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Objectives: The present studies examined two dimensions of racial ingroup identification, using them as predictors of Black and White Americans' attitudes toward paying college athletes. Following Leach et al. (2008), the present work distinguished between ingroup self-investment and ingroup self-definition. The central prediction was that respondent race and self-investment would interact in predicting compensation support.Method: In three studies (N = 352, N = 476, & N = 562), U.S. residents who were 18 or older and either Black or White completed an online survey in which they completed a self-report measure of racial identification, as well as reporting their opinion of paying college athletes.Results: The results supported the prediction, demonstrating that Black respondents' support was higher than that for Whites, but this was especially the case at high levels of self-investment. The third study suggests that these effects were driven by respondents who believed that Black athletes made up a larger percentage of the pool of likely beneficiaries of compensation. Ingroup self-definition played no role as a moderator.Conclusions: Broadly speaking, it may be that, for policies whose likely beneficiaries are disproportionately Black, stronger racial self-investment serves to widen racial divides in support. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, researchers have studied how Americans' attitudes toward health experts influence their health behaviors and policy opinions. Fewer, however, consider the potential gap between individual and expert opinion about COVID-19, and how that might shape health attitudes and behavior. This omission is notable, as discrepancies between individual and expert opinion could help explain why some Americans fail to take action to protect themselves and others from the virus. In novel demographically representative surveys of the US adult population (N = 5,482) and primary care physician subpopulations (PCPs; N = 625), we contrast the relationship between: (1) Americans' and (2) PCPs' preferences regarding who ought to be responsible for taking action to combat the spread of COVID-19, as well as (3) Americans' perceptions of PCP preferences ("PCP meta-opinion"). In the aggregate, we find that Americans are far less likely than PCPs to see a role for both private and state actors in taking action to combat COVID-19. Interestingly, though, this disjuncture is not reflected in individual-level PCP meta -opinion; as most Americans think that PCPs share their views on state and private intervention (τ b = 0.44–0.49). However, this consonance is often erroneous, which we show can have problematic health consequences. Multivariate models suggest that Americans who both see little place for individual responsibility in taking action to stop viral spread and who think that PCPs share those views are significantly less likely to vaccinate against COVID-19. We conclude by discussing the public health benefits of efforts to bring public opinion in line with expert opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An influential body of research on American public opinion since the mid-1980s has found economic self-interest to be, at best, inconsistently and weakly related to social and political attitude formation. This article argues that this conclusion is related to a dearth of analysis of the potential effect of economic insecurity on American public opinion. It is argued that respondents' perceptions of their own economic insecurity capture the extent to which not acting self-interestedly can result in hardship-causing economic loss. Empirically, it is shown—through standard regression techniques and more stringent coarsened exact matching (CEM)—that economic insecurity has a systematic and strong effect on the redistributive, class, and racial attitudes of Americans; an effect that often rivals or supersedes the effect of sociotropic and symbolic attitudes. It is also shown that affective economic insecurity—one's worry or anxiety regarding the potential of future economic hardship—and cognitive economic insecurity—an individual's more or less dispassionate estimate of future economic hardship—often have distinct and complementary effects in determining public opinion, even when both measures are included in the same model. The evidence presented here makes it clear that existing measures and conceptualizations of economic self-interest—and the body of empirical work that discounts economic factors in American public opinion—need to be rethought in light of economic insecurity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives: In this article, we explore the effects of race linked fate and racial self‐identification on Americans' attitudes toward the police. We suggest that the strength of the connection between race linked fate and police attitudes depends on whether a given racial group experiences or perceives a pattern of marginalization and discrimination by the police that targets their racial group. We expect that the negative relationship between race linked fate and police attitudes will be strongest among African Americans and Latinos (i.e., two groups with often contentious relations with law enforcement), weaker among Asians and other race individuals, and negligible or (possibly) positive for whites. Methods: Using data from the 2016 Voter Study Group survey, we estimate a series of ordinary least squares regression and binary logit models of police attitudes. Results: We find, as expected, that the effects of race linked fate on attitudes toward the police are very strong for African Americans and Latinos, weak and/or inconsistent for Asians and other race respondents, and nonexistent for white respondents. Conclusion: These results point to the importance of racial self‐identification and race linked fate in shaping attitudes about the police, particularly among African Americans and Latinos. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Race, Representation, and Satire" is a comprehensive exploration of how satire interacts with issues of race and ethnicity in modern media. The book examines both the positive and negative impacts of satire, highlighting its ability to challenge stereotypes while also reinforcing harmful narratives. The chapters cover a range of media forms, including TV series, memes, songs, and commercials, and discuss topics such as visual sovereignty, oppositional gaze, and hyper-wokeness. While the book primarily focuses on TV series and sitcoms, it suggests the need for further exploration of satire in new media forms. The content of the book makes it relevant to scholars in media studies, cultural studies, sociology, and race studies, and it is suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses on race and media representation. [Extracted from the article]

