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Abstract: A number of claims made by Derrida concerning Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Husserl will be carefully considered and evaluated here. First, Derrida’s claim that Merleau-Ponty’s mis-interprets Husserl’s letter to Lévy-Bruhl will be challenged. Secondly, Derrida’s claim that his criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology can be applied just as well to Merleau-Ponty’s will be challenged. Thirdly, it is a careful consideration of textual evidence that will be used to support these challenges. Finally, Merleau-Ponty’s late lectures will take us back to the Lévy-Bruhl letter and finally to Merleau-Ponty’s own phenomenology of language, one that integrates perception and language and yet that still privileges not eidetic essences or linguistic expression but perception as its primary term.

In this article, we demonstrate empirically that imagination is fundamental in experiences of visual art. We do so through phenomenological interviews and analysis in dialogue with works of the phenomenologists Mikel Dufrenne, Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. We challenge Dufrenne's delimiting of imagination to a pre-reflective power of synthesis, and argue in favor of a more comprehensive psychological understanding of imagination, which encompasses psychological differences in actual lived experience. Our analysis shows how imagination is necessarily part of experiences with visual art, as it provides ways of exploring and unfolding the expressions of the work of art. Such experiences are therefore characterized by a close relation between imagination and perception, as well as an affective lining which belongs to our imaginings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problems of clarifying the fundamental logical and mathematical concepts, and hence of accomplishing a truly radical grounding of logic and mathematics, were precisely what motivated the very beginnings of Husserl's phenomenology. This paper is divided into two main parts. The first part focuses on the meaning and structure of Husserl's explanation of the "logical and psychological" nature of fundamental arithmetical concepts. Particular emphasis is placed on the strategy of Philosophy of Arithmetics (1891) of analysing cardinal numbers in concepts (pivotal yet just as much harmful to philosophy) such as Vorstellungen, mental phenomena and representations. Together with Arend Heyting and Hermann Weyl, it was the phenomenologist-mathematician Oskar Becker who was the main actor in the second round in the complex dialogue between meta-mathematics and phenomenological philosophy. The second part of this paper aims to clarify Becker's attempt to apply the theory of actualization of intentionality to the problem of the mode of being of the mathematical and the criterion of mathematical existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Maslow suggests that a study of "superior" human specimen might have the potential to identify biological traits that distinguish flourishing individuals from those who are languishing. Maslow's recommendation is open to criticisms. First, his method is circular. Second, the thrust of Maslow's project has a eugenic ring to it. However, while Maslow's eugenic vision should be sidelined, his call for an understanding of normativity and the need to overcome the fact-value dichotomy in psychology and neuroscience are well-considered recommendations. A phenomenological approach to normativity presents a more authentically humanistic approach to consideration of normativity. Husserl's concept of optimal givenness and Merleau-Ponty's notion of maximum grip illustrate that normativity is a quality that can be identified at a pre-predicative, implicit level of operative intentionality. Based on an examination of the notions of optimal givenness and maximum grip, the article further suggests that, within the context of interpersonal relations, agapic love can be understood to operate as a normative and regulative idea for ethical relations. Since this form of intentionality instantiates itself into perceptual and motor habits, normative ethical relations may be subject to investigation within neuroscience, to the extent that it maintains an ongoing dialogue with phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article brings into conversation phenomenology and the Ignatian tradition of discernment as it explores phenomena of illusion in spiritual life. Special attention is paid to harmful illusions, such as religiously motivated and/ or justified sexual abuse, abuse of authority, and terrorist acts. Here the article explores both the resilience of illusions, as they enter at different phases of experience, and a process of learning resilience as a person or a community learns to cope with misperceptions, serious errors of judgment and their consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of "mode of existence" has recently experienced a great diffusion in both continental and analytic philosophy. However, philosophers do not pay much attention to the concept of mode of existence itself. This paper proposes to establish a branch