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Naval architects and marine engineers should apply practical economics to decision-making in ship design. A commercial ship is not an engineering success unless it is also a potentially profitable investment. Profitability is related to technical characteristics, and these relationships should be understood by the designer. The paper gives a brief outline of several economic methods applicable to ship design, pointing out that the choice of criterion depends on such circumstances as whether revenues are predictable or not. It continues with suggested methods for estimating weights and building costs for ships. The problems of predicting annual transport capacity and operating costs are discussed in detail. There follow several comments on the practical application of all the foregoing ideas to decision-making in ship design. Sample studies are appended. Numerical values given in the paper are only intended to indicate trends. There is no intent to present an estimating handbook; the emphasis is entirely on principles and methods of application.

The paper presents an approximate method for estimation of resistance of twin-screw merchant ship with open stern of transom type. The method is based on the systematic model tests carried out at the Gdansk Technical University. An algorithm for calculation is elaborated. Some information concerning the propulsion coefficients are also given.

Early in 1940 the German naval high command, acting through the German naval attaché in Moscow, opened negotiations with the Soviet Navy for the passage of two ships along the Northern Sea Route in the summer of that year. Agreement with the Soviet naval authorities was reached, possibly without the knowledge of the Soviet Government. The operation was to be carried out in the strictest secrecy, and a sum of 850,000 roubles (calculated on the expenses of the icebreakers involved) was to be paid by the Germans. Preparations accordingly went forward. One of the two ships was obliged for some reason to drop out, leaving only the other, the raider Komet, to make the voyage. The Komet was a converted merchant ship of 3300 gross registered tons driven by Diesel motors. She had a top speed of 14 knots. Special preparations for running in ice included strengthening the hull and screw and testing the steering gear more severely than usual: the special type of screw with removable blades, as used by Russian ships for ice passages, was not available. Her commander was Kapitan, later Konteradmiral, Robert Eyssen. He had worked in the 1930'sfor Hydrografisches Amt des OKK (Hydrographic Office of the German naval high command), and while first officer and later commander of the survey vessel Meteor had had experience in ice navigation off East Greenland. The crew numbered 270, but included no meteorologists or hydrographers. From the commander's point of view, one of the most useful members of the crew was his interpreter, a man referred to in reports as Agent Kroepsch, a person of unknown allegiance. Krbepsch's knowledge of Russian enabled the commander to get a clearer picture of the changeable and, to him, most suspicious attitude of the Russians towards the voyage, and to act accordingly. The voyage itself was remarkable because it showed that with the assistance of icebreakers and good ice and weather conditions very fast time can be made—in fact the voyage was the fastest ever made up to that date.

A growing gap exists between U.S. Navy communications and Merchant Marine communications. As naval communications becomes more sophisticated, the capability of communications between U.S. Navy ships and U.S. Merchant Ships becomes reduced. Two systems have been developed to improve Merchant Ship communications. an imporved High Frequency System using digital selective calling and a Satellite Communication System. Brief technical descriptions of these systems are given to acquaint the “non—communicator” with these communications improvements.

The marine radioman in the British Merchant Navy has officer status, but, because of the special nature of his role, his status does not fit easily into the general officer hierarchy of the average merchant ship. It is suggested that in both the formal and the informal social structure of the ship's company there are many factors which result in the radio officer's being odd man out.

This chapter discusses the incident related to the United States merchant ship, The City of Flint. On October 9, 1939 the ship, with a mixed cargo destined for British ports was captured by a German warship. With a German prize crew and under the German flag she was taken first to Tromso (Norway) and from there to Murmansk in the Soviet Union. Soviet authorities, however, interned the German prize crew, later releasing it, because the City of Flint had been unseaworthy and in need of machinery repairs when brought into port. The City of Flint incident again raised the question, which had first gained significance in World War I, of the circumstances under which prizes could be brought into neutral harbours and how they should be treated there. Art. 21 of the 1907 Hague Convention XIII provides that a prize may only be brought into a neutral port on account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel or provisions. It is questionable whether a neutral State, although under no obligation to admit prizes to its ports, may immediately intern the crew of a prize which has entered its harbour and then release the vessel to its original crew, or whether it may only resort to such measures when the prize commander has refused to leave.

