Search

How should a developed country quantify the costs and benefits of the safety externalities that its energy and environmental policies generate for a developing country and vice versa? This paper addresses this question within a conventional utilitarian welfare-economics framework on the assumption that citizens of the countries concerned are rational economic agents. Counter to moral intuition, the paper shows that a developed country that displays purely altruistic concern for the wellbeing of citizens of a developing country will not value the safety externalities that it generates for the developing country at the developed country's "high" value of safety, but will instead apply the developing country's own "low" value. In turn, it is shown that even if the developing country displays a corresponding degree of purely altruistic concern for the wellbeing of citizens of the developed country it will nonetheless value the safety externalities that it generates for the developed country at a substantial discount relative to its own "low" value of safety. The paper also explores the implications of other forms of altruistic concern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to develop and test a model of the promotional expenditure decision for a firm operating under conditions of combined uncertainty and oligopoly. The uncertainty is assumed to exist in respect of the impact of any particular level of promotional expenditure upon the demand conditions facing the firm.
The analysis forms part of a wider study of advertising by confectionery manufacturers and arose largely as a result of conversations with advertising executives in the confectionery market. In the course of these discussions it became clear that the existing body of theory concerning the promotional expenditure decision is almost completely incapable of accommodating the extensive uncertainty which is an integral part of the promotional decision in a market such as that under consideration. It also became clear (at least in the case of the confectionery market) (a) that decision makers regard the pricing and promotional expenditure decisions as being largely independent and (b) that in a large number of cases decision makers think in terms of a minimum or 'threshold' level of promotional expenditure. While these factors are predominantly in the nature of impressionistic informal observations and therefore of doubtful validity as bases for a scientific enquiry, it was nonetheless felt worthwhile to attempt to develop a theoretical framework capable of accommodating them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reports on the developed theories of Kalman in which consumer preferences are directly affected by prices. Significance of Lagrange multiplier from first order conditions; Comparison between the Kalman and Slutsky consumer theories; Verifications of the validity of the theories.