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This article examines the pre-crisis (2014–2016) state of interethnic relations in Russia and European countries and takes into account Russian scholarship on this subject. Interethnic tensions are treated as a socio-psychological characteristic reflecting an imbalance in relationships that result from heightened conflict among ethnic groups. Respondents’ attitudes toward migrants entering their country are used to shed light on interethnic tensions in Russia and Europe. Our data come from the European Social Survey (ESS). We examine such indicators of interethnic tension as respondents’ attitudes toward the movement of immigrants into their countries and their assessments of the changes such immigrants bring. By identifying analogues of these indicators, we were able to design an interethnic-tension index that enables comparisons across European countries. The article identifies the countries where interethnic tensions were, at the time the study was conducted, least (Scandinavia) and most pronounced (Cyprus, Russia, the Czech Republic, Portugal, and Hungary). The greatest tension was found among members of the old and young age groups and among women and respondents with the least education, least income, and who reside in rural areas. Among the main causes of interethnic tension (cultural features of interacting ethnic groups) we identified other factors that consistently affect the level of tensions: per capita GDP, the proportion of immigrants within the overall population, the number of immigrants arriving within the past five years, trust in people, and type of employment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses European strategy towards Russia during the Ukraine crisis between February 2014 and December 2015, conceptualising it as a coercive diplomatic strategy and analysing the relationship between its ends, ways and means. European strategy sought to reverse Russian intervention. However, this overarching aim was flanked by two ‘constraining’ aims of avoiding an escalation of the conflict and a breakdown of relations with Russia. The strategy shifted between these aims, which proved to be irreconcilable: while the EU partly succeeded in containing the conflict, it failed to reverse Russian intervention and relations between the EU and Russia deteriorated sharply. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the 1990s-2010s, a considerable number of people from the Northern Caucasus emigrated from Russia to Europe, mainly Chechens, mostly for political (Chechen wars) and economic reasons. The article is devoted to the specifics of their ethnocultural integration in modern France. The work is done on the basis of materials obtained by the author's own ethnographic field research conducted in 2015-2016, and is the first trial in the development of the given scientific direction. Examined are: getting work in the new country, learning the language, attitudes regarding French laws, culture and society, formation of the Turkish and North Caucasian people's milieu in France. Examined are the changes in the cultural life-supporting functions and socionormative (weddings and burials) traditions. With regard to the North Caucasian migrants of the first post-Soviet wave it is possible to speak of the process of adaptation, whereas their children can already be partly viewed as undergoing assimilation, in any case, some typical characteristics are obvious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the current state of the gas relationship between the European Union (EU) and Russia and assesses its future prospects. It highlights that Russia has been an important supplier of gas to the European Union for more than four decades. However, the EU-Russia gas trade currently faces uncertainty over the regular transit of Russian gas via Ukraine, the construction of new pipelines and the implementation of EU legislation concerning the Union's gas market. As the EU and Russia will remain interdependent in the gas sector at least for the next decade, it is in both sides' interest to resolve these issues. The EU should both strengthen the security of its import routes for Russian gas and reduce the vulnerability of individual member states to supply shocks. Simultaneously, the EU would do well to increase the production of renewable energy and boost energy efficiency, which would reduce its dependence on external suppliers of fossil fuels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses a probit and dprobit model to examine the domestic determinants of corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Furthermore, it looks at whether economic links with a country that is perceived as corrupt - Russia - leads to an increase or decrease in the level of domestic corruption. Using a dataset at the firm level provided by the World Bank, this paper finds that the "Control Rights Hypothesis," the "Bargaining Power Hypothesis", and the "Grease the Wheels Hypothesis" are statistically significant at the domestic level and also shows that increased commerce links with