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Fin du communisme, mondialisation et révolution numérique : en trente ans, le monde a changé radicalement. Mais qui le gouverne désormais ? Paradoxalement, la question du pouvoir paraît plus mystérieuse que jamais, au point de susciter des interprétations complotistes qui envahissent Internet. C’est pourquoi cette nouvelle édition de L’état du monde a choisi d’en analyser les grands mécanismes. Elle place au cœur de la réflexion cinq paramètres sensibles du système mondial – la tradition, le religieux, les institutions étatiques, l’économie et la mondialisation –, tout en déclinant les différents modes d’exercice du pouvoir.Les États ne sont plus les seuls acteurs à prétendre dominer le monde. Avec la mondialisation, qui favorise la mobilité, bouleverse les relations sociales et engendre de nouvelles dépendances, les firmes multinationales et les réseaux défient les souverainetés étatiques, ce qui se traduit également par une apparence de fragmentation du pouvoir et des interdépendances de plus en plus complexes.Grâce aux chercheurs et journalistes réunis autour de Bertrand Badie et Dominique Vidal, cette édition 2017 de L’état du monde propose de nouvelles perspectives pour comprendre qui (et comment se) gouverne le monde. Afin d’en finir avec une géopolitique occidentalo-centrée qui ne permet plus de rendre compte de l’évolution d’un paysage international en plein bouleversement.

This chapter highlights the dangers arising from connivance, identifies different strategies of diplomatic connivance and suggests that they are dependent on both an issue-specific context and the constellation of interests. The author stresses that connivance tends to become the major pattern in any concert setting and in turn jeopardizes global integration, triggers frustration among excluded members and by and large leads to rather poor decisions. However, under three conditions, it might be possible for a modern-day concert system to mitigate the destructive potential of connivance diplomacy: a high level of institutionalization, a high level of inclusiveness and strong public diplomacy.

Depuis plusieurs annees, et singulierement apres la crise financiere de 2008, les inegalites sont redevenues un theme d’actualite. Des best-sellers internationaux se consacrent a cette question trop longtemps negligee. Des ONG publient des chiffres alarmistes qui illustrent le fosse croissant entre les pauvres, qui paraissent toujours plus nombreux et vulnerables, et les ultra-riches, qui ne savent plus comment depenser leurs gigantesques fortunes. D’Athenes a New York, de Madrid a Hong Kong, les mouvements populaires qui placent la lutte contre les « inegalites » au cœur de leur programme se multiplient et prennent de l’ampleur. Mais, derriere les slogans, comment apprehender et mesurer precisement ces inegalites qui pesent de plus en plus sur l’agenda international ? Politiques, economiques, sociales, raciales, culturelles ou sexuelles : comment s’enchevetrent les differentes facettes de l’inegalite ? Pourquoi les institutions internationales, elles-memes tres inegalitaires, echouent presque toujours a atteindre les objectifs qu’elles se sont fixes en matiere de « developpement » ? Pourquoi l’acces a l’alimentation, au logement, a l’education ou a la sante reste-t-il a ce point inegalitaire ? L’injustice ressentie par de nombreuses populations favorise-t-elle les conflits et la violence politique ? Grâce aux chercheurs et journalistes reunis autour de Bertrand Badie et Dominique Vidal, cette edition 2016 de L’etat du monde propose de nouvelles perspectives pour comprendre les inegalites contemporaines aux echelles mondiale, regionale et nationale. S’appuyant sur de solides ressources statistiques et sur d’innombrables exemples, sur les cinq continents, les specialistes qui ont contribue a ce volume en decortiquent les mecanismes et fournissent ainsi quelques pistes pour tenter de les combattre.

