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We use the multivariate extension of Exponential Generalized Autoregressive Conditionally Heteroscedastic (EGARCH) of Nelson, Econometrica, 59: 347–370, 1991 to test for spillover effects and examine the extent of asymmetries between short- and long-term interest rates and portfolios of money center, large, and medium-size banks in the U.S. Our results indicate the existence of price and volatility spillovers from short- and long-term interest rates to the three bank portfolios. We also provide evidence of response asymmetries for the portfolios of money center and large banks, suggesting that money center and large banks are more sensitive to negative than positive short- and long-term interest rate changes.

Bank profit warnings represent a milder form of negative news than a bank failure. Yet, they may contain signals about a bank or its rivals because the information is transmitted when the bank believes that the market is overly optimistic about its future earnings. Thus, the profit warning serves as a means by which insiders of the bank can reduce the asymmetric information between the bank’s insiders and its investors. We find that banks experience negative valuation effects in response to their profit warnings. The banks’ profit warnings result in significant negative valuation effects for its corresponding rival banks, which implies that the warning carries valuable information about banking industry conditions. However, the effects on rivals are attenuated since the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RFD). This implies that investors may be relying on more transparent sources of information about individual banks rather than relying on one bank’s warning as a signal about other banks. Furthermore, bank regulations may allow for more transparent communication by banks than that of nonbank firms.

We find that profit-warning announcements elicit a strong negative market response that is not sensitive to timing the warning in advance of the earnings announcement. Share prices begin to adjust about five days before a profit warning, and the market response is not complete until about five days after the warning. The accumulated response over the 11-day period ending five days after the announcement is −21.7%. The profit warning effect over the two-day announcement period is 32 times the valuation effect upon subsequent release of the actual earnings. There is no evidence of a reversal after this period, and therefore no sign that the market response is excessive.

We assess the pricing behavior of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) in response to information about their profitability. Specifically, we test for leakage effects and lagged effects, and we assess the cross-sectional variation in market inefficiencies related to profit warnings by foreign firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges as ADRs. Foreign firms experience strong negative valuation effects at the time of the profit warning. Furthermore, there are pronounced leakage effects, which suggests that some market participants were able to capitalize on inside information before the profit warnings were issued. We also find statistically significant evidence of a three-day lag effect following the profit warning, which suggests that investors who did not have inside information could profit from a warning. When using the leakage as a proxy, the degree of market inefficiency is more pronounced for firms in the technology sector, but the extent of government ownership or countries of origin are not significant ...

Series of analogs to the functional m1 selective agonist, xanomeline (hexyloxy-TZTP), were evaluated for their in vitro m1 efficacy in cell lines transfected with the human m1 receptor. Systematic variation of the side chain and the azacyclic ring led to the discovery of potent muscarinic agonists with robust m1 efficacy, all having the phenylpropargyloxy/thio as the side chain. The most selective compound was the phenylpropargylthio-[3.2.1] endo analog 28, which is a potent and efficacious m1 agonist with no m2 activity.

This study sought to identify the risk of sudden cardiac death (SCD) associated with obstructive sleep apnea (OSA).Risk stratification for SCD, a major cause of mortality, is difficult. OSA is linked to cardiovascular disease and arrhythmias and has been shown to increase the risk of nocturnal SCD. It is unknown if OSA independently increases the risk of SCD.We included 10,701 consecutive adults undergoing their first diagnostic polysomnogram between July 1987 and July 2003. During follow-up up to 15 years, we assessed incident resuscitated or fatal SCD in relation to the presence of OSA, physiological data including the apnea-hypopnea index (AHI), and nocturnal oxygen saturation (O2sat) parameters, and relevant comorbidities.During an average follow-up of 5.3 years, 142 patients had resuscitated or fatal SCD (annual rate 0.27%). In multivariate analysis, independent risk factors for SCD were age, hypertension, coronary artery disease, cardiomyopathy or heart failure, ventricular ectopy or nonsustained ventricular tachycardia, and lowest nocturnal O2sat (per 10% decrease, hazard ratio [HR]: 1.14; p = 0.029). SCD was best predicted by age60 years (HR: 5.53), apnea-hypopnea index20 (HR: 1.60), mean nocturnal O2sat 93% (HR: 2.93), and lowest nocturnal O2sat 78% (HR: 2.60; all p 0.0001).In a population of 10,701 adults referred for polysomnography, OSA predicted incident SCD, and the magnitude of risk was predicted by multiple parameters characterizing OSA severity. Nocturnal hypoxemia, an important pathophysiological feature of OSA, strongly predicted SCD independently of well-established risk factors. These findings implicate OSA, a prevalent condition, as a novel risk factor for SCD.

Currently, community banks hold only 14% of bank assets in the US; nonetheless, they play an important role in the US economy because they continue to provide the majority of funding to small busin...

