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The legal status, scope, and policy implications of the waiver of tort doctrine have been a prominent, controversial, and unresolved feature of many recent class action proceedings in Canada, especially in products liability cases, where plaintiffs have sought to claim disgorgement of profits or revenues as an alternative to proof of damage or injury. The doctrine in recent years has been invoked frequently by plaintiffs in negligence class actions, though its legal status in such a context remains uncertain, as it has not been judicially decided. The article assesses the waiver of tort doctrine from an economic perspective. It argues that decoupling remedies from actual damages in negligence cases generally, or in products liability cases in particular, is not well founded from an economic perspective. Theory and evidence suggests that the deterrence and insurance aspects of negligence law are best achieved by linking remedies to losses actually suffered. In many contexts, disgorgement of gains from activities entailing negligent conduct may induce socially wasteful forms of over-deterrence. Economic analysis does not support the waiver of tort doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports decision of different U.S. courts in different cases, as of December 2015. Several cases discussed include 'United States v. Taylor' related to federal sentencing; "Edwards v. Arkansas Department of Human Services" concerning Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure; and "Gill v. State" related to conviction for criminal negligence.

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Law & Society/Revue Canadienne Droit et Societe (Cambridge University Press) is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

'Attempted negligence' is a category of criminal offense that many jurists and philosophers have law have deemed conceptually incoherent. In his Attempts: In the Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law, Gideon Yaffe challenges this dismissal, anchoring his argument in cases of what he calls 'mental self-management' in which agents plan to bring about that they perform unintentional actions at a later time. He plausibly argues that mental self-management-type attempted negligence is possible. However, his account raises the question whether such attempts can be successful: whether, in other words, attempts to perform unintentional actions at a later time could issue in actions that are, indeed, unintentional. Intuitively, at least, it would seem that we should answer in the affirmative. However, that answer poses problems for a plausible and widely-held account of intentional action. Al Mele, responding to Yaffe's account, has pointed out this problem without, I think, providing a satisfactory resolution. I propose another way of vindicating the possibility of successful attempted negligence with small, if significant, revision to the standard view of intentional action. In these cases, I argue, agents fail to act intentionally because they render themselves, through their acts of self-management, unaware that they are successfully executing their intentions. Moreover, I argue that these agents' intentions to bring about that they perform unintentional actions do not commit them to acting intentionally because of the nature of intentions to bring about actions. I offer an account of the intention to bring about that one A's and defend it against some objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One proposed way of preserving the link between criminal negligence and blameworthiness is to define criminal negligence in moral terms. On this view, a person can be held criminally responsible for a negligent act if her negligence reflects a deficit of moral concern. Some theorists are convinced that this definition restores the link between negligence and blameworthiness, while others insist that criminal negligence remains suspect. This article contributes to the discussion by applying the work of ethicist Nomy Arpaly to criminal negligence. Although not interested in legal issues herself, Arpaly has a well-developed theory of moral agency that explains moral concern in terms of responsiveness to moral reasons. Introducing her work to the ongoing scholarly debate will be helpful for two reasons. First, while a definition of negligence in terms of moral concern is recognized as one proposed solution to the negligence–blameworthiness problem, authors promoting it have yet to give a systematic account of moral concern and its relation to blame. Borrowing Arpaly's account will help clarify the idea of moral concern so that both proponents and critics of a concern approach to negligence can have a better-defined debate. Second, her theory of blameworthiness is especially suited to defending the blameworthiness of negligent actions, because it does not have recourse to a special quality of choice or self-control that must be active to render conduct blameworthy. To make this second advantage clear, the article argues that reliance on choice or self-control problematizes blameworthiness for negligence. Those who wish to defend blameworthiness for negligent acts should base their work on an account of moral agency that does not rely on either choice or self-control to explain when an action is blameworthy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article offers information on the history, drawbacks and legal reforms to prosecution of manslaughter by criminal negligence of physicians in various jurisdictions in Australia. It discusses the case of Jayant Patel, the Director of Surgery at Bundaberg Base Hospital, Queensland, which reflects prosecutorial failure of the criminal justice system of Australia to address the fraud charges associated with deaths.