This article analyses the contemporary re-emergence of various and complex political claims founded on sovereignty (“sovereigntism”). After discussing five historical stages in the evolution of sovereigntism, it highlights three structuring features of the post-bipolar international system namely, a growing discrepancy between the affirmation of sovereign equality as a norm and its flawed empirical reality, the perpetuation of an institutionalised hierarchy that no longer reflects the international distribution of power, and the disruption provoked by globalisation, which enables marginalised actors to voice their concerns while provoking resistances on the part of others who feel threatened in their status and identity. Three distinct conceptions of sovereigntism coexist as a result of these three structuring features: ‘neo-sovereigntism’ (claiming the implementation of sovereign equality and protesting the rigidity of the international architecture), conservative sovereigntism (seeking to preserve the international architecture by redefining sovereignty on normative grounds), and archeo-sovereigntism (radically opposing the transnational dynamics of globalisation and picturing them as a threat). The encounter of these three incompatible conceptions of sovereignty, it is argued, is a relevant variable for explaining contemporary disorders. Keywords: Sovereignty; neo-sovereigntism; emerging Powers; globalisation; international system ----- Bibliography: Alles, Delphine/Badie, Bertrand: Sovereigntism in the international system: From change to split, ERIS, 2-2016, pp. 5-19. https://doi.org/10.3224/eris.v3i2.02

On a probablement accordé trop de crédit à la puissance, tenant celle-ci pour indépendante des conjonctures, pour une évidence qui transcende l’histoire, qui s’impose dans tous les contextes. Le débat théorique a tourné, depuis la fin de la bipolarité et de la Guerre froide, autour des concepts de « superpuissance », « d’hyperpuissance », ou d’unipolarité. On n’a cependant pas été assez attentif à la crise qui frappait l’univers hobbésien et ses héritiers, Clausewitz, Weber, Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau ou Kissinger : peut-être la puissance est-elle aujourd’hui attaquée dans son évidence même, partout où elle est utilisée comme principe d’action internationale, au-delà même des vicissitudes rencontrées par la première puissance mondiale elle-même. Dans le jeu post-bipolaire, la puissance devient peut-être impuissante…

Bertrand Badie a accepté de répondre à nouveau, 20 ans après, à la question qui lui avait été posée par la revue Vingtième Siècle en 1997 : « Que pensez-vous et que faut-il penser, selon vous, du concept de populisme et de ses usages scientifiques et civiques, pour comprendre une société contemporaine, d’hier à aujourd’hui ? »

Auteur d’un ouvrage intitule Quand le Sud reinvente le monde. Essai sur la puissance de la faiblesse1, Bertrand Badie aborde les enjeux de pouvoirs mondiaux dans une optique a contre-courant de celle couramment mediatisee qui va de la vindicte aux louanges beates de la mondialisation. Si son propos semble parfois dissocier des faits que nous considerons lies en tant que consequences du mode de production capitaliste mondialise – comme la pauperisation pour le plus grand nombre qui accompagne les concentrations de richesses entre de moins en moins de mains et la montee de mouvements politiques identitaires –, il montre neanmoins que, tres loin d’etre le probleme, la mondialisation est au cœur d’une gouvernance alternative du monde.

I had the pleasure and the great honour to meet Emile Durkheim who accepted to give this interview in his office, located in the Sorbonne. Even if the great sociologist had never worked on International Relations (which did not exist as a discipline in France at his time), the major role that he played in founding the French sociology and irradiating the discipline everywhere around the world urged me to have this chat with him.

La guerre a modelé l'Europe, consolidé sa puissance et structuré son rapport au monde. En migrant sur les scènes moyen-orientale et africaine, elle a façonné un nouvel ordre géopolitique.