Russia are a statistically significant determinant for corruption, thereby further supporting the "Grease the Wheels Hypothesis" hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is based on the fact that a number of factors, but particularly the restricting utility of military force between great powers, increase the significance of soft power as a tool both for legitimization and expansion in international relations in general, and in the West - Russia confrontation over the "common (or shared) neighbourhood" in particular. It explores how this fact affects the policies of the Western powers and Russia within the frame of the confrontation they are in. The paper narrows down its analytical focus on the efforts of the Kremlin to affect the public opinion in its neighbourhood and to counter Western soft power. It is argued that the Ukraine crisis has affected Russia's perception of soft power, re-constructed its counter-revolutionary agenda, and increased the profile of propaganda in its foreign policy. The paper concludes that the soft power competition between Russia and West and the policies of the two powers to win over the hearts and minds of people in the shared neighbourhood re-define the character of geopolitical games in the Former Soviet Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia defines itself as a Great Power in relation to Europe and the West. The first part of the article traces how, since 1991, a story about greatness centred on being part of contemporary European civilization has given way to a story of how Russia is great by being superior to a Europe that is now seen as rotten and decadent. The former story spelled cooperation with Europe and the West, where the latter spells confrontation. The second part argues that Russia's superiority complex is unsustainable. It is hard to see how, in the face of the formative structural pressure of the state system, Russia will be able to sustain its superiority complex. A state that does not order itself in such a way that it may either gain recognition as a Great Power by forcing its way and/or by being emulated by others, is unlikely to maintain that status. The costs of maintaining Great-Power status without radical political and economic change seem to be increasing rapidly. If Russia wants to maintain its status, an about-turn is needed. Such a turn may in itself be no solution, though, for if Russia does not do anything about the root causes of its perceived inferiority to Europe, then the Russian cyclical shifting from a Westernizing to a xenophobic stance will not be broken. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the changes in Russia’s policy towards Asia, arguing that Russia’s pivot to Asia is a reality, one that is motivated by both political and economic interests. And although that shift is not progressing as quickly as some might want and occasionally encounters difficulties, the process has definitely begun and is in all likelihood irreversible. Only a small, marginal segment of Russian society continues to dream of unity with Europe—which itself has entered a period of severe crisis. Most of the Russian elite as well as the majority of Russian citizens understand that nobody is waiting for them with open arms. Therefore, not wanting a confrontation and in an effort to maintain working relations, Russia—under any leader—is unlikely to seek a relationship based on a common outlook. That will move Russia ever closer to the non-Western world, primarily the Asian giants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An important source for the investigation of the Russian language during the reign of Peter the Great is the first printed paper Vědomosti (1703-1727) initiated by the Tsar himself. Here many compilations from Western European papers are found, that transported words of Latin provenance into Vědomosti, including later latinized spellings and Latin quotations. This shows the strong position of latinitas in the Western European language area at the time, in particular Dutch, the language favoured by the Tzar, but also German and French. Therefore we are dealing here with «Eurolatinisms» which form a connection between Russia and the European area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains why a considerable part of the International Relations literature frames highly complex energy relations between the EU and Russia in terms of simple, exclusive geopolitical intentions. Drawing on Construal Level Theory, it addresses the gap between immediate interaction between various private and public actors with their own agendas and individual intentionalities and assumed collective geopolitical intentionalities. Because of the degree of abstraction, collective motivations are attributed to actors like Russia and the EU. This attribution risks to be subject to bias. It is argued that higher psychological distance increases the likelihood of more radical and ideologised framing. These abstract schemes do not follow from the endogenous energy dynamics but are function of a broader logic of competition which has characterised EU-Russia relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the sphere of natural gas, Russia and the EU share an interdependent relationship: Russia is the single largest supplier of natural gas to the EU, while the EU is Russia’s largest gas export market. In May 2014, a deal was struck between Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation to enable large-scale Russian gas exports to China. What impact could this deal have on the EU-Russia gas relationship? This article analyses Russia’s existing and proposed gas production and export infrastructure for the delivery of natural gas to Europe and to China, and the extent to which increased gas exports to the East could result in the limitation of Russian gas exports to Europe. It is concluded that, due to its dependence on new gas production in eastern Siberia and the construction of new, purpose-built pipeline infrastructure, the Gazprom-CNPC deal of May 2014 will not have a significant impact on Russia’s gas exports from north-western Siberia to the EU. The launch of talks aimed at delivering Russian gas from the Yamal Peninsula to China via the ‘western route’ opened the first possibility for Russia to balance its gas exports between East and West. However, this is unlikely to generate price competition between Europe and China, due to Gazprom’s inability to extract a ‘European’ price for its gas exports to China. This suggests that Gazprom will not re-direct significant volumes away from Europe towards China, but rather will seek additional export volumes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recent developments in European security have shown the growing need for a better understanding of the security dynamics on the European continent. This article presents an analysis of differing Russian and European perceptions of European security in general, and concerning the crisis in Ukraine in particular. As much of the literature on these issues has been normatively driven, we aim to provide an impartial presentation and analysis of the dominant Russian and EU discourses. This we see as essential for investigating the potential for constructive dialogue between Russia and the EU. If simplistic assumptions about the motivations and intentions of other actors take hold in the public debate and policy analyses, the main actors may be drawn into a logic that is ultimately dangerous or counterproductive. With this article we offer a modest contribution towards discouraging such a development in Russia–EU relations. After presenting an analysis of the differing EU and Russian perceptions, we discuss the potential for dialogue between such different worldviews, and reflect on potential implications for European security. As the article shows, there are tendencies of a certain adjustment in the Union’s approach that may make a partial rapprochement between the two sides more likely. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Amid tensions with the West over Ukraine, Russia pulled out of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in March 2015. The Russian case is another example of a country disengaging from conventional arms control when relations with other member states deteriorate. This raises an important question: can arms control regimes aimed at preventing conflict survive periods of tension and preserve peace? This article argues no. It demonstrates that the prospect and stability of conventional arms control regimes depend on healthy international relations. In times of tension, governments rely on military institutions for advice and absorb military biases incompatible with arms control. Therefore, these regimes fail when most needed and are impotent as instruments of peace. Beyond conventional arms control, the article hints at the fragility of nuclear agreements such as the 2015 Iran deal and the 2010 New START between the United States and Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's views on the role of Russia in Europe as of July 2016. He offers information on Europe which is a leader in industrial production and export worldwide, accounting for a significant percentage of the world gross domestic product. Also discussed are the history of the European Union (EU), the political and economic conditions in Europe, and the political relations between the EU and Russia.

The article talks about the Russia and European Union (EU) relations taking in context the crises in Ukraine and the Russia's role in it focusing on the stagnating ties between the EU and Russia, several statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding it, and the EU Association Agreement.

The article discusses the ways in which the European Union (EU) has responded to Russian aggression in Ukraine and Georgia. Topics discussed include the reasons for the EU's reluctance to use military strength to subdue Russian activities in Ukraine and Georgia, the factors behind the escalating aggression of Russia towards its former republics and towards other neighboring nations and the factors that may put pressure on the EU to end its economic sanctions against Russia.

