Search

Rehabilitation and reconstruction of social and economic infrastructure in a post-conflict environment are complex and long-debated issues in development cooperation. Both in pre-conflict and post-conflict situations, deepening chaos and disorder can be found at the highest social, economic and political levels, and serious development challenges remain insufficiently addressed. After almost a decade of the war in Kosovo, the providers of infrastructure services for the disaster affected, returning communities are faced with multifaceted problems characterised by a fragile society with political, economic and institutional breakdowns.Planning and implementing reconstruction projects in areas that are affected by conflict has proven to be far more challenging than expected, and has often been considered to be a feeble response from practitioners, aid agencies and government. In addition, genuine community-level involvement in post-conflict planning and decision-making for programs are central to any process for empowerment. With the presence of multiple donors and aid organisations, making informed decisions about complex multifaceted solutions, promoting good governance and better allocation of scarce resources are required to achieve a good outcome in a post-war situation. This also entails having a clearer focus and understanding of planning and implementation of post-war reconstruction projects and programs, thereby leading to nation building.The concept of managing post-conflict reconstruction and development projects according to internationally-accepted project management processes is a relatively new and developing field. The current study looked at how the planning and execution of post-conflict reconstruction and development projects in Kosovo could be used to develop a conceptual framework with which to design projects and programs that would be more likely to yield positive outcomes for society. The impetus for the study was to examine the planning and im

Even as the NATO Secretary General alluded to the possible withdrawal of forces from Kosovo, critics are clamoring that no clear exit strategy exists. The unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 2008 puts this new nation at the crossroads and is a game changer for NATO. For the past ten years NATO, through KFOR, established a safe and secure environment within the country. Kosovo must evolve as a nation capable of sustaining itself without the dependency on international donors or a peacekeeping force to guarantee security. An objective analysis of the latest progress reports from Kosovo is warranted. This paper examines the impact PRTs would have in Kosovo, where no PRTs are operating. It demonstrates the viability of PRTs in Kosovo by comparing current developmental needs against demonstrated PRT civil-military capabilities. Finally, this paper draws conclusions concerning the current KFOR capabilities and recommends that PRTs deploy in-lieu of the Multination Task Forces currently operating in Kosovo as an exit strategy., A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations. The original document contains color images.

In its efforts to assist post-conflict societies in africa the international aid community has acitvely promoted projects of psycho-social healing among people traumatized during wars and violent conflict. To a large degree these projects have been established in the tradtion of Western psychology. More recently, however, it has been realized in order to help survivors of war effectivley it is necessary to adapt projects and enhance “local” psycho-social healing. This policy report locates the structures – with local legitimacy – that are available to young people who experienced sexual abuse during the Sierra Leone civil war (1991–2002). To this end, this booklet discusses a healing complex that comprises a number of overlapping actors, including herbalists, Zoe Mammies (heads of the female secret societies), Mori-men (Muslim healers); Karamokos (Muslim teachers) and Christian pastors.

The study investigates the interface between the variables - language attitude and language use in a development context, and attempts to determine the contribution of language to Rwanda's post-conflict development, reconstruction and reconciliation. It examines the language attitudes and language use patterns of 53 students from Rwanda's public universities focusing on how students, who are all Rwandan citizens, view the role of Kinyarwanda, French, English and Kiswahili languages in twelve core areas of post-conflict development. Although post-conflict development is socio-economic, previous historical and political factors affecting Rwanda's violent past play a role as new forms of linguistic categorization - Anglophone and Francophone - emerge which may be used to camouflage previous ethnic categorizations that have had disastrous effects in Rwanda. Further, social categorizations laden with salient features of linguistic identity may influence the implementation of the post-conflict development programmes, and also affect the pace and pattern of reconciliation in Rwanda. Conclusions are based on eclectic sources: quantitative, qualitative, historical and participatory, with patterns of analysis established from secondary and historical data. The study is also grounded in the Communication Accommodation Theory that rests on issues of divergence and convergence during interaction where emerging language identities dovetail with language attitudes and language use, resulting in an interface that influences the implementation of Rwanda's post-conflict development programmes. Additionally, it is argued that the African languages such as Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili, should be considered as vehicles for Rwanda's post-conflict development, although Kinyarwanda, the home language, has in the past really not served an intranational unifying function. On the other hand, Kiswahili, unlike Kinyarwanda, has no divisive myths and identities that would inhibit post-conflict deve