Individual attitudes towards immigration are powerfully driven by ethnic context, that is, size of foreign-born population. We advance the literature by examining how the change (growth) in foreign-born population, in addition to its size (level), is related to two distinct outcomes: natives' views on legal and unauthorized immigration. By analysing a probability US sample, we find that an increase in the state-level immigration population is positively related to Americans' approval of a policy aimed at containing the flow of undocumented immigrants. The proportion of immigrants in a state, however, is not a significant predictor of support for such restrictive policy. With respect to legal immigration, neither the amount of recent change in, nor the size of, the immigration population matters. Our study provides strong evidence for contextual effects: net of compositional factors, a dynamic change in foreign-born population has an independent impact on how Americans view unauthorized, but not legal, immigration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On October 1, 1962, James Meredith made history as the first African-American student to be admitted to the then racially segregated University of Mississippi. In the weeks before and after his admission, Meredith received thousands of letters from around the world expressing support or condemnation of his actions. Today, many of these letters are housed at the University of Mississippi Archives and Special Collections and have been digitized and made publicly available on eGrove, the University's institutional repository. Motivated to raise awareness of and interest in this important archival collection, the authors designed a spatial humanities project, "Dear Mr. Meredith," that maps the locations from which these letters were sent. By coding the letters based on whether they are "pro" or "anti" integration, the project creates a snapshot of American attitudes about segregation and allows for critical examination of public perception of James Meredith's actions during the height of the civil rights movement. This article will provide a detailed account of the project, including the methodological approach, a thorough analysis of the findings, implications of the mapping project, and next steps for future research using the letters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bridging Cultures is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica Argentina and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study compares changes in American attitudes toward intermarriage with Blacks, Asians, Hispanics, and Whites in the twenty-first century simultaneously, using nationally representative samples from General Social Surveys 2000–2018. Our trend analyses reveal that, since 2000, nearly two thirds or more of Americans have strongly favored, favored, or held a neutral stance on, intermarriage with Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics, but favorable attitudes toward intermarriage with non-Hispanic Whites have either been generally steady or even slightly declined. Our generalized linear ordinal logistic regression analyses show that either including or excluding control variables, American attitudes have become generally more supportive of intermarriage with Blacks since 2002, with Asians since 2008, and with Hispanics since 2010, but have witnessed insignificant undulating changes in support for intermarriage with non-Hispanic Whites in the twenty-first century. The findings have significant implications for social progress and inter-group relations, hierarchies, and distances in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Local political news is losing consumers over the past decade at a faster rate than other political media, while online news consumption is growing. Previous research shows that local news can slow polarization, encourage political participation, and reduce government and business corruption, but not whether changes over time can affect political attitudes. Is this consequential shift in the media environment associated with changes in Americans’ perceptions of electoral integrity and their system of government? We use a three-wave panel survey from 2012 to 2014 to assess the relationship between changes in self-reported news diets and opinions about American elections and democracy. Switching out of local newspapers is associated with a significant decrease in faith in elections but does not appear to influence support for the broader U.S. system of government. We conclude by discussing the implications of declining local and legacy media news use for Americans’ attitudes toward U.S. elections and democracy in the aftermath of the 2020 elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to examine the function of entertainment media as a mythmaker in interpreting the legacy of the Vietnam war, which served not only as a flashpoint within the context of the Cold War but as a global turning point culturally as well. The United States' foray into the conflict was broadcast each night on television, Americans saw an increasing number of veterans returning home with antiwar attitudes and/or posttraumatic stress disorder, and