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The rate of erroneous conviction of innocent criminal defendants is often described as not merely unknown but unknowable. There is no systematic method to determine the accuracy of a criminal conviction; if there were, these errors would not occur in the first place. As a result, very few false convictions are ever discovered, and those that are discovered are not representative of the group as a whole. In the United States, however, a high proportion of false convictions that do come to light and produce exonerations are concentrated among the tiny minority of cases in which defendants are sentenced to death. This makes it possible to use data on death row exonerations to estimate the overall rate of false conviction among death sentences. The high rate of exoneration among death-sentenced defendants appears to be driven by the threat of execution, but most death-sentenced defendants are removed from death row and resentenced to life imprisonment, after which the likelihood of exoneration drops sharply. We use survival analysis to model this effect, and estimate that if all death-sentenced defendants remained under sentence of death indefinitely, at least 4.1% would be exonerated. We conclude that this is a conservative estimate of the proportion of false conviction among death sentences in the United States.

The U.S. Supreme Court addressed competency to be executed in Ford v. Wainwright, holding that execution of the insane violates the Eighth Amendment. More than 20 years later, the Court defined this standard in its landmark decision in Panetti v. Quarterman. The Panetti ruling held that an inmate's factual awareness of the reasons for his execution was not sufficient to determine his competence. The Court advised that a prisoner must have a rational understanding of the reasons for his death sentence. The Panetti Court declined to establish specific competency criteria and acknowledged that rational understanding is difficult to define. Following Ford and Panetti, lower courts have struggled to apply the standards articulated in these two landmark cases. This struggle was recently highlighted in Ferguson v. Florida (2013), a case that received substantial attention and was decided by the Florida Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court. Ferguson featured majority and concurring opinions that, although consistent in their ultimate conclusions, expressed differing interpretations of their application of the Panetti standard. Although the Panetti Court declined to set a national standard for competency to be executed, Ferguson v. Florida is a cautionary reminder that more tangible guidelines are necessary for consistent application of a conclusion that cannot be revised., (© 2014 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law.)

Empathy is related, directly or indirectly, to important elements in criminology such as the enactment of harsh penalties for repeat offenders, antisocial behavior, feelings of legitimacy toward the law, and attitudes toward the death penalty. Although empathy is beginning to find its way into criminological discourse, it is still not well understood nor often incorporated into quantitative research. This is likely due to issues regarding the conceptualization and measurement of empathy as well as the lack of measures of empathy incorporated into contemporary data sets. This study discusses the importance of empathy for criminology and uses a set of research examples to exemplify the relationships between empathy and outcomes important to criminology. Empathy emerges as an important predictor of criminal behavior, support for harsh laws, and perceptions of police effectiveness. Future research should incorporate measures of empathy when seeking to understand individual feelings and behaviors as they relate to important facets of criminology and criminal justice.

In October 2003 the Supreme Court of the United States allowed Arkansas officials to force Charles Laverne Singleton, a schizophrenic prisoner convicted of murder, to take drugs that would render him sane enough to be executed. On January 6 2004 he was killed by lethal injection, raising many ethical questions. By reference to the Singleton case, this article will analyse in both moral and legal terms the controversial justifications of the enforced medical treatment of death-row inmates. Starting with a description of the Singleton case, I will highlight the prima facie reasons for which this case is problematic and merits attention. Next, I will consider the justification of punishment in Western society and, in that context, the evolution of the notion of insanity in the assessment of criminal responsibility during the past two centuries, both in the US and the UK. In doing so, I will take into account the moral justification used to enforce treatment, looking at the conflict between the prisoner's right to treatment and his right to refuse medication where not justified by outcomes that can be reasonably expected to be positive for the individual. Finally, in contrast with some retributivist arguments in favour of enforced treatment to enable execution, I will propose a possible alternative, necessary if we are to consistently uphold the notion of autonomy.