of ontology entirely devoted to clarifying the use of such a concept. We will begin by showing how Husserl's framework for addressing the heterogeneity of being, based on the distinction between material and formal ontology, participates in two ideas that have defined the tradition of the univocity of being in Western philosophy: the decision in favor of identity in the "ontological tension" between conceiving of being in terms of identity or in terms of difference, left as a legacy of Aristotle's Metaphysics; and the correlative processes of the "logicization of being" and the "essentialization of existence", that allowed Duns Scotus to proclaim that the concept of being is univocal. Then, we follow Roman Ingarden in claiming that "existential ontology" should be added to Husserl's bifurcation of formal and material ontology: existential ontology is a formal inquiry into the very meaning of there being modes of existence, which, unlike Husserl's formal ontology, does not subject all existence to the mode of logic. The main features of existential ontology are outlined, and some of the questions it must face are mentioned. Finally, an example of how it should work is given by addressing the question of the "existential difference" between being and existence. The idea of existential ontology that should emerge is that of a discipline that provides a "diplomatic" framework in which different understandings of modes of existence can be confronted and debated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that Hans Blumenberg's theory illuminates a novel interpretation of the phenomenological concept of the lifeworld—as a world sustained by myths and their receptions. This paper combines two central themes in Blumenberg's philosophy: his interpretation of Edmund Husserl and his aesthetics, especially his theory of the novel and of myth. My claim to originality is to offer a mythology of the lifeworld with the help of one of Blumenberg's less-known texts, "Wirklichkeitsbegriff und Wirkungspotential des Mythos." In the first part, I will examine a crucial aspect in Blumenberg's reading of Husserl's notion of the lifeworld, namely the unorthodox view that the lifeworld, as the foundation for sciences and their logos, itself has no need to resort to language. To put it mythically: the lifeworld is an expressionless state of naivety. To support this deconstructive reading, I will then turn to Blumenberg's theory of the novel. As has been noticed by Blumenberg and his colleagues, the underlying meaning structure of the novel, or its "concept of reality," has a typically modern character, and largely overlaps with the phenomenological idea of the world and lifeworld. However, in the second part, I will radicalize Blumenberg's discussions about reality, and show that the novelistic reality can never fully supersede that of myth. Mythology has a persistent existence, and, in Blumenberg's argument, the history of mythical reception reveals a perpetual movement of human struggle against terror. In this Blumenbergian philosophy of mythology, a new image of the lifeworld presents itself, a world made by the myth-telling humans, by their active and aesthetic use of words, instead of slumbers of naivety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In his later works, the great logician and mathematician Kurt Gödel concentrated his focus on philosophical problems such as the implications of set theory, the grammar and philosophy of language, objectivity and relativity, the ontological proof of God's existence, and phenomenology as an exact method. This essay explores how Gödel read the philosophy (of logic and mathematics) of his time and why he turned his attention to Husserl's phenomenology to describe the foundations of mathematics. To begin with, Gödel employs Husserl's significant distinction between Weltanschauung (worldview) philosophy and philosophy as rigorous science: According to the Weltanschauung philosophy, the spirit of time constantly changes so that the ideas discussed and goals attempted are meant to be temporal, and not for the sake of eternal truths, but for that of their own perfection; philosophy as rigorous science, on the other hand, is supratemporal so that its aim is to discover absolute and timeless values. As for the worldview of his time, Gödel saw the development of philosophy, and mathematics leaned toward skepticism, pessimism, and positivism. For instance, the antinomies of set theory have shaken the grounds on which mathematics and logic are founded. Gödel also used these paradoxes in his incompleteness theorems to prove that there are some statements that can neither be proven nor disproved within a system. This also means that arithmetic is not sufficient to prove consistency. From this, however, Gödel does not come to a conclusion for a nihilism in mathematics and logic: These mere antinomies of set theory do not "necessarily" lead us to logical positivism, and neither to such a materialism, nor to any kind of pessimistic theory of knowledge. The incompleteness theorems assert that there are arithmetical propositions that are true but neither provable nor unprovable within their own calculus, so that arithmetic