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North Korea's missile launch in August 1998 represented a continued DPRK threat to regional stability, but progress was made in addressing security concerns through engagement. Arguably, the US and South Korea have derived key policy lessons: the need to employ balanced policies of engagement and containment and balanced use of economic and military power; the value of coordination of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral strategies towards the North; the importance of keeping Japan on board the engagement strategy as a major long-term source of economic assistance to the North. This paper argues that Tokyo abandoned a balanced approach in each of the key policy lessons and shifted erratically between dialogue and deterrence. The result was to create Japan-US and Japan-ROK friction and threaten to undermine the Perry process. Major lessons: Japan's concerns about North Korea have quickened the remilitarization of its security policy; its continued security concerns may lead it to abandon again t...

The abiding impression of Japan's involvement in and response to the East Asian currency crisis is one of sorry failure. Japan stands accused of purveying a defective developmental state model of growth to the East Asian states--over-dependent for its functioning upon exports, inflows of capital, and lack of transparency in governance--and then proceeding to undermine this model due to its own domestic economic difficulties and neglect of the economic welfare of other countries in the region. In addition to triggering the onset of the crises, Japan is also believed to be culpable for prolonging them by providing inappropriate economic leadership in the region--represented most clearly by its failed proposal for the AMF and its reluctance to stimulate its domestic economy and act as the primary "absorber" of East Asian exports. As a consequence, Japan's position of economic dominance and nascent political leadership role in the region is seen to be under attack following the currency crises. This research paper, whilst agreeing that Japan has not necessarily provided effective crisis management or short term rescue packages for East Asia, attempts to re-evaluate some of the criticisms of Japan's role and argues that over the longer term Japan is continuing to exercise considerable covert economic leadership in the region. Examination of Japanese policy-makers' perceptions of the East Asian crisis reveals that they see the region as hit above all by currency crises which have transmuted into economic ones, but that the basic model of export and FDI-powered growth in the region is still fundamentally sound. Moreover, Japanese policy-makers contend that Japan is neither responsible for the occurrence of the crises, nor are the U.S.-prescribed solutions of the expansion of domestic demand in Japan likely to hold the key to the immediate restoration of growth in East Asia. Instead, they quietly lay the blame for the crises upon China for undercutting the competitiveness of East Asian exports and moving ahead of the NIES-4 in the regional production cycle. Hence, Japanese policy-makers have acted to support the IMF in its approach to eliminating speculative bubbles and restoring good financial management in the region, but have directed their own efforts to attempts to re-gear the existing developmental model through the extension of trade and financial credits, and the technology necessary to improve the competitiveness of East Asian exports and to enable these economies to move up the production chain. The paper then moves on to show how these policies have gradually begun to work in Japan's favor, as it has been able to restore a measure of confidence in Japanese economic leadership, to slow the onslaught of convergence theory on the East Asian developmental model, and to set its own agendas in multilateral approaches to the crises. Hence the final outcome of the economic crisis in East Asia may actually be the strengthening of the Japanese model of capitalism, the position of Japanese corporations, and developmental state model, rather than the defeat of these actors and concepts as many commentators have predicted.

Events such as the Aum Shinrikyo's sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1994 have placed terrorism at the top of the post‐Cold War security agenda and have caused policy makers to sense qualitative change and new dangers in the terrorist threat to industrialised societies. By examining the case of the Aum Shinrikyo and comparing it in detail with Japanese terrorism during the Cold War period, this article demonstrates that terrorism has indeed undergone qualitative change in the 1990s due to terrorism's enhanced non‐specificity, expansion in destructive potential, greater erosion of the barriers between internal and external security, and ability to corrode the legitimacy of existing security institutions. The article then goes on to argue that Aum's characteristics as a terrorist phenomenon reflect the nature of the post‐Cold War security agenda as a whole, and that the policy lesson of the Tokyo subway attack is that, in the 1990s, in order for security institutions to detect new security chall...

