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(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2023 8(2), 405-410 | European Forum Highlight of 26 July 2023 | (Abstract) The Digital Markets Act (DMA) intends to ensure contestable and fair markets in the digital sector through the introduction of obligations for “gatekeepers”. This term represents a legal innovation. No mention of gatekeepers can be retrieved in the case law regarding digital platforms, and the origins of the nomenclature cannot be ascribed to competition law. The concept can, however, be linked to information studies: its adoption in the DMA reflects the centrality of information control for contestability and fairness. A look at the DMA treatment of gatekeepers reveals that, on the one hand, it is coherent with an information-based approach, while on the other it is not devoid of elements typical of a competition law approach. Only the future interpretation of the DMA will show whether the Regulation is an attempt to inform competition policy with notions fit for the data economy or if it is bound to depart from a competition-based reading.

The proposed Digital Markets Act has been under severe scrutiny in the past couple of years. While it received mostly positive feedback, there were numerous authors and scholars arguing that the new legislation does not provide anything useful or new. The common denominator of most of the analyses is that the Digital Markets Act is an ex-ante antitrust legislation and that the obligations tackle the (abusive) dominance of the gatekeepers to be designated. In this article, I try to deconstruct the requirements for determining whether an undertaking is a gatekeeper and to assess whether the proposal fits into a regulatory compliance type of legislation or ex-ante competition law. In addition to the analytical approach, I will take the example of the Intel and Microsoft cases and the intricacies that arose from them. I will further assess possible implications that the proposal might have for innovation and other aspects of the market.

Digital technology brought informational saturation to our lives. In cyberspace, private and business users need help to make valuable pieces of information stand out from the noise of excessive information. With search algorithms, recommender systems, and online advertising, digital platforms specialised in providing relief for this problem. Their technologies arrange digitalised information to make it intelligible and relevant for individuals. But the separation of information from noise did not only become a necessity to comfortably navigate the depths of the web, it also became a commodity. There is a demand for it, a supply, a price, and an exchange on markets which is enabled by private law. The examples of general search, recommender systems, and online advertising illustrate that. At the same time, their commodification can become problematic. This paper argues that in the European Union (EU), the separation of information from noise has become a contested commodity according to M. J. Radin’s framework. The Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act purposefully limit the influence of the market price mechanism on the design and allocation of the separation technology to protect legal goods like the democratic process, innovation, and privacy.

Contexto: A Diante do avanço das grandes empresas de tecnologia no mercado internacional, percebe-se que tais multinacionais apresentam aspectos específicos de funcionamento que chamam atenção das autoridades reguladoras da concorrência, ensejando discussões e produções de regulações, tais como o Digital Markets Act (DMA), a propor uma cooperação antitruste que não se limita às fronteiras nacionais. Objetivo: Face ao contexto observado, a presente pesquisa tem por objetivo investigar, a partir de uma abordagem descritiva e explicativa, de que modo a União Europeia, por meio da adoção do DMA, tem regulado a defesa da livre-concorrência no setor digital, em especial sobre as condutas adotadas pelas grandes empresas do setor, partindo do pressuposto de que a defesa da concorrência, em âmbito meramente nacional, não se demonstra plenamente suficiente para garantir o bem-estar dos consumidores. Método: Os autores utilizam-se de metodologia documental, bibliográfica e qualitativa nas fontes, selecionando, sobretudo, artigos de origem estrangeira. Quanto aos objetivos, a pesquisa é explicativa e descritiva. O DMA é utilizado como case de estudo. Conclusões: Após a análise realizada sobre o DMA como regulação voltada à concorrência nos mercados digitais, conclui-se que, em razão das peculiaridades e efeitos transnacionais produzidos pela ação das big techs, uma abordagem cooperativa e transnacional poderá trazer, como já tem sido observado, resultados mais efetivos na defesa da livre-concorrência no setor, sempre se levando em consideração os aspectos econômicos, jurídicos e regulatórios peculiares de cada Estado.