While the basic techniques of safe navigation of a seagoing surface vessel are essentially independent of the size of the vessel, there is, of course, a wide variety of navigation department organizations on board different types of ships. The entire crew of a small boat may consist of only one or two people, who carry out navigational responsibilities in addition to all other responsibilities of operating the vessel. Aboard most merchant vessels, the navigation department usually consists of a single deck officer, typically a second mate, who performs the assignment as ship’s navigator as a collateral duty, and who is assisted when the ship is under way by the ship’s master and the deck officer on watch. On board Navy ships, the ship’s navigator may be a collateral duty assignment on destroyer-type ships and smaller, and a full-time billet on larger ships and staffs. Since the duties of navigator on a warship are generally considerably more complex than on a merchant ship, Navy navigators are assisted by a division of from two to twenty enlisted personnel of the quartermaster rating, with the exact number dependent on the size and mission of the ship. On larger Navy ships such as a cruiser or carrier, the division may even constitute a separate ship’s department, with a junior officer assigned as assistant navigator and N-division officer.

Maritime strategy has never been determined in a vacuum but always in a real world of constantly changing conditions. The works of the great naval writers like Mahan and Corbett can be seen, in fact, as a record of the way in which maritime strategy has adapted to those changes. But the extent of environmental change occasionally seemed to require something more drastic than mere adaptation; it seemed to call for some concepts to be totally discarded and others brought in to replace them. In modern conditions, the wisdom of past masters of the naval art might therefore be misleading, irrevelant or even downright dangerous, at least as a guide to present and future policy. This view has never been more widely held than it is now. Primarily it is a reaction to changes seen over the past generation or so in the political, economic, legal and technological environment of maritime strategy. The next step, therefore, must be briefly to consider these changes.

The Merchant Ship Naval Augmentation Program (MSNAP) is a research and development program. It supports a procurement plan whereby merchant ships will be modified to allow rapid installation of modular or standardized underway replenishment (UNREP) equipment such as the Standard Tensioned Replenishment Alongside Method (STREAM) gear delivery system or fuel transfer station gear. MSNAP gear enables merchant ships to operate as naval auxiliary UNREP ships to conduct consolidation operations and limited direct replenishment of combatant ships. This memorandum describes the MSNAP demonstrations that were performed in 1981 and 1985 and discusses the status of MSNAP funding, planned ship modifications, and ship manning issues.

While this chapter is entitled ‘The Current Position of the Royal Navy’ I intend to give you something more than a mere rehearsal of the ‘naval case’. I hope to be able to examine some of the influences which are upon us today and to open up some of the questions which we must resolve in shaping our way forward.

During the First World War British heavy manufacturing trades generally achieved record levels of activity. After that they had to face the trauma of reconstruction to meet peacetime levels and types of demand. Government, recognising the problems, set up Reconstruction Committees for various industries. Naturally, for no business was conversion to peacetime operations a more serious problem than for armament firms. All of them had extended existing plants and built new works so that their activities had become even more widely scattered. Vickers, for instance, now had works at Sheffield, Barrow, Erith, Dartford, Crayford, Birmingham and Ipswich as well as in Canada, Italy, Spain, Japan and Russia. Expansion had been so great that co-ordination had become extremely difficult. As a new chief within that department recalled much later, Vicker’s accounting system in 1920 was in a terrible state.1

