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The aim of this paper is to show how philosophical grammatical consideration can contribute to better understanding of rationality of religion, and increase respect, fair cooperation and dialogue between adherents of different religions and worldviews. I have picked three examples of such account: Wittgenstein's account of theology as grammar, Alvin Plantinga's criticism of classical foundationalism and Hilary Putnam's semantical externalism. In the second part of the paper, I analyse the connection between grammar, rationality, and authenticity. I show that understanding of this connection provides a rational ground for claiming the possibility of dialogue and fair cooperation with others even in case when their rationality is different from ours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate between proponents and opponents of causal foundationalism has recently surfaced as a disparity between causal structuralism and causal anti-foundationalism in the structural realist camp. The paper outlines and dissolves the problem of disparity for (informational) structural realism. I follow John Collier (also Carl T. Bergstrom and Martin Rosvall) to specify causation in terms of the transmission of information. Unlike them, I built upon the reverse quantum data-processing inequality to show how this approach models causation as a symmetric process at the level of fundamental physics (but not special sciences). I show how this suggestion reduces the disparity about causation to a problem of application to diverse contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leibniz argues that there must be a fundamental level of simple substances because composites borrow their reality from their constituents and not all reality can be borrowed. I contend that the underlying logic of this 'borrowed reality argument' has been misunderstood, particularly the rationale for the key premise that not all reality can be borrowed. Contrary to what has been suggested, the rationale turns neither on the alleged viciousness of an unending regress of reality borrowers nor on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, but on the idea that composites are phenomena and thus can be real only insofar as they have a foundation in substances, from which they directly 'borrow' their reality. The claim that composites are phenomena rests in turn on Leibniz's conceptualism about relations. So understood, what initially looked like a disappointingly simple argument for simples turns out to be a rather rich and sophisticated one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We review two important schools within business and society research, which we label positivist and postpositivist corporate social responsibility (CSR). The former is criticized because of its instrumentalism and normative vacuity and the latter because of its relativism, foundationalism, and utopianism. We propose a new approach, based on Jürgen Habermas's theory of democracy, and we define the new role of the business firm as a political actor in a globalizing society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Viewed from the perspective of the epistemology of science, Schlick's theory of affirmations was an obvious failure. Most interpreters either reject his conception wholesale or save only parts of it at the cost of discarding others. This paper investigates whether it is possible to provide a more favorable reading by placing Schlick's affirmations in a broader interpretive framework than the Vienna Circle's protocol sentence debate, namely, his longstanding concern with skepticism. I argue that reading Schlick's affirmations as an attempt to improve his old, pre-Vienna Circle response to skepticism by the new means that his discussions with Wittgenstein and familiarity with his unpublished writings made available does possess plausibility as an interpretation of authorial intentions. Yet, while this reading makes better sense of Schlick's theory of affirmations than common attributions of foundationalist ambitions, I show that it ultimately does not "save" his theory either. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is it possible to provide a philosophical foundation for our moral practices? Or should we admit that the project of grounding morality failed? In this paper, I re-examine moral foundationalism. First, I describe the problem from the Aristotelian perspective and also from the Kantian viewpoint. Secondly, I discuss Nietzsche's and Moore's criticisms of the foundationalist project. Finally, I sketch a non-foundatinalist justification of the highest good by appealing to some of the later Wittgenstein's theses about the norms of meaning in ordinary language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay puts the modern philosopher Alain Badiou's theory of foundationalism into dialogue with the early modern playwright William Shakespeare's Hamlet. Doing so reveals a new candidate for Hamlet's traditionally hard-to-define hamartia —his "tragic mistake"—while providing an opportunity to theorize the notion of tragic foundationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many take the claim that you cannot 'get' an 'ought' from an 'is' to imply that non-moral beliefs are by themselves incapable of justifying moral beliefs. I argue that this is a mistake and that the position that moral beliefs are justified exclusively by non-moral beliefs—a view that I call moral inferentialism—presents an attractive non-sceptical moral epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some see concrete foundationalism as providing the central task for sparse ontology, that of identifying which concreta ground other concreta but