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Soon after the First World War, Muslim India was involved in a mass political convulsion of a composite nature. Its components were two parallel and mutually linked agitations: a tense and explosive pan-Islamic emotionalism apprehensive of the fate of the defeated Ottoman empire, of the Arab lands (especially the Hijāz), and of the institution of the caliphate; and an alliance with the Hindus in the nationalist and anti-imperialist mass-movement led by the Indian National Congress. These two elements of the agitation were directed against linked objectives: pressure on the government in Britain for a more sympathetic approach in deciding the fate of the vanquished Ottoman empire; and pressure on the British government in India for greater concessions towards self-determination. The way for a working alliance with Congress had been prepared since 1911 by a series of national and international developments. The annulment of the partition of Bengal (1911), which deprived the Muslims of that province of the political and economic advantage conceded to them earlier, had convinced the Muslim leadership of the instability of British patronage. British action, inaction, or indifference on such developments as the Italian occupation of Libya, or the extension of French control over Morocco, the Balkan War, the suspected designs of a partition of Persia (and possibly Turkey) between Russia and Great Britain, had built up the image of British imperialism as an ally of all European imperialist thrusts directed against the Muslim lands. The annulment of the partition of Bengal had also taught the Muslim political leaders the lesson that the policy of loyalism, initiated by Sayyid Ahmad Khān and followed ever since, did not pay as rich political dividends as the organised movement of political opposition conducted by Congress, or even the terrorism of extremist Hindus.

In Great Britain war with Revolutionary France became a serious public question in the last three months of 1792, when the armies of the newly established republic unexpectedly swept all before them on three fronts. In the South, Savoy and Nice were quickly overrun in September. In the East, the Rhenish towns surrendered one after another to a small force commanded by Custine. In the North, Dumourier's conquest of Belgium was completed by the end of November. These successes profoundly affected British society. They showed, in the first place, that France remained the leading military power in Europe, whatever was once thought of the debilitating effect of revolution. British policy therefore had still to be founded on at least potential membership of an anti-French coalition to defend the country's interests on the Continent, including perhaps the security of allies. As the crisis worsened, the anti-French publicists began to refer to Britain and France as ‘natural’ enemies and looked forward to the impending struggle as the continuation of earlier wars. The second feature of the French victories of 1792 was frighteningly new. Europe had learnt to live with an enormously powerful France, but never with one which flagrantly disregarded the conventions of war and diplomacy and which seemed bent on destroying the old world order. These fears were drawn to the surface by event after event. The annexation of Savoy in November, along with the invasions of Germany and Belgium, suggested that the military might of the republic would be employed in ambitious schemes of national aggrandisement.

The Restoration of Charles II was an event of great moment and was proclaimed, expounded, celebrated and recorded in a profusion of pageantry and panegyric, tracts, sermons, pictures, diary entries and, later on, memoirs and histories. The array of responses to Charles’s return was effusive and apparently unanimous, although often clumsy or heavy-handed, and conveys a striking sense of surprise, wonder, and even shock. The king’s Restoration was a mystery verging on the miraculous, as many contemporaries saw it, and had come about with almost inexplicable suddenness and ease. Poets registered the wonder of the occasion abundantly and equally in prose writings religiosity combined with loyalism to confer a peculiarly exalted significance on the event, working to achieve for the political change a heightened, near-mythical status. To remove Charles’s Restoration from the shifting uncertainties of the immediate political situation required ingenuity and boldness and it is curious that what now might be regarded as a blatantly wishful way of seeing seems at the time to have been not merely convincing but inevitable and natural. Restoration panegyric was not the product of superficial time-serving alone. After twelve years of government upheaval, and after twelve months of particularly extreme instability, a fresh start which was also a return to stability was urgently desired.