Two phenomena have been recently utilised to explain conflict onset among rational choice analysts: greed and grievance. The former reflects elite competition over valuable natural resource rents. The latter argues that relative deprivation and the grievance it produces fuels conflict. Central to grievance are concepts of inter-ethnic or horizontal inequality. Identity formation is also crucial to intra-state conflict, as it overcomes the collective action problem. Conflict can rarely be explained by greed alone, yet, the greed versus grievance hypotheses may be complementary explanations for conflict. The greed explanation for conflict duration and secessionist wars works best in cross-country studies, but has to make way for grievance-based arguments in quantitative country-case studies. Grievances and horizontal inequalities may be better at explaining why conflicts begin, but not necessarily why they persist. Neither the presence of greed or grievance is sufficient for the outbreak of violent conflict, something which requires institutional breakdown, which we describe as the failure of the social contract. The degradation of the social contract is more likely in the context of poverty and growth failure. We provide a synthesis of the greed and grievance hypotheses, including comments on post-conflict reconstruction.

Since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom nearly seven years ago, Afghanistan has made only very limited progress towards reconstruction. While they have experienced limited political progress under the framework agreed to in Bonn Agreement, the development, reform, and progress in other sectors of the society have predominantly fallen short of expectations. After several years of relative calm, the Taliban reemerged in 2004 significantly increasing their operations and territorial control each year. The influence of the Taliban was accelerated, in part, by the dissatisfaction of the population due to the lack of progress in post-conflict development. In response, the international community and the United States are increasing the money and manpower dedicated to the reconstruction effort. This thesis quantitatively analyzes the number, type, and location of reconstruction projects, the localized Taliban risk level, and the number, type, and location of Taliban attacks from January 2004 to June 2007. The goal of the analysis is to assess the effectiveness of the reconstruction effort at decreasing Taliban attacks and to uncover which sectors have the greatest impact and act as the key leverage points. Through statistical calculations, it was determined that reconstruction projects targeting rural development, agricultural development, and natural resources development had the greatest effect on decreasing the Taliban presence. Local, small-scale security projects, rather than decreasing attacks, actually increased Taliban attacks, in some cases accounting for an amazing 76 percent of the increase. Additionally, the $10.3 billion in strategic-level security and infrastructure improvements had no measurable impact on decreasing the level of Taliban attacks.

In a post-conflict situation, a strategy of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is critical to achieving sustainable peace. There are three main DDR approaches: the cooperative, successful against macro-insecurities; the integrated, emphasizes micro-insecurities; and the coercive, commonly a failure. Today, coercive DDR programs are increasingly common, which creates a need to understand why many think they always fail, and how the programs can be improved. This thesis conducts a comparative study of three coercive DDR programs, comparing within and across the programs to ascertain conditions that lead to both success and failure. Haiti 1994 2004 is an example of coercive DDR with short-term success but long-term failure. Haiti 2004 2007 is an example of the unique challenges implementers confront when targeting criminal gangs. Albania 1997 1999 is an example of how coercive DDR achieves long-term success by using a community-based approach. The study finds that short-term success is sustainable when the terms of DDR are acceptable to the target group. Security, economic guarantees, and community involvement are critical to the success of coercive DDR. Contrary to expectations, coercive DDR programs can succeed, but require careful integration of local actors and local situations, a condition that is often absent.

In the numerous armed conflicts that are tearing the African continent apart, young women are participants and carry guns alongside their male comrades-in-arms. Challenging the stereotype of women in African wars as victims only, this issue of the Nordic Africa Institute Policy Dialogues shows how in modern African wars women have often been as active as men. Female fighters are victimized, yet they are not mere victims. Girls and young women who volunteer to fight often possess quite considerable strength and independence. Programmes for disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former fighters must be based on better understanding of the range of women's roles and experiences in war and post-war settings in order to act in a gender-sensitive way and to empower this group of women in the aftermath of war., CONTENTS -- Women and war -- Female fighters : disarmament and demobilization -- Surviving peace

Imagining a Peaceful Society: A Vision of Children's Literature in a Post-Conflict Zimbabwe addresses the marginalisation of children's literature from the discourse on conflict and peace building in Africa. By presenting a unique perspective to how writers of children's literature, and children themselves understand, grapple with, and envision peace in a post-conflict Zimbabwean society, this Discussion Paper calls attention to the immense, but largely untapped potential of literature as a critical resource for the promotion peace in Africa., CONTENTS -- Zimbabwe: An Anatomy of Crisis -- Children's Literature: A Definition -- Naming Conflict: Zimbabwean Children's Literature -- Envisioning a New Society: Zimbabwean Children's Literature