Background In the current environment, pressure is ever increasing to maximize financial performance in surgery departments. Factors such as physician extenders, billing and collection, payor mix, contracting, incentives from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and administrative incentives may greatly influence financial performance. However, despite a plethora of information from the University HealthSystem Consortium and the Association of American Medical Colleges, best-practice information for business infrastructure is lacking. To obtain a sampling of current practices, we conducted a survey of departments of surgery. Methods An anonymous 30-question survey addressing demographics, productivity, revenue and expense profile, payor mix, physician extender and staff personnel, billing and collections methodology, and financial performance was distributed among members of the Society of Surgical Chairs via SurveyMonkey. This was approved by the Loyola Institutional Research Board. Multivariate linear regression analyses and t tests/rank-sum tests were performed, as appropriate. Data are presented as mean ± SEM. Results A total of 25 (19%) departments responded; 14 were integrated with the hospital/health system, and 11 were integrated with the medical school. In 60% ( n = 15), the main hospital had 500 to 1,000 beds; 48% ( n = 12) had >4 hospitals in their system. For FY10, MD clinical full-time equivalents (FTEs) were 49 ± 10; total work relative value units (wRVUs) were 320 ± 8 k; and total billed cases were 43 ± 16 k. A total of 23 of 25 used physician-extenders with an average of 18 ± 5 per department and in 22 of 23, the physician extenders billed. On average, there were 18 ± 6 clinical-support staff, 25 ± 11 front-office staff, and 13 ± 3 back-office support staff FTEs. Among these FTEs, there were 16 ± 5 devoted to business operations (billing, coding, denial/claims management, financial oversight). Collections/wRVUs were $60 ± 3 (range, 39–80). Regression modeling demonstrated that total wRVUs were determined by the number of MD FTEs ( P = .01), number of physician extenders ( P = .01), number of front-office staff ( P = .01), number of back-office staff ( P = .02), and number of total business staff ( P = .01). Collections/wRVUs were predicted by number of hospitals ( P = .04), number of MD FTEs ( P = .03), number of physician extenders ( P = .01), and number of cases/total business staff ( P = .02). Interestingly, wRVUs/MD was predicted by number of MD FTEs ( P = .01) but were not greatly impacted by numbers of clinical or business support staff. In 4 of 25, the billing and coding staff were incentivized and had a Collections/wRVU = 64 ± 5 whereas nonincentivized staff had collections/wRVU = 59 ± 3. ( P = NS) Also, %Accounts receivable >90 days (15% vs 25%) were not substantially different. Only 48% (12/25) have departments have recouped Centers for Medicare and Medicaid dollars for Physician Quality Reporting Initiative, Meaningful Use, Patient-Centered Medical Homes, or other Accountable Care-like programs. One-half (13) of the departments had both an inpatient and outpatient electronic medical record. Finally, on a scale of 1–10 (10 = highest), the average level of satisfaction with billing and collections processes was 6. Conclusion Our results indicate that the physician extender, clinical support staff, and business staff environment can impact surgeon productivity, and there is opportunity for improvement. Determining best practices for ratios of support staff/MD and optimizing the role of electronic medical record in workflow and billing/collections are critical in the current environment. Our pilot study requires extension across more institutions for validation.

Purpose – This study explores the probability of expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders in the form of CEO compensation under an imperfect governance institution by using a novel Chinese dataset over 2001–2010. Design/methodology/approach – We use a direct method to gauge controlling shareholders’ tunneling and expropriation of minority shareholders, and we present a simple model to link corporate governance and the degree of entrenchment by the largest shareholder. We use both Logit and Probit models to predict the likelihood of tunneling and use two-stage least square (2SLS) regression to address the endogeneity issues. Findings – There are significant deterioration effects between controlling shareholder's tunneling and firm performance. Firms with more tunneling activities typically have larger controlling ownership, greater evidence of state control, less balance of power among large shareholders, and weaker board characteristics. Research limitations/implications – The positive relationship between controlling shareholders’ tunneling and executive compensation implies that the controlling shareholder might divert personal benefits from the public firms at the expense of minority shareholders. Originality/value – We focus on the effects of corporate governance restructuring on executive compensation and controlling shareholders’ tunneling in the Chinese context, and we also investigate whether these effects are stronger with the involvement of state ownership. We empirically address the issues between executive compensation and expropriation of minority shareholders.

Growing enough cover crop biomass to adequately suppress weeds is one of the primary challenges in reduced-tillage systems that rely on mulch-based weed suppression. We investigated two approaches to increasing cereal rye biomass for improved weed suppression: (1) increasing soil fertility and (2) increasing cereal rye seeding rate. We conducted a factorial experiment with three poultry litter application rates (0, 80, and 160 kg N ha21) and three rye seeding rates (90, 150, and 210 kg seed ha21) in Pennsylvania and Maryland in 2008 and 2009. We quantified rye biomass immediately after mechanically terminating it with a roller and weed biomass at 10 wk after termination (WAT). Rye biomass increased with poultry litter applications (675, 768, and 787 g m22 in the 0, 80, and 160 kg N ha21 treatments, respectively), but this increased rye biomass did not decrease weed biomass. In contrast, increasing rye seeding rate did not increase rye biomass, but it did reduce weed biomass (328, 279, and 225 g m22 in the 90, 150, and 210 kg seed ha21 treatments, respectively). In 2009, we also sampled ground cover before rolling and weed biomass and density at 4 WAT. Despite no treatment effects, we found a correlation between bare soil before rolling (%) and weed biomass at 4 WAT. Our results suggest that increased rye seeding rate can effectively reduce weed biomass and that ground cover in early spring can influence weed biomass later in the growing season.

Executive compensation in the U.S. banking industry has been criticized as a root cause of the recent financial crisis. This study examines the relationship between executive compensation, ownership structure, and firm performance for Chinese financial corporations during 2001-2009. The results reveal that executive compensation in Chinese banks follows a relation-based rather than a market-based contract. There is little evidence in support of the pay-for-performance setting for Chinese executive compensation. Ownership concentration has significantly negative impacts while firm size has significantly positive impacts on CEO compensation. Further, the involvement of state ownership tends to limit executive compensation, while the compensation committee is friendly and enhances management compensation. The results suggest that the government or regulation may ensure efficient corporate governance in business activity as a helping hand when corporate governance is weak.