Medical profession differentiates itself from other professions, where apart from the knowledge and skill, touch of humanity is also required. Since the inclusion of medical profession under the ambit of Consumer Protection Act there has been a spurt in the number of cases against the doctors. Bolam's test is applied to assess medical negligence of doctor. Cases against the doctors can be brought in a civil or criminal court, and accordingly the negligence may be civil or criminal negligence. In deciding criminal negligence against doctors criminal intent need to be proved. The Medical Law and Ethical Code for medical professional in India are prescribed by Indian Medical Council, under the section 20-A of Indian Medical Council Act of 1956 and Amendment Act No. 24 of 1964. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dental profession holds a special level of trust with the patients; the profession makes a commitment to patient that they will adhere to high ethical standard of conduct. In recent times the dental profession is under attack by litigation cases by disgruntled patients who are not satisfied by the treatment. The dissatisfaction can be resolved between patients and doctors but sometimes patient turn to courts to get the matter solved. A litigation case against a dentist causes loss of reputation, loss of income, harassment, mental agony and embarrassment in the society. Hence, to protect oneself from such type of suffering the dentist should have an idea about the rules and regulation guiding their profession, the law and litigation pertaining to their practice and standard protocols to follow to avoid the malpractice cases. The data gathered for this review article was from manual and internet search of records. The following review article provides basic information on ethical principles, dental negligence and related liabilities, case reports and how to make dental treatment more qualitative and accountable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the lawsuit HKSAR v. Lai Shui Yin related to gross negligence manslaughter (GNM) in Hong Kong, China. Topics discussed include importance of mens rea in issues related to GNM, imposition of mandatory lengthy sentences in the cases of GNM, and issues of recklessness associated with GNM in comparison to gross negligence.

This Article empirically tests two key questions. First: How sensitive are jurors to variations in the language that delineates the criminal mental state categories? Second: To what extent do jurors assign culpability in the manner assumed by the Model Penal Code (MPC)? In prior work, we challenged numerous assumptions underlying the MPC mental state architecture, which divides guilty minds into four kinds: purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent. Our experiments showed that subjects had profound difficulty categorizing some of the mental states, particularly recklessness, in the context of scenarios in which hypothetical actors caused harmful results. And, when asked to punish hypothetical actors, subjects punished knowing behavior and reckless behavior indistinguishably. Here, we extend our prior work in two main ways. First, we show that a person's ability to apply the MPC mental states is susceptible to subtle variations in the language that defines and communicates them. For instance, we demonstrate that using slightly different wording can significantly improve participants' ability to accurately identify the mental state of recklessness (notwithstanding that reckless and knowing mental states remain by far the hardest to classify). Second, we show that even when people can see the mental state distinctions that the MPC draws, they don't necessarily rank order the mental states--by culpability level--in the order the MPC assumes. These findings raise questions about the normative basis for the knowing/reckless distinction in the MPC's mental state hierarchy in the context of result elements. Further, because even small changes in phrasing can produce significant differences in juror evaluation, the findings raise genuine concerns about the adequacy of MPC-based culpability instructions in criminal cases. Our results suggest the need for a critical reexamination of the substantial divide between the expectations and assumptions of drafters of criminal codes, on one hand, and empirical reality, on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses corporate criminal liability and crimes such as price fixing which are committed by corporate senior officers in Canada as of January 2014, focusing on criminal negligence and the corporate liability provisions of Canada's Criminal Code. The vicarious liability legal principle is mentioned, along with several criminal law cases involving entities such as Metron Construction Corp. and Pétroles Global Inc. Corporate compliance systems and agency law are also examined.

The article focuses on the judiciary enforcement of the law on the decision of deterrent penalties to be inflicted on corporations liable for workplace-related criminal negligence.

The article discusses the changes in the Singapore law on occupiers' liability with the recent Court of Appeal decision in Toh Siew Kee v. Ho Ah Lam Ferrocement (Pte) Ltd. It discusses the two changes in the law including no longer a distinction between invitees and licensees and occupiers' liability under the tort of negligence. It discusses the High Court's decision in which the Justice Woo Bih Li dismissed all the claims related to See Toh (C.A.).