Recent research with college undergraduate mock jurors suggests that how psychopathic they perceive a criminal defendant to be is a powerful predictor of whether they will support a death verdict in simulated capital murder trials. Perceived affective and interpersonal traits of psychopathy are especially predictive of support for capital punishment, with perceived remorselessness explaining a disproportionate amount of variance in these attitudes. The present study attempted to extend these findings with a more representative sample of community members called for jury duty (N = 304). Jurors reviewed a case vignette based on an actual capital murder trial, provided sentencing verdicts, and rated the defendant on several characteristics historically associated with the construct of psychopathy. Consistent with prior findings, remorselessness predicted death verdicts, as did the affective and interpersonal features of psychopathy - though the latter effect was more pronounced among jurors who were Caucasian and/or who described their political beliefs as moderate rather than conservative or liberal. Results are discussed in terms of the potentially stigmatizing effects of psychopathy evidence in capital cases., (Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

Publication is one of the primary rewards in the academic research community and is the first step in the dissemination of a new discovery that could lead to recognition and opportunity. Because of this, the publication of research can serve as a tacit endorsement of the methodology behind the science. This becomes a problem when vulnerable populations that are incapable of giving legitimate informed consent, such as prisoners, are used in research. The problem is especially critical in the field of transplant research, in which unverified consent can enable research that exploits the vulnerabilities of prisoners, especially those awaiting execution. Because the doctrine of informed consent is central to the protection of vulnerable populations, we have performed a historical analysis of the standards of informed consent in codes of international human subject protections to form the foundation for our limit and ban recommendations: (1) limit the publication of transplant research involving prisoners in general and (2) ban the publication of transplant research involving executed prisoners in particular., (Copyright © 2013 American Association for the Study of Liver Diseases.)

Intellectual disability (ID) is differently yet validly described by different professions. Legal professionals find it most useful to consider ID as a disability rather than a disorder. Because the law regulates the actions of individuals in a society and the actions of society on an individual, the law's concern in dealing with a person with ID is almost always with that person's functional abilities and limitations in society. This concern is reflected in various aspects of criminal and civil law, although the methods of assessing those functional abilities and limitations have changed considerably over time. The law has not always been wise or humane in its treatment of people with ID, but its focus on functional abilities and limitations allows us to assist people with ID to use their abilities and participate in society to their fullest potential.

The current study is a partial replication of previous studies designed to estimate the level of risk posed by capital murder defendants. The study draws on data describing the behavior of nearly 2,000 incarcerated capital murderers to forecast violence propensity among defendants sentenced to life imprisonment. Logistic regression is used to model various violence outcomes, relying on the following predictors: age, educational attainment, prior imprisonment, and gang affiliation. This exercise is designed to illustrate how actuarial data may be used to anchor individualized clinical assessments of risk in capital murder trials.

Punishment of juvenile murderers forces policy makers to weigh the developmental immaturity of adolescents against the heinousness of their crimes. The U.S. Supreme Court has progressively limited the severity of punishments that can be imposed on juveniles, holding that their impulsivity, susceptibility to peer pressure, and more fluid character render them less culpable for their actions. Having eliminated the death penalty as a punishment, the Court recently struck down mandatory life sentences without prospect of parole. The decision is interesting for its emphasis on rehabilitation, opening the door to further restrictions on punitive sentences for juveniles-and perhaps for adults too.

The intervertebral haemorrhages described by Simon in 1968 as a vital sign of hanging have been verified and endorsed by other authors. They occur in 40-50 % of hanging cases, most frequently in the lumbar spine, in younger age groups, and in cases of free suspension. The haemorrhages are not unique to hanging, but may occur in particular as a result of other traumatic elongation or overextension of the spinal column (e. g. in the course of traffic accidents). In cases of decomposition of the body, "false positive" findings are relatively common. As external findings scarcely provide any reliable vital signs of hanging, there is still a high demand for autopsies. In addition to Simon's bleedings, internal findings which are diagnostically conclusive also include microscopic examinations of the lungs and the neck musculature. More recent findings such as haemorrhages in the back and auxiliary respiratory muscles as well as the intestinal wall, if confirmed, could supplement Simon's bleedings. Frei's fibre sample and evidence of histamine in the ligature mark should not be neglected. Finally, it must be emphasized that the forensic assessment of hanging cases should always be based on a criminological and forensic evaluation of all the circumstances of the offence as well as on post-mortem findings.

