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Much has been made of the once brotherly relationship between Syrian President Bashar al Assad and the Turkish President Recep Teyep Erdogan. Indeed, this relationship formed the bedrock of Turkey's much-vaunted move towards the Arab world and its re-engagement with regions on which Ataturk and his successive Kemalist Generals had shut a door. Yet, more than fifteen years after the historic first visits by the Turkish and Syrian leaders to each other's capitals, the Syria-Turkey relationship lies in ruins. Whilst much of the focus of the war in Syria has been on the exaggerated sectarian divide in the Middle East and the great power rivalry between the United States and Russia, a key aspect overlooked is the fundamental relationship between Turkey and Syria. The last two decades of this relationship have been defined by Assad and Erdogan. As Turkey slowly begins to re-engage with Syria one can trace the tumultuous relationship between the two neighbours in the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The Arab nationalists and Turkish nationalists have been at daggers drawn over the make up of the border. Syria has never forgotten the land-grab of the Turks in the aftermath of the French exit of the Levant. Furthermore, the diverse set of communities – the Greeks, the Armenians, the Kurds and the Syriacs – that make up the inhabitants of the region still suffer from the effects of the mismanagement of the French exit and what is seen by many of these communities as an illegal annexation by Turks and Arabs. However, under the Syrian Arab Republic the Christians of all denominations including the Armenians and Greeks flourished whilst Turkey forced only one identity upon its once diverse people. This article will argue that the relationship between Syria and Turkey has ebbed and flowed – and this dynamic is rooted in history where successive Turkic dynasties have favoured Syria as their pivot to control the region. Similarly, when Syria became less important, the very foundation of the Turkic and later Turkish influence became weak in the region. The close relationship between Erdogan and Assad overturned more than six decades of animosity, but once Erdogan turned his back to Assad and supported the overthrow of the Syrian government the relationship fell apart. As the end of the war nears, a defining factor to end this war will be how Turkey and Syria reconcile or interact. The Syrian Kurds now seem to be back in Assad's corner as they prefer to be under Damascus' sovereignty then under attack from Ankara across the border. The Kurdish question is of significant value to both Syria and Turkey; it has been a major reason for both countries to be at peace and war. A closer look at the history of these two countries' relationship proves that the Assad-Erdogan relationship has mirrored the history of the two states since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Their future in more than one way is now inter-twined on how they interact with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of History Studies (13094688) is the property of History Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Social Anthropology / Anthropologie Sociale is the property of Berghahn Books and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article analyzes regional events in the twenty-first century and identifies Turkey's relations with Arab countries, pointing out the serious deterioration that has occurred in those relations with its bordering Arab neighbors as well as Egypt and Lebanon. The article argues that Turkey's "imperatives of state," as in the case of any other state actor, determine the foreign policy trajectory and consequently its regional and international relations. Turkey has chosen to ally itself with pro-Western regional states, namely Israel and Qatar, but not others, such as Egypt. Creating rivalry and animosity with bordering states is neither conducive to Turkey's long-term relations with those states nor to its ultimate political stability. Its NATO membership exacerbates animosity that would ultimately work against Turkey's regional influence. Consequently, Turkey's imperatives of state ironically stand in the way of achieving its regional ambitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign trade expansion plays an important role in economic growth and development. Since Iran's singleproduct economy is facing tight sanctions, among trading partners, Turkey benefits from special place, and political independence in international relations because of its large population, rising per capita income, high economic growth rate, geographical and cultural proximity to Iran. Many opportunities and substantial capacities have been established for expanding foreign trade between these two countries. To do this, it is necessary to determine the maximum export capacity of Iran to Turkey and whether this capacity has actually been deployed and realized or not. The next question is what the bases of Iran's export development to Turkey are, and the goods which should be focused on to develop trading. Therefore, the aim of this study was to estimate the maximum export capacity of Iran to Turkey and to determine the commodities with the highest export capacity. The Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index, the Cosine Index, and the General Model of the gravity model were used to evaluate Iran's export potential and to determine commodities in which Iran has export advantage. Iran's export potential to Turkey was investigated in various years and in different commodity groups by comparing the rate of export volume of each commodity to total volume of its import by Turkey. Research findings indicated that the highest Iranian export potential value to Turkey was $9,339 million, and just 7.2% of that ($669 million) has been realized. Also, 11 commodity groups formed more than 66% of Iranian potential exports to Turkey. Among them, 'mineral products' with $2,730 million, 'plastics and natural rubber and artifacts made from them' with 1,185 million, 'common metals and artifacts made from them' with $918 million, and 'products of the chemical industry