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The article discusses U.S. presidential recess appointments to government office without the U.S. Senate's approval from the 1690s through the early 2010s, through examining the U.S. Constitution's Recess Appointments Clause and constitutional law. The relationship between U.S. executive power and the Recess Appointments Clause, including U.S. President Barack Obama's recess appointments, is discussed. The Recess Appointment Clause's granting the U.S. Senate the legislative power to advise the president is also discussed.

The article discusses the journalist, founder of the newspaper the "Philadelphia Aurora" and political philosopher Benjamin Franklin Bache's perspective on early American politics, including its portrayal in the essay "Remarks Occasioned by the Late Conduct of Mr. Washington as President of the United States: MDCCXCVI." Bache's perspective on U.S. executive power, the U.S. President George Washington, the U.S. Vice President (and future president) John Adams, and republicanism is discussed. An overview of Bache's theory on the U.S. Constitution, including constitutional amendments, is provided. Bache's relationship with the U.S. Secretary of State, future president and Anti-Federalist Thomas Jefferson, is also discussed.

An essay is presented on the history of executive power in the U.S. as of January 2013, focusing on the decisionmaking powers of presidential administrations, and several legal cases including the U.S. Supreme Court (USSC) case Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (State Farm). USSC Justice William Rehnquist's concurring opinion in the State Farm case is addressed, along with the political views of former U.S. President Ronald Reagan's administration.

This article represents an important step in understanding early, modern presidents’ strategic use of signing statements by taking a sharp focus on the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. In contrast to recent presidents who have used the instrument increasingly to challenge legislative provisions, Eisenhower's use of signing statements was rather complex—from political credit-claiming, explaining the provisions of bills to the American public, and reinforcing his views on the federal-state balance of power—to maintaining bipartisan relations on foreign policy, shaping implementation of congressional bills, and selectively criticizing Congress for overspending. The theoretical framework devotes particular attention to the interplay of contexts—electoral, institutional, and economic—on Eisenhower's use of signing statements by policy area across his two terms. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An understanding of President Gerald Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon is complicated due to conflicting interpretations. While academic response to the pardon is often critical, cultural critics assert it had a healing effect on the nation. Over time, popular opinion regarding the pardon became more positive. This article seeks to answer the following research question: How may scholars best assess the Nixon pardon? This article synthesizes disparate understandings of the pardon by situating a rhetorical analysis of Ford's language within a cultural interpretation of the pardon power. The author concludes the pardon may be best assessed according to non-juridical metrics. In addition, evidence suggests the pardon helped popularize a discourse of mercy and forgiveness among the American people. The findings have important implications for scholars of presidential rhetoric and executive power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presidential management styles vary by each president, with consequences for the structures, processes, and outcomes of American foreign policymaking. Thus, understanding what the United States (U.S.) does in foreign policy in a given administration involves not only the international and domestic context and problems facing the U.S., but also the intersection of: 1) presidential style and personal preferences; 2) key stakeholders, structures and decision-making processes, and; 3) policy choices, which are shaped by the first two factors. However, while it is common to refer to a particular style for a particular president, in fact the same president may simultaneously employ very different styles, with very different policy consequences. This paper examines President Barack Obama's style, structures/processes, and policy outcomes in two policy areas: one in foreign economic policy (the 2008-2009 economic crisis) and one in national security policy (the 2009 Afghanistan "surge" decisions). We conclude that the two cases reveal two very different sets of decision-making dynamics under the same President at roughly the same time. Thus, presidents may have multiple styles, even within the same policy domains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, a theoretically informed and historically grounded perspective on ideology and ideologues is developed to address a paradox: while presidents play a central role in articulating socially diffuse ideologies, such as the soft-Statism of the New Deal or the anti-Statism championed by today's Republican Party, few administrations have been hospitable to ideologues, the True Believers who develop ideologies in the first place and are dedicated to their implementation. While institutional inducements to the presidential employment of ideologues have grown throughout the modern presidential era, differential inducements to their influence have been critical in explaining when, and how, both ideologues and ideology have intersected with the modern presidency. These differential inducements are exogenous crises, the regime characteristics of each presidency, and the personal traits of presidents. The interplay of these factors is charted from Franklin Delano Roosevelt (or FDR) through the Obama administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores whether U.S. Presidents shape and control federal bureaucracy by considering the actions of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) during the administrations of U.S. Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower. The authors use a qualitative approach to explore the responsiveness of the FHA to presidential and congressional pressures, decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, and lobbying interests. The FHA was created to insure mortgages, but from its inception, had long practiced a policy of racial segregation by enforcing a restrictive covenant policy on mortgage offerings and denying funding to African Americans, in stark contrast to the racial policies forwarded by Truman.