Acknowledgements Contributors 1. Introduction: Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland - Maria Power 2. Understanding the role of non-aligned civil society in peacebuilding in Northern Ireland: towards a fresh approach - Nicholas Acheson, Carl Milofsky and Maurice Stringer 3. The role of civil society in promoting peace in Northern Ireland - Timothy J. White 4. The contribution of integrated schools to peacebuilding in Northern Ireland - Claire McGlynn 5. Providing a prophetic voice for peace? Church leaders and peacebuilding - Maria Power 6. 'Peace Women', gender and peacebuilding in Northern Ireland: from reconciliation and political inclusion to human rights and human security - Marie Hammond-Callaghan 7. Encumbered by data: understanding politically motivated former prisoners and the transition to peace in Northern Ireland - Kieran McEvoy and Pete Shirlow 8. Loyalism and peacebuilding in the 2000s - Joana Etchart 9. Civil Society, the State and conflict Transformation in the Nationalist Community - Kevin Bean 10. Examining the peacebuilding policy framework of the Irish and British governments - Sandra Buchanan 11. Building peace and crossing borders: the north/south dimension of reconciliation - Katy Hayward, Cathal McCall and Ivo Damkat 12. Peace dividends: the role of aid in peacebuilding - Elham Atashi Index

L'A. examine un aspect neglige mais important du sectarisme en Irlande du Nord contemporaine : son incorporation dans la culture materielle et les pratiques sociales quotidiennes de ses factions antagonistes. Apres une breve revue theorique du sectarisme (caracterise comme formation discursive), il decrit ce phenomene tel qu'il se trouve dans une communaute loyaliste en Ulster. Il montre comment la realite materielle du sectarisme incorpore les activites quotidiennes de ces loyalistes, y compris leur culture traditionnelle de l'Orangisme et les domaines du sport, des loisirs et des distractions. Au sein de ces pratiques culturelles quotidiennes, les valeurs sectaires sont objectifiees et conservees dans des objets fetichises tels que drapeaux et bannieres ainsi que dans une culture orale de chants et de slogans.

L'auteur s'interesse a l'approche de la vie politique de Confucius et a la facon dont il a concilie ses propres convictions et son activite politique effective au sein des royaumes de l'epoque Chunqiu (Printemps et Automnes)

In Northern Ireland (hereafter called NI), as we all know, the sphere of cultural and political identities is a fiercely contested one. Young people in NI develop a sense of ethnic awareness in an ongoing situation of political mobilization and sectarian confrontation. Historically conditioned cultural divisions are reproduced in and through the education system. Increasing levels of segregation combined with the isolating effect of mass unemployment have led to further ghettoization of young people within their confessional communities. This paper examines the symbiotic relation between the dynamics of urban working-class youth culture and the ethnic boundary maintenance practices of adult life in NI. For working-class youth, as for their parents, the defence of the territorial and symbolic boundaries of their confessional communities are central concerns. We suggest that young people in NI are more than passive initiates into the Loyalist and Republican political and cultural traditions. In their youth-cultural practices they play an active part in the reproduction of'sectarian' ideology. In the research reported here we explore the specific relationship of Protestant youth to a parental culture of Loyalism a culture subject to acute tensions in the current situation of mass unemployment and felt political insecurity in NI. We argue that the cultural practices of Protestant youth their bands, parades, kerb and wall markings, bonfires are an attempt to address, at the level of the symbolic, the focal concerns of a Loyalist parental political culture and the material and ideological contradictions which beset this. But young people themselves are experiencing a specific material situation. This is the generation whose birth coincided with the onset of the 'troubles'. The ghettoization of-residential life since then has affected them perhaps more than any other age group. Their physical mobility is restricted as are their opportunities for recreation and even employment. Their adolescence is occurring in a period within capitalist society of general marginalization of young workers from

Probably the greatest popular movement in Georgian Britain was that formed around military volunteering during the wars against revolutionary and Napoleonic France. Often cited is the number of volunteers enrolled in 1803–4, nearly 400,000. These were the most active participants. Outside the ranks there existed an even larger mass of organizers, subscribers and supporters, including sometimes female committees; at this time volunteering was one of several developments which brought Britain recognizably close to ‘total’ war in terms of its population's war-involvement. Yet historians have said little about the movement. We have not progressed very far beyond the gospel according to Victorian and Edwardian nationalism in which Napoleonic volunteering was depicted as the British people's inevitable response to the threat of foreign invasion, proud testimony of their ‘warlike spirit’, ‘love of freedom’ and ‘patriotic unanimity’. The only critical evaluation there has been remains based on an article by J. R. Western, published as long ago as 1956. This refined the established ‘wave of patriotism’ version by linking volunteering with the counter-revolution of the 1790s directed against popular radicals. Volunteers were depicted as armed loyalists, their corps as the successors of the loyalist associations and the movement as a whole as a key component of an extensive and dominant ‘party of order’. The most recent work on the anti-radical reaction barely disturbs this interpretation. While it is not denied that the threat of foreign attack was also instrumental in producing volunteers, the emphasis continues to be on volunteering, at least in its early phase, as an outgrowth of counter-revolutionary loyalism.

