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WOS:000289715000006 (Nº de Acesso Web of Science) “Prémio Científico ISCTE-IUL 2012” In coalition government, the relationship between parties and ministers is one of double delegation: from the party to the minister and from the coalition of parties to the individual minister. On the basis of principal—agent theory, I argue that a coalition agreement is a tool used by coalition parties to reduce agency loss when delegating to ministers. In six governments in Belgium, Italy and The Netherlands, I show that: a majority of the pledges were transferred into cabinet decisions, a majority of cabinet decisions were effectively constrained by the coalition agreement and that one-third of cabinet decisions had been precisely defined beforehand in the document. Interestingly, the length of the coalition agreement, the entry of party leaders to government and the number of ministers participating in the negotiations do not seem to have had a significant influence on the above two measurements.

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Is informal governance the rule or the exception in day-to-day EU politics? What can explain variation in the use of this practice? Is it a good or a bad thing? These are fascinating questions, and...

Introduction Luis de Sousa and Catherine Moury 1. Building Europe for Future Generations - Achievements and New Tasks of the European Union Pat Cox 2. How to govern the ever larger European Union? Jan Zielonka 3. The rules of change in the European Union: the lost balance between rigidity and flexibility Bruno de Witte 4. Where to look for legitimacy Miguel Maduro 5. The European Citizenship: Ideals, Reality and Problems Maurizio Cotta and Pierangelo Isernia 6. Democratization of the EU Philippe Schmitter 7. The Invisible Transformation of Codecision: Problems of Democratic Legitimacy Adrienne Heritier and Henry Farrel 8. Europe and the challenge of a non-State democracy Yves Meny Conclusion Catherine Moury

In this article, I look at the dialectic between parties and government to understand the extent to which ministers are bound by the coalition agreement. I first observe that considering the coalition agreement as a contract written by the parties for the government to avoid “agency losses” is an oversimplification. In almost all cases the main ministers have participated in the negotiations, with, or as, party leaders. I also observe that the government follows to a large extent the coalition agreement in Belgium and in the Netherlands and also, although to a lesser extent in Italy, in where the coalition agreement are drafted before the elections. Moreover, if ministers have to fulfil the coalition agreement, they will do it better if they have participated in its draft. The transfer of the program only tells one part of the extent to which ministers are bound by the coalition agreement: measuring the proportion of ministerial decision based on the coalition agreement is also significant. The results of this measurement enlighten once more the importance of the coalition agreement for ministers, as at least one third (and up to two thirds) of the governmental bills originate in the coalition agreement. We observe much more variation on this second dimension and the crucial variable explaining a high proportion of agreement-based decisions is the absence of party leaders in the government. This finding suggests that party leaders will tend to accept more non agreement-based ministerial initiatives when they are themselves ministers. Neste artigo, analiso a relação entre os partidos e o governo, procurando perceber a extensão da vinculação dos ministros a acordos de coligação. Primeiro observo que considerar os acordos de coligação como um contrato escrito entre partidos em proveito do governo com intuito de evitar “perdas agenciais” é uma banalização. Na maioria dos casos, os principais ministros participam nas negociações, a par, ou enquanto líderes de partido. Observo também que o governo cumpre em larga medida os acordos de coligação na Bélgica e na Holanda. Em Itália também, embora com menor expressão, sendo de mencionar que neste país a redacção dos acordos de coligação se faz antes das eleições. Não é de menosprezar, em caso de cumprimento do acordo de coligação por parte dos ministros, que esta será encadeada se os mesmos participarem activamente na sua redacção. A transferência do programa revela apenas uma parte do vínculo dos ministros ao acordo de coligação: é igualmente significativo medir a proporção da decisão ministerial com base nos acordos de coligação. Os resultados obtidos a partir dessa análise esclarecem uma vez mais a importância dos acordos de coligação, para os ministros e atendo ao facto de um terço (até dois terços) das contas públicas e propostas governamentais derivarem de acordos de coligação. Deparamo-nos com variações muito mais acentuadas nesta segunda dimensão, assim como as variáveis cruciais que explicam a maior proporção de decisões com base em acordos se deve à ausência de líderes de partido no governo. Deste modo, os resultados sugerem que os líderes partidários revelam maior tendência a não adoptar iniciativas ministeriais com base em acordos, quando são eles próprios ministros. Cet article analyse les rapports entre les partis et le gouvernement, afin de comprendre à quel point les ministres sont liés par les accords de coalition. Il commence par observer qu’il est banal de considérer les accords de coalition comme un contrat écrit entre partis au profit du gouvernement dans le but d’éviter les “pertes agentielles”. Dans la plupart des cas, les principaux ministres participent aux négociations avec les leaders des partis ou en tant que leaders eux-mêmes. L’auteur constate également que le gouvernement respecte en grande partie les accords de coalition en Belgique et aux Pays-Bas, ainsi qu’en Italie, même si c’est un peu moins (dans ce pays, les accords de coalition sont rédigés avant les élections). Il ne faut pas négliger le fait qu’en cas d’exécution de l’accord de coalition par les ministres, celle-ci sera mise en œuvre s’ils ont participé activement à sa rédaction. Le transfert du programme révèle seulement une partie de l’engagement des ministres par l’accord de coalition: il est aussi important de mesurer le pourcentage de décisions ministérielles fondées sur les accords de coalition. Les résultats obtenus à partir de cette analyse révèlent une fois de plus l’importance des accords de coalition pour les ministres, dans la mesure où un tiers (voire deux tiers) des comptes publics et des projets gouvernementaux dérivent d’accords de coalition. On observe des variations beaucoup plus accentuées dans cette seconde dimension et les variables cruciales relevées expliquent le plus grand pourcentage de décisions fondées sur ces accords, lorsque les leaders des partis ne sont pas au gouvernement. Les résultats suggèrent que les leaders des partis ont tendance à ne pas prendre d’initiatives ministérielles fondées sur les accords lorsqu’ils sont eux-mêmes ministres. En este artículo analizo la relación entre los partidos y el gobierno, procurando entender la extensión de la vinculación de los ministros y acuerdos de coligación. En primer lugar, se observa que la consideración de los acuerdos de coligación como un contrato escrito entre partidos en provecho del gobierno con la intención de evitar “pérdidas en la capacidad de acción” es una banalización. En la mayoría de los casos, los principales ministros participan en las negociaciones, a la par, o mientras son líderes del partido. Observo también que el gobierno cumple en gran medida los acuerdos de coligación en Bélgica y Holanda. En Italia también, pero con menor expresión, siendo importante mencionar que en este país la redacción de los acuerdos de coligación se hace antes de las elecciones. Es importante mencionar que en caso de cumplimiento del acuerdo de coligación por parte de los ministros que esta será inter-ligada si los mismos participaran activamente en su redacción. La transferencia del programa revela sólo una parte del vínculo de los ministros al acuerdo de coligación: es igualmente significativo medir la proporción de la decisión ministerial con base en los acuerdos de coligación. Los resultados obtenidos a partir de este análisis esclarecen una vez más la importancia de los acuerdos de coligación, para los ministros y entendiendo el hecho de que un tercio (hasta dos tercios) de las cuentas públicas y propuestas gubernamentales se derivan de los acuerdos de coligación. Nos encontramos con variaciones más acentuadas en esta segunda dimensión, así como las variables cruciales que explican la mayor proporción de decisiones con base en acuerdos, se debe a la ausencia de líderes de partido en el gobierno. De este modo, los resultados sugieren que los líderes partidarios revelan una mayor tendencia a adoptar iniciativas ministeriales con base en acuerdos, cuando son ministros.