the United States witnessed the rise of numerous countercultural trends and saw a decreasing trust for its government. All of this served in destabilizing traditional attitudes of American exceptionalism and Western colonialism. To process the collective trauma and confusion of the Vietnam conflict and its intrinsically connected periphery, America turned to Hollywood for answers. This article argues that the simulation of war as it appeared on screen, while distinctly different from historical reality, is itself no less important in the formation of our collective memory—it has informed coverage of subsequent conflicts as well as the deep cultural gulfs present in both the U.S. and Westernized culture as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical data do not support the conclusion of a crisis of public trust in science. They do support the conclusion of a crisis of conservative trust in science: polls show that American attitudes toward science are highly polarized along political lines. In this essay, we argue that conservative hostility toward science is rooted in conservative hostility toward government regulation of the marketplace, which has morphed in recent decades into conservative hostility to government, tout court. This distrust was cultivated by conservative business leaders for nearly a century, but took strong hold during the Reagan administration, largely in response to scientific evidence of environmental crises that invited governmental response. Thus, science-particularly environmental and public health science-became the target of conservative anti-regulatory attitudes. We argue that contemporary distrust of science is mostly collateral damage, a spillover from carefully orchestrated conservative distrust of government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the social identity theory, this exploratory study looked at how mass media, race, age, gender, and politic affiliation contribute to Americans' attitude toward the police. Findings indicate one's social identity and identification with police play a substantial role in how people choose to view police. Additionally, increased media trust and resulted in more positive perceptions of police, and people who listened to radio news more frequently were more likely to consider police part of their in-group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rural communities are vital to the foundation of American agriculture and are currently disproportionately affected by health and environmental challenges that will require broad scientific solutions. Cooperative Extension professionals and agricultural communicators are increasingly tasked with communicating about the science surrounding these topics and need effective tools for determining strategic communication tactics to influence personal behaviors. The purpose of this study was to understand the role of community-based social marketing (CBSM) concepts and trust in science on rural Americans' intentions and attitudes toward the COVID-19 vaccine. A hypothesized model was developed that included concepts of CBSM, trust in science, intentions, and attitudes all related to the COVID-19 vaccine. Results showed that CBSM principles had significant explanatory power for predicting intentions to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. CBSM and trust in science were also significant predictors of rural Americans attitudes toward the COVID-19 vaccine. Implications for this study reveal a need for future research and practice related to communicating about science and vaccines to rural Americans while building community-based principles for increasing trust and advancing perceptions of science. Future research should determine the impact of CBSM and trust in science on the end-state behavior of receiving the vaccine. Additionally, Extension professionals and agricultural communicators should prioritize CBSM concepts when developing programming and messages related to health behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent do white nationalists influence Congressional representative conservatism? Although ethnocentrism, out-group prejudice, and racial threats strongly predict American political attitudes and voter behavior, how social movements predicated on these beliefs shape political outcomes is rarely considered. We argue that white nationalist activities significantly contribute to the radicalization of Congressional representatives' policy agendas in a manner non-reducible to demographic or socioeconomic conditions. By mobilizing white voters against racial status threats, they indirectly compel politicians to adopt more radically conservative agendas. We quantitatively test these propositions by examining distributions of white nationalist groups in the American South against Congressional representative conservatism from 2010–2017. Analyses reveal that white nationalists indeed appear to significantly impact representative radical conservatism, even controlling for numerous factors commonly theorized to explain their rise. In doing so, we contribute to emerging insights on the political influence of the radical right on the contemporary American conservative "mainstream." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives: This study aimed to examine how Americans' opinions of the seriousness of various health-related problems have changed over time and to quantify the public's preferences for research prioritization.Methods: We conducted a survey that asked respondents to rate the seriousness of 80 health-related problems on a 4-point Likert scale ("very serious problem," "somewhat serious problem," "not too serious of a problem," or "not a problem at all"). Results were compared with past surveys from 2001 and 2013 that examined the same set of health-related problems (with the exception of COVID-19). The survey also included best-worst scaling questions that asked respondents to select, from 20 health problems, those they considered most and least important for research funding. Respondents were recruited from the KnowledgePanel, a nationally representative sample of American households.Results: A total of 768 adults completed the survey between September 3, 2020, and September 14, 2020. The health-related problems that Americans consider to be "very serious" generally align with the leading causes of death and noncommunicable diseases such as heart disease, diabetes, and mental health; nevertheless, several social determinants of health are also identified. COVID-19 was an unsurprising top priority, whereas cancer remains the highest and a persistent priority for research funding.Conclusions: Americans consider a diverse set of health-related problems to be "very serious," with recognition of social determinants of health rising. Our findings offer guidance as to the disease areas for which the public would value further public and private investment in treatment innovations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research observes the relationship between Latin American (LA) journalists from six countries that are rarely observed by international scholars (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Peru and Venezuela) and artificial intelligence (AI). Particularly, it seeks to identify and compare their attitudes, perceived constraints, and knowledge on the state of the art of the application of AI to professional journalistic practices. In tune with the quantitative turn in contemporary journalism and due to the lack of quantitative measures in this field, this research also develops and psychometrically validates tools for measuring such aspects. The main results reveal the existence of differences in these journalists' attitudes and knowledge with regard to AI that can be attributed to their cultural context. They also show similarities to attitudes of journalists from Northern countries to AI. This research fills in the gap in the existing literature on journalism, AI, journalists' attitudes, Global South and LA journalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Americans are increasingly polarized by a variety of metrics. The dimensions, extent, causes, and consequences of that polarization have been the subject of much debate. Yet despite the centrality of religion to early discussions, the analytical focus on America's divides has largely shifted toward partisan identity, political ideology, race, and class interests. I show that religion remains powerfully implicated in all dimensions of American polarization, and sociologists must once again make religion more central to their analyses. After outlining research on American polarization, focusing on the role of religion, I survey findings within the burgeoning literatures on cultural transformation processes, (White) Christian nationalism, complex religion, and Americans' attitudes toward science in order to underscore the centrality of ethno-religious identities, religious demography, and religious institutions for both shaping and exacerbating various forms of polarization. Lastly, I propose an agenda for elucidating religion's ongoing role in understanding polarization beyond public opinion research at the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels. Though polarization research has been dominated by political scientists, leveraging religion in our analyses—not merely as a sui generis variable, but as a site of complex social behavior—facilitates novel sociological contributions to these literatures via our relative attention to multiple levels of analysis, theoretical eclecticism, and methodological fluidity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We test whether the economic effects of globalization change the social and political attitudes of white Americans. Specifically, we examine the effect of a local labor market's exposure to import competition brought about by the rapid changes in the Chinese economy from 1990 to 2007 on perceptions of immigrants, minorities, religion and guns. We do not find meaningful changes in aggregate attitudes. Instead, using detailed information from the General Social Survey, we find evidence of significant hardening of existing attitudes or "clinging" to long‐standing beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic was a key policy issue during the 2020 election in the United States. As such, it is important to analyze how voters evaluated government responses to the pandemic. To this end, in this article, we examine factors that influenced Americans' evaluations of state-level COVID-19 policy responses. We find that during the pandemic onset period, Americans typically rated their state governments' responses more favorably if their governor was a co-partisan. In contrast, during the re-opening period, we find that Democrats relied on both partisanship and policy to evaluate their state-level responses, while Republicans continued to rely solely on partisanship. We contend that given the complex policy environment surrounding COVID-19, Americans may have not been fully aware of the policies their state governments adopted, so they relied on partisan cues to help them evaluate their state-level policy responses. But by the re-opening period, Americans likely had enough time to better understand state-level policy responses; this allowed Democrats to also evaluate their state-level responses based on policy. These findings shed light on how Americans evaluated COVID-19 responses just prior to the 2020 election. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The history of Babylon, fused from the Christian Bible and classical sources, occupied a critical, but hitherto unacknowledged, place in the conceptual life of Americans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By examining the uses of Babylon and Babel, which early Americans conceived of as the same historical place, this article works to expand historians' understanding of empire in the early modern Atlantic. From the American Revolution through a second "Great Awakening" and the demise of the Federalist party, many Americans turned to Babylon as a model to grapple with their country's growing imperial aspirations. Since the fall of the Tower of Babel the history of Babylon reflected and formed a larger ambivalence toward empire in ways that distinguished it from the familiar narrative of decline and fall. Those who wrestled with Babylon's story saw potential for a lasting empire in the world but were torn as to whether that empire aught to be one of liberty or uniformity. Ultimately, Babylon provided a conceptual space in which Americans wrestled with how best to be a Godly empire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In three studies, the authors show that Americans and South Koreans react differently to environmental advertising campaigns featuring assertive messages that threaten autonomous freedoms. The findings uphold their hypothesis that cultural differences determine whether consumers will show reactance to assertive advertising campaigns. Study 1 demonstrates that Americans are less receptive to an assertive recycling message using imperatives such as should, must, and ought and more receptive to a nonassertive message using could, might, and worth. South Koreans do not show the reactance response. Study 2, an energy-saving campaign, conceptually replicates the findings and further shows that perceived threat to freedom mediates the effects. Study 3 uses a realistic setting (i.e., online magazine) to further support the hypothesis that cultural differences affect attitudes toward assertive messages, but adds perceived politeness as an underlying second mediator. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose - The objective of this research was to statistically compare employee's use of sources of guidance (SOGs) at work in the United States and Brazil and discuss results in the light of differences concerning national cultural characteristics. Method - 220 employees from a Brazilian university and 166 employees from an American university filled out a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. Pearson correlation tests (r) and Student t-tests were run to investigate statistically significant differences between the two samples, which were discussed in the light of national cultural characteristics. Main results - Americans presented significantly higher means than Brazilians on Informal Rules and People Outside Organization, and Brazilians presented significantly higher mean than Americans on Formal Rules and Procedures. The discussion showed that some of these differences are compatible with national cultural characteristics. Relevance/Originality - Recognizing the importance and the role of national cultures on individuals' attitudes and behavior within the organizational environment is fundamental in the search for effective and contextualized management practices. Theoretical/methodological contributions - Up until 2020, only 12 theoreticalempirical studies about SOGs were developed. Hence, the present study theoretically and empirically contributes to knowledge about this very important work-related construct. Social/management contributions - The results suggest to managers, human resource professionals, and psychologists important differences in the attitudes of American and Brazilian employees concerning the use of sources of guidance at work, contributing, for instance, to recruitment and selection processes in multinationals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Muslims are often accused of being antisemitic and for being a major source of attacks and violence against Jews and Jewish institutions. Research also finds variation in Muslim orientations toward Jews at the aggregate, cross-national level, with lower levels of anti-Jewish sentiment in some western nations. There is also variation in the antisemitic sentiment of Muslims at the individual level in western nations. This paper asks whether factors that affect antisemitism among non-Muslims similarly affect Muslims with the same weight. In order to estimate these relative effects with precision, it is desirable to have a common dataset that includes both Muslims and non-Muslims. Since Muslims comprise a small percentage of the population in most western nations, nationally representative surveys rarely contain enough Muslim respondents for reliable statistical analysis. This paper uses the Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape survey, which has over 500,000 respondents, including 5000 Muslim respondents, sufficient for such analysis. The analysis finds that although American Muslims are less positive toward Jews than non-Muslims, the difference is not great, and, on average, American Muslims have positive views of Jews. Results also find that education, being foreign born, and perceiving discrimination against Muslims similarly affects Muslim and non-Muslim attitudes toward Jews. However, perceptions of a weak economy and age have discernably different effects on Muslim and non-Muslim attitudes toward Jews. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Americans' attitudes toward same-sex relationships have liberalized considerably over the last 40 years. We examine how the demographic processes generating social change in attitudes toward same-sex relationships changed over time. Using data from the 1973 to 2018 General Social Survey and decomposition techniques, we estimate the relative contributions of intracohort change and cohort replacement to overall social change for three different periods. We examine (1) the period prior to the rapid increase in attitude liberalization toward same-sex marriage rights (1973–1991), (2) the period of contentious debate about same-sex marriage and lesbian and gay rights (1991–2002), and (3) the period of legislative and judicial liberalization at the state and federal levels (2002–2018). We find that both intracohort and intercohort change played positive and significant roles in the liberalization of attitudes toward same-sex relationships in the postlegalization period, but that individual change was more important