is intrinsically incomplete. However, instead of Alfred Tarski's pathological view of examining the detections within the faulty system and then reforming the system all together, Gödel holds that we need to change our methods to find new patterns that describe the antinomies pointing to the unrecoverable reality of the mathematical world. Thus, Gödel does not follow any variation of the Weltanschauung philosophy of his time, either attempting to reduce mathematical realities to mathematical proofs in order to get rid of antinomies, or endeavoring to rescue a complete system of truths by a closed formal system, both Weltanschauung philosophies fail to set forth a realistic method. In this context, Gödel finds the task of phenomenology analogous to what he pursues, in terms of a systematic framework for the foundations of mathematics. Husserl's phenomenology, in Gödel's account, proliferates the intuition of (mathematical) essences and clarifies the meaning of undefinable concepts such as the antinomies of set theory. Applying phenomenological reduction to the objective reality of the mathematical world, Gödel believes that one obtains a clear experiential reality of the essential characteristics of (mathematical and logical) concepts. Briefly, what Gödel finds in Husserl's phenomenology that corresponds to his way of mathematical realism is a thoroughly designated method that gives us mathematical essences back again. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper explores anew the question of Husserl's metaphysics by contrasting H. Philipse and D. Zahavi's respective position on the matter. I argue that these positions fall victim to opposing exegetical pitfalls. On the one hand, while I concur with Philipse's general characterisation of Husserl as an ontological phenomenalist, I disagree that this implies Husserl was a subjective idealist similar to Berkeley. On the other hand, while Zahavi's correlationist interpretation of Husserl avoids this subjective idealist interpretation, I argue that it inadvertently succumbs to the realist alternative that construes the world as existing independently from subjectivity. The way out of this dilemma is to interpret Husserl as an experiential monist, where the phenomenal stream (Erlebnisstrom) is taken to be ontologically primary, by virtue of its antecedence over the subject-object or mind-world dichotomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present study, I would like to analyse four different views on collective identity and decision-making from a phenomenological perspective: the conception of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Paul Ricoeur, and László Tengelyi. I would like to show that we 126 can already find an account of narrative identity in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, according to whom “the ego constitutes itself so to speak in the unity of a story” (Cartesian Meditations, §37). But in Husserl’s opinion, the ego also constitutes itself necessarily as an intersubjective being – and in the end, Husserl attributes a narrative identity to whole communities also. We can find a more specific idea of collective identity and decisionmaking in the philosophy of Heidegger, who attaches fundamental importance to moods in this regard, and to collective moods in particular. But the first phenomenological author, who analysed the problem of collective identity and decision-making in a really detailed manner, embedded into the historical, cultural, and practical context, was Paul Ricoeur. Lastly, I try to demonstrate that László Tengelyi, and his concept of “destinal (or fateful) events” (Schicksalsereignisse, sorsesemény) made a substantial contribution to the theory of narrative identity, even at the collective level. In my opinion, all these philosophical treatments of collective identity and decision-making could be fruitfully used in contemporary positive scientific research on the topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is concerned with the relationship between paradigms of explication and the practice of conceptual engineering. It defends three interrelated claims: First, the predominant functionalist attitude in the present debate on conceptual engineering is due to its roots in Carnapian explication, which identifies the explicandum with a precursor concept. Second, alternative metaphysical paradigms of explication locate the explicandum in a part of a concept-independent reality ('field explication', as I will call it). Third, field explication may be a better paradigm than Carnapian functionalism for certain instances of socio-political conceptual engineering. In these instances, we adjust our concepts to more adequately capture differences in our concept-independent (felt) reality. To demonstrate this, I will contrast the metaphysical to the functionalist paradigm concerning the example of Heimat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The early phenomenologist József Somogyi was one of, if not the first to write a monograph specifically dedicated to the history of the nascent phenomenological philosophy. The two letters written by him during his stay in Freiburg in WS 1923/24, which are hereby published