In legal domains ranging from tort to torture, pain and its degree do important definitional work by delimiting boundaries of lawfulness and of entitlements. Yet, for all the work done by pain as a term in legal texts and practice, it has a confounding lack of external verifiability. Now, neuroimaging is rendering pain and myriad other subjective states at least partly ascertainable. This emerging ability to ascertain and quantify subjective states is prompting a "hedonic" or a "subjectivist" turn in legal scholarship, which has sparked a vigorous debate as to whether the quantification of subjective states might affect legal theory and practice. Subjectivists contend that much values-talk in law has been a necessary but poor substitute for quantitative determinations of subjective states--determinations that will be possible in the law's "experiential future." This Article argues the converse: that pain discourse in law frequently is a heuristic for values. Drawing on interviews and laboratory visits with neuroimaging researchers, this Article shows current and in-principle limitations of pain quantification through neuroimaging. It then presents case studies on torture-murder, torture, the death penalty, and abortion to show the largely heuristic role of pain discourse in law. Introducing the theory of "embodied morality," the Article describes how moral conceptions of rights and duties are informed by human physicality and constrained by the limits of empathic identification. Pain neuroimaging helps reveal this dual factual and heuristic nature of pain in the law, and thus itself points to the translational work required for neuroimaging to influence, much less transform, legal practice and doctrine.

When a client faces a penalty of death, defense attorneys may call on social workers in many capacities: mitigation specialist, expert witness, consulting specialist, direct witness, or defense-initiated victim outreach worker. The American Bar Association set forth standards for capital defense attorneys, which led an interdisciplinary team to produce the "Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases" to promote the exceptional competence and diligence required when the consequence is life or death. This article summarizes the "Supplementary Guidelines," with implications for social work practice--that is, professional responsibility, competence, interviewing skill, knowledge of behavioral and mental impairment, records review, life history compilation, data interpretation, witness support, law-related knowledge, and testimony. The social work, which is scrutinized in a court of law, requires cultural competence, diverse oral and written communication skills, diligence, and the highest ethical standards.

The study by Neal et al. of mock jurors in the penalty phase of a homicide case led me to observations on gender changes over the past few decades in the professions of law and forensic psychiatry and psychology. From an earlier paucity of women in these professions, today their percentages have greatly increased. Yet, as in this study, there are differences that work to the advantage of men in how the genders are perceived as expert witnesses. Suggestions for addressing gender discrepancy are offered, along with a cautionary note, such as in the area of experts in cases involving abortion.

The study by Corwin et al. adds to the emerging but limited data on the impact of defendant remorse on sentencing decisions. The authors studied verbal and nonverbal expressions of defendant remorse and whether they were perceived as remorseful by mock jurors. They found that incongruent verbal and nonverbal behavior, as well as mock jurors' willingness to approach emotional situations, resulted in more lenient sentences for defendants. An overarching and as yet unanswered validity concern regarding this line of research in general is whether the use of undergraduate mock jurors reliably models real jurors in actual courtroom settings.

Justice Scalia warned in his dissent in ATKINS v. VIRGINIA, 536 U.S. 304, 122S.Ct. 2242 (2002) that the problem of feigned mental retardation would complicate the findings in cases involving the death penalty in low IQ individuals. Validity measurement in low IQ individuals has been criticized, largely with questions concerning specificity of performance validity tests (PVTs; Salekin & Doane, 2009, Applied Neuropsychology, 16, 105). In this article, our purpose is to examine the false positive rates of specific PVTs in low IQ individuals, particularly with reference to a Symptom Validity Scale previously developed for low functioning individuals (Chafetz, Abrahams, & Kohlmaier, 2007, Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 22, 1). The findings show that the PVTs analyzed have few false positives in a low IQ range of 60-75 when these individuals are well motivated to perform highly on testing, which allows these PVTs to be used in high stakes cases to provide evidence concerning malingering. Principles of dealing with performance validity in low functioning individuals are discussed with reference to the issues in capital cases. A practical summary guide is supplied.

The capital trial, by its nature, is fraught with emotionally disturbing elements that jurors must face when deciding the ultimate fate of a guilty defendant. A confluence of mitigating and aggravating factors influences a capital jury's decision to impose a sentence of death. The presence or absence of defendant remorse in these cases may make all the difference in whether a capital defendant's life is spared. This commentary examines the onerous emotional toll encountered by capital jurors in light of the findings of Corwin and colleagues regarding defendant remorse and juror's need for affect. The commentary also presents practical and ethics-related considerations that should be kept in mind when reflecting on their study.