than population turnover over this period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past forty years Chinese youth attitudes toward the United States have undergone major changes, which have affected attitudes toward American higher education and studying in the US. These attitudinal changes have been influenced by several factors, including Chinese government policies on Sino-American educational exchanges, the overall relationship between the two countries, 0 and tile penetration of American culture in China. Data sources iiiclude the analysis of surveys conducted by Chinese social scientists in different periods; interviews with Chinese students; Chinese policy documents on overseas study; and Chinese media, books, ancl journals. Chinese youth can compartmentalize "two Americas," holding highly negative attitudes toward the "hegemonist" America which seeks to prevent the rise of China as an equal in world affairs, while lic)1

What shapes Americans' attitudes toward and about Native Americans? Public opinion research acknowledges that race and ethnicity are a factor in shaping US public opinion. Native Americans have been almost entirely excluded from this research. But we do know that, despite being a relatively small population, the general public holds stereotypes and false narratives about Native Americans that have been perpetuated by popular culture, education curriculum, and national myths. In this paper, we use new and original data collected under the Reclaiming Native Truth project to examine the factors that shape attitudes toward Native Americans. More specifically, we examine individual and contextual factors that shape views of discrimination against Native Americans and resentment toward Native Americans. We find that political ideology (liberal versus conservative) and the reliance on Native American stereotypes are factors most consistently associated with resentment and attitudes about Native American discrimination, although direct personal experiences and factual knowledge also matter. Our findings contribute to conversations about attitudes toward racial and ethnic minority groups and emerging scholarship on the role of political attitudes in settler-colonial societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using age‐period‐cohort modeling (APC), scholars suggest that the profound increase in Americans' acceptance of same‐sex relations is mainly explained by "period" effects, in which people have become more tolerant of same‐sex relations over time regardless of their age or birth cohort. To further explain the patterns of attitude changes, this research situates period effects in the specific sociohistorical boundaries unique to the development of same‐sex issues in the United States. This contextualization of period effects also sheds light on how and why attitudes have shifted at different paces for various sociodemographic groups. Using data from the 1973 to 2018 General Social Survey, the ordered logistical models reveal that significant period effects have emerged only after the height of the AIDS Epidemic. The surge of public acceptance after this period was accompanied by heightened demographic and cultural polarization, with changes in attitudes for black and for politically and religiously conservative individuals shifting at a much slower pace than their nonblack and less conservative counterparts. Such a polarization in attitudes reflects the ever‐changing association between sociodemographic characteristics and mainstream cultural beliefs about same‐sex relations over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last two decades, a rift has emerged on the US political left regarding the State of Israel. Public polling has shown that young people and the ideological far left have developed distinctly negative views toward Israel. In the fall of 2020, we surveyed 3500 US adults, including oversampling of 2500 adults aged 18–30. We first explore the young left's views toward Israel in comparison to how they view other foreign countries, and in comparison to how older adults and more conservative adults view Israel. We then ask whether their negative views toward Israel are explained by an issue prioritization of the Israel/Palestine conflict (no). Finally, we ask whether the young left's negative attitudes toward Israel are focused on Israel's politics and government or on other features of the country, such as its cultures and religions (it's both). Overall, the young left evaluates Israel like it evaluates US adversaries such as Russia and Iran, whereas the center and right evaluate Israel like they evaluate other US allies, such as Mexico and India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Linking local COVID-19 and population statistics to a U.S.-based survey we recently conducted, we examine the spatial variation in the impact of COVID-19 on Americans' attitudes toward China. The research strategy capitalizes on differential local COVID-19 incidence rates as varying dosages of COVID-19 impact across local contexts in the United States. Our results reveal negative yet heterogeneous effects of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic on Americans' attitudes toward China. We find that greater local exposure to COVID-19 is associated with a lower level of trust in Chinese and a less favorable attitude toward China. These findings lend consistent support to behavioral immune system theory by bridging the literature on contextual variations in public attitudes, with broader implications for U.S.