and its related industries' with $879 million were respectively the four commodity groups with the highest export potential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political Islamist AKP (Justice and Development Party) has been in power in Turkey since the November 2002 elections. This era brought about significant changes and transformations in many aspects of state‒society and state‒economy relations. However, as far as the state's management of labour power is considered, the era represented a direct continuity with the post-1980 authoritarian neoliberal restructuring. The party's policies aimed to make the labour market more competitive, flexible, low-waged, precarious and de-unionized. Economic policies in this term also increased the indebtedness of labourers as a result of the detrimental developments in the labour markets for workers. The AKP also did not hesitate to use state power whenever possible in order to suppress workers' discontent and strikes. However, the party also enjoyed a considerable amount of working class support as a result of the 'neoliberal social policy regime' which attempted to alleviate the detrimental effects in the labour market. Against this background, this article attempts to develop a critical appraisal of state‒labour relations and general trends thereof, and make sense of developments in the labour market during the AKP era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the Europeanization of Turkey's foreign policy by examining Turkey's mediating role in the Israel–Palestine dispute. The paper assesses whether, to what extent and how the EU shaped Turkey's mediating role in the conflict. It is concluded that Turkish political actors used the EU to justify certain policies and their relations with certain actors, which would otherwise be considered unacceptable. Given its indirect impact on Turkey's mediation, the EU's role in Turkish foreign policy should not be exaggerated. There seems to be no evidence in this case that Turkish foreign policy-makers internalized EU foreign-policy norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some scholars argue that Turkish foreign policy has undergone a structural change since 2002. This shift in Turkey's identity is primarily linked to the ascendancy of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) and its proactive foreign policy towards Turkey's eastern neighbourhood. The change in Turkey's identity and foreign policy is mostly intertwined with the Islamist identity embraced by the AKP, which can be traced back to the National Vision Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi). This article aims to analyse what are said to be 'newly' established preferences in AKP identity and its reflections in Turkey's foreign policy, particularly since 2009/2010. The main argument is that the emergence of this new ideological discourse has had immediate reflections on Turkey's relationship with North Cyprus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent Turkish foreign policy (TFP) under the successive AKP governments has seen different populist turns. A clear distinction can be made between the thin and thick populisms of TFP, based on the status of the West. The first decade of AKP rule, when foreign policy was thinly populist, was characterised by steady de-Europeanisation, increasing engagement with regional issues and a decentring of Turkey's Western orientation. The turn toward thick populism has been characterised by anti-Westernist discourses in which the West is resituated as the 'other' of Turkish political identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey faced the impact of Europeanisation in the context of regional policy and structural funds. This impact challenged the long-established statist tradition of the Turkish administrative structure and led to the need for reforms in order to bring its regional policy in line with European Union (EU) standards. The polity effect of Europeanisation in Turkey in the post-Helsinki era has been a change in administrative relations between three different territorial tiers: supranational, national and subnational. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey's humanitarian and development intervention in Somalia is unusually illuminating as a case study to investigate the relations between emerging and conventional interveners in conflict zones since, in this case, Turkey's intervention carries adequate impetus to resist assimilation with conventional North/Western counterparts. Our starting point is the observation that Turkish and conventional humanitarian and development interveners have struggled to coordinate or cooperate in Somalia. This article investigates what this uncooperative and uncoordinated organisational behaviour means, and we root our investigation in 21 face-to-face interviews with officials working inside the Turkish and conventional intervention in Mogadishu and Nairobi to inquire about how they understand and theorise this discordant behaviour. We use a parsimonious analytical framework of trustworthiness that questions the 'ability' and 'integrity' of counterpart organisations to explore the intentions behind organisational behaviours. Our analysis of interview narratives evidences challenges to conventional methods of intervention by Turkish organisations and the protection of the same by North/Western organisations. Our concluding discussion interprets these findings in relation to consequences for the status quo hierarchy of global governance and its promotion of liberal intervention norms, and for the utilisation of securitised and remote-control intervention methodologies in conflict zones such as Somalia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article highlights the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, his condolence message to Armenian communities and positions taken by the legislatures of countries, the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands. Topics include that the message acknowledged the deaths of the Ottoman Armenians who were killed alongside people of all religions and ethnicities in the events of 1915; and the deteriorating relations between Israel and Turkey.