INDIVIDUAL choice is the essence of aggregate political affiliation. In the crisis of 1776, loyalism and revolution grew from particular colonists' adoption of opposing partisan stances. In the course of a political and military upheaval lasting an entire generation, almost every AngloAmerican faced this decision. For many of these individuals, known only by cryptic references in muster lists or confiscation rolls, the question of choice remains unanswered. Whatever gross surmise there may be about this faceless multitude-many perhaps victims of geographical accident or invading armies-as individuals, they chose to stay or flee, sign oaths of allegiance or resist the oath givers. One can couch this fact in psychological terms: "human action is never directly caused by situations; it is invariably mediated by psychological variables." A relative handful of loyalists and revolutionaries did leave behind them sufficient evidence for the historian to probe the psychological dimensions of individual choice. This essay is a report on the application of modern psychological scaling techniques and quantitative methods to study political affiliation among loyalists and revolutionaries in New York.' The colony of New York presents the problem of revolutionary political choice at its most complex. Recent investigators have agreed that New York loyalists and revolutionaries "cannot readily be placed into predetermined categories." Aristocratic planters, merchants, N. E. H. Hull is a graduate student at Columbia University. Peter C. Hoffer is assistant professor of history in the University of Georgia, Athens. Steven L. Allen is a graduate student at New York University.

ANADIAN ATTITUDES toward American English reflected in the popular press of English Canada (essentially Ontario) from the mid-nineteenth century until shortly after the First World War vary considerably with the social and political climate and, not least of all, with the degree of Loyalism in author or editor. These views are generally the result of political rather than linguistic principles, and, since Canada-apart from its attachment to the Crown-has from its inception had to resist the economic and cultural influences of the United States, it is not surprising that her statements on American speech are most commonly hostile. The degree of hostility alters, however, with changes in the political scene. Thus, The Canadian Magazine of Politics, Science, Art and Literature, adamantly opposed to "Americanisms," published in 1901 an essay on "Our Fighting Vocabulary" which appeared to be appreciative of American slang. The author, F. Blake Crofton, remarked that "Americans have contributed largely to the common store of striking expressions"'--the pun was, I am afraid, intentional. It must be observed that Crofton is not entirely laudatory of American expressions, for while the American words come from "their roughs" and "the New York rowdy," similar expressions are from more civilized "angry Canadian youths." The difference between the rowdy and the angry youth reflects a common conception of the United States as 'a rough, crude society' as compared with Canada. The reason for the slight degree of response to American slang here is explainable by the politics of the day: During and for a short time after the Boer War, the Canadian press tended to glorify all things Anglo-Saxon-even things as tangentially Anglo-Saxon as American English.2

Re-examines the causes of the American Revolution, looking at those men in leadership positions who actively supported the pre-revolutionary movement, but who after 1776 changed their minds, and opposed the Revolution to such an extent that they became Loyalists.

My purpose in the following pages is to speak on behalf of Marvell's major "Augustan" satire, Last Instructions to a Painter. If few have done so, it is not hard to see why. George deForest Lord sets the problem this way: how does one account for the fact " that a lyric poet of unexcelled grace and sensitivity could have produced such a poem, . . . a poem that is often derisive, tendentious, cynical, and ugly "? 1 Many critics respond to the problem by accepting this disjunction for what it appears to be and excluding the poem from general discussions of Marvell's poems. Critics who take the poem seriously accept the disjunction too. They disconnect Last Instructions from the earlier work and concentrate on matters extrinsic to the poem: it is an expression of anti-government " loyalism " to the King; it is a poetic "painting" in the consciously grotesque style of satirical prints; or it is an important experiment in " epic " satire, leading to Dryden's far greater poems in that mode.2 It is, of course, all of these, but it is also a major public statement on political affairs by a poet whose true mastery lay in poems of meditation and retirement. Professor Lord argues that there is no true disjunction between the lyrics and the satires. An outer world of " involvement " and " action " continually exerts pressure on the retired, contemplative world of his lyrics-and sometimes it brutally breaks in. Marvell's gravitation toward action and involvement, which is