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We analyse the likely trade effects of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which defines the post-Brexit trading environment between the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU). We apply a computable general equilibrium model and focus on trade in value added rather than just the gross values of exports and imports. We describe the TCA and estimate its effects on the costs of conducting UK–EU trade, including various non-tariff barriers in both goods and services. We suggest that the TCA will reduce UK trade significantly: total exports by around 7 per cent and imports by around 14 per cent. In terms of value added (i.e. incomes generated), textiles and vehicles, both of which trade extensively with the EU, suffer heavily, as do services which trade significantly with the EU, face large increases in trade barriers, and experience declining demand from other sectors as those sectors' exports fall. Such inter-industry linkages spread the losses from Brexit widely through the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the EU and the UK. We focus on two specific features: rules of origin and non-tariff barriers. The putative purpose of the TCA was to promote free trade between the signatories, and both of the features identified have 'level-playing-field' objectives which are designed to promote that purpose. However, both can also be used for covert protectionism against the other party to the agreement. The paper recommends that rules of origin and non-tariff barriers should be recrafted where possible, and there is a description of how this might be done. The aim of such action would be to make transparent the role of these features in preserving a level playing field. Doing this would also make clear that any residual unadulterated rules of origin and non-tariff barriers existed for purely protectionist reasons and jeopardized open borders. Hopefully, the exposure of such protectionism would encourage its dismantlement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we examine the possible distributional impacts of new trade barriers associated with the new Trade and Cooperation Agreement governing relations between the UK and EU after Brexit. We use a model of labour demand that incorporates input–output links across industries, and that allows for demand substitution by firms and consumers and worker reallocation across industries. We find that workers' exposure is moderately increasing across the earnings distribution. Exposure is greater for men than for women as they are more likely to work in manufacturing industries that are relatively harder hit by new trade barriers. Looking across areas, we find that exposure to new Brexit trade barriers is uncorrelated with measures of local deprivation and the impacts of the recent Covid-19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper reviews the implications of the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) for the control of subsidies. Controls will be less strict than under the EU state aid regime but tighter than with no deal and WTO rules. A subsidy control authority will be established by the UK which will oversee the application of broad principles set out in the TCA. A well-designed authority would help to prevent a repeat of the UK experience in the 1970s and 1980s, when subsidies were detrimental to economic performance. Regrettably, however, the government has decided to adopt a politicized approach to subsidy policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: We analyse the effects of uncertainty and anticipation shocks associated with the 2016 Brexit vote as a treatment on trade between the UK and 14 EU and 14 non‐EU trading partners, using the synthetic control method (SCM). After controlling for exchange rate and GDP changes, UK exports to both groups of countries fell below those of the 'synthetic Britain', with much of the shortfall developing over the year prior to the referendum, following the 2015 Conservative general election win. The results indicate that UK exports to EU countries may have lost nearly 25% by early 2018, due to the Brexit shock, somewhat more than those to non‐EU countries. Imports from the EU and non‐EU countries also declined a little, although there is tentative evidence that UK consumers may have been avoiding countries with preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with the EU, and possibly turning towards the Commonwealth. Overall, the results confirm that policy uncertainty has a major effect upon trade and that uncertainty about supply chain costs is a potential explanation for at least some of the shortfall. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea of "Britain and Europe" that David Cameron emphasised in his speech on 23 January 2013 is a curious one -it evokes a shared history full of intricate twists, which spans over several centuries, and at the same time, preserves the apparent incompatibility of the island nation and the continent. Cameron even proposed an "in-out referendum" to determine the future of the British people, and its realisation in 2016 made Brexit an unexpected reality and signifies a crucial setback in the recent history of the European project. Brexit is furthermore an expression of "a perceived cultural distinction between Britain and Europe" (Spiering 2015) that seems to persist in British discourse specifically. The paper thus uses Menno Spiering's concept of "British Euroscepticism" (2004), a unique form of Euroscepticism in terms of history, politics and culture, to discuss the cultural aspects of British differentness as entailing not only an opposition to Europe but also a potential to reflect on shared values and experiences. Based on this, the paper will trace the presentation of Europe in contemporary literature that emerged as a reaction to Brexit, especially poetry by Simon Armitage, Sean O'Brien and David Clarke, to ascertain the British perspective on the continent as either the paradigmatic Other or a constituent part for defining British identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To perform their long-distance postnuptial migration, trans-Saharan migratory passerines must refuel repeatedly at different stopover sites. But some stopover sites have a specific role because most of the reserves needed to cross large ecological barriers (e.g., sea or desert) are stored there. This is the case in the west of the Iberian Peninsula, which is the main fattening area for European pied flycatcher Ficedula hypoleuca before they cross the Sahara. Upstream, no sites have been sampled in Western Europe between Great Britain and the southern Iberian Peninsula. Southwestern France is a main postnuptial route for this species with funnel effect between the end of the Pyrenees barrier and the Atlantic Ocean. In this area, we estimated energetic parameters from capture–mark–recapture data obtained during standardized monitoring. The mean stopover duration was relatively high, estimated at 8.4 days after the first capture by a capture–mark–recapture model and at 16.8 days assuming a similar duration before the first capture. Individual minimum stopover durations of 23 and 28 days were recorded. Pied flycatchers were fattening at an average rate of 0.29 g day−1 (3.1% of lean body mass) consistent throughout the season and independent of initial body mass, supporting the idea that the area was targeted for fattening. Very high fuel deposition rates over short durations were observed in several individuals (from 5 to 13.3% of their lean body mass). The mean fuel load did not differ by age or year and averaged 33.8% of lean body mass. The mean fuel load of the 25% heaviest fraction of birds was 57.3%, providing a flight range covering 80% of the distance to the southern margin of the Sahara. Hence, the departure fuel load was insufficient to cross the Sahara. At least one additional stopover would be necessary in the Iberian Peninsula, but for a moderate extra fuel. Individuals fattening under time pressure coexisted with individuals in prolonged stopover. Both behaviors are on few specific sites. Although the Sahara is still far away, South-West France is not solely a transit region concentrating birds because of the Pyrenees barrier. It must be an area of high refueling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past year was characterized by a difficult relationship between the EU and the UK, mainly due to issues with the implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol. This led to trade disruptions and unrest in Northern Ireland. After Boris Johnson's resignation, Liz Truss was appointed as the new Prime Minister, and it remained unclear whether the EU-UK relationship would change. The British government decided not to trigger Article 16 of the Protocol and paused negotiations with the EU before the elections in Northern Ireland in May 2022. There were tensions within the British government and EU infringement proceedings against the UK. The differences over the Protocol also affected cooperation in other areas between the EU and the UK. There were also conflicts in fisheries policy and problems with the implementation of import controls for goods shipments from the EU. Prime Minister Boris Johnson resigned in July 2022 and was replaced by Liz Truss. The relationship between the EU and the UK remains tense. [Extracted from the article]

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The purpose of this article is to assess whether the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) may entail the revival of the early bilateral agreements between the UK and EU member states. The main claim is that the earlier bilateral agreements may be reinstated pursuant to international law, but the revival is substantially narrowed due to the limitations arising from EU law and the new EU - UK legal framework. This is based on the argument that the earlier bilateral agreements were not terminated or suspended in operation, and remain in force with limited application. After providing the outline of the new legal relations between the EU and the UK, the article analyses the framework provided for subsequent agreements in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the case-law of international tribunals. The current analysis draws implications for a revival from EU Treaties and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU. Finally, general considerations are provided as applied to agreements in the two specific fields reviewed, namely aviation and coordination of social security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the dispute settlement elements of the UK–European Union Trade and Cooperation Agreement's (TCA) novel Level Playing Field (LPF) rebalancing obligations, consisting of a requirement not to lower standards in areas of labour, the environment and subsidy policy such that an adverse material impact results to trade or investment flows between the parties. The test for violations of these provisions is narrowly framed, requiring strong evidence of significant harms and carefully calibrated retaliation. The system contemplates several avenues of dispute settlement including unilateral ex ante retaliation which may be levied against another sector. The article suggests that the substantive and procedural features of the TCA's LPF mechanism affords reasonably wide opportunity for parties to practice regulatory divergence while evincing a commitment to shared values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is now a significant literature on the effects of Brexit on the differentiated forms of integration that have become an increasingly familiar feature of the EU's political landscape. While the significance of British withdrawal for questions of differentiation is not difficult to establish, there is little agreement in the literature on whether Brexit will lead to a more or less differentiated EU, which aspects of withdrawal are most relevant, and how the specified causal mechanisms operate. This article takes stock of the debate, discussing four distinct causal pathways: (1) the removal of the UK's