Search

• We examined whether children (and adults) distinguish between caring and liking. • Ownership and object attractiveness differentially influence caring and liking. • By age 6, children differentiate caring from liking in their own judgments. • By age 4, children differentiate caring from liking in their inferences of others' valuations. Liking one object more than another does not guarantee caring about it more, and vice-versa. Here we show that with age, children increasingly distinguish between these two ways of valuing objects. We conducted three experiments on 589 children and 415 adults. In Experiment 1, 3–7-year-olds and adults chose between their own plain sticker and another more attractive one. Among 6−7-year-olds and adults, choices of the plain sticker were relatively more common for caring than liking. In Experiment 2, 3−6-year-olds and adults inferred what others care about and like. Among 4−6-year-olds and adults, choices of a plain object owned by another person were relatively more common in inferences about caring than liking. However, children chose the owned objects at low rates, raising the possibility that children had predominantly based judgments on the relative attractiveness of the objects. Experiment 3 addressed this concern by examining judgments about identical-looking objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We investigated a typicality bias for stories in 2- to 4-year-olds. • Children continued stories consisting of atypical events with typical events. • Children readily remembered atypical events. • Children did not fully override the bias when predicting how the experimenter would continue a story. Across four experiments (total N = 280) we find that children aged 2–4 show a novel bias favoring typical over atypical story events. In Experiment 1, 2−3-year-olds expected animals in a story to eat species-typical foods, even though other animals in the story ate foods atypical for their species. In Experiment 2, 2−3-year-olds successfully remembered atypical events in a story, which suggests the bias does not result from difficulty remembering these events. In Experiment 3, 3−4-year-olds chose atypical events when judging how a story would continue. But when predicting how the experimenter would continue the story, they were as likely to choose typical events. In Experiments 4A&B, children persisted in choosing typical events after having been asked to explain why earlier story events had been atypical. Overall, our findings suggest that children favor typical over atypical story events and may have difficulty disregarding or overriding the bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does probability affect attributions of intentionality? In five experiments (total N = 1410), we provide evidence for a probability raising account holding that people are more likely to see the outcome of an agent's action as intentional if the agent does something to increase the odds of that outcome. Experiment 1 found that high probability without probability raising does not suffice for strong attributions of intentionality. Participants were more likely to conclude a girl intentionally obtained a desired gumball from a single gumball machine when it offered favorable odds for getting that kind of gumball compared with when it offered poor odds, but their attributions of intentionality were lukewarm. Experiments 2 and 3 then found stronger attributions of intentionality when the girl raised her probability of success by choosing to use machines offering favorable odds over machines offering poor odds. Finally, Experiments 4 and 5 examined whether these effects of probability raising might reduce to consideration of agents' beliefs and expectations. We found that although these mental states do matter, probability raising matters too—people attribute intentional actions to agents who increase their odds of success, rather than to agents who merely become convinced that success is likely. We discuss the implications of these findings for claims that control and skill contribute to attributions of intentional action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some outcomes are brought about by intentional agents with access to information and others are not. Children use a variety of cues to infer the causes of outcomes, such as statistical reasoning (e.g., the probability of the outcome) and theory of mind (e.g., a person's perceptual access, preferences, or knowledge). Here we show that children use these cues to infer cheating, a finding which informs our understanding of the flexibility of children's theory of mind. In four experiments (N = 444), 4- to 7-year-olds saw vignettes about blindfolded agents retrieving 10 gumballs from a distribution of yummy and yucky gumballs. Children were then asked if agents were really blindfolded or had peeked. We manipulated the probability of the outcome (i.e., the correspondence between the distribution sampled from and the outcome produced) and the ordering of the outcome was patterned (e.g., five yummy then five yucky) or haphazard. From age 5, children began to use both cues to infer cheating, and also showed signs of flexibly integrating these cues. Together, these findings show that young children can detect cheaters, and that their theory of mind reasoning is flexible and not based on simple and rigid rules (e.g., equating not-seeing with failure). The findings also suggest that children use probabilistic reasoning to infer knowledge., (© 2024 The Author(s). Developmental Science published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Information is easier to remember when it is recognized as structured. One explanation for this benefit is that people represent structured information in a compressed form, thus reducing memory load. However, the contribution of long-term memory and working memory to compression are not yet disentangled. Previous work has mostly produced evidence that long-term memory is the main source of compression. In the present work, we reveal two signatures of compression in working memory using a large-scale naturalistic data set from a science museum. Analyzing data from more than 32,000 memory trials, in which people attempted to recall briefly displayed sequences of colors, we examined how the estimated compressibility of each sequence predicted memory performance. Besides finding that compressibility predicted memory performance, we found that greater compressibility of early subsections of sequences predicted better memory for later subsections, and that mis-recalled sequences were simpler than the originals. These findings suggest that (1) more compressibility reduces memory load, leaving space for additional information; (2) memory errors are not random and instead reflect compression gone awry. Together, these findings suggest that compression can take place in working memory. This may enable efficient storage on the spot without direct contributions from long-term memory. However, we also discuss ways long-term memory could explain our findings., (© 2023. The Psychonomic Society, Inc.)