aren't themselves grounded by concreta. There is, however, potentially much more to sparse ontology. The thesis of abstract foundationalism, if true, provides an additional task: identifying which abstracta ground other abstracta but aren't themselves grounded by abstracta. We focus on two abstract foundationalist theses—abstract atomism and abstract monism—that correspond to the concrete foundationalist theses of priority atomism and priority monism. We show that a consequence of an attractive package of views is that abstract reality has a particular mereological structure, one capable of underwriting both theses. We argue that, of abstract foundationalist theses formulated in mereological terms, abstract atomism is the most plausible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foundationalism in moral epistemology is a core tenet of ethical intuitionism. According to foundationalism, some moral beliefs (such as Ross' list of prima facie duties) can be known without inferential justification; instead, all that is required is a proper understanding of the beliefs in question. In an influential criticism against this view, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued that certain psychological facts undermine the reliability of moral intuitions. He claims that foundationalists would have to show that non-inferentially justified beliefs are not subject to those defeaters, but this would already constitute a form of inference and hence undermine the possibility of noninferential justification. The goal of my paper is to defend foundationalism against Sinnott-Armstrong's criticism. After presenting his challenge, I first argue that the most promising objection to it fails. This objection makes the case that defeater-defeaters are not part of the justification, but merely preserve the justification which the original claim provides. I object to this argument by distinguishing between weak and robust defeaters; only weak defeaters, I argue, fall outside the scope of justification, and it is an open question whether Sinnott-Armstrong's defeaters fall into that category. This leads the way to my own criticism of Sinnott-Armstrong's challenge: foundationalists in moral epistemology are entitled to the use of defeater-defeaters as part of the justification for moral beliefs as long as those defeater-defeaters themselves do not entail moral claims. Therefore, Sinnott-Armstrong's challenge does not undermine foundationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jonathan Weisberg has argued that Bayesianism's rigid updating rules make Bayesian updating incompatible with undermining defeat. In this paper, I argue that when we attend to the higher-order beliefs we must ascribe to agents in the kinds of cases Weisberg considers, the problem he raises disappears. Once we acknowledge the importance of higher-order beliefs to the undermining story, we are led to a different understanding of how these cases arise. And on this different understanding of things, the rigid nature of Bayesianism's updating rules is no obstacle to its accommodating undermining defeat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In line with the tradition of the Conversational School of Philosophy, this essay provides a rare and unique space of discourse for the authors to converse about the place of the 'ethno' in African philosophy. This conversation is a revisit, a renewal of the key positions that have coloured the ethnophilosophy debate by the conversers who themselves are notable contributors to arguments for and against the importance of ethnophilosophy in the unfolding of African philosophy particularly in the last decade or so. There are four key positions that have been argued for in the pages of this paper: (1) ethnophilosophy is not African philosophy and it is useless and inimical to the growth of African philosophy and should thus be jettisoned -- Matolino; (2) ethnophilosophy is the foundation for African philosophy as it provides the raw materials for African philosophical discourse -- Ogbonnaya and Agada; (3) ethnophilosophy has some value for African philosophy but it is definitely not the foundation for genuine African philosophy the way criticism and rigours are -- Attoe; and (4) ethnophilosophy can be adequately conceived as African philosophy particularly in terms of its etymology as culture or race philosophy, dealing with a philosophical or critical reflections on, and exposition of, immanent principles in African thought -- Mangena and Etieyibo. These conversers provide good arguments for the positions they hold, arguments that are of course, open for further interrogation. Two points can be concluded from the ethnophilosophy debate provided in this essay: (1) the disparities in views among conversers it seems, stem ultimately from the understanding of ethnophilosophy that each converser holds, which varies from the notion of a method used at some point in the history of African philosophy, to an etymological understanding as culture philosophy; and (2) the debate about ethnophilosophy in the spirit of any philosophical tradition remains a perennial one that is yet to be concluded. This essay certainly concretises what is on ground and paves the way for further discussions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper argues that the Venezuelan-Chilean philosopher Andrés Bello constitutes an important but heretofore neglected prefiguration of Richard Rorty. I argue for this thesis by articulating first an Inter-American philosophical narrative (based on previous work by Alex Stehn and Carlos Sanchez) that enables me to highlight certain common characteristics in philosophical projects that flourished across the Americas. Having done this, I show that Rorty's