This essay examines Iraq as a case study in nation-building. The purpose is to give the reader a thorough understanding of what nation-building is, the situation in Iraq since the U.S. invasion, and how the two (nation-building and Iraq) go together. The theory for the empirical analysis is built upon the three concepts of ideological legitimation, social integration, and state-building. The roles of security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and governance and participation and their relevance to the nation-building effort in Iraq are also explored. The thesis is divided into three main sections. The first section covers the most important elements involved in nation-building and provides a brief history of it since World War II. The second section gives a thorough overview of the Iraq conflict and the primary actors involved (United States, Shi?a Arab, Sunni Arab, and Kurds). The third section integrates the first two in order to provide an empirical case study of nation-building in Iraq. I then discuss my conclusions. The intended effect is to give the reader an understanding of the intricacies of the nation-building effort in Iraq, and open up debate for what the continuing nation-building effort there will require in order to be successful. The material used is composed of a large amount of literary, journal, and internet sources, the majority of which were written after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Stabilization and reconstruction operations are necessary to secure and maintain the peace in the aftermath of conflict. The complexities of nation-building involve many different but interrelated systems and institutions. The basic structure of a country may or may not remain; its political, economic, and judicial systems, cultural, educational, medical, and military institutions, and critical infrastructure all vitally contribute to the overall progression of stability and prosperity. Understanding the significance of the dynamic relationships between the forces in play during stability and reconstruction operations is paramount to the successful conclusion of such missions. The system dynamics model proposed in this research functions as a support tool allowing decisionmakers and analysts to investigate different sets of decision approaches at a sub-national, regional level. Concentration on the regional level allows for specific identification and investigation of potentially troublesome regions, providing the model-user with more detailed information concerning the internal dynamics prevalent within the area of operations. Construction of two different measures via logistic regression, a probability of stabilization success and a probability of stabilization failure, provide indication as to the successful execution of stabilization and reconstruction operations. The proposed model is a general construct, widely adaptable to a variety of post-conflict nation-building scenarios. The model is notionally demonstrated using Operation Iraqi Freedom as a test case., Sponsored in part by Department of Defense, Fort George G. Meade, MD. The original document contains color images.

How does post-conflict militarization affect democratization in Sri Lanka? In 2009, Sri Lanka ended three decades of counter-insurgency action with the separatist LTTE. Yet the military remains active in the reconstruction processes. Critics describe the deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction as an impediment to democratization. This thesis, however, argues that the deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction both positively and negatively affects democratization processes in Sri Lanka. This thesis also studies the political developments from 1948 to 2016 that resulted in the deployment of the military internally. Then, it analyzes the effects of such military roles toward democratic consolidation and civil-military relations within the frameworks of analysis provided by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, and Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei. This thesis finds that post-conflict militarization positively affects democratic consolidation in the short term but negatively in the long term. It also finds both positive and negative effects toward democratic civil-military relations. Sri Lanka presents a unique case because militarization helped the economic growth of the country during the conflict. Hence, this research will contribute to the studies on the effects of post-conflict militarization toward democratization theoretically, and in the South Asian context., http://archive.org/details/deploymentofmili1094551682, Lieutenant Colonel, Sri Lanka Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Psychological operations (PSYOP) forces should undertake significant doctrinal, training, and operational reforms to ensure the viability of support provided to U.S. led stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Such operations involve increased civilmilitary interactions and necessitate effective cross-cultural communications with not only the indigenous populace, but a host of transnational actors as well. Today's PSYOP training is reflective of a persisting "Cold War mentality" that fails to adequately prepare soldiers for effective post-conflict situations such as the reunification of the Korean peninsula, whether brought about either through a renewal of combat operations or the result of diplomatic means. Meanwhile, North Korea's formidable and adept propaganda machine has persisted in isolating its populace from external influences for more than a halfcentury. Post-Korean War generation North Koreans have been successfully indoctrinated since birth to despise the United States. Furthermore, anti-U.S. sentiment has been on the rise in South Korea for a number of years. Under the current training model, contemporary psychological operations forces are ill-prepared to conduct effective operations in an environment involving two-way, face-to-face communications such as those required while stabilizing and reconstructing a nation. The case of Korean reunification serves as an extreme scenario that nevertheless depicts the drastic need for improvements in the capabilities of modern PSYOP forces., http://archive.org/details/psyopinstabiliza109452229, Captain, United States Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This monograph examines the use of the Marshall Plan as a strategic analogy for successful post-conflict success. It details what the Marshall Plan really was, what it accomplished, and how it did so in post-World War II Western Europe. In doing so, this research extracts five contextual variables that contributed to the Marshall Plan's success in Western Europe and applies them to recent post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan to determine the utility of the Marshall Plan as a strategic analogy for post-conflict success. This monograph concludes that the Marshall Plan analogy has been poorly applied creating troubling implications for phases IV (Stabilize) and V (Enable Civil Authority) operational planners. Planners must recognize the use of strategic analogy, understand its potential implications when used as a form of strategic guidance, see through analogy to seek the best understanding possible of the context they face, and develop a solution to future post-conflict operations that accounts for such context.