As digitalisation has increased and data has become more powerful, more comprehensive digital regulation has become necessary, including by national competition authorities and the European Commission. The Digital Markets Act (the DMA) is a good example of this area of regulation.1 In November 2022, the DMA came into force, introducing new regulations for core platform services which functioned as 'gatekeepers' in the digital market. By enacting the DMA, these platforms are prevented from treating businesses and consumers unfairly. The purpose of this paper is to provide a general overview of the DMA and its relationship to antitrust enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Právník is the property of Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of State & Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2023 8(1), 17-23 | European Forum Highlight of 12 April 2023 | (Abstract) This Highlight proposes an interpretation of the notion of “fairness” in the context of the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA), and explores whether it could become an evaluative principle for gatekeeper compliance with Articles 5 and 6 of the Act. There are good reasons to believe that fairness refers to equity, i.e. a distribution of legal entitlements that takes into account individual characteristics of the subjects. Gatekeepers have different obligations compared to non-gatekeepers. By imposing that discrimination, the legislator aims for a different allocation of economic rents and opportunities in the platform economy. But apart from the DMA’s vague reference to a “significant disequilibrium in rights and obligations” in certain relationships with platforms, there is no concrete understanding of a fair or equitable distribution. Fairness, as presented in the DMA, is inherently indeterminate. It is not a legal standard, but a “gut feeling”. This is not necessarily a bad thing. The fairness language simply confers power from economists to lawyers in competition agencies and courts, who will be required to find an elusive “disequilibrium in rights and obligations”. Fairness leaves a certain margin of appreciation to any enforcer responsible for deciding the scope of gatekeeper obligations.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(3), 1113-1119 | European Forum Highlight of 31 January 2023 | (Abstract) This Highlight provides an overview of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) from the perspective of consumer protection. The DMA constitutes a part of a long-anticipated digital package of cross-cutting legislation proposed by the European Commission in 2020. The DMA entered into force in 2022 with the objective of ensuring a safe, fair, and contestable digital market. Besides the influx of legislative acts in digital law, the year 2022 was also marked by the 50th anniversary of EU consumer protection. The author takes advantage of this moment to reflect on how the DMA fits in the broader regulatory context of consumer protection and investigate what improvements the DMA brings for consumers. The main problem with the Regulation lies in the ambiguity of its goals, and its approach to the notion of "fairness" in particular. On the one hand, the DMA improves consumer rights through multiple provisions which contribute to increasing interoperability in the market, ensuring easy uninstallation, subscription cancellation, data portability and data transfer, as well as eliminating unfair market practices such as self-preferencing, tying, and tracking users without their proper consent. On the other hand, the DMA treats consumers merely as passive end users in the digital market and it does not engage them fully in the introduced institutional and procedural proceedings. The DMA also misses the opportunity to provide the long-anticipated updated definition of "consumer", which could lead to a recalibration of the EU consumer protection law, and it does not exploit fully the potential of consumer protection.