and discussed for the first time, are, similarly, of interest first due to the rare, valuable insight they can provide – when combined with a detailed microhistorical reconstruction of the surrounding constellation – into the elaborate structures of mid-1920s Freiburg phenomenology around Edmund Husserl (directly after Martin Heidegger's departure to Marburg). Ranging from Husserl's teaching style to interactions between phenomenology and Catholic thought and to preconditions of the extraordinary philosophical creativity that distinguished early phenomenology, they offer a snapshot that differs significantly from the established narratives of subsequent privileged members of the Phenomenological Movement. Somogyi's letters thus exemplify the possibility of reclaiming the plurivocity and philosophical richness of the early Phenomenological Movement by virtue of democratizing the historiography, i.e., giving voice to neglected historical actors (often originating from the peripheries). What is at stake is, however, not merely a more nuanced historical understanding of a particular epoch of early phenomenology. Quite the contrary, as I am finally going to argue on the basis of an adjacent short episode from the reception history of Husserl's (or Eugen Fink's) selfinterpretation, Somogyi's case also exemplifies the possibility of a transformation in our understanding of the history of phenomenology (inspired by the methodological revolutions which took place in other compartments of the historiography of philosophy): namely to make the intricate, simultaneously conceptual and historical phenomena of the history of phenomenology a genuine subject matter of contemporary phenomenological research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I argue for the value of reading primary historical texts in mathematics courses. In particular, I show how close readings of Bolzano's 1817 paper on the Intermediate Value Theorem in an introductory analysis course helps students understand the working use of fundamental analytic concepts and problems. I further argue that the philosophical purpose of reading primary texts is the "desedimentation" of knowledge, a process through which students come to understand the origins of mathematical concepts as solutions to historical problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the text is to address the phenomenon of hygiene as that which concerns the transitory boundary of our corporeality (the lived body in the physical body), as an ambiguous and diverse phenomenon, which presents itself in various ways (in the field of expressivity). The study draws on the fruitful cooperation between phenomenology and philosophical anthropology. In the first part, the text analyzes how corporeality is treated in the phenomenological reflection based on Edmund Husserl’s conception of the lived body and in the following phenomenological thematizations of corporeality. Upon the foundation of such an approach, we engage in an elaboration of the problem of hygiene in its anthropological specificity. With the help of an anthropological study of Helmuth Plessner, it is possible, in the subsequent parts of the text, to approach the phenomenon of hygiene in its particular manifestations—as expressions of interaction in society (with examples of diplomacy and good manners) as well as in the field of artistic expressions (with examples of hygienic images in the first half of the 20th century). Hygiene thus appears as a phenomenon in the framework of a complex being in the world, and it cannot be derived from the outer (socially construed) or causalphysiological phenomena. This makes hygiene a specific leading clue for the research regarding subjectivity

Reading Voice and Phenomenon from a phenomenological perspective, this paper argues that the book is an internal criticism of Husserlian phenomenology that, among other things, can serve as an introduction to Husserl's genetic method. Derrida's most powerful arguments are delivered by turning the Cartesian method of Logical Investigations and Ideas I to Husserl's inquiries into time-consciousness; as such, it is a phenomenological criticism through and through. An analysis of Husserl's later manuscripts and lectures published posthumously shows that driven by what Derrida calls the radicality of intuitionism, Husserl has developed a genetic phenomenological method that breaks free from the metaphysics of presence and arrived at a conception of meaning and language that is similar to Derrida's. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As phenomenology rose to prominence at the beginning of the 20th century, several aestheticians tried to establish the Husserlian method of "phenomenological reduction" in the field of aesthetics. These ventures were met with resistance from psychological aesthetics, which was the predominant form of aesthetics in the German-speaking world at the time. This paper examines, first, practical attempts to apply the method of "phenomenological reduction" in aesthetics. Using Waldemar Conrad and Moritz Geiger as examples, I try to trace what aestheticians actually did when they applied this method in their investigations. Secondly, I reconstruct the four central objections with which psychological aesthetics reacted to such attempts. I have identified four central counterarguments in the work of Johannes Volkelt and Oswald Külpe, who were among the most eminent critics of phenomenological aesthetics: the transcendental argument, the susceptibility-to-errors argument, the constructivism argument, and the non-normativity argument. Finally, I also discuss the refusal of psychological aesthetics to acknowledge that a genuine phenomenological method even existed and the consequences of this refusal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a 1911 research manuscript, Husserl puts forth an idea that resembles Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment presented in the 1970s. In this paper, I study Husserl’s “Twin Earth” passage and assess various readings of it to determine whether Husserl is better understood as an internalist or an externalist. I define internalism as the view that content depends solely on internal factors to the subject, whereas I distinguish between two versions of externalism: weak externalism, according to which content can also depend on other subjects’ conceptions, and strong externalism, which maintains that content can also depend on the real world. Only strong externalism maintains what McGinn calls “the philosophical significance of externalism” because it entails realism about the world. I argue that Husserl is better understood as an externalist when it comes to the “Twin Earth” passage, but the more precise question regarding weak and strong externalism requires further evidence. This additional evidence concerns Husserl’s concepts of the identity of sense (Sinnesidentität) and worldly meaning (weltlicher Sinn). In evaluating externalist Husserl interpretations, I classify Smith’s externalist interpretation as weak, whereas I take Crowell’s externalist interpretation to be ambivalent. Crowell’s excellent but somewhat embryonic interpretation leaves the dependence relation between content and the real world ambiguous. I clarify this relation by assessing McGinn’s argument for the philosophical significance of externalism from the Husserlian viewpoint. Although this study is historical, it also serves a systematic purpose because the externalist interpretation of Husserl calls into question central issues in phenomenology and externalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The paper offers a systematic reconstruction of the relations that, in Husserl's work, bind together our shared social world ("the spiritual world") with shared intentionality. It is claimed that, by sharing experiences, persons create social reasons and that these reasons impose a normative structure on the social world. Because there are two ways in which persons can share experiences (depending on whether these experiences rest on mutual communication or on group's identity), social normativity comes in two kinds. It is either directed (it has an addressee) or it is collective or absolute (it applies to all group members). Social normativity should be distinguished from axiological normativity: The first is grounded in shared intentionality, the second in values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What could a political phenomenology look like? Recent attempts to address this question under the rubric "critical phenomenology" have centered primarily around important issues such as the lived experience of marginalization and oppression or the ways in which power asymmetries or structural biases are internalized, habitualized, and embodied. In this paper, I will take a different route and test the impact of Husserl's account of the state against the background of key classical and contemporary political theories. I aim to show that Husserl indeed provides some conceptual requisites for an original phenomenological social ontology of the state. By furnishing analyses of the social formation that constitutes the stately body politic, Husserl helps us see the limitations of the standard, broadly Weberian, conception of the state underlying much of contemporary political theorizing. Moreover, Husserl provides an interesting alternative to both naturalistic and social contract theories of the state. However, against more optimistic readings, I argue that Husserl's idealistic conception of the state, which is implicitly modelled on his notion of the "love community," ultimately fails as a political theory, particularly when it comes to accounting for the struggle of recognition and the agonistic nature of politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In their recent work in phenomenological psychopathology, Andreas Rosén Rasmussen and Joseph Parnas argue that there is an expressive relationship between the anomalies of imagination reported in schizophrenic spectrum disorders (SSDs) and an underlying generative self- or ipseity disorder. The authors build their argument on an updated review of the phenomenological model of consciousness, by which each experience articulates itself in ipseity according to its modality. Therefore, they explain imagination as the figuration of an absent object mediated by the imaginary and