In this study, we examined how manipulations of likeability and knowledge affected mock jurors' perceptions of female and male expert witness credibility (n = 290). Our findings extend the person-perception literature by demonstrating how warmth and competence overlap with existing conceptions of likeability and knowledge in the psycholegal domain. We found that experts high in likeability, knowledge, or both were perceived equally positively, regardless of gender, in a death penalty sentencing context. Gender differences emerged when the expert was low in likeability or knowledge. In these conditions the male expert was perceived more positively than the comparable female expert. Although intermediate judgments (e.g., perceptions of credibility) were affected by our manipulations, ultimate decisions (e.g., sentencing) were not. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

Defendant remorse is generally accepted as a mitigating factor in capital murder sentencing in the legal system. The current study addressed whether verbal and nonverbal expressions of defendant remorse are perceived as remorseful by mock jurors. Moreover, this study investigated the associations of defendant behaviors and mock juror need for affect on sentencing decisions. Participants watched a video of a defendant depicting either high or low levels of verbal and nonverbal remorseful behavior. Results indicated that nonverbal behaviors were more important than verbal cues for perception of remorse. Incongruent verbal and nonverbal behavior, as well as mock juror willingness to approach emotional situations (i.e., high need for affect (NFA)) resulted in more lenient sentences for defendants. Implications for the remorse construct, for witness preparation, and for jury selection are discussed.

Forensic psychiatric evaluators of adolescent defendants are often asked to address open-ended questions that affect what court an adolescent will be tried in and what sentence he might receive. Such questions often involve the extent to which the adolescent should be considered less culpable than an adult who has committed a similar offense. Assessing partial or diminished culpability in an adolescent is difficult because the concept of partial culpability is complex, assessment methods are inexact, and the implications for legal disposition are often not clear. This article suggests 10 factors a forensic evaluator may wish to consider in reaching opinions about an adolescent's culpability: appreciation of wrongfulness, ability to conform to law, developmental course of aggression and impulsivity, psychosocial immaturity (including time sense, susceptibility to peer pressure, risk-taking, and ability to empathize), environmental circumstances, peer group norms, out-of-character action, incomplete personality development, mental illness, and reactive attitudes toward the offense.

Should adolescents be held as culpable for their behavior as adults? Adolescence is a tumultuous time, full of change and transformation. This paper examines the development of brain functions and cognitive capabilities of teenagers. It explores the effect of alcohol use on brain development and the fundamental cognitive differences between adolescents and adults. This knowledge, coupled with the assessment of developmental perspective, suggests that the adultification of youth (or waiver to adult court) is unduly harsh for youth whose brains have not fully formed., (Copyright © 2011. Published by Elsevier Ltd.)

On 16 June 2011, the Bombay High Court issued a judgment that overturned the law providing for a mandatory death penalty for certain drug crimes, becoming the first court in the world to do so.

This research examined the effects of several versions of capital penalty phase instructions on juror comprehension. Study One documented the impact of California's recently implemented "plain language" instruction. It showed that although the new instruction has clear advantages over the previous version, significant comprehension problems remain. Study Two evaluated several modified instructions designed to enhance comprehension. Participants heard either a standard patterned instruction or one of two alternatives-a psycholinguistically improved instruction, or a "pinpoint" instruction using case-related facts to illustrate key terms-in a simulated death penalty sentencing phase. Persons who heard modified instructions demonstrated higher levels of comprehension on virtually every measure as compared to those in the standard instruction condition.

In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court held the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to juveniles in Roper v. Simmons. The Court reasoned that juveniles were less criminally culpable than adults because they lack maturity, they are more vulnerable to peer influence, and their character is not as well formed as that of adults. Although Roper addressed the imposition of the ultimate punishment of death within the context of a juvenile's moral blameworthiness for a crime of murder, this article considers the application of the Court's reasoning in Roper to the issue of juvenile waiver. Specifically, the author asks the question whether Roper's ultimate language distinguishing juveniles from adults in capital cases should apply to the conventional practice of their trial and sentencing as adults. Despite the fact that juvenile transfer is a less serious sanction than the death penalty, this inquiry confronts the traditional objective of the juvenile court system, a system of punishment that was founded on rehabilitation rather than retribution. The author questions whether the punitive objectives of deterrence and retribution are satisfied by juvenile waiver and whether the mitigating effect of adolescence negates the trial of youth as adults.