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The author critically examines an article by Kar-Yui Wong concerning "two important, well-known propositions on international factor movements--namely, first, finite international factor movements are beneficial to the nationals of the destination-country but detrimental to those who are left behind in the source-country; and second, marginal movements do not have such welfare implications.... The present paper, by utilizing the indirect trade utility function, derives...results in a manner that is both direct and at once intuitively transparent."

This paper studies the welfare losses from tariff protection in a small open economy when some factors are internationally mobile. Our principal result is that international fictor mobility must raise the cost of protection. More specifically, the welfare loss resulting from a uniform increase in tariffs in a competitive small open economy is greater when tariff-induced international factor movements take place than when factors are internationally immobile. By contrast, an exogen1ous inflow of factors in the presence of tariffs may increase or reduce the welfare loss associated with protection, depending on whether or not the protected commodities use the foreign-owned factors intensively relative to domestically-owned factors. These results are proven for a very general specification of the economy's technology: in particular, no restrictions are placed on the degree of vertical integration in production, on the sectors into which factors are internationally mobile, or on the number of goods and factors. Our main result holds whether or not an increase in tariff rates leads the economy to specialise. In addition, we show how our results relate to earlier work on immiserising capital inflows and on negative shadow prices for factors of production, thus synthesizing a number of recent results within a common framework. The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we explain our framework and derive expressions for the welfare effects of tariffs when all factors are domestically owned and when some factors are foreign-owned but not internationally

Reprint of a paper presented to the 1st postwar World Population Conference in 1954 in Rome addressing the issue of the uses of international trade for overcoming inequalities in world distribution of population and resources. Many underdeveloped countries have failed to derive either from trade or from international factor movements the advantages that would have been expected on the basis of prevailing economic theory and the author is not sanquine about the prospects of lessening the resulting international income inequalities.

This note examines and extends the following two propositions: that finite international factor movements are beneficial to the nationals of the destination country but detrimental to those left behind in the source country and that marginal movements do not have such welfare effects. Using some newly developed techniques the propositions are found to be valid irrespective of the number of goods and factors if the economy starts from the autarky position. When only one factor can flow the gain of the nationals (loss of those left behind) will be positively dependent upon the amount of inflow (outflow). However if goods trade and/or factor flow are initially present the propositions are in general not true. (SUMMARY IN FRE) (EXCERPT)