anti-representationalism and anti-foundationalism are prefigured in Bello's most important philosophical treatise, Filosofía del Entendimiento , to the extent that Bello recognizes the problems posed by the ocular metaphors that are systematically used by Early modern philosophers such as Descartes or Locke, and suggests their elimination and replacement by other metaphors. Finally, I conclude that, if my arguments are correct, the intellectual geography of neo-pragmatism needs to be expanded beyond traditional geographies such as Europe and the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this piece I will focus on what I think is a central aspect of Albert Camus's thinking, embodied in the distinction he makes in The Rebel between rebel and revolutionary. His is a philosophy of rebellion and he thinks that revolutions are a distorted expression of our need to rebel against that which we cannot accept. His views should serve as a counterpoint to those who think that an all-or-nothing approach to social change is desirable (those who, for instance, are too quick to justify murderous campaigns allegedly aimed at justice). And the issue here is not that embodied crudely in the reactionary (or conservative)/radical dichotomy. Rather, it is a defence of the need to rebel within limits, not so much to preserve the old against the threat of the new but, instead, to preserve basic human decency from the dark side of outrage, without dismissing what is crucial about outrage and emancipatory struggles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Infinitism, in contrast to foundationalism and coherentism, claims that justification in any proposition requires the availability of an infinite chain of propositional reasons, each providing a justificatory reason for its successor in the chain. Both infinitists and some critics of the theory have at times noted the possibility that the theory may have sceptical consequences for doxastic justification. It is argued here that, for reasons that appear not to have been previously appreciated, sceptical results very definitely do follow from infinitism. On one construal of infinitism, this constitutes a reductio of the theory. On an alternative construal, infinitists may embrace the sceptical conclusion, but in doing so, will take on all the problems that scepticism faces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the discussion on numerous nineteenth century elaborations of the theme of normativity. Topics include involving a large number of questions about the differences between the anthropological point of views embedded within traditional foundationalism; and granting to the defense of contingentism as against transcendentalism/metaphysics and specifically to the theme of the change in vocabularies.

The article presents the discussion on linguistic expressions of human events. Topics include substantially asserting the interpretative component of every interaction having with both physical-natural and socio-cultural reality; asserting linguistic-interpretative character of every human performance and consequently the struggle against foundationalism presenting a search for a language-free access.

In the contemporary cognitive science and philosophy of mind debate the definition of the ontology of the Self is difficult if not downright dubious. Thus, different theories aim to provide an account, especially where further neuroscientific research could be implemented. To this extent, the identity of the Self is suggested to be pinpointed by virtue of its specific set of mechanical features or brain functions, or it is considered the product of cognitive and conceptual capacities that build representations and narratives about ourselves. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach, based on the Spread Mind Theory (Manzotti, 2017a). Starting from the idea that the Self isn't just an aprioristic or transcendental form, I claim, endorsing a Neo Naturalist approach, that our first-personal experience is identical to the external objects which, due to a physical relation, constitute the same experience. Thanks to an externalist explanation of the experience of the Self it is possible to avoid multiple ontologies, causal foundationalism, naïve materialism and questions begging about what we should explain. Clarifying the concept of the Self, as a bundle of relative objects which are identical with the experiences themselves, allows us to draw a physical ontology, based on the neutral (and natural) idea of relative existence rather than any posited concept of subjectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To contend with the racist scaling of bodies seems to tend toward the ontological and metaphysical. Counter-strategies entail engagement with the predominant framework - i.e., with its categories of being and its grounds of analysis - however, much subjected to critique and deconstruction. Shawn Copeland and Mayra Rivera both identify and accept this "risk" in their theological projects. I argue that, although each does it with differing relative emphases, their political theologies trade upon an alternation between practical and poetical modes of critical reflection - the one is more negative and formal, the other is more positive and material; and this unitary alternation is what staves off failure in ideology and foundationalism. I furthermore suggest that the practical-poetical alternation I describe represents a contemporary politicization of the aesthetical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John White and John Tillson have both raised objections to the theory of moral education I have recently advanced. Here I reply to their objections and offer some critical remarks on the