The coalition and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) face a complex and difficult challenge in their search for solutions to the Afghan conundrum. The establishment of Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) represents a revolutionary step in meeting this challenge. The PRT program combines security and civil action to facilitate regional development. PRTs afford an important interface and make possible information sharing among the local population and government, non-government and international aid organizations. Despite their diminutive size, PRTs possess an innate ability to influence a significant proportion of Afghanistan’s rural population, thereby reinforcing regional stability. Notwithstanding common agendas, significant variances exist between coalition and NATO PRTs. Inconsistencies in modus operandi, perceived mandates, roles and responsibilities, national caveats and operational structures have all faced criticism. With international pressure mounting for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to take the lead throughout Afghanistan, this study of existing PRTs is not only timely, but provides a constructive insight for those nations contemplating supporting the reconstruction effort. This investigation is also useful to those nations who staff existing PRTs in the north and northwest and who may be considering transferring their efforts to the southern or southeastern regions; the most insecure and challenging areas of Afghanistan. This monograph provides a historical overview of Afghanistan’s recent history, reviews the contemporary causes of internal instability, illustrates the international response, and analyses three existing approaches to PRTs: those of the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States. It also identifies and evaluates a number of PRT tactical and operational lessons learned. The monograph concludes by combining the pertinent lessons learned into a recommended PRT “blueprint” to meet the contemporary and evol

The execution of the post-hostilities phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom has prompted many to ask did why the U.S. military plan so poorly for stability and reconstruction operations (SRO)? Many studies have suggested that the lack of interagency coordination within the U.S. government was the cause of poor SRO planning and execution. However, detailed analysis of the nature of military operations, the military’s responsibilities, and the limited capacity of agencies within the U.S. government point to a different reason; a reluctance on the part of the military to consider SRO a core competency. Therefore, in the near term the solutions to improving the ability of the military to plan and execute SRO are to be found inside the military, not through improvements in interagency coordination. To reach the conclusion that the military ought to focus internally rather than pursue improvements to interagency coordination requires the recognition that the military’s ability to plan and perform SRO tasks consists of several interrelated dimensions. The first dimension requires the definition of SRO as a basis for developing a list of associated SRO tasks. The second dimension is the current process used to plan SRO and the assignment of responsibility for SRO tasks. Investigating the second dimension reveals the potential contributions from the interagency, specifically, the potential contributions from organizational initiatives like the JIACG and the S/CRS. The last dimension consists of the universe of organizations that have the capability to conduct SRO tasks. The analysis of this dimension reveals the requirement for military forces to conduct SRO tasks. Ultimately, the analysis shows that SRO and combat are closely related. Therefore, military plans should address both from the onset instead of sequentially. Additionally, planners should focus on the transition to civilian control rather than the end of combat operations. This is so because the military is likely the

The attacks of 11 September 2001 taught the United States that weak states can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. With this lesson still fresh in the minds of policy makers, and the mixed results of several humanitarian and nation-building missions in the 1990s, considerable interest in redefining US responsibility and capability to rebuild post-conflict nations has arisen. The current struggle to constitute stable governments in both Afghanistan and Iraq has intensified the calls for America to develop a standing nation-building capacity. It is essential that US government policy making bodies, such as the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), understand the US Army’s current capability to perform stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) missions. This monograph examines what principal activities and roles inherent in SRO, beyond establishing and preserving security, the US Army is currently capable of conducting or coordinating. A secondary question is whether the US Army, as an institution, is suited to govern an occupied territory. The current body of theory, analysis, and commentary on SRO from foreign policy research and analysis institutions, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), agrees that the US needs to improve its standing SRO capability, but differs significantly with regards to which particular aspects of SRO are the most critical to mission success. Using a modified case study approach, profiles of the Army’s planning and performance of SRO in post-World War II Japan and in early Operation Iraqi Freedom are compared. Though the two profiles share many important similarities (e.g. both are instances in which the US decided for various national security reasons to affect fundamental governmental, economic, and societal changes in a foreign country), the differences are striking. These contrasts show that conditions for the peaceful o