There was no early plan to evacuate military or civilian personnel from Singapore. The ‘official’ evacuation took place very much towards the end of the Malayan Campaign and its scope was limited; yet, in its own way, it was as dramatic, and as tragic, as anything which occurred during the whole campaign. The large ships which left with women and children on board at the end of January have already been mentioned. Between 11 and 14 February a mass of small shipping was organised in the port area of Singapore to take away about 3000 people, about equally divided between the services and civilians. Rear-Admiral Spooner, who had been in charge of the Singapore naval base, took a leading role in the work of collecting together the merchant ships and such naval escort vessels as could be provided. It was a desperate mission and fraught with grave dangers. Sailing southwards from Singapore, the ships would head first in the direction of the Rhio Archipelago, part of the Dutch East Indies. To the south again, lay the large island of Bangka, and, beyond it, Sumatra. Java, the heartland of the Dutch empire in the East, lay more to the south-east, with its capital, then Batavia, on the north side of the island and approachable from Singapore. A number of named ‘straits’ indicated shipping passages between the island groupings in the South China Sea and the Java Sea. Of these, the Bangka Strait, to the north of Bangka Island, and the Sunda Strait, between Sumatra and Java, were to feature prominently in the evacuation routes from Singapore. Immediately south of the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago, and to the north of the Bangka Strait was another sea passage, the Berhala Strait, which gave more direct access to river estuaries in eastern Sumatra, particularly the Djambi (Hari) River and the Indragiri River. The Palembang (Moesi) River, too, offered access, but it was much closer to Bangka, which was to prove a great danger, as Palembang itself was captured early by Japanese parachute troops.

The Atlantic ‘nature’ of the NATO Alliance has been talked about on many occasions, with speakers invoking in its support the very title of the Alliance, the US nuclear ‘umbrella’ over Europe, the role of US conventional in-place forces, the need for the protection of resupply and US reinforcement forces, the threat of the growth of the Soviet Navy, the need for political unity within the Alliance and a host of other good, and not so good, reasons. The Alliance, we are told, is held together not by string nor by political cohesion, but by water. And NATO navies try to determine their naval roles accordingly.

The offshore defence force is a large, distinctive and important part of the Soviet Navy which is intended primarily for operations in local waters. It comprises about 1,200 frigates and minor combatants of various kinds with a collective displacement tonnage something in excess of 450,000 tons. Since this represents about one-sixth of the Navy’s overall tonnage, the offshore defence force plainly deserves more attention than it usually gets from the West.

This chapter describes the concept of armed merchant ships. Merchant ship is a lawful aim in sea warfare and belligerents, depending on uninterrupted maritime transport for their existence, will try to protect such transport by any necessary means, including the arming of merchant ships. By simply being armed, a merchant ship is not transformed into an auxiliary cruiser; it retains prima facie its non-combatant status. Merchant ships had no legal duty to submit to visit and search by enemy warships because these are steps towards capture, and capture of enemy merchantmen is not a right but a hostile act. Until the end of the Napoleonic wars, merchantmen were primarily armed against pirates and privateers. Thereafter two developments converged, firstly, privatizing was abandoned and piracy suppressed. Secondly, the improvement in both offensive armament and defensive armor-plating gave surface warships such overwhelming military power that a rule could develop which protected merchant ships from attack without warning. As a result, the arming of merchant ships gradually fell into disuse without ever being formally abolished.

Ship signatures in the form of 1/10 octave band time series and narrowband spectra (0.15 Hz resolution) over the frequency range 10 to 500 Hz are presented. These signatures, detected on a near-bottom receiver in the mid- northeast Pacific Ocean during the CHURCH OPAL exercise, are characterized by greater than 20 dB signal-to-noise ratios over the entire frequency band of 10 to 500 Hz for all merchant ships that approached the receiver site to within 10 nm. The high signal-to-noise ratios resulted from very low noise levels observed in this ocean area. Estimates of source level based on reported ship positions and theoretical propagation loss are 10 dB greater than expected.