-China relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I report findings from a pair of conjoint experiments that presented respondents with a series of profiles of pregnant women and asked whether it should be possible for each to obtain a legal abortion. The profiles varied the reason for the abortion, gestational age, and demographic characteristics of the hypothetical woman. I find little evidence that women's demographic characteristics—including their purported ethnoracial identities—affect these judgments. In contrast, the effects of gestational age and the reason for the abortion are substantial. Notably, the effects of gestational age appear to be linear and unresponsive to trimester and viability thresholds commonly cited in elite discourse. I also find that the reason for the abortion becomes more consequential as gestational age increases. Finally, I consider whether these effects vary with respondents' party affiliation and gender. The findings offer new insights into the contours of abortion attitudes in the United States and illustrate the strengths and limitations of conjoint designs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current research shows that news stories on COVID-19 influence Americans' opinions on most aspects of the pandemic. This study aims to better understand newspaper narratives of pregnancy during the COVID-19 pandemic. A qualitative textual analysis of newspaper articles in the New York Times uncovered common themes in coverage. Relevant themes are reexamining women's reproductive rights, highlighting inequalities in the U.S. health care system and uncertainty/fear among pregnant women and women's health professionals. Theoretical contributions are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Americans are becoming increasingly aware of the systemic biases we possess and how those biases preclude us from collectively living out the true meaning of our national creed. But to fully understand systemic bias we must acknowledge that it is pervasive and extends beyond the contexts of race, privilege, and economic status. Understanding all forms of systemic bias helps us to better understand ourselves and our shortcomings. At first glance, a human bias against emerging technology caused by systemic risk misperception might seem uninteresting or unimportant. But this Article demonstrates how the presence of systemic bias anywhere, even in an area as unexpected as technology regulation, creates inefficiencies and inequalities that exact heavy costs in the form of human lives, standards of living, and lost economic opportunities. The decision to regulate or implement an emerging technology, like any other complex decision, naturally involves some form of cost-benefit or risk-reward analysis. However, in the context of emerging technology, that analysis is biased by systemic risk misperception. Immutable characteristics existing in emerging technology combine with interrelated characteristics in human decisionmakers and regulators to inflate perceptions of risks and depress perceptions of benefits. This artificial shifting of cost-benefit curves results in suboptimal legislative and regulatory responses to emerging technology, and ultimately, in the loss of American lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes the determinants of American public opinion towards Islam and Muslims. It examines the impact of both period of time (1990-2020) and significant events (e.g., September 11, 2001) on the general impression (favorability) and knowledge of Islam among the American people. Twenty-two polls including questions about the favorability and the knowledge of Islam and carried out between 1990 and 2020 were analyzed. The results show that (1) positive attitudes towards Islam increase over time, meaning that time has a positive impact on Americans' impressions about Islam; (2) knowledge about Islam among the American people increases over time--time has also been found to have a positive impact on Americans' knowledge about Islam; and (3) there is a reciprocal correlation between knowledge and attitudes. Knowledge of Islam has a positive impact on attitudes, and attitudes have positive impact on knowledge about Islam. The findings of this study set the base for a strategic plan to improve the image of Islam in the United States and Americans' knowledge about Muslims and their true beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the gender gap in attitudes toward the use of military force in the United States. Given that the United States has been continuously engaged in war for the last 17 years, we revisit the topic and explore whether a gender gap in attitudes persists by utilizing Cooperative Congressional Election Study data for 2006–16. In addition, given the primacy of partisanship to issue attitudes, we go beyond examining the gender gap to explore the impact of partisanship on these attitudes. We find that women are less likely than men to support the use of force in most circumstances. We also find gender gaps in the Democratic and Republican parties and acknowledge the diversity among women and among men in these attitudes because of partisan identity. Finally, we identify points of cross-pressure on individuals whose gender and partisan identities pull them in different directions, namely, Republican women and Democratic men. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When guerrilla war first broke out in northern Mexico, the motives and modalities of the violence Americans and Mexicans inflicted on each other were informed by previous fighting with Native Americans, and American attitudes were also shaped by Jacksonian Democracy, with its hardening racial attitudes and vigilantism. In northern Mexico, US officers tried and failed to control atrocities against Mexican civilians. During the later US invasion of central Mexico, US officers sought to prevent guerrilla warfare by restraining US troops and threatening Mexican civilians with reprisals. After guerrilla warfare developed there and began to hamper their operations, commanders implicitly encouraged atrocities through their lack of action against US soldiers who committed them and the assignment of known perpetrators to counterinsurgency duty. US leaders did not use explicit legal reasoning and did not even always document de facto policies. During the Civil War, in contrast, US officers and lawyers developed anti-guerrilla policies that they documented in orders and justified through legal reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using