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This paper develops a model of money demand where the opportunity cost of holding money is subject to regime changes. The regimes are fully characterized by the mean and variance of inflation and are assumed to be the result of alternative government policies. Agents are unable to directly observe whether government actions are indeed consistent with the inflation rate targeted as part of a stabilization program but can construct probability inferences on the basis of available observations of inflation and money growth. Government announcements are assumed to provide agents with additional, possibly truthful information regarding the regime. This specification is estimated and tested using data from the Israeli and Argentine high inflation periods. Results indicate the successful stabilization program implemented in Israel in July 1985 was more credible than either the earlier Israeli attempt in November 1984 or the Argentine programs. Government’s signaling might substantially simplify the inference problem and increase the speed of learning on the part of the agents. However, under certain conditions, it might increase the volatility of inflation. After the introduction of an inflation stabilization plan, the welfare gains from a temporary increase in real balances might be high enough to induce agents to raise their real balances in the short-term, even if they are uncertain about the nature of government policy and the eventual outcome of the stabilization attempt. Statistically, the model restrictions cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level., Cet article propose un modèle avec demande de monnaie dont le coût d’opportunité est soumis à des changements de régime. Un régime étant entièrement défini par la moyenne et la variance du taux d’inflation, on émet l’hypothèse qu’il dépend du choix de politiques gouvernementales. Un taux d’inflation à atteindre est déterminé dans le cadre d’un programme de stabilisation. Les agents économiques ne peuvent toutefois observer directement si les actions du gouvernement correspondent avec le taux recherché. Ils doivent produire des inférences statistiques à partir d’observations sur les taux d’inflation et la croissance du stock de monnaie. Il est de plus admis que les annonces gouvernementales peuvent fournir davantage d’information, parfois véridique, en ce qui concerne le régime choisi. Cette modélisation est estimée et testée au moyen de données relatives aux périodes de forte inflation en Israël et en Argentine. Les résultats suggèrent que le programme de stabilisation de juillet 1985, entrepris avec succès en Israël, était plus crédible que la tentative précédente de novembre 1984 ou que les programmes argentins. Il semble que les signaux émis par le gouvernement contribuent à simplifier de manière significative le problème d’inférence, ainsi qu’à augmenter la vitesse d’apprentissage des agents. Ils peuvent cependant, et sous certaines conditions, contribuer à hausser la volatilité du taux d’inflation. L’instauration d’un programme de stabilisation de l’inflation se traduit par des gains en bien-être dus à la hausse temporaire des encaisses réelles; s’ils sont assez importants, ces gains peuvent inciter les agents à augmenter leurs encaisses réelles à court terme, et ce, même s’ils ont des incertitudes quant à la nature de la politique gouvernementale et au succès éventuel de la tentative de stabilisation. Statistiquement, les restrictions du modèle ne peuvent être rejetées à un niveau significatif de 1 %.

The purpose of the project was to analyse how state intervention, or, more precisely industrial policy, influences market economies. The countries selected for case studies were: Austria, Chile, the European union, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan. At the end of the project there is a brief review of the present industrial policy in Croatia. The research indicated the following conclusions as policy recommendations for Croatia: 1) All the countries under consideration have conducted industrial policies over a long period of time so it seems that an industrial policy is a unavoidable building block of every market economy ; 2) Industrial policy has undergone a transformation from a targeted policy to one relying on horizontal measures ; 3) Targeted industrial policies are aimed at directly supporting selected industrial sectors (either "national champions" or "lame ducks"). Generally this policy has not proved successful. The state administration has not shown itself to be capable of successfully choosing and effectively supporting chosen sectors ; 4)An increasing number of economists agree that industrial policy should rely on horizontal policies, i.e. those aimed at supporting key inputs (e.g. invest in infrastructure, finance labour re-qualification schemes, develop information networks for financial markets, support research and development, support environmental protection, etc.). Such interventions benefit all market agents and lead to least relative price distortions ; 5) Even horizontal state intervention must be limited in time, must consider all costs and benefits, must be as transparent as possible and must distort relative prices as little as possible.

This article presents a review of the stabilization attempts in Argentina, Brazil, and Israel during the 1980’s. Earlier research is summarized and complemented with additional sources of contemporaneous information and a detailed analysis of institutional features. The examination of these episodes underscores the strong economic and empirical relationship between the governments’ fiscal policy and the rate of inflation., Cet article passe en revue les efforts de stabilisation observés pendant les années 1980 en Argentine, au Brésil et en Israël. Un résumé de la recherche antérieure y est présenté et complété par l’information la plus récente et par une analyse détaillée des aspects institutionnels pertinents. L’étude de ces épisodes met en évidence un lien économique et empirique important entre la politique budgétaire gouvernementale et le taux d’inflation.

Effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables during 1973-93 are analysed using a disaggregated macroeconometric model of the Norwegian economy. Fiscal policy is measured as deviations from estimated trends for disaggregated policy variables. The policy effects are related to the cyclical situation of the economy. Variations in fiscal policy instruments have reduced output volatility during 1973-93 by approximately 10 per cent, according to our results. On average the behaviour of local government has been procyclical. Partial effects of various fiscal instruments are calculated. During certain episodes fiscal policy appeared procyclical, an effect that is due to the aim of stabilizing the current account.

The energy shocks of the 1970's had significant effects on the global economy. Were they engineered by an effective cartel of OPEC members acting to share the market by controlling output and influencing market prices? If OPEC was an effective cartel sharing the market among its members, there would be a long-run relationship between each member's individual production and total OPEC output. One would also expect OPEC's production to significantly affect the market price of oil as the organization is often accused of curbing production in order to raise prices. These implications of cartel behavior are tested via cointegration and causality tests. The likely effects of regime changes are dealt with using techniques developed by Perron (1989). There is evidence of output coordination among some members of the organization, especially in the output rationing era (1982-93). This is also the only period in which the causality from OPEC production to the price of oil is statistically significant. Overall, the evidence suggests that OPEC did act as a cartel in the 1980's in order to maintain prices, while it simply took advantage of market conditions in the 1970's and did not have to restrain output.

This paper examines the Irish macroeconomic adjustment over the period since 1979 with particular reference to the interaction of the real exchange rate with the balance between national saving and investment. The transition from a large current account deficit to an exceptional surplus and the reversal of the growth in external indebtedness are discussed. The fact that a major reduction in absorption was achieved without a real exchange rate depreciation is attributed to a simultaneous reduction in investment spending relative to GDP and an improvement in the relative efficiency of the industrial exporting sectors. These factors are likely to continue to exert upward pressure on the Irish real exchange rate.

Effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables during 1973-93 are analysed using a disaggregated macroeconometric model of the Norwegian economy. Fiscal policy is measured as deviations from estimated trends for disaggregated policy variables. The policy effects are related to the cyclical situation of the economy. Variations in fiscal policy instruments have reduced output volatility during 1973-93 by approximately 10 per cent, according to our results. On average the behaviour of local government has been procyclical. Partial effects of various fiscal instruments are calculated. During certain episodes fiscal policy appeared procyclical, an effect that is due to the aim of stabilizing the current account.

In earlier work we documented two episodes in which a sharp fiscal consolidation was associated with a very large expansions in private domestic demand. In this paper we draw on further evidence to investigate if and when fiscal policy changes can have such non-Keynesian effects. In the first part of the paper, we analyze cross-country data for 19 OECD countries. In the second, we concentrate on the Swedish fiscal expansion of the early 1990s. The cross-country evidence on private consumption confirms that fiscal policy changes - both contractions and expansions - can have non-Keynesian effects if they are sufficiently large and persistent, and suggests that these effects can result not only from changes in public consumption but to some extent also from changes in taxes and transfers. The latter result is consistent with the Swedish experience where a decrease in net taxes (with almost no change in public consumption) was associated with a dramatic fall in private domestic demand. Our evidence and that from other studies agree that during the Swedish fiscal expansion of the early 1990s a large negative error appears in the consumption function. There is less consensus about how this error should be interpreted, but it is clear that the most obvious candidates (wealth effects and after-tax real interest rate effects) are not sufficient to explain it. This error may reflect a large downward revision of permanent disposable income, which affected the consumption of Swedish households over and beyond the negative effects of the drop in real asset prices. We suggest that this revision in permanent income may have been triggered, at least partly, by the fiscal expansion of the early 1990s.

This paper studies the variable impact of the global economic crisis on the countries of South East Europe. The central question is whether the institutional reforms introduced during the transition period have enabled countries to cope with external shocks such as those associated with the recent global economic crisis. The transmission mechanisms of the crisis to the region are identified as contractions of credit, foreign direct investment, remittances, and exports, and their variable impact across countries is assessed. Several types of institutions are examined, including the degree to which countries have adopted the acquis communautaire, determined by the extent of their EU integration, progress with transition, and the broad institutional environment measured through the quality of governance. The paper asks whether countries with a more flexible economy due to faster progress with transition reforms were better able to adjust to the impact of external shocks. It concludes that the variable impact of the global crisis in the region can be explained mainly by their degree of integration into the global economy, and that the institutional reforms that were introduced during the boom times have made countries more integrated into the global economy, and therefore more vulnerable to the impact of the global economic crisis.