The assertion that the presidency is coequal in power to the other branches in the American system of government is often heard, has been suggested by all recent presidents, and has even made its way into political science. But tracing the history of the concept demonstrates that this assertion is an invention of quite recent vintage. Those who wrote and favored the Constitution did not make such claims, nor did early presidents. Even Andrew Jackson's famous and, to his generation, shocking assertion of coequality coincident with his censure was not really a claim of equal power between branches. According to our systematic analysis of presidential rhetoric it was Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford who initiated and popularized the idea of interbranch coequality. They did so to defend themselves in two episodes of substantial presidential vulnerability: Watergate and the ensuing midterm elections. Subsequent presidents have elevated something that would have seemed wrong and absurd to any founder into a blithe truism. This belief harms governance by creating both artificially high expectations for the president and a presumption of institutional stasis. The “second constitution” based on popular beliefs about interbranch relations continues to evolve, as much a product of happenstance as of rational design. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

How did the signing statements of the modern presidency before Watergate shape the development of the tool and contribute to its institutionalization? A content analysis of the 626 signing statements from 1933 to 1974 shows that the Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon administrations set important precedents for the modern constitutional use of the tool by protecting the institution from legislative vetoes and perceived encroachments in regard to foreign affairs and executive privilege. The results reveal that the constitutional logic required for the growth of challenges is rooted in this era and that Watergate served to amplify a trend that was already in motion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should we assess unilateral tactics and their contribution to presidential power in a less-than-unitary executive branch? To explore this question this article examines the provenance of nearly 300 executive orders from 1947 through 1987. Archival data show that executive orders are frequently a less-than-perfect representation of presidential preferences, despite the assumptions of recent work on unilateral power. That is, the issuance of executive orders often involves persuasion rather than simply command: it incorporates wide consultation across the executive branch and, frequently, White House ratification of what agencies wanted to do in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the foreign policy of U.S. Senator Wayne L. Morse, with a particular focus on his opposition to the expansion of executive power in the U.S. government since World War II. Particular focus is given to Morse's efforts to limit U.S. presidential war powers, including his opposition to the Mutual Security bill of 1951, his efforts to limit the power of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and his opposition to U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's request for expanded executive powers in regard to U.S. national security interests in Asia.

