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How long is the long run in the relationship between money growth and inflation? How important are high inflation episodes for the unit slope finding in the quantity theory of money? To answer these questions we study the relationship between excess money growth and inflation over time and across frequencies using annual data from 1871 to 2013 for several developed countries. Wavelet-based exploratory analysis shows the existence of a close stable relationship between excess money growth and inflation only over longer time horizons, i.e. periods greater than 16 and 24 years, with money growth mostly leading. When we investigate the sensitivity of the unit slope finding to inflation episodes using a scale-based panel data approach we find that low-frequency regression coefficients estimated over variable-length subsamples before and after WWII are largely affected by high inflation episodes. Taken together the results that inflationary upsurges affect regression coefficients but not the closeness of the long-run relationship call for a qualification of the Quantity Theory of Money and suggests that policymakers should not lose interest on monetary developments.

To reconcile the mixed empirical results, we develop a theoretical model whose main implication is a concave impact of regulation on the probability of a crisis. We test this relationship by applying a Probit model of a non-linear specification to annual data from 1999 to 2011 drawn from 132 countries. The probability of a financial crisis fits an inverted U-shaped curve: it rises as regulation stringency moves from low to medium levels and falls from medium to high levels. Countries located at the intermediate level of regulatory stringency face more instability than countries that are either loosely or severely regulated. We identify the latter two groups as falling in “liberalization traps”. Institutional quality interacts significantly with the regulatory environment.

This paper makes three points. The first is that external imbalances between Member States are relevant for the performance of a monetary union when the latter is not backed by a strong political commitment and a solid political framework. Eurozone policymakers have ignored these inter-member imbalances and have instead concentrated on union-wide imbalances, so much so that statistical data on the former phenomenon still remain largely incomplete. There are signs that a correction is in the making, which we hope will lead to a comprehensive quantitative knowledge of intra-EMU imbalances. The second objective of the paper is to design specific policies aimed at reducing inter-member external disequilibria, for example by fixing targets on current-account imbalances symmetrically applied to both deficit and surplus countries. The contrast between the keen attention of the EZ policymakers on national fiscal imbalances and the belated and lukewarm attention given to external imbalances is striking. The third aim of the paper is to propose a more flexible monetary policy aimed at controlling the distribution of liquidity among Member States, resulting from inter-member external imbalances. Our proposal is that National Central Banks should add a risk premium cost to official interest rates on banks that accumulate “excessive” borrowings or deposits to compensate, respectively, for outflows and inflows of the monetary base due to the effect of external imbalances. JEL classification: E42, E52, E58, PSL Quarterly Review, V. 68, N. 275 (2015)