In recent years, there has been a tidal wave of merger filings involving large digital firms acquiring low turnover but high value start-ups. The vast majority of those transactions have flown under the radar of EU and National Competition Authorities and, among the few which have been reviewed, none has been blocked. Competition scholars wonder whether there has been a systematic bias towards under-enforcement against acquisitions of start-ups by already dominant tech firms. Some Member States are calling for a reform of the EU merger control's notification system and an adaptation of the substantive test to effectively address cases of potentially predatory acquisitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Doing Business in a World of Goliaths: Power Imbalances and Economic Dependency in Platform-to-Business Relations Digital platforms have emerged as crucial infrastructures in today's economy, facilitating digital transactions between buyers and sellers. However, propelled by network effects and other sources of market power, digital platforms are generally the stronger party in their relations with users, and this could lead them to abuse their market power through exclusionary and exploitative practices. While extensive consumer regulations shield consumers in business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions, scant protection is afforded to businesses in presumed peer-to-peer business-to-business (B2B) transactions. Although certain EU provisions, such as Article 102 TFEU, Regulation 1150/2019 and the Digital Markets Act (DMA), aim to safeguard business users in platform-to-business (P2B) contexts, their effectiveness is constrained. These regulations and provisions are often too narrow in scope, fail to consider the platform's unique features, prioritise public interests over those of individual businesses and lack effective remedies. Conversely, some Member States have adopted abuse of economic dependence regulations, potentially offering stronger protection, as such an approach provides more flexibility and emphasises contractual fairness for individual business users. The present article attempts to show that business users are in fact economically dependent on the platform, thereby suggesting that an EU level prohibition of abuse of economic dependence could more effectively address the existing gaps in protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In September 2022, the European Union (EU) legislature adopted the Digital Markets Act (DMA)—a landmark piece of regulation with the potential to transform the digital economy in Europe and beyond. Even after adoption, however, questions remain about its stated goals, underlying assumptions, scope, obligations, and eventual effectiveness. This article examines these questions using EU competition law not as a touchstone but as a reference point. First, the DMA's goals of "fairness" and "contestability" can be more accurately restated as the protection of intra-platform and the promotion of inter-platform competition. Second, the DMA is based on the idea that the enforcement of the abuse of dominance provision, Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), is ineffective both procedurally (due to lengthy investigations and remedial issues) and substantively (due to the difficulty of establishing dominance and abuse)—two assumptions that must be tested by examining competition law's track record. Third, the scope of the DMA is built around the concept of "gatekeepers," which are in turn defined based on turnover, market capitalization, and active users. Is this an application of the resurgent "big is bad" ideology or a proxy for market power? Fourth, the DMA imposes a list of dos and don'ts on gatekeepers, many of which are inspired by past or ongoing antitrust investigations. Does this experience justify the far-reaching obligations and if so, are they sufficiently flexible to allow for procompetitive gatekeeper conduct? Finally, the DMA is based on the idea that large online platforms have not continued to deliver the desired innovation outcomes and have reaped more than their fair share of the rewards from the innovation they brought. This assumption is tested by a historical look at Apple's App Store—the most important innovation platform to arise in the digital economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While business users face difficulties accessing and porting data on platforms, the Digital Markets Act has been hailed as the legislative tool enabling business users access and transfer the data they have generated on platforms controlled by gatekeepers. The tool provided by the Digital Markets Act is discussed in this article and the author argue that business users should have a more elaborated right to first access the data they produce on platforms and in ecosystems, and secondly transfer such data from platform to platform, cloud to cloud, thing to thing or in-house. A right to access and transfer data could have several benefits; it benefits dissemination of data, creativity and innovation in connected markets and it promotes competition between platforms, clouds and ecosystem providers. Creativity will be enhanced because necessary data—being the raw material for new innovations—will be more broadly disbursed. It will also benefit consumers having a disbursed and disseminated data commons for the development of ideas, innovations, and the exchange of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital technology brought informational saturation to our lives. In cyberspace, private and business users need help to make valuable pieces of information stand out from the noise of excessive information. With search algorithms, recommender systems, and online advertising, digital platforms specialised in providing relief for this problem. Their technologies arrange digitalised information to make it intelligible and relevant for individuals. But the separation of information from noise did not only become a necessity to comfortably navigate the depths of the web, it