Contemporary scholarship has focused much attention on presidents' routine exploitation of signing statements since the 1980s to disallow provisions of bills passed by Congress. Much less is known about earlier post–World War II presidents' use of signing statements and what precedents they may have set for their successors. This study takes a sharp focus on the 934 signing statements issued from 1945 to 1980, from Presidents Harry Truman through Jimmy Carter. The analysis classifies these signing statements by policy area and by the type of comments the president made. The results accentuate how the resurgent Congress in the 1970s—including budget reform and challenges to presidential latitude in foreign policy through legislative vetoes—compelled Presidents Gerald Ford and Carter to increasingly use signing statements to nullify legislative provisos. The analysis emphasizes how cycles of congressional change affected earlier presidents' use of signing statements, laying a foundation for their successors' more broad manipulation of this rhetorical instrument to aggrandize executive prerogative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine two competing arguments relating to the role of Congress in explaining presidential decisions to use force from 1953 to 2000. We offer a policy availability rationale that suggests Congress matters in the decision to use force because presidents are motivated by their ability to influence legislative policy making. The models demonstrate that presidential success in Congress is the significant factor determining military action, not party control. Presidents employ force when their ability to influence policy is weak and avoid military actions when Congress supports the president's agenda. The results speak to the intersection of two important literatures, namely, presidential unilateralism and conventional theories on domestic politics and the use of force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign policy decision making during presidential transitions is an inherently difficult challenge. By examining the 1960-1961 presidential transition and resulting Bay of Pigs fiasco, this article demonstrates that there are six independent, causal variables that best determine the success or failure of foreign policy decision making during presidential transitions: national security decision-making structure, availability of information relevant to the substance and history of the crisis and its policy responses; focus of time and resources; relevant campaign commitments; 'newness' of the incoming administration; and 'inheritedness' of the policy. Three of President John F. Kennedy's most important Bay of Pigs decisions are explained using this six-variable framework. Drawing from the lessons of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, recommendations are offered for how to improve future national security transitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his articles, books, and legal memoranda for the U.S. Department of Justice, John Yoo is well known for favoring broad and even exclusive presidential power in the field of national security. Less understood is his dependence on the British model and the prerogatives it extended to the king over external affairs. In his writings, Yoo devotes little attention to the framers' rejection of British executive prerogatives. Even less does he acknowledge their commitment to a republic, a form of government in which sovereign power is vested not in an executive but in the people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at how the historiography of the Reagan era has evolved through three separate periods and argues that Ronald Reagan’s impact on American life and politics, while significant, has been exaggerated. Historians and political scientists tend to look at the period since 1980—often called the Age of Reagan—through a narrow, Reagan-centered perspective that is based on surprisingly little research on his presidency. The lack of writing on Bill Clinton and the two Bushes has worsened the distortion, diminishing our understanding of the importance and independence of the presidencies that followed Reagan’s. This essay offers three research questions looking at areas that have not been addressed adequately (or at all), but whose answers might shed light on the post-Reagan period, open new lines of inquiry, and bring Clinton and the Bushes out of Reagan’s shadow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors seek to answer the questions of why presidents use the power to temporarily seat federal court judges during recesses of the Senate. The use of the recess power can upset the carefully calculated separation of powers envisioned by the framers, shifting power away from one branch of government toward another. Examining every judicial recess appointment from 1789 to 2004, the authors discover that presidents are conditionally strategic in their use of the unilateral authority to appoint federal court judges during Senate recesses but that the use of this power is careful and spare, especially in the modern era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The book presents a discussion and analysis of the book "The Cult of the Presidency: America's Dangerous Devotion to Executive Power," by Gene Healy. The author reflects on the dangers associated with the expansion of presidential power and how the modern presidency differs from what the Framers of the U.S. Constitution envisioned. Topics explored include the constitutional authority to declare war, the impact of Progressivism on executive power, and the rhetorical reliance on the metaphor of war in the unilateral policies of U.S. president George W. Bush. Other topics include abuses of presidential power such as the Watergate scandal, the corrupting power of the office of the presidency, and the influence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