It is fashionable to claim ‘the end of history’. As classical war seems to be over, many scholars – particularly Alexandre Kojeve – argue that we currently face ‘the end of international relations’. This article considers the opposite, that is to say how we are now at the real beginning of international relations, and even of ‘intersocial relations’, whereby social actors and individuals are more and more involved. Such an analysis is also a way of reinterpreting the dawn of IR, with its internal debates and tensions as well as their present transformations. The article questions the traditional typology of IR theories, and points out correlations between theoretical challenges and changes or evolutions of history. It is also a way for shedding light on what could be considered, in such a chaos, the French approach of International Relations. Is it only a ‘French touch’ or the basis of a new paradigm? Keywords: IR theory, end of history, sociology of IR, power politics ----- Bibliography: Bertrand, Badie: When History Begins, ERIS, 2-2014, pp. 3-15. https://doi.org/10.3224/eris.v1i2.16500

This article describes how the paradigmatic debate in the field of international relations, opposing Grotius's tradition of transnational relations to the Hobbes vision of sovereign territorial units in rivalry for power politics, is turning to the advantage of the former. It points out that the current globalization process reinforces the transnational paradigm that focuses on individuals as international actors, with a new configuration emerging in which politics loses the hierarchical position implied by realism. Three kinds of actors (the state, transnational actors, and identity entrepreneurs) are described as promoting a special type of commitment: civic commitment to the state, utilitarian and pragmatic commitment to transnational networks, and a primary commitment to identity entrepreneurs. relations The paradigmatic debate in international relations is rooted in a very old tradition reflected in the antagonism which opposed, during the seventeenth century, Grotius to Hobbes, DeJure Pacis ac Belli to Leviathan. The Dutch lawyer stressed the role of individuals in the international arena; as the legal adviser of a maritime company, he had a sense of transnational relations and of the need for an international security which implied a real international common power. This point was contradicted by Hobbes, for whom interstate relations were bringing gladiators into conflict: national interest, he believed, should promote an intractable national security vision (Keohane, 1995: 165-187; Holzgrefe, 1989; Grotius, 1925). We would like to imagine that Grotius could have won over Hobbes, but it was the English challenger who won: symbolically, Leviathan was published just three years after the Peace of Westphalia established the sovereignty paradigm. The international order should be seen from then on as the juxtaposition of sovereign

L’histoire du concept de souveraineté se confond volontiers avec celle qui raconte l’émergence de notre système international contemporain. Ses origines ont en même temps un parfum amer de modernité : Jean Bodin en pose les fondements dans un contexte qui était celui de la Saint-Barthélémy, au moment où les déchirements inter-confessionnels affaiblissaient la communauté politique et le pouvoir central et où, de part et d’autre, on faisait appel à l’aide étrangère, aux Espagnols pour aider les Catholiques et aux Anglais pour appuyer les Protestants du royaume de France.

Pour Bertrand Badie, la mondialisation oblige è repenser la citoyenneté. En effet celle-ci ne peut plus être limitée au seul cadre national, territorialisé : l'échelon local, les grandes régions du monde, les réseaux et diasporas suscitent des allégeances multiples et des citoyennetés sur plusieurs espaces. Cependant, face è la menace de dilution du cadre national que représente ce processus, l'Etat-nation risque d'être tenté par un repli sur une conception ethniciste de la citoyenneté., Badie Bertrand, Dewitte Philippe. Quelles citoyennetés à l'heure de la mondialisation ? Un entretien avec Bertrand Badie. In: Hommes et Migrations, n°1206, Mars-avril 1997. Citoyennetés sans frontières. pp. 5-14.