alternative accounts of moral education they propose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article explains the tenets of an updated version of semiosic translation. Many of the ideas in this paper have been brewing for some time. For example, the integration of the Peircean notions of sign and abduction and the Wittgensteinian concepts of rule-following, complex-fact, and hypothesis. It turns out that this synthesis leads to some new proposals about translation semiotics that seek to move the field from the reification of objects, concepts and practices toward a broader conception of translation and translating centered on the translator's agency. What this means is, among other things, that semiosic translation avoids a delimitation of signification (things and actions conveying meaning) by rejecting any conceptual appeals tinged with foundationalism. Rather, my argument will concentrate on elucidating the unpredictability of semiosis as a determinant of all forms of translation across sign systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question "What is philosophy?" is difficult to answer because it seems to presuppose answers to long‐standing and controversial philosophical questions. As answers to these questions affect one's metaphilosophy, apparently irresolvable philosophical disagreements are then converted into deadlock concerning the nature of the discipline. As this problem is unique to philosophy, however, this difficulty itself reveals something of philosophy's essential nature. As, under analysis, it turns out to arise from a definite way of posing problems, philosophy can initially be defined by a particular mode of problematisation. This essay establishes this argument and proposes a method for developing this insight into a fully realised, socio‐historical metaphilosophy. This involves stages of (a) hermeneutical analysis and (b) historical contextualisation, both of which increase the account's empirical adequacy. A conclusion discusses the extent to which philosophy is on trial here and argues that questioning the future of philosophy is not inherently philistine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an interview with philosopher and musician Michael Krausz who discusses his concept of relativity. He comments on the nature of reference frames in relativism. Topics discussed include his definition of relativism, variables in relativism, and the connection between realism, universalism and foundationalism.

Arguments from "easy knowledge" are meant to refute a class of epistemological views, including foundationalism about perceptual knowledge. I present arguments from easy knowledge in their strongest form, and explain why other formulations in the literature are inferior. I criticize two features of Stewart Cohen's presentation (2002, 2005), namely his focus on knowing that one's faculties are reliable, and his use of a Williamson-style closure principle. Rather, the issue around easy knowledge must be understood using a notion of epistemic priority. Roger White's presentation (2006) is contaminated by the so-called lottery puzzle, which is best kept separate. Distinguishing basic from non-basic visual contents limits the force of the examples discussed by Cohen, White, and Crispin Wright (2007). Finally, I present a new strategy for resisting even the best-formulated arguments from easy knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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There is a long-standing debate in epistemology on the structure of justification. Some recent work in formal epistemology promises to shed some new light on that debate. I have in mind here some recent work by David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, hereafter “A&P”, on infinite regresses of probabilistic support. A&P show that there are probability distributions defined over an infinite set of propositions {p1,p2,p3,…,pn,…} such that (i) pi is probabilistically supported by pi+1 for all i and (ii) p1 has a high probability. Let this result be “APR” (short for “A&P’s Result”). A&P oftentimes write as though they believe that APR runs counter to foundationalism. This makes sense, since there is some prima facie plausibility in the idea that APR runs counter to foundationalism, and since some prominent foundationalists argue for theses inconsistent with APR. I argue, though, that in fact APR does not run counter to foundationalism. I further argue that there is a place in foundationalism for infinite regresses of probabilistic support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores an alternative to the established dichotomy between philosophical (natural law) accounts of human rights, characterized by a foundationalist tendency, and political (practice-based) accounts of human rights, which aspire to be non-foundationalist. I argue that in order to justify human rights practice, political accounts of human rights cannot do without the support of theoretical foundations, although not necessarily of the natural-law variety. As an alternative to natural-law metaphysics, a deflationary theory of human rights, based on a deflationary account of truth, is put forward. Starting from a distinction between 'extreme' and 'moderate' forms of deflationism, this article defends a constructivist theory of human rights grounded on the Humean notion of conventionalism. This innovative approach to human rights provides political conceptions of human rights with the foundations (or quasi-foundations) they need, but are currently lacking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophy experienced a turning point at the time of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Likewise, religion (Judaism) encountered