The nature of security on the Korean Peninsula has undergone fundamental change in the post‐Cold War period, characterized by the growing recognition on the part of the major regional powers that there is a need for economic as well as military approaches to security and conflict avoidance. The chief manifestation of this trend is the emergence of the US Department of State's ‘soft landing’ and other engagement policies as attempts to resolve North Korean security threats. Some commentators have seen the soft‐landing policy as an opportunity for Japan to use its economic power to contribute to regional and international security. This article examines the evolution and rationale of the soft‐landing policy, how Japanese policy‐makers evaluate its potential as a solution to the North Korean security problem and the current extent of Japan's contribution to it. The article also points out the‐limitations of Japanese support for the soft landing due to international restrictions on the Japanese government's room for diplomatic manoeuvre, domestic political obstacles to engaging North Korea and the general lack of Japanese private business interest in the North. Finally the conclusion shows that, despite the recognition of the need to engage North Korea economically, Japanese policy‐makers have devoted their energies principally to the redefinition of the US‐Japan military alliance based on the legitimacy of the North Korean threat.

(1996). The North Korean nuclear crisis and Japanese security. Survival: Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 79-103.

In the post‐cold war period, the security situation in the Asia‐Pacific region and in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia is undergoing a transformation with the emergence for the first time of multilateral security dialogue. One of the most striking features of this transformation is Japan's new role as a sponsor of multilateral security dialogue in the early 1990s. Japanese policymakers are also working to create security and defence linkages with Asian nations at the subregional level. Evidence gathered from diverse sources reveals that the Japanese Defence Agency and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are experiencing varied success in extending these types of linkages to the ASEAN nations, South Korea and China. Linkages with the ASEAN nations have been slow to emerge but look set to progress further as suspicion lessens of Japan's role in Southeast Asian security, and as Japan's role in peacekeeping expands. Remarkable progress has been made between Japan and South Korea in establishing security and defence linkages, and the strategic uncertainties of the instability of North Korea and the commitment of the US to Northeast Asia look likely to push Japan and South Korea towards closer co‐operation on security matters. By contrast, Japan's repeated efforts to involve China in a closer dialogue on security have met with limited success, and immediate progress is hampered by the issues of missile and nuclear testing, Chinese attempts to intimidate Taiwan with military exercises in late 1995 and early 1996, and, more generally, the problem of ‘transparency’ in security relations. Indeed, the evidence from Japan's attempts to create subregional security and defence linkages suggests that the most crucial factor in the success of this policy is the existence of a degree of ‘transparency’ in relations between Japan and the ASEAN nations, South Korea and China.

Part 1: What is Security? Introduction 1.1 National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol Arnold Wolfers 1.2 Redefining Security Richard Ullman 1.3 The National Security Problem in International Relations Barry Buzan 1.4 The Concept of Security David Baldwin 1.5 Security and Emancipation Ken Booth 1.6 Feminism and Security J. Ann Tickner 1.7 The Third World and Security Studies Amitav Acharya 1.8 Redefining Security (2) Jessica Tuchman Matthews 1.9 Human Security Roland Paris 1.10 The Renaissance of Security Studies Stephen M. Walt 1.11 Securitisation Ole Waever Part 2: Security Paradigms Introduction 2.1 The Nemesis of Utopianism E. H. Carr 2.2 A Realist Theory of International Politics Hans J. Morgenthau 2.3 The Concept of Order in World Politics Hedley Bull 2.4 Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power Kenneth N. Waltz 2.5 Cooperation under the Security Dilemma Robert Jervis 2.6 The False Promise of International Institutions John J. Mearsheimer 2.7 Economics and the Moral Case for War Norman Angell 2.8 Neoliberal Institutionalism Robert Keohane 2.9 Democratic Peace Michael W. Doyle 2.10 Neo-Kantian Perspective Bruce Russett 2.11 The Social Construction of Power Politics Alexander Wendt 2.12 Norms, Identity and National Security Thomas U. Berger Part 3: Security Dimensions and Issues Introduction 3.1 Nuclear Deterrence Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein 3.2 Arms Races Barry Buzan and Eric Herring 3.3 Nuclear Proliferation Scott Sagan 3.4 New Military Conflict Lawrence Freedman 3.5 Technology and War Michael O'Hanlon 3.6 Resources and Conflict Thomas Homer-Dixon 3.7 Migration and Security Myron Weiner 3.8 Transnational Crime and Security Phil Williams 3.9 AIDS/HIV and Security P. W. Singer 3.10 Economics and Security Jonathan Kirshner Part 4: Security Frameworks and Actors Introduction 4.1 The Long Peace John Lewis Gaddis 4.2 The Unipolar Illusion Christopher Layne 4.3 Alliance Politics Glenn Snyder 4.4. Alliance Futures Stephen M. Walt 4.5 Multilateralism John Gerard Ruggie 4.6 Regimes Robert Jervis 4.7 Security Communities Emanuel Adler 4.8 Interventionism Adam Roberts 4.9 Economic Sanctions Robert A. Pape 4.10 Private Military Companies David Shearer Part 5: The Future of Security Introduction 5.1 Security in the Twenty First Century Barry Buzan 5.2 Instability in Europe? John J. Mearsheimer 5.3 Security Dilemmas in East Asia? Thomas J. Christensen 5.4 Structural Realism Redux Kenneth N. Waltz 5.5 Security and Global Transformation Ken Booth 5.6 Globalisation and Security Victor D. Cha 5.7 Terrorism Walter Laqueur 5.8 The War on Terrorism Michael Howard