accompanied by a sense of irreality. Finally, by drawing on patients' descriptions, Rasmussen and Parnas show that SSD imagination disorders testify to the breakdown of this model of consciousness. In this article, I aim to complexify the scenario summarized above by focusing on the contributionmade by the phenomenologist Marc Richir in his latemasterwork Phantasia, imagination et affectivité (2004). To this end, I examine the genetic analyses of the pathologies of the imaginary that Richir develops through a non- standard interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology of imagination (in particular, Hua XXIII, text n.16, 1912). In my examination, I aim to unfold an alternative model of consciousness that (a) is based on the gap between the architectonic registers of phantasia and imagination (and the corresponding stages of sense-making and the institution of sense), (b) takes account of the role of affectivity in those registers, (c) places the pathologies of the imaginary in the quasi-empathy that characterizes the missed encounter with the other, and (d) links the institution of these pathologies with the psychoanalytic account of the fixation of the phantasm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The presented study presents the approach of the philosopher of phenomenology and ontology - Edmund Husserl. The subject is an attempt to point out the transition of thinking from the description of the existing to the present in Husserl. Subsequently, we discuss Husserl and his approach to the term phenomenon, which, as the founder of phenomenology, is devoted to its investigation. We gradually address the topic of other important concepts such as intentionality, intersubjectivity, pairing, analogical apperception and "Lebenswelt". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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How can historical change be thought, in a very concrete way? How do we philosophically arrive at concepts that represent this change and at the same time grant reliability in an idealistic sense? This means that idealities must endure in the course of history and at the same time grant the possibility of historical change. If the problem of historicity is addressed in this way, a theory of history has to mediate between statics and dynamics. It has to grant both the stability and dynamics that are needed to 'transport' thoughts across generations and epochs. As I intend to show, Hans Blumenberg's concept of historicity is based on these assumptions. The article starts from a transcendental account of the lifeworld and links it to Edmund Husserl's Urstiftung in order to illustrate how historicity and historical change can be conceptualized philosophically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The phenomenology of time-consciousness marks one of the high points of Blumenberg's philosophy; the issue is broached in Lifetime and World Time (1986), on the one hand, and in the posthumously publishedworks Description of Man (2006), Theory of the Life-World and Phenomenological Writings (2018), on the other hand. Setting out fromBlumenberg's critical analysis of Husserl's genetic phenomenology, this article endeavors to reconstruct and interpret the most important aspects of Blumenberg's own descriptions of the structures of time-consciousness. Special attention is paid to the concept of "presence" in Husserl's lectures, whose meta-physical premises Blumenberg addresses, and to the concept of "recollection" (Erinnerung). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article offers a trenchant criticism of the imaginative geographies of 'Europe' using a Pred inspired methodology. The essay strikes at the mythos of Europa as the vanguard of humanity, and enumerates many of the 'dirty tricks' that project the singular as confirmation of the universal. It aligns with the critique of the present in the manner of Allan Pred's critical takes on Europe and deconstruction of the mythos of Europe. With Nietzsche's takes on 'philosophical laughter' as a cue, the essay offers playful parodies on the narcissistic discourses of Europe's historical mission or purpose, its essence/identity, and its place in history. My critique is thus an instance of postcolonial laughter. Critique of historicism and 'European reason' are recurrent themes in Pred's work. Historicism places European humanity as history's prime (favourite) subject, culminating in the infamous yet pompous 'end of history' thesis popularized by Fukuyama, of which Pred was highly critical of. In my reading, Pred's playful takes on Fukuyama's folly, are inspired by postcolonial laughter. Postcolonial laughter is deployed here as an affirmative response to the European negation of the other's being. I use by turn satire and irony, by turn parody and the grotesque to strike at the heart of the mythos of Europe and its 'dirty tricks'. Postcolonial laughter unsettles the hubris and narcissism underlying discourses of Europe's mission/moralism as the vanguard of humanity. Postcolonial laughter is attuned to Pred's 'restless geographies'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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