transformation during the time of the apostle Paul. Wittgenstein's metaphor of the 'River-bed' that was later subsumed in the language-game theory is a concept that challenged the then status quo of philosophy known as rationalistic foundationalism. This philosophical predisposition is analogous to the religious situation when Paul began his Christian ministry Paul's passionate emphasis on 'justification by faith' rather than legalistic or ritualistic observance of the law, was a shockwave to the Judaist religious establishment. Wittgenstein and Paul could as well be regarded as 'radicals' or rebels in their respective disciplines. Wittgenstein introduced a paradigm shift into philosophy while Paul did it in the Christian religion. Their unconventional outlooks were, however, met with a lot of resistance especially from the diehard philosophers and/or religionists of the day This paper, therefore, is a comparative work on Wittgenstein (Philosophy) and Paul (Religion) in order to demonstrate sustained revolutionary tendencies toward human innovations and the need to strive for excellence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an essay titled Aquinas on the Foundations of Knowledge, Eleonore Stump rejects the idea that Aquinas's epistemology is foundationalist. I agree with Stump, and share in her conviction that the Angelic doctor developed instead what can be seen as a kind of theological reliabilism. In this article, I intend to take her position a step further. First, I would like to show that Thomistic reliabilism falls into a vicious circle if seen as based on a merely rational theism. Second, I am going to argue that for Aquinas such reliabilism depends instead on Christian faith, construed as the act of believing the revealed truth by virtue of the love relationship that God allows human beings to have with him. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper criticizes phenomenal conservatism--the view according to which a subject S's seeming that P provides S with defeasible justification for believing P. It argues that phenomenal conservatism, if true at all, has a significant limitation: seeming-based justification is elusive because S can easily lose it by just reflecting on her seemings and speculating about their causes. The paper also argues that because of this limitation, phenomenal conservatism doesn't have all the epistemic merits attributed to it by its advocates. If true, phenomenal conservatism constitutes a unified theory of epistemic justification capable of giving everyday epistemic practices a rationale, but it doesn't afford us the means of an effective response to the skeptic. Furthermore, phenomenal conservatism doesn't form the general basis for foundationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to highlight the advantages of integrating biblical perspectives and professional practices of the leader through coaching. The three basic biblical principles this article explores are faith, truth, and perseverance anchored in the biblical accounts of James. The integration of these three practical teachings adds value to the coaching profession while it fosters the establishment of deep-rooted and trusting relationships. These biblical concepts provide insight, understanding, and solutions for coaching practitioners in order to develop the leader to enhance relationships within the organization providing foundational competencies which improve the leader's performance in all areas of life. Trusting relationships are an innate necessity for leaders to partake in any endeavor throughout their personal or professional life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Preservationism is a dominant account of the justification of beliefs formed on the basis of memory. According to preservationism, a memory belief is justified only if that belief was justified when it was initially held. However, we now know that much (if not most) of what we remember is not explicitly stored, but instead reconstructed when we attempt to recall it. Since reconstructive memory beliefs may not have been continuously held by the agent, or never held before at all, a purely preservationist account of memory does not allow for justified reconstructed memory beliefs. In this essay, I show how a process reliabilist account can maintain preservationism about reproductive memory beliefs while accommodating the justification of reconstructive memory beliefs. I argue that reconstructive memory is an inferential process, and that therefore the beliefs it produces are justified in the same way that other inferential beliefs are justified. Accordingly, my process reliabilist account combines a preservationist account of reproductive memory with an inferential account of reconstructive memory. I end by defending this view against objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I pose two questions for Stephen White and his aspirational model of citizenship. The first is to ask what ethical sources do citizens need to oppose the presence of Nazis in our public sphere. The second is to question White’s deep suspicion of foundationalism and theism as sources of an open and democratic bearing and indeed as sources from which we can build strong opposition to Nazis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on view in epistemology that justifies a belief must always be a belief as Keith Lehrer dramatically puts it and there is no exit from the circle of one's beliefs. Topics include examines often the argument for this "circle-of-belief" view assumes that the only alternative is what Wilfrid Sellars stigmatizes as "the Myth of the Given" and often the conclusion drawn from it is that foundationalism cannot be the correct theory of justification.