Although stories for children often feature supernatural and fantastical events, children themselves often prefer realistic events when choosing what should happen in a story. In two experiments, we investigated whether 3- to 5-year-olds (total N = 240 from diverse backgrounds) might be more likely to include fantastical events in stories about familiar fantasy characters. In Experiment 1, children saw stories about fantasy or real-world characters (e.g., a mermaid or an ordinary woman) and judged whether they would achieve goals using fantastic or realistic methods. Children were more likely to choose fantastic methods for the fantasy characters, and this tendency was more common in older children. In Experiment 2, children were asked yes/no questions about whether characters could use fantastic, realistic, and unusual methods to achieve goals. Children more often affirmed fantastic methods for fantasy than real-world characters. These findings contrast with previous work suggesting children avoid including fantastic events in fiction and suggest that children use precedent and familiarity to decide what can happen in a story. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Counterfactual outcomes (i.e., events that did not happen) vary in their closeness to reality. Whereas some are viewed as distant possibilities, others are seen as close, barely unrealized outcomes. Here, we investigate whether young children distinguish between two kinds of counterfactual closeness: one based on proximity and the other on ability. In two experiments, 4-7-year-olds (total N = 304) saw stories where two agents lost a race against a competitor. One of the losing racers finished just behind the winner (proximity), whereas the other losing racer was much faster than the winner (ability) but lost after tripping on a stone. When asked which racer almost won the race, children across the full age range predominantly picked the racer who finished in second place, close behind the winner. However, when asked which racer easily could have won and when asked which racer should have won, children at older ages picked the fastest racer. Together, these findings show that children's understanding of proximity-based closeness is already present at Age 4, earlier than children were previously thought to grasp counterfactual closeness. Moreover, the findings suggest young children have differentiated concepts of counterfactual closeness and do not conflate the two kinds of closeness. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Adults expect people to be biased by sunk costs, but young children do not. We tested between two accounts for why children overlook the sunk cost bias. On one account, children do not see sunk costs as causal. The other account posits that children see sunk costs as causal, but unlike adults, think future actions cannot make up for sunk costs. These accounts make opposing predictions about whether children should see sunk costs as affecting emotions. Across three experiments, 4-7-year-olds (total N = 320) and adults (total N = 429) saw stories about characters who collected items that were easy or difficult to obtain, and predicted characters' emotions and actions. At all ages, participants anticipated that characters would feel sadder about high-cost objects, but only adults predicted that characters would keep high-cost objects. Our findings show that children see incurred costs as causal, and that costs are integrated children's and adults' theory of emotions. Moreover, the findings suggest that developmental differences in sunk cost reasoning may rest in children's incomplete mental accounting. We also discuss children's reasoning about rational and irrational action., (Copyright © 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Developing the ability to accurately infer others' emotions is crucial for children's cognitive development. Here, we offer a new theoretical perspective on how children develop this ability. We first review recent work showing that with age, children increasingly use probability to infer emotions. We discuss how these findings do not fit with prominent accounts of how children understand emotions, namely the script account and the theory of mind account. We then outline a theory of how probability allows children to infer others' emotions. Specifically, we suggest that probability provides children with information about how much weight to put on alternative outcomes, allowing them to infer emotions by comparing outcomes to counterfactual alternatives., (© 2023 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.)

Boyer proposes that ownership intuitions depend on tracking cues predictive of agents' motivations to compete for resources. However, the account may mis-predict people's intuitions about ownership, and it may also be too cognitively costly to be feasible. Even so, alternative accounts could benefit by taking inspiration from how the account handles thorny issues in the psychology of ownership.

No one has ever performed a successful brain transplant or traveled the Milky Way, but people often see these events as within the realm of possibility. Across six preregistered experiments ( N = 1,472) we explore whether American adults' beliefs about possibility are driven by perceptions of similarity to known events. We find that people's confidence in the possibility of hypothetical future events is strongly predicted by how similar they think the events are to events that have already happened. We find that perceived similarity explains possibility ratings better than how desirable people think the events are, or how morally good or bad they think it would be to accomplish them. We also show that similarity to past events is a better predictor of people's beliefs about future possibilities than counterfactual similarity or similarity to events in fiction. We find mixed evidence regarding whether prompting participants to consider similarity shifts their beliefs about possibility. Our findings suggest that people may reflexively use memories of known events to guide their inferences about what is possible. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Owners decide what happens to their property, and so adults typically view autonomous beings as non-owned. If children likewise consider autonomy when judging what is owned, this may have implications for how they view themselves. If children believe that parents have power over them, that they themselves lack autonomy, and that only the autonomous cannot be owned, this may lead them to believe that they are owned by their parents. Across three experiments, we found that 4- to 7-year-old children ( N = 206) consistently affirm that children are owned by their parents. In Experiment 1, children judged that children and domesticated animals are owned, but denied this for adults and wild animals. In Experiment 2, children were more likely to see children as owned by their parents than by their teachers, and also denied that children own either kind of adult. Finally, in Experiment 3, children were less likely to view a child who makes decisions against parental authority as owned. These judgments are unlikely to mirror what children have been told. Instead, they likely result from children spontaneously using autonomy principles, and possibly other principles of ownership, in reasoning about the ownership of living entities., (© 2023 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.)