also became a commodity. There is a demand for it, a supply, a price, and an exchange on markets which is enabled by private law. The examples of general search, recommender systems, and online advertising illustrate that. At the same time, their commodification can become problematic. This paper argues that in the European Union (EU), the separation of information from noise has become a contested commodity according to M. J. Radin's framework. The Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act purposefully limit the influence of the market price mechanism on the design and allocation of the separation technology to protect legal goods like the democratic process, innovation, and privacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The text discusses the Digital Markets Act (DMA), a new regulatory regime aimed at introducing more competition into digital platform markets. The DMA has been implemented quickly, with compliance reports already being published by designated gatekeepers. The first designation decisions show that companies can escape DMA obligations based on the delimitation of their "core platform services" and can appeal their gatekeeper designation, although such appeals do not suspend compliance duties. The text also explores the relationship between the DMA and competition law, noting that compliance with the DMA does not preclude competition law enforcement. The text concludes by highlighting the ongoing developments and reporting on various topics in the field. [Extracted from the article]

In the digital economy, data (as opposed to monetary prices) often serve as a kind of non-monetary consideration provided by the user. Against this background, data policies of dominant undertakings may, under certain circumstances, violate the prohibition of imposing unfair trading conditions as laid out in Art 102 lit a TFEU (Section 5 para 1 nr 1 Austrian Cartel Act). The economic peculiarities of the digital economy as well as the functioning of multi-sided online platforms require a differentiated analytical framework under competition law. In accordance with the constituting elements of Art 102 TFEU (Section 5 Austrian Cartel Act), this framework should not only apply to the definition of the relevant market and the determination of market power, but also to the assessment of the incriminated conduct’s fairness. Reliable results warrant economic concepts that adequately consider the multi-sidedness of platform markets, the interconnectedness of different customer groups, the platform operators’ pricing logic as well as the competition in innovation prevailing in the digital economy. The fairness of the business terms in question always needs to be assessed against competition law standards, which may also include non-competition concerns (such as data protection interests). However, violations of norms outside the remit of competition law (such as data protection law) are neither necessary nor sufficient for an abuse of a dominant position in the meaning of Art 102 TFEU (Section 5 Austrian Cartel Act).

On 18 July 2022, the Council gave its final approval of the Digital Market Act's final text. Notwithstanding the amendments following the initial proposal published by the European Commission on 15 December 2020, the main objectives of the DMA have remained untouched and separate from the objectives pursued by competition rules. In the interim, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued its preliminary rulings on the bpost and Nordzucker cases, with particularly relevant consequences concerning the application of the double jeopardy principle. The potential remedies and obligations imposed on the main digital platforms both under Articles 5 to 7 of the DMA and under competition law rules will overlap and create a risk of incoherent enforcement, especially on the side of the European Commission. Against this background, the paper strives to draw out the narrow enforcement gap left for competition authorities. In addition, the paper highlights a number of alternatives open to competition authorities when enforcing competition law rules on digital markets, namely the segmentation of its enforcement efforts depending on the type of service concerned in each case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the interactions between the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the laws and competition frameworks of Member States. Specifically, the article sets out three different interpretations on the text of articles 1 (5) and (6) of the DMA, which govern interactions between the DMA and national law and competition policy. The article identifies a narrow, broader, and broadest interpretation of the legal interests protected under the DMA. Each interpretation creates different harmonization effects. The article argues that the narrow and broader interpretations allow for significant divergence between national rules, creating the risk of regulatory fragmentation. The broadest interpretation would allow competition authorities and courts to weigh the interests protected in the DMA against national interests and create greater convergence of laws and competition policy in the Digital Single Market. The article also proposes ways forward for the implementation and enforcement of the DMA and national competition laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In July 2022 the European Council gave final approval to new regulation of digital markets. This specifically addresses the main concerns raised by the business behaviour of operators of core services in their gatekeeping positions. The list of core services was extended during revisions. In this article, I address the question of whether the inclusion of virtual assistants into the list of core services was the right decision. Overall, this paper argues that (i) virtual assistants as gatekeepers for consumption should be listed among core services, (ii) some of the Digital Markets Act's obligations need to be adopted to fit the specifics of virtual assistants, (iii) there are