Search

Nonskeptical foundationalists say that there are basic beliefs. But, one might object, either there is a reason why basic beliefs are likely to be true or there is not. If there is, then they are not basic; if there is not, then they are arbitrary. I argue that this dilemma is not nearly as decisive as its author, Peter Klein, would have us believe.

On doxastic theories of propositional faith, necessarily, S has faith that p only if S believes that p. On nondoxastic theories of propositional faith, it's false that, necessarily, S has faith that p only if S believes that p. In this article, I defend three arguments for nondoxastic theories of faith and I respond to published criticisms of them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I summarize John Hick's pluralistic theory of the world's great religions, largely in his own voice. I then focus on the core posit of his theory, what he calls 'the Real,' but which I less tendentiously call 'God'. God is supposed to be the ultimate religious reality. As such, it must be both possible and capable of explanatory and religious significance. Unfortunately, God is, by definition, transcategorial, i.e. necessarily, for any creaturely conceivable substantial property F, it is neither an F nor a non-F. As a result, God is impossible, as shown by the Self-Identity Problem, the Number Problem, and the Pairing Problem. Moreover, even if God is possible, it faces the Insignificance Problem. The upshot is that, so far as I can see, John Hick's God is unworthy of any further interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A descriptive polytheist thinks there are at least two gods. John Hick and Richard Swinburne are descriptive polytheists. In this respect, they are like Thomas Aquinas and many other theists. What sets Swinburne and Hick apart from Aquinas, however, is that unlike him they are normative polytheists. That is, Swinburne and Hick think that it is right that we, or at least some of us, worship more than one god. However, the evidence available to me shows that only Swinburne, and not Hick, is a cultic polytheist: he actually worships more than one god. I conclude that only Swinburne is a polytheist par excellence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his fine book The Wisdom to Doubt, J. L. Schellenberg builds a case for religious scepticism by advancing a version of the Hiddenness Argument. This argument rests on the claim that God could not love, in an admirable way, those who seek God while also remaining hidden from them. In this article, I distinguish two arguments for this claim. Neither argument succeeds, I contend, as each rests on an unsatisfactory understanding of the nature of admirable love, whether human or divine. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents the response of author's response to criticisms on his stand on philosophy and religion. Particular focus is given on his trilogy, "Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion," "The Wisdom of Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism" and "The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Skeptical Religion." He explains the difference between philosophy of religion and philosophy of science. He considers the thesis about a way of manifesting non-doxastic faith.

This article reflects critically on some of the claims of J. L. Schellenberg's trilogy and on the fundamental decisions lying behind them. Some of the latter are found to be tied to his earlier work on atheism in ways that can be questioned. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

I argue that J. L. Schellenberg's sceptical religion faces two problems of religious adequacy. The first has to do with its relationship to the goal of bringing persons into proper alignment with an ultimate good; the second, with the desideratum of sceptical religion's becoming sufficiently well-established as to be a vehicle for the accomplishment of great things on the stage of history. I argue that actual sceptical religion would need to accommodate itself to the requirements of historical existence, and that such accommodation might well lead to a blurring of the distinctions Schellenberg draws between ‘sectarian’ and sceptical religion. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In his recent trilogy, J. L. Schellenberg presents a new religious option: to have beliefless faith in a general object of religious concern that he thinks is referenced at the core of most sectarian religions – the axiological, soteriological, and metaphysical ultimate, which I call ‘UUU’. After explaining what UUU is more fully, I argue that the claim that UUU exists should not be, as Schellenberg says, the only focus for philosophy of religion. Still, I argue that such a claim is a good basis for a new form of religion, especially if it is modified in a couple of ways. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

According to J. L. Schellenberg, sceptical faith in the Ultimate is not merely permitted, but is rationally required. It is, all things considered, the response that we should make. In this article, I assess just three of Schellenberg's arguments for this bold conclusion. I explain why I find each of them unpersuasive. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

I discuss some trends in recent philosophy of religion, focusing on J. L. Schellenberg's Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion. I pay special attention to Schellenberg's dual emphases on ‘the Ultimate’ as metaphysical object of inquiry and various non-doxastic states (‘faith that’, ‘faith in’) as psychological objects of inquiry. This view is contrasted throughout to what might be called a ‘liturgical’ orientation in philosophy of religion. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article, I explain and critique J. L. Schellenberg's atheological argument from horrors. I raise an epistemic objection, arguing that no one could be justified in believing its conclusion on the basis of its premises. Then I adumbrate a notion of the divine which is different in various ways from the God of classical theism and argue that Schellenberg's argument makes no trouble for belief in the existence of God so construed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The author discusses his stand on the philosophy of religion. He shares that following the publication of his book "Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason" in 1993, his stand in philosophy of religion has evolved, resulting in the publication of his trilogy, "Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion," "The Wisdom of Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism" and "The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Skeptical Religion." His defense as to why he believes theism is false is detailed.

The cover page of the June 2013 issue of the journal "Religious & Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion" is presented.

The back cover of the June 2013 issue of the journal "Religious & Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion" is presented.