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International audience; Nous étudions l’allocation de la dotation globale de fonctionnement (DGF) des communes. Les modalités d’allocation de la DGF sont fixées par des règles en apparence strictes, mais dont la complexité même pourrait créer des marges discrétionnaires. Notre analyse empirique révèle que ces marges existent et sont utilisées, favorisant certains « bastions » électoraux.

This paper sheds some new light on the determinants of FOMC members? monetary policy preferences. For thatpurpose, we use a new dataset of macroeconomic indicators for the Fed districts, as well as preferences revealed byFOMC members in the Transcripts, to compute a desired interest rate for each individual member. First, we find thatFOMC members react to the regional unemployment rate. Second, individuals holding a Master or Bachelor degree,and issued from either the central bank, or from the private or public sector have a higher propensity to disagree onthe dovish side, while women tend to disagree on the hawkish side. These findings provide further insights for centralbank watchers about the upcoming policy decisions that are likely to be implemented by the FOMC, following thecomposition of its committee and the evolution of regional cycles.

International audience; This paper examines the modalities of risk sharing in the United States, and their evolution between the pre-financial crisis period and the post-crisis one. Reassessing the mechanisms at play in the US economy, we document a lower share of adjustment coming from capital markets, in comparison to previous estimates. The measures taken during the crisis have not impacted the absolute degree of risk sharing, although the relative size of its components has changed, with a stronger role for the federal government.

International audience

Collection LARJE.; International audience

Collection LARJE.; International audience

Les finances publiques québécoises sont régies, depuis 1996, par la Loi sur l'équilibre budgétaire, et, depuis 2006, par la Loi sur la réduction de la dette. Dans la foulée de la dernière récession, plusieurs dispositions de ces deux lois ont été modifiées. Les règles budgétaires québécoises ainsi réformées pourront-elles demeurer en place à long terme ? Pourront-elles être améliorées ? Le présent chapitre situe un éventuel débat québécois sur ces questions dans un contexte plus large, nord-américain et européen. Nous abordons d’abord les types de règles budgétaires et les objectifs de politiques publiques qui les sous-tendent. Les conséquences attendues des règles, certaines positives mais d’autres néfastes, sont ensuite discutées. Nous analysons enfin des institutions complémentaires aux règles budgétaires qui peuvent en améliorer l’efficacité, puis dégageons des perspectives pour d’éventuelles modifications à apporter aux règles budgétaires québécoises.

We show that voters are fiscal conservatives, although in the long run only: while the average (over the mandate) level of debt has a negative impact on the probability of reelection, pre-election debt accumulation by incumbents increases their probability of reelection. As the negative impact is larger the higher the debt level, it compensates the short run effect. Elections thus appear as a disciplining device, even if a weak one.

This research looks at the determinants of the adoption of the school-rhythm reform by French municipalities. The possibility opened to mayors to adopt the reform sooner (2013) or later (2014) offers the opportunity to measure how much the interests of the children have weighted on the decision. As our results reveal strong partisan biases to be prevalent, and financial reasons to be influential, it can be affirmed that the children's interest has clearly not been the only consideration in mind.

This paper aims to explain the rise and fall of communism by exploring the interplay between economic incentives and social preferences transmitted by ideology. We introduce inequality-averse and inefficiency-averse agents and analyze their conflict through the interaction between leaders with economic power and followers with ideological determination. The socioeconomic dynamics of our model generate a pendulum-like switch from markets to a centrally-planned economy abolishing private ownership, and back to restoring market incentives. The grand experiment of communism is thus characterized to have led to the discovery of a trade-off between equality and efficiency at the scale of alternative economic systems. While our focus is on the long-run transitions from capitalism to communism and back observed in the course of the 20-th century, the model also derives conditions under which the two systems converge and become stable.

This study examines public opinion in 15 European countries, on the proposal to establish an independent European Central Bank (ECB). Using data from Euro- barometer surveys for 1998 to 2000, which included a speci c question on this issue, we show that in ation performance is not su cient to explain people's preference for an independent central bank: personal characteristics and circumstances have a stronger impact, with gender, employment status, education level, income quartiles, and degree of information and civic concern showing particular relevance.

Using a new database of French municipalities that covers 821 towns and 2 elections (2001 and 2008), we examine how the budget structure, degree of electoral competition and the economic context affect the share of votes for the incumbent. We assess the specicities created by the two-round process under French electoral rule (a dual ballot under plurality rule). We show that in the first round of the electoral process, spending on equipment can influence the voter, and that electoral competition has a strong impact on the incumbent's score. In the second round, the incumbent's vote is affected more by national considerations and local budget variables have no effect. We show that the dynamics between the first and the second rounds are intense. The results suggest that the determinants of each round in a two-round electoral process are different.