Depuis la chute du Mur de Berlin, le système international est devenu une sorte d'énigme, que les spécialistes peinent à décrypter et qualifier. Vit-on désormais dans un monde « post-bipolaire » - selon une catégorie héritée du passé -, « unipolaire » - ce que dément l'impuissance américaine - ou « multipolaire » - alors que les puissances moyennes démontrent une faible attractivité ? Derrière ce flou terminologique se dissimule une continuité profonde : la prétention des plus « grands », formalisée à partir de 1815 à travers une « diplomatie de concert », à se partager le pilotage du monde. On retrouve aujourd'hui cet entêtement oligarchique dans les nouveaux « directoires du monde » que seraient le G8 puis le G20, qui renouvellent pourtant les blocages. S'autolégitimant autour de notions telles que l'« Occident » et la « démocratie », la « diplomatie de connivence » - telle que Bertrand Badie la qualifie - conduit à des conflits (Afghanistan, Irak) qui ensuite lui échappent. Figée dans un fonctionnement d'exclusion, elle suscite la contestation d'États (Iran, Venezuela), d'opinions publiques et d'acteurs - parfois armés - frustrés d'être écartés de la prise de décision. Limitées dans ses performances et protectrice de ses privilèges, elle met en scène la volonté de résoudre de grandes crises, comme celles affectant l'économie mondiale, sans parvenir à des réformes concrètes. Phénix médiocre qui renaît toujours de ses cendres, la « diplomatie de connivence » est examinée ici dans son histoire, ses fonctions, et ses échecs. Bonne manière d'explorer aussi la notion obscure de « système international ».

All major clashes bring in tow their share of lasting transformations. Multilateralism was certainly invented by the winners of World War II and was quickly stoked with the ambiguities accumulated up to that point: old-style diplomacy was far from extinct. But the context was no longer the same: the swift rise in East-West tensions, the construction of “blocs”—and later decolonization—and the development of globalization produced new causes, barriers, and meanings, to use Gary Goertz’s classification (cf. infra). A logic of polarization was taking shape for the first time, but in a rather contradictory, imprecise, and equivocal manner. Oligarchic diplomacy did not really vanish: it was dormant and sometimes came back to life elsewhere. Polar logics gradually took hold, but in a rather peculiar way: under the effect of power, but just what power? With a pretension that had universal ambitions, but how far could it really carry its inclusiveness? By engaging in a confrontation reminiscent of Hobbes and his gladiators, but in a complex arena containing a fluctuating degree of connivance that made its return in another form. Polarization laid down its law, but less clearly so than is believed.

A rebours de l'idée d'une mondialisation triomphante qui gomme peu à peu le rôle des Etats, l'auteur démontre que l'époque contemporaine est marquée par une nouvelle séquence de l'histoire des relations mondiales, où les acteurs sociaux prennent le devant de la scène. Les relations internationales se transforment en relations intersociales, à la fois universelles et imprévisibles.

The word “governance” took on its current meaning in the 1970s in response to globalization, which was beginning to take off and already encountering its first major crisis. The intent was to signify that the word “government” had been disqualified through its association with the state and to highlight compatibility with the age of management. It was in this same context, and nearly the same year, that the G6 was created, then turned into the G7. The imperative was clear. Was it heeded?

Europe’s princes had had a terrible fright, and fear is known to be a poor guide: the France of 1789, as well as of 1792 (declaration of war with Austria) and 1804 (coronation of Napoleon and the founding of the First Empire), had at once altered the map of Europe and shaken Europe’s thrones. Already in 1815, the most conservative sovereigns knew that the international order was not so clearly distinct from domestic orders. The old Hobbesian philosophy that still today inspires the realist creed was already defunct in their minds: saving one’s crown and the regime that served it meant if not a common power, at least the common exercise of shared power. Czar Alexander I would have much preferred for that alliance of convenience to be also an alliance of values and even sanctified under the banner of the “Holy Alliance.”

What system is hiding behind this anonymity? Actors and observers of the old international politics, as if destabilized by their loss of points of reference, have not managed to rechristen the system that has been taking shape since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Worse still, the race toward intellectual conservatism had begun, everyone desperately seeking to recycle the old and moribund idea of poles. Arithmetic enthusiasts believed that a bipolar system from which one of the two superpowers had defected could not help but produce a unipolar system through the simple operation of subtraction. Those, on the other hand, who were impatiently awaiting the restoration of their sovereignty advocated a system that had become multipolar.