Argues that the hierarchical mode of governance has been rendered inadequate by enlargement and the EU should embrace more flexible, decentralised and soft modes of governance. Considers the complex relations between new member states such as Poland with their neighbours, and their opposition to strong centralisation of European foreign and security policies. Argues that if the existing, much-cricitized system for adopting foreign and security policies prevents the EU from becoming a global actor in these fields (with quick decision-making and rapid responses), it nevertheless creates conditions for deliberation and prevents the EU rushing to ill-conceived courses of action.

In this article we argue that that the delegation of implementing power to the Commission changes due to the fact that, under co-decision, two legislators (the Council and the EP) must agree to delegate. We first show that, with the introduction of co-decision in environmental policy, the legislators have relied more extensively on delegation. This indicates that the EP and the Council sought to save the political transaction costs associated with detailed legislation.. Moreover, the finding that increased delegation preceded the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty shows that the Council – anticipating its relative loss of power by having to share legislative power with the EP - was in a rush to delegate as much as possible to the Commission before the entry into force of co-decision. This is in accordance with a redistributive power-based bargaining argument according to which the Council prefers to delegate to the Commission, over which it has some control through comitology rather than sharing the legislative power with the EP. We also claimed that with increasing formal powers in comitology the EP will less oppose delegation. Our results support this hypothesis, but call for some qualification: the EP opposes delegation less, if the increase in competences is important. If, however, it is only minor, it does not lead to less opposition to comitology. Quite the contrary, the EP appears to be prompted to systematically introduce amendments to restrict the scope of delegation. Which in turn may be used as a leverage in future negotiations over the revising of the rules governing comitology.