The target article proposes that people perceive social robots as depictions rather than as genuine social agents. We suggest that people might instead view social robots as social agents, albeit agents with more restricted capacities and moral rights than humans. We discuss why social robots, unlike other kinds of depictions, present a special challenge for testing the depiction hypothesis.

How we feel about an outcome often depends on how close an alternative outcome was to occurring. In four experiments, we investigated whether predominantly White, middle-class, Canadian children ( N = 425, Experiments 1-3) and American adults ( N = 227, Experiment 4) consider close counterfactual alternatives when inferring other people's emotions. In Experiment 1, 6-year-olds (but not 4- and 5-year-olds) inferred that an agent would feel sadder about winning a mediocre prize if she later found out that a more attractive one could have easily been won. However, children of all ages failed to judge whether the better outcome could have easily happened. In Experiment 2, when 5- and 6-year-olds knew the locations of the prizes beforehand, they inferred that an agent would be equally happy about winning a mediocre prize, regardless if she almost won a better prize or not. Again, they did not recognize when the better outcome was a close counterfactual possibility. In Experiment 3, we included extra cues to the closeness of the alternative and both 5- and 6-year-olds inferred that she would feel sadder about winning a mediocre prize, and 6-year-olds acknowledged that the attractive prize was a close counterfactual alternative. In Experiment 4, adults considered close counterfactuals when inferring emotions. Our findings suggest that close counterfactuals influence children's emotion inferences before they become able to acknowledge their closeness. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Four experiments examined Canadian 2- to 3-year-old children's (N = 224; 104 girls, 120 boys) thoughts about shared preferences. Children saw sets of items, and identified theirs and another person's preferences. Children expected that food preferences would be more likely to be shared than color preferences, regardless of whether the items were similar or different in appeal (Experiments 1-3). A final study replicated these findings while also exploring children's expectations about activity and animal preferences. Across all studies, children expected shared preferences at surprisingly low rates (never higher than chance). Overall, these findings suggest that young children understand that some preferences are more subjective than others, and that these expectations are driven by beliefs about domains of preferences., (© 2021 The Authors Child Development © 2021 Society for Research in Child Development.)

Academics across widely ranging disciplines all pursue knowledge, but they do so using vastly different methods. Do these academics therefore also have different ideas about when someone possesses knowledge? Recent experimental findings suggest that intuitions about when individuals have knowledge may vary across groups; in particular, the concept of knowledge espoused by the discipline of philosophy may not align with the concept held by laypeople. Across two studies, we investigate the concept of knowledge held by academics across seven disciplines (N = 1,581) and compare these judgments to those of philosophers (N = 204) and laypeople (N = 336). We find that academics and laypeople share a similar concept of knowledge, while philosophers have a substantially different concept. These experiments show that (a) in contrast to philosophers, other academics and laypeople attribute knowledge to others in some "Gettier" situations; (b) academics and laypeople are much less likely to attribute knowledge when reminded of the possibility of error, but philosophers are not affected by this reminder; and (c) non-philosophy academics are overall more skeptical about knowledge than laypeople or philosophers. These findings suggest that academics across a wide range of disciplines share a similar concept of knowledge, and that this concept aligns closely with the intuitions held by laypeople, and differs considerably from the concept of knowledge described in the philosophical literature, as well as the epistemic intuitions of philosophers themselves., (© 2020 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.)

Happiness with an outcome often depends on whether better or worse outcomes were initially more likely. In five experiments, we found that young children ( N = 620, Experiments 1-4) and adults ( N = 254, Experiment 5) used probability to infer emotions and assess outcome quality. In Experiments 1 and 2, 5- and 6-year-olds (but not 4-year-olds) inferred that an agent would be less happy with an outcome if a better outcome were initially more likely. In Experiment 3, 4- to 6-year-olds used probability to assess quality. These findings suggest a developmental lag between 4-year-olds' assessments of quality and happiness. We replicated this lag in Experiment 4. In Experiment 5, adults used probability to assess both quality and happiness. We suggest that children and adults may use probability to establish a standard against which actual outcomes are compared. Doing so might allow them to make probability-based inferences of happiness without drawing on counterfactual reasoning.

In 4 experiments, we show that young children (total N = 290) use information about supply and demand to infer the desirability of resources. In each experiment, children saw scenarios about sandwiches from different shops, which varied in supply (number of sandwiches produced for the day) and demand (number of customers attracted). In Experiments 1 and 2, 5- to 6-year-olds gave higher desirability ratings for sandwiches from shops with greater than lesser demand when supply was held constant. In Experiment 3, 5- to 7-year-olds gave higher desirability ratings for sandwiches from shops with less than more supply when demand was held constant. Finally, in Experiment 4, 5- to 6-year-olds were more likely to judge that sandwiches came from a good shop (rather than from a bad one) when demand exceeded supply than when supply exceeded demand. Together, the findings reveal a way that children can infer how desirable resources are, without needing to incur the costs that would normally be required to obtain and sample the resources themselves. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).