In this paper I will argue against a view that I call foundationalism about persistence-conditions. The core of this view is that composite physical objects have their specific persistence-conditions in virtue of these conditions being fulfilled by the object's physical constituents at various times. I will provide two arguments - the argument from the possibility of instantaneous objects and the argument from the presence of persistence-conditions - which show that this view is untenable. These arguments will also point towards a more adequate understanding of what it means for an object to have certain persistence-conditions. I will expound this understanding and suggest, on its basis, an unorthodox, hylomorphist account of the persistence-conditions of objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · In the past three decades, the work of Varela has had an enormous impact on current developments in contemporary science. Problem · Varela's thought was extremely complex and multifaceted, and while some aspects - notably his contributions to the autopoietic theory of living and enactivist approach to cognition - have gained widespread acclaim, others have been ignored or watered down. Method · We identify three dimensions of Varela's thought: (a) anti-realism of the "middle way"; (b) anti-foundationalism of the circular onto-epistemology; and (c) ethical/social implications of the circularity. The discussion of these dimensions is followed by a concise overview of the individual target articles in this issue and the topics they cover. Finally, we discuss in what ways the articles extend and relate to Varela's work. We do this by means of a concrete example: the relation between "enaction" and "enactivism." Results · We show that the ignoring-cum-watering-down process of Varela's contributions to science is at least partly linked to these three dimensions of Varela's thought. On the basis of our examination, we also find that the more narrow research topics are always interrelated with broader philosophical reflection. Researching into ignored and watered-down aspects of Varela's work enables us to not only gain fresh insights into Varela's overall philosophy and rekindle interest in the topics and themes that have been brushed aside, but also cast a fresh light on those that are currently flourishing. Implications · Reviving interest in Varela's work in toto could lead to fruitful research and discussion in numerous scientific fields. To illustrate this idea, we delineate, tentatively, three domains - theoretical, empirical, and existential - where Varela's contribution to philosophy and science could instigate a productive exchange of views. Constructivist content · All three dimensions of Varela's philosophy have strong affinities with the radical constructivist critique of realism and some of its epistemological and ethical implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to priority monism, there are many concrete entities and there is one, the cosmos, that is ontologically prior to all the others. I begin by clarifying this thesis as well as its main rival, priority atomism. I show how the disagreement between the priority monist and atomist ultimately turns on how the thesis of concrete foundationalism is implemented. While it's standard to interpret priority monism as being metaphysically noncontingent, I show that there are two competing, prima facie plausible conceptions of metaphysical necessity-the essence-based and law-based conceptions-on which it is reasonable to view its modal status differently. This, I suggest, is good for the priority monist-various objections to the thesis presuppose that it's metaphysically noncontingent, while there are arguments for the thesis that don't make the presupposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One important strand of Sellars's attack on classical foundationalism from Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind is his thesis about the priority of is-talk over looks-talk. This thesis has been criticized extensively in recent years, and classical foundationalism has found several contemporary defenders. I revisit Sellars's thesis and argue that is-talk is epistemically prior to looks-talk in a way that undermines classical foundationalism. The classical foundationalist claims that epistemic foundations are constituted by the agent's set of looks-judgments. However, I argue that only a subset of these looks-judgments are even candidates to serve as foundations for the agent's empirical knowledge, and membership in this subset is determined by the agent's theory of how the world is. Thus, the epistemic force of the looks-judgments in this subset is dependent on the agent's theory of how the world is. This means that these looks-judgments aren't foundational at all, as the agent's theory of how the