In recent years, one of the most popular concepts in Turkish foreign policy has been public diplomacy, which refers to government activities to increase the country's image among foreign societies. While the concept is important, the problem is that a similar emphasis and attention is not given to personal diplomacy, another state practice of modern diplomacy. This article illustrates that personal diplomacy is most effective in crisis periods, when there is dominant leadership, and when the political leader is confident about his/her ability to shape policies. As all these factors exist in Turkish foreign policy today, it is not surprising to see that Ankara increasingly relies on personal diplomacy in its relations with foreign countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the reasons why the U.S. was unable to persuade Turkey to host U.S. troops headed for Iraq. Negotiations over the U.S. use of Turkish territory in aid of the U.S. campaign; Creation of safe heavens that allowed the return of Iraqi Kurds who had fled their country and sought refuge in Turkey and Iran; Public rumors about secret U.S. plans for a Kurdish state.

This article draws on the contents of the Turkish Cypriot Museum of Barbarism and a Greek Cypriot elementary level schoolbook to show how the image of the home, both personal and collective, can be used as an evocative framework for commemorating the conflict on Cyprus. The inherent familiarity of this image, its deep connection to our identities and its ability to evoke feelings of nostalgia and grief, hope and pain, make it a powerful trope around which memories of the many lives lost in the conflict can be constructed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the first wave of migration from Turkey to North Cyprus (1975–1980), which is largely absent from existing migration literature. Through extensive oral history interviews with influential policy makers, policy implementers and opposition politicians of the period, as well as through in-depth interviews with immigrants, the complexly interwoven socio-economic and political-ideological parameters of this migratory movement is discussed. Thereby the paper endeavours to challenge the dichotomy between voluntary 'labour migrations' characterised by a predominant economic dimension, and 'ethnic migrations', which stand out due to their strong political-ideological dimension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In January 2017, relations between Greece and Turkey were under severe strain when warships from both sides engaged in a brief standoff near a pair of uninhabited Greek 'islets' in the Aegean, whose sovereignty is disputed by Turkey. Theoretically informed by the literature of foreign policy analysis, we examine how the Greek diplomats, military officers and political analysts interpreted Turkey's behaviour at that particular time. The article considers the following research question: which factors, from a Greek point of view, explain Turkey's foreign policy in the Aegean in January 2017? Our theoretical expectation is that, in the aftermath of the coup attempt in Turkey, Greek diplomats, military officers and political analysts would ascribe domestic calculations into Turkey's activities. We employed Q- methodology to uncover socially shared perspectives on this topic. Based on our findings, we uncovered two viewpoints: (1) Turkey's diachronic strategy in the Aegean and (2) the strongman style. According to the former and most widely shared viewpoint, a consistent 'rationalist' strategy to change the status quo in the Aegean explains Turkey's behaviour. According to the second one, the belief system of Turkey's leadership legitimises the use of force in the conduct of foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

2019 is the 100th anniversary of the Greek occupation and the our National Struggle in the Aegean Region. The process which started with the invasion of İzmir on May 15, 1919, continued soon after in Greek occupation of Manisa. One of the main sources of this process is the press of the period. Newspapers published in Turkey has fulfilled their duties of informing their readers about the occupation under extremely difficult conditions. However, the situation of the press is different in Greece which occupies the region. In our country, it was not emphasized how the other party approaches the situation. However, the press is an important resource in Greece as well as in our country. Of course the general view of the Greek press in those days was positive. Because the Greek armies occupied İzmir, which was of great material and moral importance for them, and continued occupation in the Aegean region rapidly. In this context, it is possible to perceive a general mood of satisfaction in the Greek newspapers. On the other hand, in the Turkish press, a reaction against the occupations and the attempt to prove the Turkishness of the region is perceived. The main objective of this study is to evaluate how the two sides see the occupation of Manisa and transfer them to the public, based on the accessible collections of newspapers published during the occupation period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ataturk Yolu Journal / Atatürk Yolu Dergisi is the property of Ataturk Yolu Journal / Ataturk Yolu Dergisi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