two relevant dimensions of power which should be considered in competition policy and regulation analysis: market power on virtual assistants' market and the ecosystem of related markets (cross-market integration criterion), (iv) the growth of new gatekeepers should be prevented, among other means by stricter merger control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recently adopted Digital Markets Act (henceforth: DMA) addresses the behaviour of so-called gatekeepers by imposing a list of prohibitions and obligations on these platforms. Despite the potential of the initiative, it remains questionable how the DMA fits in the regulatory landscape. The DMA is – at least formally – not a competition law instrument but also differs from sector-specific regulation. This begs the question of how the DMA fits in the broader regulatory context. This paper aims to address this issue by assessing to what extent the DMA is different from "traditional" competition law and sector-specific regulation respectively. The unclarities regarding the position of the DMA in the broader regulatory context result in various difficulties, amongst others relating to the institutional set-up. The second part of this paper addresses these institutional difficulties resulting from the concurrent application of the DMA and "traditional" EU competition law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Polarization of the society is nowadays easier than ever due to the strong influence of social media. Opaque algorithms personalize news feed of users through massive data processing and thus creating effects that are fueling extremization of opinions. Negative effects of social media can be used by third parties to influence society to achieve their goals, however antidemocratic. Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act aim to regulate Digital Single Market through fair competition and consumer protection regulation. This regulation can have significant impact on the democratic deficit of the European Union as it has potential to eradicate analyzed negative effects of social media on the polarization of society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today many companies are collecting and extracting data from different sources to help them with their strategic decision-making. Big data is the basis of data-driven economy, bringing significant competitive advantage and market power to companies who are able to harness and exploit its potential. Digital transformation of markets and economy challenges the existing structures of consumer protection, data protection and competition law. Data is a commodity as well as a strategic asset. The term Big data refers to the amount of data that cannot be processed in a short time by traditional informatics devices. Undertakings possessing a large scale of different data have a competitive advantage. Possible application of the essential facility doctrine to Big data issues has not attracted much attention in competition assessment. This paper will try to fill the gap by providing some insights into competition and data issues. Also, the question whether data can be considered under the essential facility doctrine will be analysed. Furthermore, it will be shown that essential facility criteria are applicable, although there is room for some adjustments to data markets. The last part of the paper will scrutinize the Digital Markets Act that tries to shed some light and clear some possible problematic behaviour of the so-called gatekeepers. The regulation leaves the conventional approach and shortens the process of tackling possible anti-competition concerns. It regulates only those undertakings that have significant impact on market and the possibility to become an important gateway in the future. When the status of a gatekeeper is established in accordance with all prescribed criteria, there will be no need to show that the elements of the essential facility doctrine are fulfilled. The essential facility doctrine will still be relevant to undertakings that are not designated as gatekeepers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to evaluate, if competition-like efficiencies of European-style rule of reason shall apply also in the context of the ex-ante regulation by the DMA. The rationale of such consideration lies in the concept of proportionality of the EU regulation and the assumption that EU law cannot proscribe behaviour with beneficial outcomes and effects that does not have negative consequences on the internal market outweighing the positive effects. The analysis is divided into three parts in this paper: position of the rule of law and the per se prohibition in the legal development of the EU competition law, the relationship between the DMA and competition law, including competition-based efficiencies brought in digital market cases and finally the per se prohibition included in the DMA. The analysis of the development of the case law showed that in the EU competition law the principle of per se prohibitions was never accepted and the CJEU accepted justifications outside the text of the statutory exemptions. Even though the aim of the DMA may be the introduction of a per se prohibition in order to facilitate the Commission's enforcement, it cannot be surprising if the CJ EU will, in some case in the future, follow the path of the EU-style rule of reason in the framework of the DMA as well on the basis of proportionality principle. The lesson learned from application of rule of reason in the context of agreements restricting competition or as a specific form of objective justification in the context of abuse of dominant position does not undermine effectiveness of competition law. The quasi per se concept can satisfy both: it shows that it is not probable that such a behaviour will be allowed and at the same time it dodges proportionality objections because the prohibition is not, at least theoretically, absolutely, per se. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A new EU regulation called the Digital Markets Act aims to keep digital markets open and fair in the face of the power of the so-called internet gatekeepers. Although the DMA has, at the first sight, much in common with Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits abuse of dominant positions, it declares itself to be a different instrument pursuing different objectives and protecting different legal interests. This text seeks to identify the similarities and differences in the values and objectives pursued between Article 102 TFEU and the DMA. Both are tools in the toolbox of the European Commission's DG Competition and their complementarity is desirable in theory and practice if competition-incompatible regulation of selected online platforms is not to occur, possibly leading to their unwanted double punishment for the same thing. The analysis carried out leads to the conclusion that, despite the insistence on their separate nature and on differences in their objectives, a value consensus prevails between the two instruments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This is important for the complex demarcation between the DMA and national instruments such as the new Section 19a GWB, as set out in Article 1(5) and (6) DMA.[9] A closer look, however, shows that this inconsistency is already inherent in the DMA itself. Possible Private Actions With the entry into force of the 11th amendment to the GWB, infringements of Articles 5, 6 and 7 DMA are treated almost identically to infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU or national competition law for private enforcement purposes. I. Introduction Germany was one of the Member States in favour of decentralised enforcement of the DMA, with significant involvement of national authorities.[2] Not surprisingly, it was also one of the first to adopt national rules to complement the DMA enforcement regime. Keywords: Digital Markets Act; gatekeeper regulation; platform regulation; enforcement EN Digital Markets Act gatekeeper regulation platform regulation enforcement 112 117 6 08/02/23 20230401 NES 230401 Finding the appropriate role for Member State authorities and courts was one of the main challenges in negotiating the Digital Markets Act (DMA). [Extracted from the article]

Since 2007, the European Commission (EC) has opened numerous competition cases regarding Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, and Meta (AAAM). Enforcement, however, has remained elusive, prompting a new regulatory paradigm in the EU known as the Digital Markets Act. In this study, we analyze the EC's competition policy approach regarding big tech with an emphasis on AAAM. Rather than implementing a consumer welfare friendly neoclassic economics analysis, we adopt a critical political economy of communications (CPE) approach to analyze these cases. The article explores whether EU competition policy does enough to yield the required measures to preserve a healthy digital economy sector for political and social welfare as much as for consumer welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Österreichische Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht (ÖZK) is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

ABSTRACT On November the 1st, The European Union’s new Digital Markets Act (DMA) entered into force. At present, the DMA is at its crucial implementation phase and will come into force in six months, as of 2 May 2023. After that, within two months (and at the latest by 3 July 2023), potential Gatekeepers will have to notify their core platform services to the Commission if they meet the thresholds established by the DMA. DMA was made with the purpose of improving customers’ digital lives, and part of that means reduction of the influence of Gatekeepers by several restrictions. Gatekeepers are defined by DMA as digital platforms that provide an important gateway between business users and consumers – whose position can grant them the power to act as a private rule maker, thus creating a bottleneck in the digital economy. As the time passes, Gatekeepers should adapt to this new regulation and corresponding restrictions. DMA established a list of rules that Gatekeepers now need to implement in their habitual activities and practices. For instance, among other requirements, the DMA requires companies marked as Gatekeepers to now allow third-party apps to be installed on their devices. In this article, we will focus on the implementations, in which specific Gatekeepers, had to make or are going to make changes, which will be in accordance with the demands of the DMA. The methodology used to identify the ‘situations’ cannot be separated from the problems that this regulation seeks to address. We will point out some of the steps that are expected by specific Gatekeepers (members of the GAFAM group) to reconcile with the DMA demands. In this article we will also outline the role of the European Commission, as the Gatekeepers in question will notice whether they meet the thresholds established by the DMA. This article reveals the various provisions of the DMA in relation to Gatekeepers and points out some of the consequences of these provisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Self-preferencing" refers to a conduct of a large provider of core platform services which consists in favouring one's own products and services over those offered by competitors on the same platform. Drawing on the experience acquired through its various antitrust investigations into the conducts of Big Tech, the European Commission, in its its "proposal for the Digital Market Act", has put forward the concept of "gatekeeper". If adopted, this regulatory instrument which aims at ensuring fairness and transparency in the EU digital markets, would enable the Commission to qualify as such any large core platform service on the basis of narrowly defined objectives criteria and submit it to a set of prohibitions and obligations. By opting for such an approach, the Commission would be able to switch from an ex-post assessment of a gatekeepers' self-preferencing practices to