The only dissent that has ever managed to constrain club diplomacy has come from the emerging powers, which the oligarchs were not able to exclude from their inner circle for long. Yet caution is in order. Demands expressed by these new powers have never been vociferous, their discretion being strengthened by the quiet force of historic fatality. Had they been kept out of things too long, international regulation would have lost all its meaning. But their admission has not been particularly credible: emerging powers are invited, as noted, only to attend the closing banquet, and then, relegated to a “second session,” they have not truly penetrated the inner sanctum which continues, until proof to the contrary, to exist in a world of its own. Even plenary sessions seem to be preempted by prior G8 deliberation.

Among equals, contention does not exist; competition prevails. That explains why the notion had not been used in international relations until recently. The advent of a unified world altered the situation: inequality, domination, and oligarchy opened the door to the various forms of dissension that currently occupy the international arena. Does this mean that a “concert of contention” has formed? The expression would imply minimal agreement about the grievances or an arrangement regarding them. That is a long way off. This new phenomenon will therefore be discussed with circumspection, comparing it somewhat to a “concert of lamentations,” simply to render the idea of variety, multiplicity, and diversity of origins.

There is a major difference between the present situation and the time of the first European concerts: in the nineteenth century, five predominating states excluded some ten others; today eight of them exclude 184 others, while the G20 excludes 173 of them. Yet, the major lesson to be drawn from globalization is total inclusion, which itself has two meanings: all peoples of the world are partners in the international system, and global governance can only function if it leaves no one standing at the door.

Power appears as a paradox in French politics as well as in the French policy. The French sociologist Michel Crozier (1957) pointed to his motherland as “the land of Command” and stressed the exceptional role of power in French political culture. We can hardly find a country in which power was so debated and was finally so inefficient. France was defeated at least three times within one century: the 1871 defeat resulted in the construction of the French Republic; the 1940 trauma has never been overcome and is still ignored by generations of young pupils who imagine that their country was among the “four winners” of the World War II. Moreover, the colonial wars led to a strange combination of military victories and political defeats. Among the P5 members, France was the first to understand that, in the new world, power was not always powerful (Badie 2004).

As the new millennium begins to unfold, everything seems to suggest that international institutions are in the throes of a severe crisis. America’s Iraq policy announced the dramatic return of unilateralism; after a brief surge in the early 1990s, peacekeeping operations are marking time; the vigorous denunciation of the great corporations and financial institutions launched in Seattle has now become routine. Multilateralism is sustaining a seemingly overwhelming barrage of criticism: it is bridled by state sovereignty: it paves the way for globalization and ncoliberalism. its incompetence and ineffectiveness have been demonstrated in the Balkans. Africa’s Great Lakes region, the Gulf of Guinea, the Near East, and the Middle East.