Some 98 per cent of British exports and 99 per cent of imports, by weight, are carried by sea. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the quantities involved and the countries of origin and destination.1 Approximately 37 per cent of exports in 1980 were carried on ships under the UK flag, as were 31 per cent of imports. The actual percentage of flag distribution varied between trading areas. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 indicate this for 1980. In the case of exports UK flag ships carried 45 per cent of cargoes from the United Kingdom to the EEC, 51 per cent to Australasia and, for example, 37 per cent to South America. In the import trades 44 per cent of cargoes originating in the EEC were carried by UK flag ships, as were 48 per cent of cargoes from Australasia and 30 per cent from South America.2

Advanced electronic navigation systems will be required for future merchant ship operations involving minimum crew manning. These systems will rely on some form of electronic chart, which will require continual and timely updating with the latest correction information. This paper describes a newly developed chart correction computer system capable of automatically updating electronic charts via satellite data transfers. The system can provide a direct computer data link between a shipboard computer and the Defense Mapping Agency's Automated Notice to Mariners System.

The ifs and buts of deterring strategic nuclear attack seem almost simple by comparison with the complex uncertainties of war at sea. Nuclear forces are permanently in presence and their relative strength, which is known in considerable detail, does not significantly depend on mobilisation, deployment or reinforcement. Defence is unimportant and, for Britain, non-existent. Only attack, counter-attack and escalation count in nuclear war and these are the acts which, when credibly threatened, constitute deterrence. There are not many scenarios and very few of them offer Britain any choice at all.

Anyone contemplating a voyage by sea may have good reason to prefer the vigorous view of the law stated in 1817 by Lord Stowell to the permissiveness recorded in 1984 by Professor O’Connell. There are today so many groups or gangs claiming political motives for the crimes they commit against inoffensive travellers that the exemption of insurgents from the penalties of piracy can only be deplored.

The special and unexpected honours shown to the English envoy, even though he did not possess ambassadorial rank, were in fact due to the Tsar’s appreciation of the value of a better connection with England.

The last two chapters have described the winners in the 500-year struggle for naval predominance and political-military ascendancy in the global system. In the present chapter, the focus shifts to the ‘also-ran’ competitors for global power — France, Spain, Russia/the Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan — who lost or — at least in the case of the Soviet Union — who have yet to win their struggles with the world powers. We shall consider in order of ‘seniority’ defined as ‘years in global status’ between 1494 and 1983: France (451); Spain (315); Russia/the USSR (232); Germany (75); and Japan (75). As in Chapter 8, the emphasis will be placed on generating brief synopses of national naval developments as a prelude to the provision of more detailed information on each global power’s annual number of capital warships.

The ability to mount or defeat operations against the shore is one of the two main ways in which command is exercised and the sea used. This form of sea use suffers from the absence of a consistent vocabulary in maritime strategy. Competing words and definitions jostle with each other to attract support: amphibious warfare, combined operations, land-sea operations, the projection of power ashore, overseas raids and invasions, attacks on territory from the sea. These all have strengths and weaknesses, but none have won universal acclaim. Probably in this case, though, the consequence is not so bad as it is with ‘sea power’ or ‘the command of the sea’. Even though the name is in dispute, there is broad agreement about what it stands for. Like Shakespeare’s rose, it smells the same, more or less, whatever we call it.

Earlier mention has been made in Chapter 2 of the analytical convenience provided by the tendencies toward standardising warships which resulted in the development of the ship-of-the-line, the capital warship of the mid-seventeenth to the first half of the nineteenth centuries. Nevertheless, this period constitutes less than half and closer to a third of the five centuries in question. Clearly, the operationalisation procedures will have to go beyond simply indicating an intention to count ships-of-the-line. For that matter, there are also some comparability problems ‘hidden’ in the ship-of-the-line concept. The procedures will also have to be sufficiently flexible to be able to take into account changes in naval technology — predominantly in terms of gunnery.

