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The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is an enduring concern in political science. Central to this debate, Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (APR) in 1981 developed four images to characterize political‐bureaucratic relations. We argue that the one‐dimensional focus on roles in their images comes with important limitations. To deal with these limitations, we collect survey responses from 3,384 local politicians from four countries on seven dimensions of the political‐bureaucratic relationship. We then use cluster analysis to develop six images bottom‐up. Five of our images are largely consistent with APR's image II and III. Yet, they differ in the extent to which politicians trust the bureaucracy, consider them loyal, and see them as an important source of information. A sixth image is not consistent with any of APR's images. We find that both systemic (country, municipality size) and individual factors (ideology, position, seniority) contribute to differences in images. Overall, our images suggest that political‐bureaucratic relations vary more between and within political systems than suggested by APR's images. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author presents theoretical propositions regarding central-local government relations, focusing on interaction in the policy areas of economics, health, and child care. Data from Sweden, Norway, and Denmark are used.

Studies of bureaucracy have been very concerned about whether the bureaucracy exploits its informational advantage vis‐à‐vis politicians to influence policy decisions. Yet, little theorizing has been undertaken about how such influence takes place. We identify and test three mechanisms that must be at work in order for policy information to function as a vehicle for political influence of bureaucrats. Using data from politicians and bureaucrats in five different political systems and survey experimental methods to deal with endogeneity and social desirability bias, we find evidence supporting all three mechanisms: bureaucrats are generally willing to use policy information to influence political decisions, politicians rely on policy information from bureaucrats when making such decisions, and the way policy information is presented matters for the policy preferences of politicians. We discuss the implications of the results and factors that are important for the mechanisms to apply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As part of the "better regulation" agenda, the European Commission created a semi‐independent institution, the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, to monitor the preparation of policy proposals. The position of this Board is potentially wide‐ranging. A proposal that is not given the green light by it cannot proceed in the Commission's internal decisionmaking process. But so far, the Board has only received scant scholarly attention. We provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board on the Commission's policy preparation. Using machine learning techniques and quantitative text analysis, we study 673 Board opinions and compare almost 100 draft and final policy proposals. Our findings show that the Board is an active watchdog that is taken seriously by the Commission's departments. A full understanding of policy preparation in the EU therefore requires more scholarly attention to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policy networks is a powerful analytical concept. However, it must be combined with a model of the actor if the analyst is to move beyond description and into the more interesting field of policy explanation. This article argues that this may be done by the use of 'new institutionalism'. It first demonstrates that policy networks may be understood as institutions, i.e. as rules constraining the actions of the participating actors. It then outlines the contribution which institutional theory may make to policy network analysis. This is done by giving an institutional answer to three questions which the policy network literature has not successfully addressed. Why do networks come into existence? Why do networks change? Why are networks so persistent? The institutional logic is illustrated in a case study of a Danish intergovernmental policy network: the annual budget negotiations between the state and local authorities. The main lesson to draw from this exercise is that when the insights from policy network analysis are combined with the theoretical insights from 'new institutionalism', it is indeed possible to start providing explanations of policy networks and their impact on policy outcomes.

How can interdepartmental coordination in large political‐administrative systems be organized? This question has vexed scholars and practitioners for more than 100 years. Two perspectives—one that features hierarchical direction and one hallmarked by horizontal negotiation—dominate the scholarly debate. However, we know surprisingly little about how interdepartmental coordination is handled in practice. This article presents an empirical study in an entire political‐administrative system, the EU Commission, and examines whether interdepartmental coordination is hierarchical or negotiated. Our study is based on almost 6,000 cases and original measures of departmental policy expertise derived from quantitative text analysis. Our results indicate that interdepartmental coordination is primarily driven by concerns of administrative turfs and thus lend support to the negotiated coordination perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the heyday of Jacques Delors, the Commission has been challenged by the rise of the European Council, the empowerment of the European Parliament and the creation of European agencies. However, while many scholars agree about the direction of change, there is disagreement about the extent to which the Commission's position has declined. A number of studies are sceptical, and we join this sceptical line. Our contribution is to focus on the Commission's role as a maker of both legislative and executive rules (implementing and delegated acts). These rules are all decided under complex inter‐institutional procedures. But the Commission possesses the right of initiative in all procedures. We investigate how the Commission can use this first‐mover advantage to influence EU policy. We establish a framework for understanding what strategic options the first‐mover advantage entails and provide a first empirical illustration with a qualitative analysis of ten selected Commission proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU Commission regularly consults with external actors when preparing policy proposals. This paper investigates possible bias in the voices the Commission listens to across all policy areas and consultation instruments. We map the full range of consultation instruments used by the Commission and analyse variation in group representation across types of consultations and policy areas. Our analysis draws on a dataset of more than 350 major Commission proposals between 2011 and 2016. We find that the Commission has established a consultation regime with the widespread use of standard consultation instruments, including open online consultations, stakeholder conferences and consultation in closed fora. The range of consulted actors depends on both consultation instruments and policy types. Open online-consultations are most inclusive. Our findings indicate that the Commission may be able to counteract the influence of business by selecting the most appropriate format for consultation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The optimal jurisdiction size has been debated since Plato and Aristotle. A large literature has studied economic and democratic scale effects, but we have almost no knowledge of the effects of jurisdiction size on the effectiveness of local services. This is due to two methodological problems. First, selection bias and reverse causality often render change in jurisdiction size an endogenous variable. Second, there is a lack of empirical indicators of effectiveness, and most studies therefore focus on spending measures. Extant research thus studies economies of scale, leaving effectiveness of scale unexamined. We address both problems in a quasi‐experimental study of public schools. Our findings from the school area indicate that jurisdiction size does not have systematic effects on effectiveness. Our analysis therefore supports recent studies of economic and democratic scale effects that indicate that the search for the optimal jurisdiction size is futile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much research following Kaufman's classic study Are Government Organizations Immortal? has investigated the claim that government agencies enjoy great security and long life. Less attention has been paid to Kaufman's thesis that government agencies facing a termination threat have strong incentives to react. In a study of the on-going Norwegian local government amalgamation reform, we demonstrate that this type of government agency reacts by hoarding (i.e. a last-minute flurry of spending) when faced with a termination threat. This finding shows that agencies facing termination threats are active players in the termination game. We discuss implications for research on agency termination and design implications for reformers of the public sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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