This paper aims to explain the rise and fall of communism by exploring the interplay between economic incentives and social preferences transmitted by ideology. We introduce inequality-averse and inefficiency-averse agents and analyze their conflict through the interaction between leaders with economic power and followers with ideological determination. The socioeconomic dynamics of our model generate a pendulum-like switch from markets to a centrally-planned economy abolishing private ownership, and back to restoring market incentives. The grand experiment of communism is thus characterized to have led to the discovery of a trade-off between equality and efficiency at the scale of alternative economic systems. While our focus is on the long-run transitions from capitalism to communism and back observed in the course of the 20-th century, the model also derives conditions under which the two systems converge and become stable.

International audience

This paper aims to explain the rise and fall of communism by exploring the interplay between economic incentives and social preferences transmitted by ideology. We introduce inequality-averse and inefficiency-averse agents and analyze their conflict through the interaction between leaders with economic power and followers with ideological determination. The socioeconomic dynamics of our model generate a pendulum-like switch from markets to a centrally-planned economy abolishing private ownership, and back to restoring market incentives. The grand experiment of communism is thus characterized to have led to the discovery of a trade-o¤ between equality and efficiency at the scale of alternative economic systems. While our focus is on the long-run transitions from capitalism to communism and back observed in the course of the 20-th century, the model also derives conditions under which each of the systems can remain stable., Current version uploaded April 2013.

This note considers the foundations of the Federal Reserve Board's independence. Its origins are shown to reside in the American political philosophy, under which independence is an essential working condition for a perennial democracy.

This paper disentangles between two hypotheses on the determinants of Australia's and the US' average tariffs levels. Relying on historical data that covers a century (1904 to 2005), it is first shown that a break in the series occurs in 1947, forcing to separate the data into two sub-periods (before and after the 1947 break). The results permit to distinguish a "rock" and a "tango" regime. The first designates the period where one country (the US) has a stronger influence on the other, while the second indicates that, after 1947, stronger reciprocal inter-relations have to be taken into account.

This paper is a study of the influence of economic and political conditions on the results of incumbent parties' candidates in local elections in France. The large sample used covers 586 towns and two elections (2001 and 2008). It explicitly deals with the specificities induced by the tworound process of the French electoral rule, and results are provided for both the reelection probability and the share of votes. It is shown that the budget structure, and notably equipment expenditures, has a strong impact on the incumbent party's share of votes. Political variables also play a role, as do the number of candidates, and national partisan waves.

This paper studies the transmission of preferences in an overlapping-generations model with heterogeneous mature agents characterized by different degrees of inflation aversion. We show how the dynamics of a society's degree of inflation aversion and the implied degree of central bank independence depend on the direction and speed of changes in the structure of the population's preferences, themselves a function of parent socialization efforts in response to observed inflation. We then construct a survey-based measure of inflation aversion and provide empirical support for our analytical and simulation results. Available cross-section evidence confirms that a nation's demographic structure, in particular variation in the share of retirees as a proxy for the more inflation-averse type, is a key determinant of inflation aversion, together with experience with past inflation and the resulting collective memory embodied in monetary institutions.

In this paper, we consider if extreme policies in terms of more polarized budgets can occur under the two following assumptions: (i) voter's preferences are skewed by the history of the budget structure, a fact that politicians can use to influence their probability of reelection and the policy of their successors, (ii) fiscal rules are imposed on the budget. The first assumption is now relatively common in Public Economics (see for example, Laffont and Tirole, 1993, chap. 9, 10), and has been empirically verified. The second assumption has been the focus of a huge literature since the European Union began to consider implementing a common currency. We explore several fiscal rules that are variations on two well-known rules: the now famous golden rule, as in the United Kingdom, where only interest rate payments can generate debt, and a balanced-budget rule. Theoretically, we build on Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Tabellini and Alesina (1990), and the recent elaboration on these by Matsen and Thøgersen (2007). The political arena is thus one with partisan politicians, the degree of partisanship being expressed in a different allocation of budget resources. In our setting, we consider politicians more or less inclined towards favoring infrastructure or operating expenditures. Such an assumption has recently found empirical support, e.g. by Veiga and Veiga (2007a, b). This partisanship use of budget, plus the assumption of voters getting used to some levels of public goods spending (habit effect) gives the incumbent an incentive to distort the allocation to try to lure more voters, thus boosting her re-election probability. Though Matsen and Thøgersen (2007) show that, in such a framework, the incumbent's optimal policy features both a more polarized allocation of the public resources and a debt bias, we verify if these results hold when the incumbent is confronted with fiscal policy rules.