There have been significant changes in Turkish foreign policy under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in particular since the 2016 military coup attempt. The changes have resulted in a strong focus on national security, an assertive style in policy implementation, a preference for transaction-based relations, and a quest for more strategic autonomy. Two main arguments are made: First, these features of policy represent both change and continuity when compared with earlier periods in Turkish foreign policy. The novelty under Erdogan is primarily in how the features are combined. Second, the changes do not represent a shift in Turkey's overall international orientation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Larq Journal for Philosophy, Linguistics & Social Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper focuses on understanding and explaining the changes in Turkish foreign policy, particularly in the last decade. Many observers have expressed suspicions that Turkey is abandoning its old Western-centric alignment and gradually shifting its axis. The thesis argues that rather than a shift, Turkey is taking an independent position. It maintains that the 1990 end of the Cold War and changes in the international structure from Bipolarity to U.S.-based Unipolarity have provided incentives for countries with some degree of material capabilities to pursue more independent policies from U.S. policy-preferences. This study analyses structural effects on the behavior of Turkey, followed by observed changes in Turkey's foreign policy as the outcome of taking more independent positions to maximize its objectives. Empirical research prove this analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Heydar Aliyev, the father of the incumbent president Ilham Aliyev, became the country's president in 1993, Azerbaijan has been known for its staunch pursuit of a so-called "balanced" policy in its relations with the outside world, particularly Russia and the West. Whereas in the past this policy tended to be "balanced" more in favor of the West as far as Azerbaijan's strategic interests were concerned, Baku's political disposition has shifted decidedly towards Russia in recent years. Over the past decade, several developments on the national, regional, and global levels have worked to gradually alter the long-established regional dynamic and alignment patterns, bringing Azerbaijan back into the Russian fold. This article's objective is to critically examine those developments to shed more light on the nature of Azerbaijani-Russian relations today and their prospects for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study examines Turkish foreign policy in the Black Sea region after the Russian annexation of Crimea. It focuses on two main issues: Turkey's policies within NATO and its balancing actions vis-a-vis Russia. The paper concludes that in spite of the sporadic Western criticism Ankara is still committed to NATO. Nonetheless, Turkey has taken only limited balancing actions to counter the Russian threat. Ankara evaluates and prioritizes threats often very differently from its Western partners, and considers certain balancing steps ineffective or too costly at a specific moment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the last decades, in parallel to its economic growth and foreign policy activism, Turkey has become an important regional actor in the Balkans. Turkey's activism has led to different reactions both from inside and outside the region. Skeptical views regarding Turkey's intentions are occasionally expressed in the international media. The skeptics' mostly voiced claim is that Turkey is undermining the Balkans' stability and Euro-Atlantic integration. Yet Turkey's approach to the region does not provide a justifiable basis for these claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the competition for regional leadership between Egypt, under President President Abdel Fattah Sisi, and Saudi Arabia, under crown prince Muhammad bin Salman. An overview of their mutual opposition to Iran and to the alliance between the organization Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey and Qatar is provided.