In the current geopolitical environment the "cold" relations between the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation are not only the consequence of the mutual imposed sanctions after the Ukrainian crisis, but also a result of EU's increased influence in former Soviet space (especially through Baltic States integration and Eastern Partnership extension). Both Eastern Partnership and the Neighborhood Policy initiatives have bean considered as an imminent threat to the Russian hegemonic position in the former USSR member states. In our opinion the EU was not prepared to manage the relationship with Russian Federation in a pragmatic approach, hence in the post-Soviet Union era the Ukraine crisis has led to extreme tension between these two powers which reflected negatively on trade and diplomatic relations. Taking into consideration those realities, this paper presents a scenario analysis regarding the perspectives of the EU-Russian Federation relationship in the light of the impact of political and economical sanctions imposed after the Ukrainian crisis. Our research is based on a quantitative analysis of the two countries trade and FDI flows (before and post the Ukrainian crisis), but also on a qualitative approach based on the most relevant theories about international sanctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essay examines the qualitative changes in EU–Russian relations which resulted from the 2014 sanctions. Thematic, structural and institutional aspects of the issue are analysed through the ‘level of analysis’ approach. Thematically, policy-specific and implementation measures reinforced an EU–Russian ‘divorce’ both in energy and trade. Structurally, the scope of EU–Russian dialogue narrowed in favour of relations between Moscow and member states, and in multilateral fora; this dialogue also became dependent on Russia–US relations. Institutionally sanctions have led to the growing poverty of transgovernmental and transnational relations. As a result, achievements of previous years have been derailed, and reversal of the negative trends will prove difficult. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to some expectations, the Baltic states’ accession to the EU in 2004 was not followed by an improvement in their relations with Russia. Instead, the Baltic states became known as the “troublemakers” of EU–Russia relations. This was commonly explained by their history and national identity, which contributed to an understanding of the Baltic concerns as marginal. The Ukraine crisis brought a reaction of “I told you so” by the Baltic states that for many years had been warning the West about Russia’s expansionist ambitions. This article explores the ideational underpinnings of the gap between the Baltic states’ perceptions of and relations with Russia on the one hand and mainstream views in Europe on the other. It identifies liberal interdependence, democratic peace, and realist geopolitics as key ideas that have framed the EU’s and Baltic states’ perceptions of Russia. In the vein of constructivist foreign policy analysis, these ideational structures are seen to condition the EU’s and Baltic states’ interests and policies vis-à-vis Russia. An analysis of the “Baltic factor” helps to illuminate the contradictions and shortcomings in the EU’s Russia policy and review its ideational basis which is now in need of a strategic rethink. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses a new simulation model to analyze the external natural gas policy of several European Union countries including Germany, Spain, and Poland and the European Union (EU) Commission. According to the authors, the model was built to meet the standards of the game-theoretic model predictioneer's game (PG) developed by American political scientist and professor Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. Relations between European Union countries and Russia are also mentioned.

In the post-Soviet space as well as the Middle East, Western leaders have largely failed to heed ample evidence that the goals of the Russian leadership are fundamentally opposed to those of the EU and the US. Whereas Moscow seeks to counter Western influence and roll back the US's role in the world, the West has proposed a win-win approach, seeking to convince Moscow that its 'true' interests should lead it to cooperate with the West. When this has not worked, Western leaders have 'compartmentalised', isolating areas of agreement from areas of disagreement. This approach has come to the end of the road because the assumptions that undergird it are false. So long as Western powers fail to understand the fundamental incompatibility of their interests with the deeply anti-Western interests of the current power brokers in the Kremlin, they are unlikely to develop policies that achieve success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in a double reflection (Russia -- the candle, Germany -- the mirror) handling one particular aspect that influences Russia-EU relations since the Ukrainian factor emerged as a playground for both East and West tectonic plates - namely the energy sector. It is vital for any global power to understand this approach in order to reach people's minds, in order to emerge as leaders on the world map and to build a strong perception over a political scene. A recently debated subject is Nord Stream 2. The reason why I have chosen to explore this subject is because I am very interested in how Kremlin seeks to have an exclusive control over Eastern Europe, given the full debate in the last three years. In this thesis I will also discuss some important elements of the Russian Soft Power over Europe introducing the plot of South Stream project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Geopolitics and geoeconomics are often addressed together, with the latter seen as a sub-variant of the former. This article shows the usefulness of differentiating them at a conceptual level. By juxtaposing traditional geopolitics and geoeconomics, we suggest that they have remarkably different qualities and implications for their targets, on both national and international levels. Importantly, these include the formation of alliances, and whether they are driven by balancing, bandwagoning or underbalancing dynamics. An analysis of Russia's shifting geostrategy towards Europe shows these differences in practice. Russian geoeconomics has long been successful as a 'wedge strategy', dividing the EU. As a result, the EU has underbalanced and its Russia policies have been incoherent. The observable tendencies in 2014-15 towards a more coherent European approach can be explained by the changing emphasis in Russia's geostrategy. Russia's turn to geopolitics works as a centripetal force, causing a relative increase in EU unity. Centripetal tendencies due to heightened threat perception can be observed in the economic sanctions, emerging German leadership in EU foreign policy, and discussion on energy union. The analysis calls for more attention to the way strategic choices-geopolitics versus geoeconomics-affect the coherence of threatened states and alliance patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the consideration of Iran as gas supplier for the European Union (EU) in relation to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Topics discussed include the impact of the EU-Russian relations and energy dependency of EU to Russia, the impact of the political pluralism on the energy industry in Iran, and the accusation of gas market liberalization by the European Commission (EC) against energy company Gazprom.