an ex-ante one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Taiwanese Journal of Political Science is the property of NTU Press & National Taiwan University, Department of Political Science and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The European Union's new regulatory agenda targeting online platforms such as social media has been presented as a progressive watershed moment after a long period of regulatory restraint. The attempt to construct an internal market lends legal competence to the two centerpieces of this agenda—the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA). This Article analyzes the Union's attempts to govern online platforms as a part of internal market construction. After examining the underlying aims of the internal market, the Article proceeds to analyze how those aims have been operationalized in existing EU electronic commerce law and more recently in the DSA and DMA proposals. The Article argues that the Union regulatory agenda is not particularly transformative. While the DSA and DMA introduce many novel regulatory mechanisms with an equalizing potential, they also remain faithfully committed to the aims and pre-existing mechanisms of internal market construction that have enabled the rise of platform corporations in the first place. Thus, the proposals risk reproducing and legitimizing various inequalities in the European digital economy. The article seeks to connect alternative visions of platforms with the re-imagination of internal market construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the foundations underpinning open banking models in Europe and identifies levers to improve their performance. Based on a review of the literature, it distinguishes four contexts for open banking: platformisation, data sharing, FinTech and regulation. The users of open banking services are surveyed to determine factors driving adoption and identify those entities that customers trust with their data and funds. The results indicate that the slow adoption of open banking services is in large part due to customers' poor understanding of such services. The results also show the importance of usefulness and trust in driving adoption. These findings highlight the disproportionate attention being given to service provider infrastructure and the ecosystems of new entrants, and indicate that more consideration should be given to the actual users of open banking frameworks. In response to the findings, the study proposes a roadmap to mitigate the main weaknesses in current open banking models. The conclusions of this study are relevant not only to the development of open banking regulations in other territories, such as the USA and Canada, but also to the extension of data-sharing regulations to non-banking sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2020 the European Commission presented its legislative package aimed to deal with new challenges for the internal market stemming from development on digital markets and alleged abuses and anticompetitive practices therein, including the Digital Markets Act (DMA). The aim of this paper is not to evaluate content of the DMA itself, but to evaluate the position of the DMA in the context of other market sector-oriented regulations , rules on unfair trade practices, competition rules as well as fitness of legal basis and observance of rule of law safeguards. As the DMA proposal departed from competition law legal basis enshrined in Art. 101 et seq. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, it paved the way for the possibility to impose sanction under both regimes. This possibility of double sanctions and necessity for check of proportionality in all actions of the Commission as well as in imposition of fines constitute one of the most relevant shortcomings from the "constitutional" point of view of position of the DMA in the EU legal framework. As it is argued in this paper, without more synchronization with competition regulatory regimes, the DMA proposal contains elements that can, at the end of the day, diminish its legal effectiveness via subsequent judicial battles.

Artykuł dotyczy projektu rozporządzenia w sprawie kontestowalnych i uczciwych rynków w sektorze cyfrowym (akt o rynkach cyfrowych) (Digital Markets Act) – propozycji legislacyjnej Komisji Europejskiej zmierzającej do zapewnienia kontestowalnych i uczciwych rynków w sektorze cyfrowym. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie proponowanych uregulowań oraz ich wpływu na prawo ochrony konkurencji. Artykuł zawiera wstępną analizę relacji projektowanych przepisów i regulacji dotyczących nadużycia pozycji dominującej, a także rozważania dotyczące optymalnego modelu egzekwowania rozporządzenia.

Google and Apple’s smartphone and tablet ‘app’ stores are facing significant antitrust scrutiny in Europe, culminating in enforcement action by the European Commission and specific obligations in the new EU Digital Markets Act. In a field previously dominated by US law and jurisprudence, we review the main European antitrust-related evidence and policy arguments for and against such app store regulation. We further show how this discourse is linked to the heavily-contested policy area of network neutrality.

The subject of this article is the Regulation (EU) on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act, DMA) in the version adopted by the Council on 18 July 2022, and the scope of application of the German § 19a of the German Competition Act (GWB), which came into force in January 2021. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the DMA potentially brings predictability and leverage for companies and consumers interacting with large online platforms, it also raises a significant number of questions in terms of its application, scope and implementation. This article discusses which platforms the DMA applies to and what the consequences are of being designated as gatekeeper. It also assesses whether the DMA is as simple a tool as many hoped it would be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]