opt-outs; (2) the lessons of the British experience; (3) Brexit as a catalyst for reform; and (4) the future UK-EU relationship. The article suggests a more starkly differentiated EU post-Brexit is likely precluded by the political context of disintegration, which downplays negative lessons, reinforces EU unity, and disincentives a 'British model' of external differentiation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article applies insights from comparative federalism to analyse different models for managing future EU–UK relations. The argument is that the stability of the EU–UK relationship before as well as after Brexit is best understood by examining the presence of federal safeguards. Drawing on Kelemen, four types of safeguards are identified as the means for balancing centrifugal and centripetal forces. During the United Kingdom's European Union membership, the strong glue provided by structural and judicial safeguards was undone by the weakness of partisan and socio-cultural ones. However, each post-Brexit scenario is characterised by weaker structural and judicial safeguards. The most stable outcome is an indeterminate Brexit that limits the incentive to politicise sovereignty and identity concerns by ending free movement of people and reducing the saliency of European Union rules. Such stability is nevertheless relative in that, from a comparative perspective, federal-type safeguards were stronger when the United Kingdom was still in the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article inquires to what extent the European Union (EU)–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) may help safeguard high levels of transnational environmental protection, taking into consideration potential reductions in UK levels of protection and the ensuing effects. The article encompasses an analysis of the Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) Chapters in recent EU trade or trade and investment Agreements (FTAs); in this respect, it emphasises that the TCA's provisions are innovative. However, the TCA has marked a shift from the EU's initial attempts to exercise its extra-territorial leverage and push for high levels of transnational environmental protection to a focus on the stricto sensu economic level playing field. This narrow focus cannot possibly capture many aspects of environmental protection. The article thus concludes that, from an environmental perspective, the TCA's provisions are far from ambitious. Further, it develops some considerations on the way forward for the EU institutions, as they start to rethink their approach to TSD Chapters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special issue aims to write Europe into the history of British culture—popular culture, to be exact—in the twentieth century. Too often British pop culture has been viewed either through the lens of national identity, in relation to American culture or with an eye to influences from other parts of the English-speaking world, usually from the former Empire. By contrast, contacts, exchanges and transfers between Britain and continental Europe have been comparatively neglected, reinforcing the idea that they do not exist. The issue shows the opposite by drawing on selected examples from cinema, fashion, food, travel and music in the period of the 1960s and 1970s. For this, the introduction prepares the ground by discussing the existing historiography, definitions and approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2016 decision by the United Kingdom to withdraw from the European Union was a seminal one for both parties. In this special issue, we consider the extent to which the inter-penetration of the national and the European arenas produced significant opportunities for recasting political action. The nesting of these two levels matters firstly in allowing for the politicisation and mobilisation of domestic actors around European issues and secondly in explaining why seemingly sub-optimal or counter-productive actions are taken. The tensions this generated reached a critical juncture with the referendum, a rupture that highlights the extent to which a nominally second-order vote can have fundamental impacts on the first order's structure and preferences. Bringing together scholars from a wide range of approaches and covering various aspects of the Brexit process, this special issue offers a significant contribution to improving our understanding of an event that will shape British and European politics for a generation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution analyses the political impact of Brexit on the EU27. The main argument is that Brexit is not just about disintegration. The UK policy proposals on Brexit have reinforced among the governments, public opinions and even Eurosceptic parties of the EU27 the cohesiveness in favour of the preservation of European integration. The article is divided into four parts. First, it presents a critical review of the theoretical literature on EU disintegration and defines the concept of cohesiveness. In the second section, it analyses why the EU27 member states remained cohesive during the Brexit negotiation talks on major policy issues such as the Single Market, free movement of persons and budgetary contribution. In the third section, the article explains why Brexit did not succeed to convince the public opinions of the EU27 that leaving the EU was a relevant issue. In the fourth section, it analyses the reasons why Eurosceptic parties (especially right wing ones) within the EU27 started using Brexit as a strategic argument against EU integration but quickly abandoned it in favour of the request that EU must be changed from inside. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Having been issues which stimulated little discussion beyond Northern Ireland before the Brexit referendum, the 'Irish issue' dominated and complicated the subsequent EU–UK withdrawal negotiations. The 'taking back control' narrative bears the hallmarks of Prime Minister Boris Johnson's notion of a 'recaptured sovereignty'. This conception of sovereignty, however, clashes with the post-sovereign character and content of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. The institutions created by the Agreement move beyond the old frameworks for political order by creating a series of interlocking territorial, cross-territorial, and cross-national institutions based on shared sovereignty. This prompts critical questions about the resilience and sustainability of the Agreement against the backdrop of a shift in sovereignty which appears incompatible with the key tenets of Northern Ireland's peace agreement. This article examines how Northern Ireland's approach to and experience of the EU referendum differed from the rest of the UK. It queries how the referendum result, subsequent political and electoral developments, and difficulties in agreeing a withdrawal formula and future UK–EU relationship, expose the gap between the UK's commitments to a post-sovereign arrangement for Northern Ireland and the preference for a return to an older conception of sovereignty as implied by the Brexit vote. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2016 referendum on the UK's membership of the EU and the election of Donald Trump in the US are seen to have exposed fundamental social divisions and acute political antagonisms. While each reflected the idiosyncrasies of their domestic political scenes, these events pointed to transnational trends and developments that were shared across and beyond Anglo-America. In the Brexit and Trump votes, the anger and frustrations of being 'left behind' was considered to have translated into a politics of social conservatism, exclusive nationalism and populist anti-elitism. The forces of globalisation seemed to have split national communities into two distinct social worlds with irreconcilable interests and values. This article examines whether these significant political events can be explained in terms of cleavage formation. The evidence from the Brexit referendum and Trump election points to a complex picture of voting in which social groups express multiple and intersecting identities and experiences. The article emphasises the universalising processes of individualisation and fragmentation in globalised societies underlying new forms of political conflict. Finally, the article assesses the role of racism in generating political divides in contexts where identities are fractured and uncertain and a new politics of exclusion has taken hold. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the interplay of Brexit as an issue per se and as a game of electoral politics between Labour and the Conservatives, from the time of the 2016 EU referendum to the December 2019 election. It seeks to provide a nuanced and multidimensional understanding of Labour's strategic choices in relation to Brexit which goes beyond one-dimensional accounts of Jeremy Corbyn's failure of leadership. This is achieved through a game theory approach whereby the game of electoral politics is conceived of as 'nested' inside the Brexit game in a way which makes the two arenas interdependent, also taking into account the level of intra-party politics and the tensions within Labour itself. Thus the first section of the article unpicks the strategic dilemmas Labour was facing, while the second section examines Labour's ambivalent response to these challenges. The final section explores the dynamic balance of contradictory forces at play, tracking the evolution of Labour's position in the electoral game from 2016 to 2019 through an analysis of the main strengths and weaknesses of the party at various points during the period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The British referendum on EU membership was both the result and the cause of major ruptures and reconfigurations of the British political order. It also marked the climax of the politicization of European integration, as highlighted by the post-functionalist theory. The UK Independence party (UKIP) is pivotal in this process: it is both a product of this politicization and one of its major agents. As such, from a European viewpoint, UKIP stands as a case in point, an illustration of the potentially disruptive impact of such parties on national and European arenas. Building on Putnam's two level-game, on Tsebelis' nested games and on Reif and Schmitt's first and second order, this article aims to show that UKIP stands as the very embodiment of the interaction between these two arenas – between first- and second-order games. It perfectly illustrates the fact that the referendum reconfigured the national game that created it. This paper will therefore explore those two aspects: how UKIP impacted the first-order game, and conversely how the referendum impacted UKIP. Finally, the paper will analyze the disruptive impact of UKIP's successor, the Brexit party, on the British and European arenas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the two years between the activation of article 50 of the Lisbon treaty and the expected withdrawal on 29 March 2019, Theresa May was confronted with an apparently classical two-level game, where she needed to find a compromise between what Brussels could find acceptable, especially as far as trade relations were concerned, and what her domestic constituency demanded. This was made more complex by the fact that the latter was itself divided between Remainers, Soft and Hard Brexiters and multiple other sub-groups. Based on a discursive institutionalist approach, this article suggests that the Prime Minister was caught in a contradiction between her 'hard' rhetoric at home and the reality of her bargaining position in Brussels. Tsebelis' nested games theory explains why her communicative discourse was politically rational but ultimately incompatible with the reality of the European power game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brexit calls us to account for nationalist politics as an independent variable in the historic construction and disintegration of the European Union. By examining the nationalist politics animating the campaigns to