In terms of the ratio of its public debt and public deficit to GDP the United States lies in the middle of the pack of industrial countries. The period since 1980 is the only peacetime period outside the Great Depression to see a sustained increase in the debt-GDP ratio. The budgetary retrenchment planned by the Clinton administration is likely to prove insufficient to achieve a sustainable path, although the remaining permanent primary (non-interest) gap is small: between 0.1% and 1.0% of GDP. The maximal amount of seigniorage revenue that can be extracted at a constant rate of inflation is not far from the recent historical value of less that 0.5% of GDP. Subtracting net public sector investment from the conventional budget deficit is likely to overstate the government revenue producing potential of public sector investment. Public debt matters when markets are incomplete and/or lump-sum taxes are restricted. Future interest payments associated with the public debt are not equivalent to currently expected future transfer payments. Even ignoring the distortionary character of most real-world taxes and transfers, and holding constant the government's exhaustive spending programme, the `generational accounts' do not therefore constitute sufficient statistic for estimating the effect on aggregate consumption of the government's tax-transfer programme. Solving the immediate budgetary problems would still leave the much more serious macroeconomic problems of an undersized US Federal government sector and an inadequate US national saving rate.

The paper analyses the monetary policy in Bulgaria for the period 1991-1992. The most commonly used by the national bank monetary instruments are described and the effects of their application are depicted. The results generally do not fulfill the expectations due to opportunities to roundabout the restrictions. The paper identifies deepening mismatch between the structure of financial and real flows that triggers inflationary pressures, credit portfolio deterioration and economic slowdown.

В настоящата разработка се прави анализ на паричната политика, провеждана в България след 1991 г. и по специално през 1992 г. Описани са най-често използваните от централната банка инструменти за регулиране на ликвидността в икономиката, както и ефектите от тяхното прилагане. Резултатите до голяма степен се разминават с очакванията поради възможностите за заобикаляне на наложените рестрикции. Идентифицирано е задълбочаващо се несъответствие между структурата на паричните и реални потоци в икономиката, което води до нарастване на инфлационния натиск, влошаване на качеството на кредитните портфейли и спад на икономическия растеж.

The collapse of the CMEA completed the Hungarian trade reorientation during the second half of the 1980s. Panel model estimations of trade reorientation reveal that cost efficiency, export subsidy and foreign demand played important and varying roles between 1981 and 1990. During the last two years cost efficiency ceased to exert an influence on the process, and subsidies were active instead.In 1991 the recession and the increased costs of trade reorientation led to a fall in the profitability of the corporate sector and exporting firms. Exporting firms with fast-growing exports had larger profits and they managed to combine the growth of exports with the expansion of domestic sales. Foreign capital and the new corporate forms have not yet ensured better performance.

This paper focuses on the obvious: Pareto-improving programmes may fail to improve everyone's lot. Politically, it has often been interpreted as a requirement that a majority should benefit from the change. Events in Central and Eastern Europe suggest otherwise and cast doubt on the relevance of the median-voter theorem. The addition of minority discontents may result in major political difficulties that lead governments to avoid actions that generate strong minority objections. As a result, the technically best-crafted plans may be rejected for political reasons. In addition, reform programmes which are ex ante politically acceptable may well become rejected ex post after they are implemented. One solution is to introduce a heavy dose of egalitarian income distribution, even if it runs against labour supply incentives.

Провежданата парична политика през 1991 г. преследваше две главни цели: да установи равновесие на паричния пазар, като съкрати изключително високото парично търсене до икономически обоснования размер на паричното предлагане; да предотврати прерастването на неизбежната либерализация на цените в хиперинфлация. За постигането на тези цели бяха използвани широка гама от инструменти, но главната тежест падна върху преките средства за контрол. Може да се каже, че поставените пред паричната политика задачи в общи линии бяха изпълнени, въпреки някои колебания през летния период.

