One noticeable aspect of emotions is their intensity (e.g., Frijda et al., 1992). The experienced intensity of emotions can have an impact on the well-being and adaptive functioning of individuals (e.g., Gruber, 2011). Well-being is often conceptualized with the experience of positive emotions and the absence of negative emotions (e.g., Diener, 1984). However, this does not indicate that individuals should strive to experience positive emotions as intense as possible and suppress negative emotions. In fact, the experience of very intense positive emotions can be detrimental (Gruber, 2011) as it makes it more likely for a person to engage in high-risk behaviors (e.g., drug use, binge eating; Cyders & Smith, 2008). In addition, Keltner and Buswell (1997) demonstrated that experiencing low levels of embarrassment in response to a social faux pas can impair an individual’s social relationships if they are not stimulated by embarrassment to excuse themselves. Despite the strong consensus on where emotions and their intensity have an impact, there is less consensus on what emotions are. The predominant scientific theories of emotion can be classified into ‘basic emotions’ theories and cognitive appraisal theories. Basic emotions theories hypothesize that there exists a small set of discrete emotions (e.g., fear, happiness) that are psychologically and biologically ‘’basic’’, each recognized in a recurring structure of associated behavioral components (Ekman, 1992). Accordingly, these theories suggest that what we experience as emotions consist of innate and universal mental states (Kowalska & Wróbel, 2017). In contrast to basic emotion theories, cognitive appraisal theories refer to emotions as processes, rather than universal, mental states (Moors et al., 2013). Cognitive appraisal theories hold the core assumption that the interpretation (i.e., appraisal) of a situation explains the elicitation and differentiation in the discrete emotions we use to classify the experience (Siemer et al., 2007). Both appraisals as well as ‘basic’ discrete emotions are often used in emotion induction procedures that work through recall of affect-laden autobiographical memories (e.g., Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). In a typical study, individuals are instructed to recall and write about an episodic memory associated with an intended emotion. This presumably causes individuals to relive that situation which, in turn, increases the probability that they will feel the intended emotion. Previous studies have demonstrated that both appraisals as well as discrete emotions instructions are effective in manipulating emotions in autobiographical recall procedures (e.g., Siemer et al., 2007). However, it remains unclear what the effects of the framing of emotion recall instructions (i.e., appraisal vs. discrete emotion) are on the recaller’s perceived emotion intensity. The perceived recalled emotion intensity is not only assumed to be predicted by the framing of the recall instructions. It is suggested that the emotions associated with autobiographical memories can decrease in intensity as time from the original event increases (e.g., Ritchie & Batteson, 2013). However, it could be argued that the extent to which the intensity fades is not equivalent for emotions associated with positive and negative autobiographical memories. The fading affect bias theory assumes that the intensity of emotions associated with negative events fades faster than emotions associated with positive events. An opposing view is the ‘’bad is stronger than good’’ theory reflected by Baumeister et al. (2001). This theory argues that due to the nature of the self, humans are more prone to remember and focus on negative events (Baumeister et al., 2001). Moreover, when investigating the effects of emotion recall instructions and valence on the recaller’s perception of emotion intensity, a possible interfering factor could be emotion regulation. Recalling emotional experiences can elicit emotions that individuals may want to regulate. Regulating emotions can subsequently influence the intensity of the recalled emotions. Individual’s motivation to use emotion regulation strategies might depend on the valence tone of the recalled emotions (e.g., English et al., 2017). In summary, the current project will be carried out in two parts, both following specific research questions. Part 1 will be guided by the following: RQ1: What are the effects of emotion recall instructions and valence on the recaller’s perception of emotion intensity, and is this effect moderated by trait emotion regulation? Part 2 is concerned with other-perception of the affective texts produced in Part 1 and the agreement between authors and readers. Especially for text, the basic idea underlying this development is that emotions can be traced in texts – on individual words, text fragments, or other linguistic patterns – and that these patterns, produced by authors, can be identified and labelled correctly by an uninvolved reader. However, disparities between self- and other-perceptions have been addressed in a range of research fields: a) regarding audio-visual data, differences between self-annotation and other-annotation of emotions have been observed (e.g., Truong, Neerincx, & Van Leeuwen, 2008); b) regarding the "curse of knowledge" (e.g., Keysar, 1994), which refers to the phenomenon that people tend to be unable to disregard their own knowledge when assessing another person's perspective, which worsens their cognitive and affective empathy; c) regarding the "illusion of transparency" (e.g., Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998), which postulates that people overestimate the intensity of their own emotional expressions, causing a dissonance between intended/assumed communicated emotions and actually communicated emotions. However, an affective text written based on appraisal instructions might lead to a more accurate assessment of an emotional situation of an uninvolved leader since the particular situation responsible for the author's emotion becomes transparent and tangible. In contrast, if an author produces a text based on their own interpretation of an emotion term such as "anger", their description of the event might remain vague, limiting the ability of a reader to take the author's perspective and experience empathy for them. Thus, Part 2 will be guided by the following research questions: RQ2: What are the effects of text emotion recall instructions and text valence on a reader's perception of emotion intensity, and is this effect moderated by trait emotion regulation? RQ3: To what extent does the recaller’s perception of an affective text match a reader’s perception? References: Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). Bad is Stronger than Good. 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