leave the European Union throughout the United Kingdom and the politics of keeping the UK united as the 'games' of the Brexit negotiations played out, this article argues for the centrality of nationalism in any further understandings of the inter-related process and politics of Brexit and European disintegration. Moreover, the Brexit referendum opened up contestation between executive, parliamentary, national and popular sovereignties in the differing nations of the United Kingdom and had a noticeable effect on British, as well as European, disintegration. Such inter-related drivers of disintegration must alert scholars to treat member-states as internally variegated and driven by imperatives to maintain state sovereignty in the face of challenges from sub-state, EU and global levels. European integration generates nationalism and creates polity contestation within the member-state as well as against the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the UK, nationalism has been gaining ground for some time, yet Brexit appears to have exacerbated these trends and given legitimation to the nationalist cause. 'Taking back control' from the EU was widely regarded as a means of reinforcing parliamentary sovereignty, notably over national borders, but also, importantly, of legitimising popular sovereignty, of giving a voice to those who often feel unrepresented by their political leaders. The idea of popular sovereignty is closely linked to that of nationalism: the rise of national populism can partly be explained by the crisis of representativity in liberal democracies and the desire for more direct, participatory forms of democracy. This article seeks to analyse the British government's articulation of nationalism following the Brexit referendum in order to determine the impact that the rise of nationalism in this peculiar context might have on democracy in the UK. Will it be Westminster business as usual or may the unleashing of nationalist sentiment represent an opportunity to move beyond the current political model? The article also focuses on the Labour Party's approach to nationalism, analysing its capacity to mark a rupture from dominant forms of nationalism and thus challenge the British political tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The turbulence of Brexit threatens to undermine England–European Union (EU) transborder cooperation at the subnational scale. This paper discusses the lived experience of city and regional leaders involved in developing cross-European cooperation during the early phase of the Brexit 'project'. It contributes to the idea of relational leadership as a framing device for studying leadership in transborder cooperation in the England–EU subnational setting, and surfaces challenges faced by subnational leaders in transborder cooperation during significant policy turbulence. Two main findings of the research have wider relevance for emerging city and regional (place) leadership theory and practice. First, the unanticipated shock caused by Brexit to the supra-national policy environment is impacting significantly on subnational leaders' ability to maintain good transborder working relationships; and second, continuing non-prejudicial dialogue and meaningful conversations between subnational partners are an antidote to the negative legacies of such policy disruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introducing a multidisciplinary special issue on the multilevel dynamics of the UK's exit from the European Union (EU), this article considers social science 'impact' from Brexit-related research, including the Economic and Social Research Council's (ESRC) UK in a Changing Europe initiative and Governance after Brexit programme. The issue draws on the initiative's Brexit Priority Grant programme, bringing together economists, political scientists, policy analysts and socio-legal scholars. It analyses the UK's regional and devolution-related Brexit dynamics. The article considers the potential and challenges of cross-disciplinary work and concludes with a critical analysis of Boris Johnson administration's 'levelling up agenda' in a post-Brexit and Covid/Covid-recovery context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Has Brexit triggered a constitutional crisis? Crisis is one of a family of concepts, including tipping points, catastrophic equilibrium and failure, identifying it as a decisive moment for overcoming contradictions and ambiguities. Across multiple UK levels – the whole state, constituent nations and different legal jurisdictions – even in 'normal times' the constitution has been marked by both a dominant 'Anglo-British imaginary' and territorial ambiguities. Drawn into political debate, these ambiguities became sources of basic constitutional instability during Theresa May's premiership. Although May avoided full-blown constitutional crisis, one may yet come. Equally, she did oversee basic constitutional change, not necessarily in the form of crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores what the UK's European Union membership has meant for the development of a distinctive, substate equalities agenda in Wales. An analysis of interview data through the lens of feminist institutionalism reveals European Union membership as integral to the emergence of Wales' approach to gender equality, with Welsh equality advocates using access to European Union norms and funding to establish and legitimize more progressive institutions to advance equality, overcoming domestic resistance and gatekeeping. In turn, research exposes structural risks for Wales' equalities agenda post-Brexit. Recent equality-related activity in Wales partially mitigates against post-Brexit risks, although vulnerabilities remain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Striking territorial variations in the 2016 Brexit referendum are neglected in the explanatory literature, a gap our analysis of the British Election Study (BES) helps to fill. Rather than modelling Britain as one political system, we present parallel models for England, Scotland and Wales. Typical in other multinational states, this approach is innovative for 'British politics'. The analysis shows different variables help to explain Leave support in England, Scotland and Wales. To analyse complex multilevel national identities, we develop a relative territorial identity (RTI) measure. The measure shows that those who prioritize their territorial identity in England tended to vote Leave, while the opposite is true in Wales and Scotland. The performance of this RTI measure helps to explain territorial differentiation in the 2016 Brexit vote. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the perspectives of expert analysts and policy-makers on the implications of Brexit for different parts of the UK economy. For local and regional areas, the need for such expert voices to be heard is urgent, given the fact that UK subnational and substate governance authorities have been effectively blocked out of all Brexit-related negotiations, and as such, are wholly unprepared for the post-Brexit realities. The issues discussed in this paper reflect the key themes that came out of four regional stakeholder participatory symposia organized by The UK in a Changing Europe (UKICE), which were held in Leeds, Birmingham, London and Edinburgh, and that focused on the Brexit-related economic and governance challenges for the different parts of the UK. These issues are examined in the light of the recent 'levelling-up' agenda prioritized by the UK government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper estimates the effects of potential post-Brexit UK trade and domestic agricultural policy scenarios on the economic welfare (real income) of farm households, at both regional (devolved administrations) and national level. Results show that depending on the selected scenario, particularly the retention or elimination of direct payments as currently provided under Pillar 1 of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the impact varies significantly across farm types and devolved administrations. Given the substantial contribution of CAP direct payments to farm business income, their removal amplifies farm vulnerability. Hence, non-farm income is critical in safeguarding the economic welfare of most UK farm households. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper assesses public attitudes in Northern Ireland towards the potential hardening of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland as a result of the UK's exit from the European Union. It investigates the relationship between border-related anxieties and support for a United Ireland. The study draws on specially designed qualitative and quantitative data, generated from a one-day citizens' assembly and a representative attitude survey. It identifies a group of conditional Catholics who support Irish unity, but only under 'hard exit' conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The National Health Service (NHS) was a critical symbolic issue in the European Union (EU) referendum. The practical ramifications of Brexit on UK patients, professionals, health research and public health are significant, with particular challenges in the devolved nations/jurisdictions. Whatever the form of Brexit, and future EU–UK relationship(s), these challenges will form a key part of health governance post-Brexit. A multilevel governance approach will help make sense of this new regulatory terrain, and its effects for health and the NHS. It is important to understand, raise awareness of and navigate the different Brexit effects for health in the devolved nations/jurisdictions, and the different Brexit effects for different aspects of health and its governance; the broader economic, social and cultural contexts of Brexit and their indirect implications for health; and how legal responsibilities for healthcare are a poor fit with the emerging realities of managing Brexit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a consequence of the UK withdrawing from the European Union, it is becoming more difficult to comply with the labelling and safety data sheet (SDS) aspects of REACH and CLP. Such difficulties have also begun to shine a light on compliance in those areas more widely across the EU – regardless of the impact of Brexit. Correspondingly, authorities are ramping up enforcement across the EU and ECHA's Enforcement Forum is undertaking an enforcement project currently focusing on this area. Fortunately for duty holders in the EU and UK, and those exporting into those jurisdictions, the majority of the obligations are the same. Primary differences are due to legal entity changes – downstream users becoming importers, and the subsequent change this requires in legal entity details on labels and in SDS. What follows is an introduction to this issue, an outline of the obligations required in each jurisdiction, problems encountered when attempting to achieve compliance, and practical solutions to these problems. We hope that this document can be used to support your continued market access and minimise the chance of enforcement action against your business, and that of your customers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article highlights the legal and procedural restrictions a Member States faces during its withdrawal from the EU and subsequent talks on a future trade relationship by analyzing the unprecedented case of the UK. One such restriction consists of an obligation to negotiate withdrawal as a result of the principle of sincere cooperation. Other limits derive from the withdrawal process itself, designed as it was by the European institutions on the basis of a very scant Article 50 TEU. By then comparing the three substantive pillars of the EU-UK WA—citizens' rights, the financial settlement, and the Irish border— with the UK's initial negotiating red lines, I offer two conclusions: That the aforementioned constraints on the withdrawing state can significantly weaken the defense of its interests during its withdrawal process and that having to agree to important issues in a first and separate stage of "orderly withdrawal" talks