In the aftermath of World War II, Italy and France experienced high inflation. The two countries enacted remarkably similar economic policy measures, but stabilization came at different times: for Italy at the end of 1947, for France a year later. Traditional explanations for the regained price stability cannot account for the difference in timing. In this paper, we use the international comparison to shed light on the nature of the inflationary process and on the cause of its decline. We conclude that inflation was symptomatic of an unresolved distributional conflict, and carne to an end when one political group, in both countries the Left, accepted its defeat. The Marshall plan helped to bring the stabilization about by reducing the costs to the group offering concessions. We argue that the French delay in stabilizing can be imputed to differences in the political climate and to the ambitious program of public investment.

As the ‘Washington Consensus’ reforms lose momentum, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is calling to shift the focus from the content of policy choices to the political process of their implementation. The analysis of the paradigmatic case of telecommunications reform in Costa Rica underscores the importance of these ‘politics of policies’. At the same time, however, it shows the shortcomings of an overly technocratic understanding of these: the failure of repeated liberalization initiatives was not only due to policy-makers’ errors in steering the project through ‘the messy world of politics’ (IDB), but it is also the policies’ content that shaped the actors’ responses. The liberalization project was able to muster bi-partisan support in the political arena; however it provoked broad popular mobilization against it, and thus became a catalyst for the disintegration of the country’s long-standing two-party system. Although the IDB warns of a ‘trade-off’ between representativeness and policy effectiveness, the analysis of the Costa Rican case shows quite to the contrary a causal link between the two: It is precisely a lack of representativeness that can crucially undermine policy effectiveness. Resumen: Por que fracasa la reforma: La ‘politica de gestion’ en la liberalizacion de las telecomunicaciones costarricenses A medida que el ‘Consenso de Washington’ pierde impetu, el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) esta llamando a concentrarse menos en el contenido de las opciones de programas y mas en el proceso politico de su implementacion. El analisis del paradigmatico caso de la reforma de las telecomunicaciones en Costa Rica subraya la importancia de estas ‘politicas de politicas’. Pese a que, al mismo tiempo, deja ver las deficiencias de una comprension demasiado tecnocratica de estas: el fracaso de las repetidas iniciativas de liberalizacion se debio no solo a errores de los responsables en la direccion del proyecto a traves del ‘turbio mundo de la politica’ (BID), sino tambien al contenido de las medidas que dieron forma a las respuestas de los participantes. El proyecto de liberalizacion fue capaz de concitar el respaldo de los dos partidos en la arena politica, pero provoco una amplia movilizacion popular en su contra y se convirtio asi en el primer catalizador de la desintegracion del antiguo sistema bipartidista. Aunque el BID proviene sobre una neutralizacion entre la representatividad y la efectividad de las medidas, el analisis del caso costarricense muestra al contrario una relacion causal entre las dos: Es precisamente la falta de representatividad la que puede minar de modo significativo la efectividad de las medidas.

The Israeli Economy has served as a laboratory for the study of inflation and government policy reponse. In periods crucial for Israel's experience of inflation, finance ministers were replaced frequently, often changing their predecessors' policies, much to the detriment of inflation. Inflation grew from an average of less than 10% per year in the decade preceding the first oil price shock to nearly 500% by the end of the first half of 1985. In the second half of 1985 a comprehensive and successful stabilization program masterminded foremost by Professor Michael Bruno brought inflation down to 15 to 20% at which level it stabilized until about 1991. The present paper which was written in early 1990 discusses Israeli inflation up to that time. In the years from 1992 to 2000 inflation was further reduced by quite a different strategy and since then Israel has been enjoying price stability.

This essay reflects the thoughts and experience of two staff members. Mark Allen has been a resident representative in both Poland (1990-93) and Hungary (1996-1998), two countries that have moved well along the road of transformation. Rick Haas was the resident representative in Belarus (1996-98), a country where much remains to be done. In some respects they had similar experiences, in others very dissimilar ones. In what follows they describe the circumstances they found themselves in, the advice they gave, the lessons they learned, and they recount some of their experiences as resident representatives. Copyright 2002, International Monetary Fund

Most former Soviet republics have fallen into an economic and political under-reform trap. An intrusive state imposes high tax rates and drives entrepreneurs into the unofficial economy, which further aggravates the pressure on official businessmen. Tax revenues and public goods dwindle, further reducing incentives to register business activity. This economic under-reform trap has a political counterpart. Remarkably, Communist parties remain popular and opposed to establishing the rule of law precisely in those places where they were able to delay and derail reform. No electoral backlash prompts the reforms necessary to leave the under-reform trap. The best way out of the trap in countries such as Russia and Ukraine is increased economic and political competition among the elite. Copyright 2002, International Monetary Fund

