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Byline: Gary Schmitt When you are in a fight and have your opponent down on the pavement with your boot on his neck, the last thing you want to do [...]

George Will, the longtime syndicated columnist and TV pundit, has rarely been accused of being a 'dove' but in a new column published Tuesday he calls for a U.S. troop [...]

I probably failed to watch the late Walter Cronkite's most important TV news moment: his landmark February 1968 CBS commentary (so out of character) after returning from Vietnam in which [...]

OBAMA's WAR You might agree with the president that Afghanistan is the war we should have been fighting all along. You might agree with the prevailing military wisdom, that what [...]

IN the final days of 2006, Iraq seemed like a lost cause. The second of two U.S. security crackdowns in Baghdad had failed, with insurgents moving back into 'cleared' neighborhoods […]

The US services have never consented on one system for measuring successes and failures in the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq. The National Intelligence Council produced a study on this issue, which stated that a coherent system should be adopted, that would help the U.S. forces to react faster and effectively to various challenges.

The article discusses that there is an increasing need for preparedness by the U.S. for counterinsurgency operations globally, as can be seen from the recent invasion of Georgia by Russia. But doubts still continue over whether a major buildup of counterinsurgency capabilities will help tackle new and emerging threats to the U.S.

The article discusses the Colombian model of counterinsurgency operations. The main aspect of the Colombian model is the investing of U.S. funds, expertise and technology rather than a massive troop commitment as a means of helping friendly governments.

The article discusses the new Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which incorporates the need for military commanders to understand the social codes, rituals and power relationships of the societies they are fighting. They have been asked to seek the assistance of anthropologists to gain a better understanding of the culture as in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The article traces the history of counterinsurgency operations right from when they first started. Some of the counterinsurgency operations conducted by U.S. forces to help in foreign conflicts are highlighted.

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs), effectively used by insurgents against the coalition forces in Iraq, have necessitated a counter-IED fight. The Army's 555th Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) conducts the counter-IED fight by breaking down the fight into fundamentals, identifying the seams and gaps that exist and closing them through proper intelligence, and utilization of force structure.

A brigade-level military transition team's (MiTT) campaign, called the Optics Campaign, is discussed to assess an Iraqi brigade headquarters (BDE HQ) and transition it from a newly formed HQ into one that is capable of conducting partnered counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. A baseline plan, consisting of four phases of the campaign, is provided that would enable the MiTT to render the HQ comprising of an Iraqi Army (IA) unit into an operational one.

Persistent violence by insurgents and foreign fighters in the western province of Al Anbar in Iraq has severely hampered development work in the region. A batch of construction projects, both civic works and military projects, are expected to enable stabilization efforts in the province, likely through economic advantages for the local communities.

Operation Iraqi Freedom is entering a phase where the transition of operations to the Iraqi local government and the Iraqi Army is of priority, even as the remaining insurgency must be combated. It is essential to equip the Iraqi Army for self-sufficiency in gathering and decentralization of intelligence to the company level, whereby productive intelligence can be ensured and enhanced by passing intelligence information laterally at the small unit level instead of vertically.

The Marine Corps intelligence system in Iraq is not equipped to fight an insurgency and hence simple changes in the training of Marines and the Iraqi Army are proposed. Marine Corps, specifically rifle companies, must adapt to intelligence needs based on individuals, small groups and networks that would enable effective combat operations in an insurgency.