For decades, presidential power has been on the rise. This article asserts that excessive executive branch secrecy has been a central root cause. Excessive secrecy has both contributed to the growth of presidential power and has added to its potential for harm. The article touches upon harms from overclassification and from claims of executive privilege and state secrets. It also presents four "what if" questions from the Bush (II), Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Truman Administrations about how American history might have been changed (for the better) if crucial secrets had been revealed. But the heart of the paper is its analysis of how the shaping of secret decisions by presidents listening only to a small coterie of like-minded advisors increases the likelihood of unwise, or even abusive, decisions. Examples discussed are decisions to use torture (Bush II); expand the domestic jurisdiction of the FBI (FDR); have the CIA engage in covert action (Truman); and Iran/Contra (Reagan). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theory of the unitary executive is sometimes used to suggest that Article II's "executive power" extends to complete control of the executive branch. While presidents have rarely come close to that ideal, for some decades administrative strategies have been key to how presidents have exercised control over governmental outcomes -- and thus, to how they have exercised power. In thinking about the future of presidential power, this essay traces how recent developments in presidential administrative strategies have tilted the bureaucratic playing field in favor of the executive branch. It stresses the role of appointments, regulatory review, managerial directives, and the theoretic underpinning of these through the invocation of presidential "rights" that lead from the Nixon, Reagan, and George W. Bush administrations to the choices facing Barack Obama. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eras of excessive claims of presidential power are often followed by congressional and judicial efforts to trim back or monitor that power. This pattern occurred in response to the "imperial presidency" of the late 1960s and early 1970s, when Congress in the mid-1970s passed such laws as the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and when the Supreme Court, for example, denied a president's claim of executive privilege in U.S. v. Nixon (1974). Three decades later, it is possible to see that many of the statutory reforms and judicial principles that were generated by those efforts to reduce executive excess have had the paradoxical effect of legitimizing the very power they sought to curb and, at times, have extended to the president even greater authority than existed previously. Reasons for this "reverse effect" are, in part, the legislative compromises accepted as the price for passage and judicial decisions that misinterpreted congressional intent or left loopholes to be exploited in future cases. The recent change of administration provides Congress and the Court, once again, with the opportunity to review executive branch overreaching by the Bush presidency over the past eight years and to determine how to scale back excessive claims of executive power. Lessons from the past offer a cautionary tale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presidential war powers jurisprudence is as unsettled as it is controversial.In this paper, I argue that the Supreme Court's rulings in the field are best understood as political phenomena — that is, as evidence of institutional rivalries between different branches of the federal government.Focusing on cases involving wartime detainees, I find that the Court takes a surprising approach.Even where Justices share the president's political ideology, there is a tendency to parse constitutional language quite strictly, a reluctance to bend even in the face of important national security exigencies, and a tendency to declare the executive's actions unconstitutional.Tracing this to Justice Black's opinion in the landmark Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer case, I refer to it as a kind of constitutional formalism.Moreover, I note that the Court tends to adopt the formalist approach in a predictable way, using it wherever assertions of presidential authority seem to encroach upon the Court's own institutional competences.The analysis therefore forecasts that the Court will likely continue to hold presidential powers in check where cases involve such matters as habeas corpus and military tribunals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past six decades, presidents have decided to violate the law by invoking the concept of "inherent" powers, claiming that these independent and exclusive actions may not be checked by Congress or the courts. To conceal illegal operations, executive officials lie to Congress and withhold information from courts. Buttressing these unilateral actions is the state secrets privilege, which administrations have relied on to keep documents from federal judges and private plaintiffs. When Congress and the courts defer to executive claims, often in the name of "national security," the political and constitutional system pays a great price and individual liberties are put at risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the institutional contributions to presidential hegemony over the nation's foreign policy. Executive aggrandizement of foreign affairs powers rests on a faulty assertion of constitutional and legal claims and misplaced policy assumptions. It hinges, moreover, on extravagant assertions of presidential prerogative and emergency powers and false allusions to historical precedents. At all events, presidential domination of American foreign policy finds no support in the constitutional text, the discussions and debates in Philadelphia or in the architecture of the Constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction to the journal is presented in which the editor discusses reports published within this issue on the wartime powers of American presidents from the administrations of Abraham Lincoln to George W. Bush, which also considers subjects including the Federalist Papers written by Alexander Hamilton, the U.S. Constitution, and the U.S.'s position as a global power.

Notwithstanding Terry Moe's claim, rational choice scholarship has been pursuing the least “revolutionary” of the possible lines of advance in presidential studies. This scholarship asks the same basic question that Richard Neustadt asked nearly a half century ago: how much can a president get done? It follows Neustadt as well in its strategic approach to presidential action and in thinking about the problem of presidential strategy systemically. The new rational choice scholarship has many real strengths. It has helped clarify system parameters and specify how they affect an incumbent's opportunities, incentives risks, and constraints. But this is a “rigor revolution” that does more to perpetuate the traditional preoccupations of presidential studies than to overthrow them. The real revolution will come when we start asking questions about the presidency that no one in 1960 would have thought to ask. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historians, political scientists, and legal scholars have long debated the origins and development of the executive veto in the early United States. Some scholars argue that the power was originally conceived as quite limited. These scholars argue that until Andrew Jackson used the veto against the recharter of the Bank of the United States, the veto was limited to unconstitutional or administratively unworkable legislation. Others argue that no such norms existed and that the veto was always understood as an important legislative power of the president and that early presidents used it as such. I argue that neither account provides an adequate explanation of the development and usage of the veto in the early republic. I claim that early veto usage was quite different, not because of constraining constitutional norms, but because the electoral conditions that generate equilibrium vetoes had yet to emerge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented where in editor discusses articles published in the issue on topics including contemporary Turkish politics, legalities of executive powers, and state of siege in Turkey.

The back cover of the journal is presented along with information on the Arabic Sciences and Philosophy and International Journal of Middle East Studies along with the table of content for the issue.

The front cover of the journal is presented along with the issue's editors including Zafer Yenal, Ayfer Bartu Candan, and Cemre Baytok, information on journal and table of content.