What lessons can be drawn from the unprecedented growth and spectacular collapse of financial pyramid schemes in Albania? This paper discusses the origins of the pyramid schemes and the way the authorities handled them. It also analyzes the economic effects of the pyramid schemes, concluding that despite the descent into anarchy triggered by the schemes' collapse, their direct effects on the economy are difficult to specify and appear to have been limited. Finally, the paper argues that prevention of pyramid schemes is better than cure and that governments and international financial institutions should be vigilant in clamping down on frauds. Copyright 2000, International Monetary Fund

The paper analyzes common issues emerging from the recent experience with Fund-supported programs in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. These comprise the initial price-overshooting and the output collapse, fiscal sustainability as well as the financial and structural problems associated with bad loan portfolios and sluggish implementation of privatization programs. Substantial success, in varying degrees, has been achieved in the initial macro-stabilization and opening-up effort. At the same time mounting difficulties with fiscal and monetary control may be emerging, as a result of social and political pressures and insufficiently clear policy signals on the micro-issues involving the sharp structural transformation of the productive and financial systems.

Fiscal policy was key determinant of macroeconomic behavior during the 80s, however it is necessary to distinguish the effects of shocks over fiscal policy from those resulting of policy decisions. For that purpose the study uses, with an adjustment, the methodology developed by Marshall and Schmidt-Hebbel (1989) that decomposes the deficit by its causes which are then analyzed from the point of view of their determinants. The study is complemented with the impacts of those determinants in a more general framework with a CGE model. The analysis was implemented for two periods, the first of crisis 1980-1984 and the second of stabilization 1985-1987.

In this paper we analyze the nature of the shocks hitting the CEECs over the recent years. To this end, we first evaluate the relative importance of symmetric vs. asymmetric shocks, and then extract their temporary component. Our final aim would be assessing the vulnerability of the CEECs to temporary and asymmetric shocks, which would be the most harmful case for the operation of a monetary union. Finally, a comparison with the case of the current EMU members is also presented.

This paper examines the effects of deficits spending and work-creation on the Nazi recovery. Although deficits were substantial and full employment was reached within four years, archival data on public deficits suggest that their fiscal impulse was too small to account for the speed of recovery. VAR forecasts of output using fiscal and monetary policy instruments also suggest only a minor role for active policy during the recovery. Nazi policies deliberately crowded out private demand to ensure high rates of rearmament. Military spending dominated civilian work-creation already in 1934. Investment in autobahn construction was minimal during the recovery and gained momentum only in 1936 when full employment was approaching. Continued fiscal and monetary expansion after that date may have prevented the economy from sliding back into recession. We find some effects of the Four Years Plan of late 1936, which boosted government spending further and tightened public control over the economy.

In this paper we assess the record of different post reform governments in meeting their targets and improving both delivery and finances. A variety of indices are constructed, and consistency checks devised to measure relative performance. No government has achieved its targets, but the congress has the best record in keeping its promises, and the NDA was most effective in reducing deficits. In the last year of the UPA the deadline effect helped meet expenditure targets, but at the cost of large deficits. The negative effect of the growth dividend on government debt and deficits is established, but the failure of government finances to improve commensurate with this, suggests further improvement in expenditure management is required. Four principles on which to base these improvements are identified.

We find that inflation does not unanimously decrease savings in the US during the postwar period. This result is puzzling as it contradicts the implications of most monetary general equilibrium models.

While experts in economics place transition to green economy on two directions - reducing ecological footprint and increasing human welfare - climate change specialists warn that effects of global warming will have a much greater impact in the future. It is natural to join scientific contributions in these two areas because both perspectives recognize the ravages made by industrialization, which triggered a serie of abrupt climate changes. For example, the average temperature in Europe has increased about 1oC. Based on these evidences, this article will show the usefulness of introducing a concept of full cycle to prevent climate change in the new paradigm that seeks to solve problems related to the fundamentals of sustainable development through transition to green economy. Using this method, this approach intends to be a new theoretical contribution which can act as support to efficiency of new clean technologies.

