251. An evolutionary game model analysis on emission control areas in China.
- Author
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Jiang, Bao, Wang, Xiaoqiong, Xue, Hailiang, Li, Jian, and Gong, Yu
- Subjects
EMISSION control ,EVOLUTIONARY models ,SHIPPING companies ,NONGOVERNMENTAL organizations ,DYNAMIC testing - Abstract
To improve the atmospheric environment of coastal areas, it is important to coordinate the accomplishment of the Emission Control Areas (ECAs) program development. However, it is difficult to achieve this objective to align the conflict interest between the government and shipping companies. This paper analyzes the differences in the benefits of the two main subjects in the implementation of China's ECA supervision. Then, based on a non-perfect rational hypothesis, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze and test the dynamic changes of participants' decision-making. Furthermore, we contrast the effects of the interfering elements (e.g., uncooperative penalty, external benefits, the shipping company cost, and third-party report rate) on their decisions under various terms, by applying simulation analysis method. The paper's outcomes demonstrate that, to inspire shipping companies to comply with ECA regulations, the government should apply a strategy, which is following dynamic penalty, to make shipping companies more willing to execute the ECA regulation within less time. Additionally, enhancing the external benefits of cooperative shipping companies and encouraging the participation of third-parties including non-governmental organizations and individuals in monitoring ECAs, are effective ways of stimulating shipping companies to comply with ECA regulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
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