ElectoralchangeshavelefttheirmarkinthecoalitionpoliticsofBelgiumandthe Netherlands. In the late 1960s, the lines of loyalty between parties andvoters started to unravel, and the tension in government coalitions betweencooperationandconflictbecamemoremanifest(Andeweg,1988;Deschouwer,1994). Electoral competition fed mistrust, and conflicts between coalitionpartiesbecameafrequentcauseofgovernmenttermination(Mu¨llerandStrom,2000,586).Theneedforaworkablemodusvivendiforpartiesinofficetogetherled to a practice of negotiating coalition agreements during governmentformation. These agreements, written by party prominents under a veil ofsecrecy, became comprehensive documents containing substantive andprocedural deals over a broad range of issues, most importantly issues thatwerecontroversial(Mu¨llerandStrom,2000;Timmermans,2003).Asinothercountries with multiparty governments, coalition agreements were meant tohelpcontaincontroversy(Klingemannetal.,1994;Keman,2002;Timmermans,2003).Despiteongoingelectoralchangesandincreasingvolatility,thelongevityofgovernments in Belgium and the Netherlands has increased, particularlyin the last 15 years. In both countries, governments reached the end oftheir legal term in office more often than before.

Cette contribution vise a comprendre pourquoi le caractere complet et / ou precis de l’accord de coalition varie dans quatre pays europeens (Belgique, Pays-Bas, Italie et France). La methode des Ensembles flous (Fuzzy sets) est appropriee pour ce faire, vu le caractere exploratoire de la recherche, car elle permet le necessaire dialogue entre idees et preuves. Les resultats suggerent qu’il convient de considerer la redaction de l’accord comme un jeu a deux niveaux: entre les partis mais aussi entre le gouvernement et les partis qui le soutiennent.

UID/CPO/04627/2013 This paper presents an in-depth case study of governmental decision-making in Portugal from 2010 to 2015. To obtain a full understanding of what really happened behind the closed doors of international meetings, we triangulated different types of data: face-to-face interviews with policy-makers, international lenders and Trade Union representatives; investigations by journalists; and IMF and EU official documents. Lastly, we analyze the official discourses of both the former and current Prime Ministers. We show that the sovereign debt crisis and the bailout have strengthened executives’ independence from other national actors. The perceived need for ‘credibility’ to avoid a ‘negative’ reaction from the markets - later associated with the conditions of the bailout - concurrently gave the executives a legitimate justification to concentrate power in their hands and a strong argument to counter the opponents of their proposed reforms. Consequently, Portuguese ministers– when they favored policies that were in congruence with those supported by international actors – were able to use the crisis to advance their own agenda. When they disagreed with Troika representatives, ministers and international lenders engaged in a negotiating process, the final outcome of which depended on the actors’ bargaining powers. Finally, contrary to what we expected, we did not find a strong gap between Prime Ministers’ official discourse and this state of affairs – thus showing limited evidence of discursive depolitization. publishersversion published

The drafting of a coalition agreement does represent a crucial arena for partners in parliamentary governments: it allows them to reach, even before the executive is in place, the necessary compromise (and eventually “package deals”) over a set of policies to implement, and on the content of the main laws to promote. The coalition agreement could also be more than a programmatic platform: defining, for instance, special rules to solve future intra-coalitional conflicts. A coalition agreement, thus, could play an extremely important role in limiting the transaction costs intrinsically related to the formation and implementation of important government (legislative) decisions. Being of exploratory nature, this paper wants to analyze the role of coalition agreements recently implemented by the Italian governments. In the first part, the literature about coalition agreements as a decision-making arena is presented. In the second part, the characteristics of the coalition agreements drafted by the Prodi I government (in 1996) and by the Berlusconi II government (in 2001) are then analyzed. In a final part, we present some empirical evidences on to what extent the coalition agreements drafted by these two governments have functioned as point of reference for the process of government decision making: to what extent the bills the Council of Ministers has approved and presented to the parliament are linked to the goals of the coalition agreement? And conversely: to what extent the pledges included in coalition agreements have been transferred into governmental decisions. And again, incidentally: does the drafting of a coalition agreement facilitate the adoption of significant legislation by the executive? And is this legislation also relatively more conflictual in parliament?

UID/CPO/04627/2013 SFRH/BD/86762/2012 IF/00926/2015 This project aims to shed light on the changes in political decision-making processes across Europe in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Crisis responses have challenged traditional parliamentary-democratic ideals such as accountability, representation and deliberation. As a result, taking a multi-disciplinary and comparative perspective, this project seeks to address the concentration of power, looking particularly at locations (arenas), processes (institutional and discursive) and long-term impact. publishersversion published

Argues that the hierarchical mode of governance has been rendered inadequate by enlargement and the EU should embrace more flexible, decentralised and soft modes of governance. Considers the complex relations between new member states such as Poland with their neighbours, and their opposition to strong centralisation of European foreign and security policies. Argues that if the existing, much-cricitized system for adopting foreign and security policies prevents the EU from becoming a global actor in these fields (with quick decision-making and rapid responses), it nevertheless creates conditions for deliberation and prevents the EU rushing to ill-conceived courses of action.