Monografia powstala w ramach finansowanego przez Narodowe Centrum Nauki projektu badawczego NN 112258439 „Koncepcje stanowionego i spontanicznego ladu gospodarczego w procesie transformacji systemowej gospodarki Polski i bylej NRD”. Poprzez przyjecie relatywnie dlugiego horyzontu czasowego analizy 1990-2010 spelniony zostal postulat powrotu historii do badan ladu gospodarczego. Nie jest to bowiem jedynie statyczna analiza roznych aktualnie istniejacych typow gospodarki rynkowej (variety of capitalism), tylko badania o charakterze par exellence dynamicznym. Poprzez empiryczne badanie sprzezenia zwrotnego pomiedzy stanowionymi i spontanicznymi elementami ladu na przykladzie wymienionych gospodarek oraz wspolwystepujacych z tym przemianami rynkowego ladu gospodarczego w badanym dwudziestoletnim podjeto probe wniesienia wkladu do konkretyzacji wysoce abstrakcyjnych teorii ladu stanowionego (Euckena) oraz ladu spontanicznego (von Hayeka). Wyrazamy przekonanie, iz stanowi to istotny i potrzebny krok w kierunku podwyzszenia ich walorow aplikacyjnych dla polityki gospodarczej.

From 1995 to 2001 Russia witnessed an asset market boom, a deep financial crisis, and a surprisingly forceful recovery. An event study of this episode provides important insights for Emerging Market investment and Russia's medium-term prospects. The initial surge in bond and stock prices in 1995-97 owed to a highly ambitious monetary stabilization program, which compressed inflation much faster than other transition economies. Due to high dollarization, disinflation was based on the exchange rate. The program produced rapid real appreciation and a persistent need for capital inflows, while weak economic structures and lack of domestic political support prevented accompanying fiscal consolidation and foreign direct investment. The gap between stabilization ambition and structural reality made the currency increasingly vulnerable. Also, the program did not provide a politically viable "emergency exit" from the exchange rate target corridor. Devaluation was postponed through heavy international support. The ultimate crisis escalation in August 1998 resulted in a partial government default and steep devaluation. However, the economy responded from 1999 with relief to the real depreciation, entering a phase of sustained expansion. Also, the crisis escalation united the political spectrum around a new fundamental consensus on economic policy. Post-crisis governments prioritized fiscal consolidation over disinflation. The more stable political and economic environment spurred broader economic reform from 2000, particularly in the areas of public finances and investment conditions. Together with persistent commitment towards international integration this heralds a long-term convergence of Russia's economic structures with those in Central and Western Europe.

In this chapter, Daniel Schwanen addresses the impact of the major trade liberalization efforts undertaken by Canada and its trading partners beginning with the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 1989. The author focuses in particular on the question of whether liberalized trade could have been a factor behind the emergence of greater inequalities in Canada in the 1990s. The author divides Canadian manufacturing industries into five groups according to their sensitivity to trade liberalization in the 1990s and to the direction taken by exports and imports following the opening of trade. Schwanen concludes from this exercise that more open trade may have contributed to inequalities in Canada, by favoring certain groups already doing relatively well, while being unfavourable to many less-skilled and lesser-paid groups.

In this paper we analyze the nature of the shocks hitting the EMU member countries over the period 1991-2004, as well as for the two subperiods before and after 1999, i.e., the start of EMU. To this end, we first evaluate the relative importance of symmetric vs. asymmetric shocks, and then extract their temporary component. Our final aim would be assessing the vulnerability of the EMU countries to temporary and asymmetric shocks, which would be the most harmful case for the operation of a monetary union.

Artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie zakresu znaczeniowego rezerw dewizowych i pojęć pokrewnych oraz zbadanie, w jakim stopniu jawność, przejrzystość i kompletność danych o rezerwach wpływały na przebieg kryzysów finansowych w gospodarkach wschodzących w latach 90. XX w., a także jak pod wpływem kryzysów zmieniła się praktyka informowania o rezerwach. Studia przypadków (kryzysy w Meksyku, Tajlandii i Korei) ujawniły, że konwencjonalne miary rezerw dewizowych dają niepełny, a niekiedy wręcz mylący obraz stanu gospodarki. Pozwala to władzom odkładać w czasie kosztowne decyzje i rodzi ryzyko gwałtownych reakcji uczestników rynków finansowych. Kryzysy finansowe skłoniły władze monetarne gospodarek wschodzących do zwiększonej akumulacji rezerw dewizowych oraz do upowszechniania danych makroekonomicznych zgodnie z opracowanymi przez MFW wytycznymi. Zgodnie z nimi władze monetarne ujawniają nie tylko rezerwy brutto, ale także przewidywane i warunkowe obciążenia aktywów rezerwowych, co pozwala uzyskać kompleksowy obraz płynności w walutach obcych i odporności na wstrząsy zewnętrzne.