The aim of this article is to study the processes that lead to a more efficient cross-border cooperation by analysing how the mental barriers are constructed in the people's mind, through discursive practices and mediated images. For the complex relation between the EU and Russia it is important to understand how different factors and mechanisms influence the significance of borders, and can encourage or block the cooperation. By analysing the case study of Russia-Estonia border we will investigate in this study the relationship between the mediated images from border regions and the institutional practices in trans-border cooperation. The analysis will be conducted at the historical level following the impact of mediated history on the cross-border co-operation process, in connection with framing of current events. How does this create a space for cooperation or for perpetuation of stereotypes and conflicting positions? Do they create a degree of familiarity useful for the cross-border cooperation? What is the historical representation of the Other in the Estonian-Russian border region and how did this change in time? What traditions of cooperation exist and how was this constructed at the mass media level? What is the dominant representation of the borders, how are these influenced by history of cooperation or conflict? These are the few questions that will be answered in order to understand the impact of mass media in changing and framing the meaning of borders at EU's external frontiers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study tries to reveal the hegemonic power struggle over Eurasia from the perspective of regional policy of Russia and European integration as the representative of the EU. Furthermore, Ukraine's statue and tension that stayed between different international actors and political reflections on Turkish political life has been examined. Integrations and cooperation pressure of the EU from West and political threats of Russia from East hold Ukraine watchful for its future. The cooperation wish of Ukraine with the EU and dependency to Russia in the energy issues drags country to a division. Crimean territory participated in the Russian political system and there is still the possibility of some of Ukraine land could join to Russia. In this study, the policies of Russia- EU and Turkey will be comparatively and qualitatively discussed with chronological perspective. In order to Russia holds energy monopoly and uses this energy as a political instrument against other countries, both Turkey and EU cannot produce alternative effective policy towards Russia. Eventually, current political and military condition in region has made Moscow more powerful by comparison with its rivals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The energy issue is a long-term one of the most discussed, controversial topics in relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation. The intention of the present article is an attempt to overcome the largely non-discursive and in the security conditions anchored way of looking at the energy interaction of the EU and the RF and through an integration discourse to analyze EU energy relations with Russia in the years 2004 - 2014. In the theoretical level, the article is based on a critical constructivism, which in relation to the discourse as the main concept reflects a number of fundamental knowledge. At the methodological level, the article is based on the discourse analysis as a basic methodological tool through which the author examines the EU text documents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A response is offered to several articles in the issue discussing the book "Struggle over the Eurasian Borderlands," by the article's author. Topics, including what is referred as geoculture, the relationship between culture and international relations, great powers' imperialistic actions in Eurasian borderlands from the 18th century through World War I and European countries' containment policy towards Russia, are discussed.

The article discusses the relationship of the states and territories of the Baltic region with Russia and European Union (EU) countries. Topics covered include the noted influence of the Soviet Union to the Baltic republics, the reported sour relationship of Russia with the Baltic countries, and the anti-Russian policy of the political elites in the Baltic countries. It also discusses the increased military presence of the U.S. and EU in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

The article discusses the potential global impact of the civilizational divorce of Europe from Russia. Topics covered include details relating to the crisis between Russia and the West, how the civilizational divorce might affect the key identity of Russians and the identified main causes and symptoms of the crisis between Russia and the West. It discusses proposals for disentangling from the Russia-West crisis.