The main focal point in this study analyzing the change of Turkey-Syria relations during the Arab Spring is the agent-structure problem. The change that took place in Turkey-Syria relations is analyzed in the light of "the beginning of the demonstrations in Daraa and the Siege of Hama", "shooting down of Turkish RF-4E reconnaissance aircraft", "violation of rules of engagement", and "Operation Euphrates Shield" in the framework of Dynamic Foreign Policy Analysis Model (DFPAM) developed by Carlsnaes based on Margaret Archer's Morphogenetic Approach. It is concluded that Turkey's Syria policy changed in the process as a result of the interaction with the "structure" and that these foreign policy actions led to a new structuring at the same time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Rouya Turkiyyah is the property of Insight Turkey and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In spite of all previous efforts, the land border between Armenia and Turkey remains closed. Being one of the last reminders of the Cold War era, it significantly hinders the development of Armenia and eastern regions of Turkey. However, a closed border is more than a physical obstacle, as it also shapes the worldview and perceptions of the respective societies. Using the recent survey on "Public Opinion Poll: The Ways for Normalization of Armenian-Turkish Relations", we identify the determinants of respondents' attitudes towards the opening of the border. Among other results, we find that more awareness of the current Armenian-Turkish relationship increases the likelihood of the approval of the border. However, when selecting those respondents, who are either loyal to or approve the opening of the border, the awareness of the protocols' content decreases the likelihood of the approval of the opening border. Our findings are supported by the contact theory which we use as a conceptual framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abraham Paşa (1837-1918) was an Ottoman Armenian who was active in Istanbul and Cairo. Originally a moneylender of Egypt, he moved on to being a civil servant of the Ottoman Empire and the Tanzimat reforms played a great role in this speedy rise to power and fame. At the same time, his service for Egypt coincided with the most dramatic era of Egyptian history in the nineteenth century. Yet, knowledge on his efforts for that province are negligible in the literature. He earned a reputation of an extravagant lifestyle, followed by the tragic loss of his fortune in Istanbul. In this sense his life actually paralleled with the economic situation of the empire, that is with drastic rises which ended up in sharp collapses. His life illustrates the career of a non-Muslim Ottoman, who thanks to his ties with the palaces of Istanbul and Cairo and his financial skills made his way to the peak of the imperial officialdom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkish-Russian relations between 2015 and 2019 are marked by extension of Russian influence on Turkish foreign policy and economy. A similar Turco-Russian rapprochement has happened in the period between 1829 and 1838. In both periods, Russia tended to increase its control on Turkey and protected the Turkish government against foreign/rival threats. Although these close relations brought benefit for Turkey, they had also a cost from the part of its Western allies. Despite the fact that Turkey searched primarily western support during its rapprochement with Russia, both in 1830's and 2010's, Western world powers preferred not to react until Turco-Russian relations reached a top level in military field. In 1838, Baltalimanı treaty between Britain and Ottoman Empire is emerged as the outcome of Western search for counterbalancing Russia. In present day, a new move from the side of the US may be expected as a reaction to deploying Russian S-400 missiles in Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The border dividing Turkey and Armenia has been sealed nearly for 20 years but since the beginning of 2000s the communication channels between Armenians and Turks on each side of the Mount Ararat has been intensified through civil society initiatives. In the pessimistic atmosphere of the current political relations after the rejections of 2009 protocols concluded between Yerevan and Ankara governments, these initiatives get less attention in academic studies on Turkey's relations with Armenia. However, second diplomacy efforts increasingly but quietly continue with various projects organized by different institutions despite the 'frozen' diplomatic relations. Within this context, benefiting from interviews and data gathered in Armenia in November, 2014, the paper aims to investigate to what extent second track diplomacy in the thorny relations has an impact on the normalization in the postprotocol period within the context of the centennial of 1915 events in 2015. It argues that second track diplomacy initiatives play an important role not only in strengthening rapprochement between two distant neighbours but also bringing peace and stability to South Caucasus region. However, this role is limited to change the current course of relations unless there is strong political will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the divisive commemoration of the battle of Erenköy, which has gained significance since the early 2000s in a resignifying of Turkish Cypriot history. Over time, the commemoration has shifted from a triumphalism symbolized in monuments to an act of mourning at the graves of the fallen. We show through this commemoration how actors have repurposed official narratives, deterritorializing them from the terrain of nationalist ideology and its countermemory and reterritorializing them in ways that look similar but are affectively quite different. We argue that this repurposing of the ritual produces an affect of agency among participants that is open-ended and future oriented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last few decades, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have become very active in Northeast Africa. In addition to developing bilateral relations with countries in the region, they regard the area as the gateway to connections with the rest of the continent, although they are guided by different motivations. Turkey's expansion of its interests in Africa is both a reaction to the European Union's rejection of its membership and an opportunity