La théorie budgétaire du niveau des prix distingue deux types de régimes pour les politiques économiques : Ricardien et Non Ricardien. Nous analysons dans quelle mesure ces deux régimes peuvent s’appliquer à des sous-périodes dans l’histoire économique d’un pays. Le cas du Liban, passé de la prospérité à la guerre puis à la reconstruction, offre une application de cette théorie, et montre sa pertinence empirique.

La théorie budgétaire du niveau des prix distingue deux types de régimes pour les politiques économiques : Ricardien et Non-Ricardien. Nous analysons dans quelle mesure ces deux régimes peuvent s'appliquer à des sous-périodes dans l'histoire économique d'un pays. Le cas du Liban, passé de la prospérité à la guerre puis à la reconstruction, offre une application de cette théorie, et montre sa pertinence empirique.

La théorie budgétaire du niveau des prix distingue deux types de régimes pour les politiques économiques :Ricardien et Non-Ricardien. Nous analysons dans quelle mesure ces deux régimes peuvent s'appliquer à des sous-périodes dans l'histoire économique d'un pays. Le cas du Liban, passé de la prospérité à la guerre puis à la reconstruction, offre une application de cette théorie, et montre sa pertinence empirique., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

This paper relates the volatility of interest rates to the collective nature of monetary policymaking in monetary unions. Several decision rules are modelled, including hegemonic and democratic procedures, and also committees headed by a chairman. A ranking of decision rules in terms of the volatility of policy rates is obtained, showing that the presence of a chairman has a cooling effect. However, members of a monetary union are better off under symmetric rules (voting, averaging, bargaining), unless they themselves chair the union. The results are robust to the inclusion of heterogeneities among members of the monetary union., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

info:eu-repo/semantics/published

This article exposes the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. This framework allows to deal with the intertemporal dimension needed to understand the prevalent cycle of promises, disappointment, new promises, new disappointment, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

This paper relates the volatility of interest rates to the collective nature of monetary policymaking in monetary unions. Several decision rules are modelled, including hegemonic and democratic procedures, and also committees headed by a chairman. A ranking of decision rules in terms of the volatility of policy rates is obtained, showing that the presence of a chairman has a cooling e¤ect. However, members of a monetary union are better off under symmetric rules (voting, consensus, bargaining), unless they themselves chair the union. The results are robust to the inclusion of heterogeneities among members of the monetary union., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

La couverture porte en plus : "tout pour réussir, l'essentiel du cours, un QCM, des conseils méthodologiques, des sujets…".; International audience; Cet ouvrage permet de clarifier les aspects historiques, empiriques et théoriques de la construction européenne, au moment où les États membres de l'Union européenne s'interrogent sur l'opportunité de ratifier ou non la Constitution pour l'Europe. Les auteurs insistent tout particulièrement sur la genèse et les performances des politiques économiques européennes, monétaires et budgétaires, et sur les difficultés de l'intégration. Ils précisent notamment dans quelle mesure les politiques préalables à l'intégration peuvent différer des politiques postérieures à cette intégration. Enfin, un chapitre est entièrement consacré aux grands dossiers de l'avenir de la construction européenne : élargissement, Pacte de stabilité et de croissance, réforme de la Banque centrale européenne. L'ouvrage s'adresse aux candidats aux concours de la fonction publique et de l'enseignement (CAPES, CAPET, agrégation sciences économiques et sociales (programme 2003-2005), aux étudiants de licence et master (économie-gestion, sciences économiques, AES), de DUT, d'écoles de commerce et d'IUP, mais aussi à tous ceux qui recherchent une synthèse des questions macroéconomiques consacrées à l'Union européenne. L'ouvrage permet en outre de contrôler l'acquisition des connaissances à l'aide de 90 questions à choix multiples et de leurs corrigés. Il permet enfin d'appliquer les règles de méthodologie des épreuves de dissertation en s'entraînant avec 5 sujets entièrement corrigés. Un index permet de se repérer rapidement dans l'ouvrage.

While monetary policy decisions are mainly taken by Committees (as is the case for the ECB, or for the Federal Reserve), the literature largely stands on the …ction of a single central banker, be it (or not) a conservative one. The purpose here is to consider explicitly the plural dimension of monetary policy Boards, and to investigate the consequences of such a decision structure for monetary policy rules.

The paper ascribes to the literature analysing the conditions leading to the break-up of nations. The model englobes the existing literature and considers two separate spaces, a state and its region, where informed and non-informed citizens cohabit. We depart in considering that noninformed citizens may be convinced, via the action of groups acting to obtain independence. Conditions for separation are established and discussed.