the appraisal and market price) at the mortgage level, matched with borrower characteristics (such as income, labor status and contract) and the lender identity, over the last credit boom and bust. We find that lending standards are softer in the boom than in the bust. Moreover, despite some adjustment in lending conditions in the good times depending on borrower risk, the results suggest too soft lending standards and excessive risk-taking in the boom. For example, mortgage spreads for non-employed are identical to employed borrowers during the boom. Banks with worse corporate governance problems soften even more the standards. Finally, we analyze the mechanism by which banks could increase the supply of mortgage loans despite of regulatory restrictions on LTVs. The evidence is consistent with banks encouraging real estate appraisal firms to introduce an upward bias in appraisal prices (29 %), to meet loan-to-value regulatory thresholds (40 % of mortgages are just bunched on these limits), thus building-up the credit and the real estate bubble. Montalvo would like to acknowledge the financial support of Project ECO2011-25272 (Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacion) and the Fellowship ICREA-Academia for Excellence in Research funded by the Generalitat de Catalunya. J. García Villar would like to acknowledge the financial support of Project ECO2012-39553-C04-01 (Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad).

We examine the role of the international credit channel in Turkey over 2005–2013. We show that larger, more capitalized banks with higher non-core liabilities increase credit supply when capital inflows are higher. This result is stronger for domestic banks relative to foreign banks and survives during the crisis period of post-2008, when foreign banks in general stop lending in emerging markets and retreat to their home countries. By decomposing capital inflows into bank and non-bank flows, we show the importance of domestic banks' external borrowing for domestic credit growth. Di Giovanni and Peydro thank the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) for financial support.

We study how capital controls and domestic macroprudential policy tame credit supply booms, either directly or by enhancing the local bank-lending channel of monetary policy. We exploit credit registry data and the introduction of capital controls on foreign exchange (FX) debt inflows and increase of reserve requirements on domestic bank deposits in Colombia during a boom. We find that capital controls strengthen the bank-lending channel. Increasing the local monetary policy rate widens the interest rate differential with the U.S.; hence, relatively more FX-indebted banks carry-trade cheap FX-funds with expensive peso lending, especially towards riskier firms. Capital controls tax FX-debt and break the carry-trade. Differently, raising reserve requirements on domestic deposits directly reduces credit supply, particularly for riskier firms, rather than enhancing the bank-lending channel. Importantly, banks differentially finance credit with domestic vis-à-vis FX-financing; hence, capital controls and domestic macroprudential policy complementarily mitigate the credit boom and related bank risk-taking. Project supported by a 2018 Leonardo Grant for Researchers and Cultural Creators, BBVA Foundation, by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 648398), from the PGC2018-102133-B-I00 (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE) grant and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563).