world is is epistemically is prior to the epistemic status of these looks-judgments. This is the sense in which judgments about how the world is are epistemically prior to judgments about how things look. This conclusion allows concrete elaboration of another of Sellars's well-know (although not well-understood) claims: 'I do wish to insist that the metaphor of 'foundation' is misleading in that it keeps us from seeing that if there is a logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rest on observation reports, there is another logical dimension in which the latter rest on the former'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A perennial epistemological question is whether things can be known just as they are in the absence of any awareness of them. This epistemological question is posterior to ontological considerations and more specific ones pertaining to mind. In light of such considerations, the author propounds a naïve realist, foundationalist account of knowledge of things in themselves, one that makes crucial use of the work of Brentano. After introducing the resources provided by Brentano's study of mind, the author reveals the ontological framework in which it takes place. Doing so is instrumental to illuminating acquaintance, the state that enables the direct engagement of a mind and some other thing. The author discusses this state and shows how it has the epistemic heft, with a Brentanian account of judgment, to provide the foundations of one's knowledge of the world. A naïve realist, foundationalist account of knowledge is open to a compelling objection; the author presents this objection with the means of undermining it. In conclusion, the author recurs to the opening theme of the primacy of ontology and suggests that familiar misgivings about knowing things in themselves are all based on questionable--and ultimately untenable--ontological presuppositions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dialogical egalitarianism is the thesis that any proposition asserted in dialogue, if questioned, must be supported or else retracted. Dialogical foundationalism is the thesis that some propositions are privileged over this burden of proof, standing in no need of support unless and until support for their negation is provided. I first discuss existing arguments for either thesis, dismissing each one of them. Absent a successful principled argument, I then examine which thesis it is pragmatically more advantageous to adopt in analytic philosophical dialogue. This requires identifying the goal of such dialogue, to the attainment of which the thesis would be so advantageous. To identify this goal, I draw on Douglas Walton's typology of dialogues for an analysis of the types of dialogue of 110 representatively selected journal articles in current analytic philosophy. 95% of articles are found to instantiate persuasion dialogue. In light of the thus prevalent goal of persuading one's opponent, I argue that the adoption of dialogical egalitarianism in analytic philosophical dialogue is pragmatically inescapable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an often-quoted passage, Richard Rorty wrote that "J.S. Mill's suggestion that governments devote themselves to optimizing the balance between leaving people's lives alone and preventing suffering seems to me pretty much the last word." In this article, I show why, for Rorty, maintaining a strong public-private divide that cordons off final vocabularies - the religious, racial, ethnic, sexual, gender, philosophical, and other terms so important for citizens' private pursuits of self-creation and self-perfection - from public political discourse is a crucial means to accomplishing both of these goals in post-secular liberal democracies. Public political justifications should instead be articulated in the foundation-neutral terms of a shared national vocabulary. Like paintbrushes and crowbars, final and shared vocabularies are different tools for different purposes, and a strong public-private divide helps ensure that no harm comes from their misuse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among the deeper strata of Rorty's philosophy is what I call his aversion to normative violence. Normative violence occurs when some specific group presents itself as having a privileged relation to reality. The alternative to normative violence is recognizing that cultural politics has priority over ontology. I trace this Rortyan idea to its origins in Nietzsche and Sellars. Rorty's contribution is to combine Nietzsche on the death of God and Sellars on the Myth of the Given. However, I conclude with a suggestion that Rorty ultimately goes too far in thinking that avoiding normative violence requires abstaining from metaphysics and epistemology as such. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]