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Violence between different communities erupts only occasionally; it is more prevalent in countries like India, Ethiopia, and Nigeria than in Mozambique, the Philippines, or Yemen. What accounts for these differences? To date, no existing study has investigated why and when communal violence occurs using systematic cross-national data; we seek to address this glaring research gap. We argue that the role of the state plays a major role in constraining or facilitating the expression of violence between different communities. In particular, we view major regime transitions as a window of opportunity for communal groups to mobilize and exploit the decreased deterrent capacity of the state; in such periods, the state is less able to contain the problems of communal opportunism that are otherwise restricted by the threat of punishment from formal institutions. Similarly, we suggest that informal in-group policing is also dependent on regime stability and will cease to function effectively during major regime transitions. We then nuance this argument to suggest that the type of regime in the previous period will affect the incentive structure for communal violence, with unconstrained and exclusionary regimes particularly likely to experience communal violence during regime transitions. We test these arguments using new global data on communal violence 1989-2007 and find that our arguments are supported: communal violence is more likely in the aftermath of major regime transitions; this is particularly so if the regime in the previous period was an autocracy, was led by an unconstrained executive, or was dominated by a single ethnic group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question of why rebel groups engage in conflict with each other. This is a puzzling phenomenon since almost all rebel groups are weaker than their governmental opponents and internecine fighting greatly increases their vulnerability to government attacks. Such fighting also diminishes the credibility of the movement in the eyes of constituents and others. To comprehend this behavior, I identify two situations in which the costs of intergroup fighting are outweighed by the benefits. The first occurs when lootable resources are located in the conflict zone. Such resources can lead to zero-sum competition for access, since without them the group will no longer be able to compete on the labor market for rebel fighters and weaponry. The second situation occurs when groups engage in negotiations with the government. Negotiations are often associated with ceasefires or de-escalated fighting, providing the opportunity for groups to rid themselves of their rivals. Negotiations also generate incentives to do so since the presence of multiple groups implies the possibility of having to divide any future concessions amongst several opponent groups. If a rebel group is able to eliminate its opponents during the negotiations phase, it can more credibly monopolize the role of sole malcontent and send a signal of strength to the government. I test these arguments by using new data on inter-group fighting for the period 1989-2008, and find support for the resources argument; the presence of drugs in the conflict zone increases the probability of intergroup fighting from 8% to 24%. The negotiations argument also finds some support, but I suggest that this argument is poorly captured by the model, and is not robust to alternative specifications. Because this paper is a first cut, I conclude by outlining some planned changes to its design. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New regimes in countries with a history of human rights abuses are faced with an important choice of how to proceed vis-a-vis those responsible for the abuses. Moving against these culpable groups requires the enactment of specific transitional justice mechanisms such as transitional trials, political purges, and truth commissions. Previous research has proposed a myriad of arguments for and against these potential targeting strategies. While they are often promoted as necessary for a country to re-establish stable governance, some suggest that they may have the opposite effect of undermining political stability. The relationship between these variables has not yet been systematically tested, making it difficult to resolve the debate. This paper addresses this gap by using quantitative data on all 165 regime transitions that occurred from 1980-2004 in which serious human rights abuses were committed under a previous regime. The results show that transitional justice measures are generally correlated with greater political stability, and that transitional trials in particular are positively and robustly related to greater political stability and improved democratic governance. Truth commissions and political purges appear to have relatively little effect, suggesting that policymakers interested in attaining political stability focus their efforts on trials rather than other forms of transitional justice. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do rebel groups attract rebels? Previous research on civil war has focused on the effect of structural variables either in providing the necessary context for rebellion or in driving an individual's decision to rebel. What is missing from the analysis of rebel recruitment is an explicit focus on the specific strategies employed by rebel groups to recruit and retain supporters. This paper focuses specifically on the use of indoctrination and other forms of political education as a rebel strategy to mobilize mass support to a rebel organization, and argues that indoctrination allows the rebel group to harness latent grievances and link individuals daily problems with a larger political platform. These ideas are illuminated through a case study of the civil war in Nepal, 1996-2006. The empirics suggest that while structural variables like social and economic inequalities provided an important context in which the Nepalese Maoist rebels operated, the mechanism for their successful recruitment strategy lay in a focus on indoctrination. Indoctrination was in fact so crucial that it superseded even military training and arms acquisition as the focus for efforts in expanding the organization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we present new data on deliberate killings of civilians in intrastate armed conflicts 1996-2003. These data contribute to the present state of quantitative research on violence against civilians in three important respects. Firstly, whereas previous data only indicate whether mass killings occur or not, we provide the actual numbers of civilians killed; secondly, we introduce data on both governments and rebel groups, and; thirdly, we present yearly figures for all actors. Using these data, we present trends and descriptive statistics, showing that the level of rebel violence is fairly constant over time, whereas government violence comes in short periods of mass killings. Using these more precise data, we also statistically re-evaluate propositions found in previous research, finding that while rebel groups tend to kill fewer civilians in territorial conflicts, governments kill more, and that conflict duration seems to have a negative effect on the level of violence. In sum, these data shed new light on the patterns of violence against civilians, and suggest new insights to the question of why warring parties choose to target civilians in war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]