O debate teorico, desde o fim da bipolaridade e da Guerra Fria, girou em torno dos conceitos de “superpotencia”, “hiperpotencia” ou unipolaridade. No entanto, nao se tem dado bastante atencao e importância a crise que atinge o universo hobbesiano: sem duvida, a potencia e hoje atacada em sua propria essencia, demonstrando-se fragil sempre que utilizada como principio de acao internacional, isso sem considerar as vicissitudes por que passa a propria primeira potencia mundial. No jogo posbipolar, um paradoxo empirico se impoe: nunca um Estado acumulou tantos recursos caracterizadores da potencia quanto os Estados-Unidos nos dias de hoje; jamais, no entanto, esta potencia teve tao pouco controle sobre os problemas com os quais se confronta. Tal contradicao e essencial na teoria das relacoes internacionais, visto que perturba os paradigmas classicos, questionando frontalmente a propria concepcao do power politics que serviu de pedra angular nao somente ao realismo e ao neorealismo, mas tambem a teoria neoinstitucional ou ainda aos diferentes estruturalismos. Neste artigo, o autor emite a hipotese de que uma certa forma de protest politics, tomando a potencia como alvo e nao mais a considerando como principio organizador da ordem mundial, ocupa doravante o lugar da nocao de power politics, abalando a teoria classica da “estabilidade hegemonica”. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: relacoes internacionais, teoria, Pos-Guerra Fria, crises de superpotencia, novos atores. THE CRISIS OF THE POWERS AND THE INTERNATIONAL DISORDER Bertrand Badie Since the end of the Cold War and the bipolarity, there has been a theoretical debate around the concepts of “superpower”, “hiperpower” or unipolarity. However, not enough attention and importance has been given to the crisis that reaches the hobbesian universe: doubtlessly, the superpower is attacked today its own essence, shown as fragile whenever used as a principle of international action, without considering the which the first world power undergoes. In the post-bipolar game, an empiric paradox is imposed: never has a State accumulated so many resources peculiar to a superpower as the United States nowadays; never, however, has this superpower had so little control on the problems she faces. Such contradiction is essential to the theory of international relations, because it disturbs its classic paradigms, frontally challenging the conception of power politics that served as a cornerstone not only to the realism and the new realism, but also to the neoinstitutional theory or still to the different structuralisms. In this paper, the author hypothesizes that a certain form of protest politics, taking the superpower as target and not considering her as an organizing principle of the world order, replaces the notion of power politics from now on, affecting the classic theory of “hegemonic stability” KEYWORDS: international relations, theory, Post Cold War, superpower crises, new actors. CRISE DE PUISSANCE ET DESORDRE INTERNATIONAL Bertrand Badie Le debat theorique a tourne, depuis la fin de la bipolarite et de la Guerre froide, autour des concepts de “superpuissance”, “d’hyper-puissance”, ou d’unipolarite. On n’a cependant pas ete assez attentif a la crise qui frappait l’univers hobbesien: peut-etre la puissance est-elle aujourd’hui attaquee dans son evidence meme, partout ou elle est utilisee comme principe d’action internationale, au-dela meme des vicissitudes rencontrees par la premiere puissance mondiale elle-meme. Dans le jeu post-bipolaire, un paradoxe empirique s’impose au fil des evene-ments: jamais un Etat n’a accumule autant de ressources de puissance que les Etats-Unis aujourd’hui; jamais pourtant cette puissance n’a eu si peu de prise sur les enjeux auxquels elle a ete confrontee. Une telle contradiction est essentielle en theorie des relations internationales, puisqu’elle bouscule les paradigmes classiques, mettant directement en cause la conception meme du “power politics” qui servait de pierre angulaire non seulement au realisme et au neo-realisme, mais aussi a la theorie neo-institutionnelle ou encore aux differents structuralismes. Dans cet article l’auteur fait l’hypothese qu’une certaine forme de “protest politics”, prenant la puissance comme cible et non plus comme principe d’ordre, vient desormais prendre le relais, ebranlant la theorie classique de la “stabilite hegemonique”, jusqu’a lui substituer l’hypothese d’une “instabilite hegemonique”. MOTS-CLES: relations internationales, theorie, Post-Guerre Froide, crises de superpuissance, nouveaux acteurs. Publicacao Online do Caderno CRH: http://www.cadernocrh.ufba.br

Prevention has become one of the declared objectives by national governments, the United Nations and the European Union to end violent conflict in the short term and to eradicate the causes of violent conflict in the longer run. Prevention defined as a comprehensive strategy includes the use of force through intervention if necessary. The article discusses first the relationship between prevention and intervention and their linkage to the international order. The abolition of inter-state war was the declared goal of the Charter of the UN. Today, the aim seems to include the abolition of internal war as well which implies a redefinition both of internal sovereignty and the non-intervention principle. During the Cold War the assumption by the two blocs was that the internal structure of states was believed to be a critical element of world peace, yet only after 1990 did this have practical consequences. Intervention has now become to some extent legitimate. Prevention as a strategy is, however fraught with ...