Japan's security trajectory, in the period following the administration of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō, has once again come into question. Japan under Koizumi's administration demonstrated sta...

The events of 11 September 2001 revealed that the nature of political violence has radically changed under globalization, while the launch of a 'war on terror' has generated important ethical and human rights issues. At the same time, the key but often invisible role played by translation and translators of all sorts in mediating conflict has become the object of new critical attention. This book focuses on the relationship between globalization, political violence and translation, developing new interdisciplinary perspectives and generating novel lines of debate for globalization research. Written by leading scholars in a wide range of disciplines (ranging from law, philosophy, politics and sociology to media studies and translation studies) the book provides key theoretical insights into the globalization of violence and the role of translation in this context, while also incorporating detailed empirical analyses of media representations and translators' accounts.

Globalization’s complicity in the generation of international security issues clearly demands academic and policy investigation. For sure, there have been a number of initial studies that have attempted to link the effects of globalization with insecurity (Clark 1999;Cha 2000;Hughes 2001, 2002;Kaldor 1999;Coker 2002;Scholte 2000: 279–315). This volume has now added to this emerging literature by providing key insights into the ‘globalization-political violence-security nexus’ from the pioneering and interdisciplinary perspective of translation studies. The objective of this concluding chapter is to offer some further political science/international relations takes on the interlinkages between globalization and political violence, and to consider some areas of crossover with translation studies as revealed in this volume.

The relationship between global governance and regionalization is fraught with ambiguity. Understanding regionalization in this context requires an understanding of its relationship, and reactive condition, with both the constellations of global governance and globalization. This book presents an overview and explores the distinctive but intersecting trajectories of regionalization and global governance. It surveys: the theoretical debates the economic dimensions: multinationals, trade and investment, and labour the security considerations: armed conflict, conflict prevention and peacekeeping and non-traditional security in Asia the governing structures: managing contemporary multilevel architecture and cultural policy, leadership and the L-20. The expert and multi-disciplinary editors and contributors survey the context as well as the general character of these projects, together with their links as both parallel mediating mechanisms and distinctive choices for interjecting governance into globalization. Examining these projects in tandem amplifies their importance and enables the contributors to tease out coincidental as well as alternative possibilities in policy direction.

Japan, in responding to US expectations for support in the 'war on terror', has displayed a degree of strategic convergence on global security objectives, thus prompting policy-makers and observers to dub it the 'Great Britain of the Far East'. This article argues, however, that Japan is far from assuming this role. For Japan, the 'war on terror' serves more as a political pretext for legitimating long-planned changes in military security policy that are often only marginally related to the US's anti-terrorism agenda. Instead, Japan has focused much more on using the terror threat rationale as a means to push forward its response to the regional and traditional security challenges of North Korea and China, even if at times it attempts to depict both as 'new security challenges' or as involving elements of counterterrorism. The final conclusion is that US military hegemony may be weakened by Japan's and the Asia-Pacific's potential divergence from the US global security agenda.

This article seeks to make sense of the policy debate on constitutional revision underway in Japan, to consider what international and domestic factors are driving the debate forward, to assess the range of proposals currently on the table, and to gauge the likelihood of actual constitutional change. Additionally, it considers how various forms of constitutional revision, if actually implemented, might affect Japan's military doctrines and capabilities; the extent of its alliance cooperation with the United States; its devotion of military capabilities to un operations; and the repercussions for Japan's regional relations in East Asia.