also diminishes the state's bargaining power with regards to the next stage of negotiating a future partnership with the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Not only did the UK lose its access to EU decision-making bodies of all kinds, but the EU had now secured its fundamental priorities in the Withdrawal Agreement. Further complication came from most British fish being sold to EU member states and most fish eaten in the UK coming from the EU, thus connecting it to the trade stream of negotiations (UK in a Changing Europe, 2020). Therefore it pushed for 'sufficient guarantees ... so as to uphold corresponding high levels of protection' (European Council, 2020a), including dynamic alignment that would tie the UK to EU standards over time and the continuing use of EU state aid rules by the UK. At most, the final treaty took the harder edges off the EU's preferences, while still tying the UK into a system of governance and dispute settlement that could have major effects; a reflection of that initial EU concern about the UK's "good faith". [Extracted from the article]

In the last century, the importance of foreign trade, particularly net exports of goods and services, in achieving balanced and high-quality economic growth has become increasingly apparent. This certainly applies to Turkey. For example, the Eleventh Development Plan prepared for the 2019-2023 period was determined within the framework of a stable, export-based growth model, in which the industrial sector played a dominant role, focusing on productivity. Recently, the new trade regime between Turkey and the United Kingdom after Brexit has been included among the subjects within the agenda of Turkish foreign trade. The present study aims to find the preliminary clues to understand the extent of the recent trade agreement between two countries, which share deep-rooted trade links, in light of the new UK-EU deal. While one of these countries does not want to lose its position as a candidate country, despite the obstacles and disagreements posed by the EU in the negotiation mechanism, the other has managed to leave the EU as a result of a very intense and complex process, that lasted approximately thirty-four months. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While policy attention is understandably diverted to COVID-19, the end of the UK's post-Brexit 'transition period' remains 31 December 2020. All forms of future EU-UK relationship are worse for health than EU membership, but analysis of the negotiating texts shows some forms are better than others. The likely outcomes involve major negative effects for NHS staffing, funding for health and social care, and capital financing for the NHS; and for UK global leadership and influence. We expect minor negative effects for cross border healthcare (except in Northern Ireland); research collaboration; and data sharing, such as the Early Warning and Response System for health threats. Despite political narratives, the legal texts show that the UK seeks de facto continuity in selected key areas for pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and equipment [including personal protective equipment (PPE)], especially clinical trials, pharmacovigilance, and batch-testing. The UK will be excluded from economies of scale of EU membership, e.g. joint procurement programmes as used recently for PPE. Above all, there is a major risk of reaching an agreement with significant adverse effects for health, without meaningful oversight by or input from the UK Parliament, or other health policy stakeholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For most analysts, Brexit reveals the highly contingent power of finance and the clear limits to its ability to influence crucial policymaking outcomes. By contrast, I contend that UK-EU negotiations demonstrate the unique capacity of finance to secure substantial commercial protections relative to all other business sectors and that the structural sources of the City's political power remain exceptionally robust. Elaborating a notion of 'structural interdependence', the paper demonstrates how policy officials on both sides came to perceive that the future prosperity and stability of their economies relied upon maintaining open trading relations in financial services. This necessitated broad continuity in access to London's deep financial markets for EU firms and preservation of the City's leading role in the UK growth regime. In establishing these claims empirically, I document an extensive range of contingency measures designed throughout December 2018-April 2019 that would function to protect the financial industry from economic disruption in the event of a no-deal Brexit. The outcome illustrates how finance benefits from a form of structural power that does not require instrumental mobilisation, but rather shapes policy decisions on the basis of deeply entrenched and commercially vital cross-border financial entanglements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland proved to be the trickiest element of the UK‐EU Withdrawal Agreement to negotiate. The version that was finally agreed to by both sides sees the EU's customs code and regulatory rules applying in Northern Ireland. In avoiding a hard border for the movement of goods on the island of Ireland, there are new frictions on the movement of goods within the United Kingdom (across the Irish Sea). Implementing the protocol is a complex practical as well as political challenge. What it means in practice is largely dependent on the nature of the UK‐EU relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores how the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic affected the legal transition and foreign relations of Great Britain following Brexit or the British withdrawal from the European Union (EU). Topics discussed include the representation of Great Britain in EU institutions during the transition period, the reported economic and social impact of the pandemic on Great Britain, and the ratification of the trade and cooperation agreement between the EU and Great Britain.