James Badenoch QC asks whether it is right that members of the medical profession should be subject to litigation when things go wrong. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In standard models on negligence rules, due care levels can be used for fine-tuning the care levels of potential injurers, and there are good arguments why care levels should vary among different fields. We extend the analysis of the impact of due care on care actually chosen to situations where damages depend on sales prices. This is the case for many contractual relationships, but also for damages on capital markets which are usually calculated as the difference between share prices paid and share prices after the adverse information becomes public. In a model with errors in court, we show that tighter negligence standards may even reduce care levels chosen by potential injurers under reasonable circumstances. Due to this counter-intuitive effect, negligence standards can hardly be applied for fine-tuning the care levels of potential injurers when damages depend on prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the calls for the introduction of the offense of corporate manslaughter in the Pike River coal mine disaster that occurred on November 19, 2010 in Greymouth, New Zealand. Topics include the reformation of the corporate liability framework in New Zealand and the organizational fault model.

Objectives: This paper is a critical evaluation of the compensation system for personal injury tort in Nigeria. The present compensation system under the law of tort leaves many victims of personal injury uncompensated in Nigeria. This stems from many factors, including the fact that traditional tort theory of no liability without fault has continued to be the principal basis for liability. This is in spite of the heavy criticisms of the tort regime as an ineffective mode of compensation. Through an analytical assessment of selected core heads of claims in tort, the paper reveals the inadequacy in the foundations of tort law and its regulation of claims for personal injury in Nigeria. Implications: It finds that fault as the primary foundation of tort law in Nigeria creates a large volume of uncompensated plaintiffs, who, without an efficient alternative social security to fall upon, have to personally bear their losses. In the light of this, the paper uses examples from other jurisdictions to recommend that tort law in Nigeria is in need of more legislative intervention. Value: The paper recommends that the provision of a sustainable compensation system for personal injury is imperative for social justice in Nigeria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article compares laws related to the liability in negligence for third party criminal acts in the U.S. and Australia, as of May 2013. Topics discussed include High Court of Australia in the case 'Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty. Ltd. v Anzil;' the U.S. court case 'MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company' and 'Donoghue v. Stevenson;' and Australian and American common law on liability for criminal acts of third parties.

A sample exam for law students in Germany concerning various aspects of German criminal law, including traffic violations, possession of stolen property, and negligence, is presented.

The article presents the author's views on the number of cases related to corporate manslaughter. The author, on going through a study of corporate manslaughter cases, found that there was a strong prima facie case for prosecuting about 40 cases of corporate manslaughter a year. The author insists the main obstacles to prosecution include a lack of resources and political will to prosecute, as well as a lack of training and legal understanding of how the law applied to corporate defendants.

Copyright of Socialinių Mokslų Studijos is the property of Mykolas Romeris University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The author examines the impact of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, which came into effect in April 2008. He analyzes the decision of the Manchester Crown Court in R v Lion Steel Equipment Ltd., which indicates worrying clues about the manner in which courts will approach the imposition of fines. The author also discusses other court cases which covered the issue of level of fines.

Copyright of Turkish Journal of Police Studies / Polis Bilimleri Dergisi is the property of Turkish National Police Academy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses federal criminal law amendments and presents a summary of criminal cases which were appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada prior to December 7, 2012, including legal matters dealing with topics such as Canada's Motor Vehicle Act, criminal negligence, and dangerous driving. In the case R v. Dineley, the court addressed amendments to the nation's Criminal Code, breathalyzer tests, and defendant Dineley's constitutional rights under the laws of Canada.

Copyright of Collected Papers of the Faculty of Law in Split / Zbornik Radova Pravnog Fakulteta u Splitu is the property of Split Faculty of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In chapter 6 of Attempts, Gideon Yaffe defends the thesis that it is 'possible to attempt crimes of negligence' (, p. 173). I am persuaded that he is right about this, provided that 'attempt crimes of negligence' is read as (potentially misleading) shorthand for 'attempt to bring it about that we commit crimes of negligence.' But I find certain parts of his defense unpersuasive. My discussion of those parts of his argument motivates the following thesis: Not only can one attempt to bring it about that one commits a crime of negligence, but the attempt can be successful as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Qualifying the automobile as a dangerous instrument is linked to the ‘responsibilization’ and the criminalization of individual negligent drivers in the United States. One case—State v. Fitzgerald (1978)—is selected to illustrate this particular process. The use of the dangerous instrument argument lowers the threshold of criminal liability from gross to ordinary negligence and offers judicial ground to increase the degree of culpability for negligent homicide. My argument is twofold. First, I claim that the criminalization of negligent driving points to a process whereby the motor vehicle and the negligent driver co-constitute one another. Second, I contend that criminalizing negligent driving is related to the emergence of a specific class of risks: circumstantial risks. I conclude by pushing for a Tardian turn in criminology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]