age‐period‐cohort modeling (APC), scholars suggest that the profound increase in Americans' acceptance of same‐sex relations is mainly explained by "period" effects, in which people have become more tolerant of same‐sex relations over time regardless of their age or birth cohort. To further explain the patterns of attitude changes, this research situates period effects in the specific sociohistorical boundaries unique to the development of same‐sex issues in the United States. This contextualization of period effects also sheds light on how and why attitudes have shifted at different paces for various sociodemographic groups. Using data from the 1973 to 2018 General Social Survey, the ordered logistical models reveal that significant period effects have emerged only after the height of the AIDS Epidemic. The surge of public acceptance after this period was accompanied by heightened demographic and cultural polarization, with changes in attitudes for black and for politically and religiously conservative individuals shifting at a much slower pace than their nonblack and less conservative counterparts. Such a polarization in attitudes reflects the ever‐changing association between sociodemographic characteristics and mainstream cultural beliefs about same‐sex relations over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In May 2020, Westat, in partnership with Stanford University School of Medicine, conducted a nationally-representative household survey of American attitudes and behaviors regarding COVID-19. In this article, we examine what the Coronavirus Attitudes and Behaviors Survey tells us about the impact of COVID-19 on financial status and how this impact varies by demographic characteristics, the presence of health risk factors, and financial status (including employment factors). The survey reveals significant inequality in financial impact, as those who were most financially vulnerable prior to the pandemic found themselves under greater financial strain, while those who were more financially secure have experienced a neutral or even positive impact of the pandemic on household finances. These findings have important implications for public policy as policymakers seek to target aid to those who need it most. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whereas the literature asks whether immigrants and their descendants come to resemble the 'mainstream', this paper places the acquisition of a new national identity at the centre of attention, contending that the views of ethnic outsiders provide strategic leverage in identifying any underlying consensus regarding the bounds of the nation and the means by which those bounds should be implemented. We contend that becoming 'American' entails adopting American attitudes towards persons beyond the territorial divide, a population that includes nationals of one's country of origin or ancestry. The paper develops a conceptual framework to understand how attachment to the people of the state of emigration gets transformed into attachment to the people of the state of immigration. The paper provides a demonstration of that process, focusing on Mexican immigrants and their descendants and using a variety of data sources to highlight and unpack different dimensions of Americanisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent scholarship has established that a majority of Americans will support the use of nuclear weapons and violate the principle of noncombatant immunity when American lives are on the line. Some scholars contend, however, that these hawkish American attitudes are an outlier and that other Western democratic publics have more fully internalized the nuclear taboo, as well as the prohibition on deliberately killing civilians. To investigate cross-national attitudes on these important norms, we conducted a survey experiment of American, British, French, and Israeli citizens. We find that American attitudes are not exceptional. Rather, Israeli respondents display the most hawkish preferences; French and American citizens are roughly equally hawkish; and the British public is consistently the least supportive of nuclear use or targeting civilians. Categorical prohibitions—against nuclear use and targeting civilians—do little to shape public opinion in these four countries. Instead, public opinion in each state follows the same consequentialist logic: a majority or near majority of respondents are willing to support using nuclear weapons when they are more effective than conventional options, but support declines when collateral civilian deaths rise. Respondents' preferences for compatriots over foreign civilians and respondents' retributiveness help explain individual-level variation in attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate how support for President Donald Trump, beyond partisanship, guided Americans' attitudes toward COVID-19. This speaks to not just how "Trumpism" and the Trump administration's handling of the pandemic influenced public attitudes but to the larger issue of how Trump's hold on voters within and beyond the Republican Party provides further evidence that leaders surpass the role of parties in influencing public opinion. Using longitudinal data with individual fixed-effects, we find that from the start of the pandemic, support for Trump above and beyond partisanship drove public attitudes capturing skepticism toward COVID-19, fears of personal vulnerability, compliance with public-safety measures, and viewing the pandemic in racist terms. Between March and August 2020, this gulf in attitudes between Trump voters and non-supporters, and between Republicans and Democrats, widened; the widening was more pronounced between Trump voters and non-supporters. Trump's influence on Independents and non-voters also grew over the same period. While the use of terms like "China virus" was related to partisanship and support for Trump, we find an increase in awareness across groups that these terms were racist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]