to expand its trade, which has been hindered by instability in the Middle East in recent years. Like Saudi Arabia, it views Northeast Africa as a place to extend its cultural influence with that region's indigenous Sunni population. Saudi Arabia has used its wealth to curtail Iran's attempts to expand its influence in the region, while Turkey has provided on-the-ground technical assistance to enhance its political and economic connections in the region. In recent years the two countries have been drawn together by Iran's involvement in Yemen, although Turkey has sought to avoid becoming involved in local political disputes. Rather, it has served in multinational peacekeeping efforts and actions to prevent piracy in the sea lanes off the coast of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. However, since the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar over the latter country's relations [End Page 1] with Iran that began in June 2017, some tension has arisen between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. While Iran also wants those sea lanes to be freely open to traffic—as they were during the time of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi—it also wants to counteract Israeli involvement in Northeast Africa. Turkey has made great inroads politically and economically in Northeast Africa in recent years, while Saudi Arabia has gained the upper hand in its rivalry with Iran. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The official visit to Turkey of the Soviet Premier Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin was important in terms of reviving relations between the two countries during the Cold War period. The visit of the Premier Kosygin and of the accompanying Soviet delegation, held in 20-27 December 1966, found extensive coverage in the Turkish press. The focal point of the talks was the relations between the two countries and the problems related to the international agenda. In particular, Czechoslovakia's sale of weapons, a Soviet ally, to the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios, and the solution of the Cyprus problem were some of the main topics of the negotiations. Despite certain disagreements on international issues, the visit of the Soviet Premier, in the Cold War conjuncture, played a role in the revitalization of bilateral relations. The Turkish Press followed with great interest the Premier Kosygin's visit to Turkey. Utilising the coverage of mainstream newspapers like Cumhuriyet, Ulus, Tercüman, Akşam, Dünya, Yeni Tanin and Vatan, the paper used the content analysis method to evaluate the reflections of the visit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey's eight years between 2008 and 2016 has been dominated by Ahmet Davutoğlu's vision of foreign policy, which was derived from his multi‐edition book Strategic Depth (2000). In order to be able to present itself in its larger periphery as a pro‐active, trustworthy actor, Davutoğlu argued, Turkey needed to change the foreign‐policy paradigms with which it was stranded. As the Strategic Depth vision unfolded, it drew explicit parallels between modern Turkey and the Ottoman neighborhood policy. Turkey‐Syria relations since 2008 had been providing the seekers of neo‐Ottomanist tendencies in the contemporary Turkish foreign policy with abundant examples, because Syria, once an Ottoman territory and always a challenge to modern Turkey, came to be the first poster country in the shift towards Turkey's imperial awakening. In the post‐Davutoğlu era, however, the rhetoric and practices of the past eight years seemed suddenly to disappear from the use of the Turkish agents of foreign policy; the new code of terms and actions to replace the Strategic Depth version is yet to be decided. This study seeks to pin down the neo‐imperialist character of Turkey's foreign‐policy discourse of the aforementioned eight years and contribute to discussions of the Turkish aspiration of neo‐Ottomanism with focus on the Syrian crisis through the Justice and Development Party's re‐invented peace discourse. In doing so, it aims to find out and elaborate on the current tendencies of Turkish foreign policy, which are no longer as explicit and articulated as they were during Davutoğlu's ministry and prime ministry. As Turkey's cross‐border operation to Syria — the Euphrates Shield — ends and another one in Idlib begins, a discursive analysis stretching from Davutoglu's diplomatic "zero problems" with Damascus to the military use of ground troops and air force is timely. Such an endeavor would be essential in understanding the spectacular swing from one edge to the other in Turkey's inclination over a phantasmagorical empire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the implications of relations between Syria and Turkey and the former's conflict for latter's border security. In addition to defending the its border, Turkey organized several border-securing operations in order to prevent spillover from the Syrian conflict. The article further states that both the countries were involved into a water-sharing dispute over cross-border river flows and a territorial dispute over Hatay.

The employment of diverse forms of security and control on territorial borders have led to the production of numerous events of border crossings, smuggling, banditry and death along with stories of separation, loss, mourning, pain, and yearning in the everyday life of border people. The Naqshbandi Khaznavi order has an expansive interpersonal social network across the political borders of Turkish and Syrian nation-states. This work analyzes the ways in which Sufis dealt with diverse aspects of the Turkish-Syrian border by unbinding shackles and orders of political system that were fabricated constantly from the 1920s to the early 1980s. The life stories and narratives of the Sufis document the existence of a religious-cultural landscape, diversifying the perception of place, time and fear which have transcended political borders for decades, contradicting official cartographic imagination and the modern-secular understanding of place and time. Besides, in addition to analyses of religious orders as social, economic and political entities, this work aims to elucidate emotional aspects of relations and faith that coexist between Sufis and their Sheikh in the context of spatial distance, political border and fear of death. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]