There should be no need in a maritime nation to justify the requirement for a navy and merchant marine commensurate with national defence commitments and trading patterns. Other contributions will without doubt demonstrate this requirement full well in the light of recent events and the developing power of the Soviet Navy. The issue arises in a decade in which the economies of the Western nations, and particularly of the United Kingdom, have been shaken by severe inflation requiring draconian measures for correction and by a marked recession in world trade and hence the requirement for shipping and shipbuilding. The defence industries have been caught in a spiral of expanding technologies and cost in which each pound spent buys significantly less hardware while the bedrock shipbuilding and engineering industries address near-empty order books. My chapter will outline the problems and the potential of the British shipbuilding industry. To do this it is necessary to briefly examine the structure of the industry and its recent history.

The interdependence between the Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy has roots embedded in history and merchant ships and merchant seamen have always been required, and have been available, in large numbers in times of war. So much so that the ability of the shipping industry to respond has been taken for granted and remains an assumption in the background of our strategic thinking. But at times throughout our history the importance of safe and secure sea communications to our country has been thrust into the foreground although, regrettably, it seems always to recede quickly again once hostilities are over. So it was in 1982 with the Falklands Operation Corporate when unexpectedly and at very short notice the two services were called upon to demonstrate their responsibilities and in so doing to emphasise yet again their interdependence. Therefore no apology seems needed, neither is it offered, for basing the following remarks on this latest ‘example’.

In earlier chapters various incidents were mentioned in which the use of limited naval force had a swift and obvious result. Barely four weeks were needed to demonstrate the failure of the Argentine Operation Rosario in 1982 (gunboat diplomacy is always accounted a failure if it leads to war); ten days to establish the success of Operation Urgent Fury against Grenada; less than 24 hours to register American acquiescence in Israeli action against the liberty in 1967.

After being on Shore [in Havana] another Twelvemonth, I endeavour’d to make my Escape the second Time, by trying to get on board of a Sloop bound to Jamaica, and as I was going from the City to the Sloop, was unhappily taken by the Guard, and ordered back to the Castle, and there confined. —However, in a short time I was set at Liberty, and order’d with a Number of others to carry the Bishop from the Castle, thro’ the Country, to confirm the old People, baptize Children, c—The Beaver, an English Man of War then lay in the Harbour, and having been informed by some of the Ship’s Crew that she was to sail in a few Days, I had nothing now to do, but to seek an Opportunity how I should make my Escape.

Several uncertainties associated with predicting activity levels in water-cooled reactors are discussed in connection with development of the Nuclear Merchant Ship Reactor (Maritime Pressurized Water Reactor). (T.R.H.)

The work on which Helmuth now embarked involved a major issue of principle. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 about the laws of war had been drawn up in days when wars were still thought of as things fought by rival armies, with civilian life remaining relatively unaffected. Once the object of war was extended beyond the defeat of the enemy army in the field to the destruction of its supplies and therefore to the continued capacity for resistance of its industrial machine and population, many of the rules became inadequate and a host of new situations arose for which no agreed rules existed. Air warfare, with its inability to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, added a further complication. In this situation, and more particularly in Germany in 1939, the lawyers faced two alternatives.

The Mediterranean Trades The Mediterranean at the beginning of the sixteenth century was still very much a world of its own. It was still a large world, not yet dwarfed by comparison with the world of great oceans beyond Suez and Gibraltar. A ship – an ordinary merchant ship, with reasonable weather – took up to two months to make the passage, say, from Cartagena or Alicante to Alexandria; perhaps two or three weeks from Messina to Tripoli of Barbary; ten or twelve days from Leghorn to Tunis. There was plenty of space, plenty of elbow room; and the area as a whole was almost self-supporting. The sixty million or so people who inhabited the countries bordering the inland sea produced between them most of the food, many of the raw materials and almost all the manufactured goods which they consumed. They built their own ships and carried their own trade. The richest, liveliest and most varied economic activity of the region was concentrated in the relatively small area of northern Italy comprising Milan, Florence, Genoa, Venice, and their smaller neighbours and satellites. Florence and Milan were primarily manufacturing centres – Florence had little success in developing its own trading fleet, and Milan never possessed one – but Venice and Genoa, both great industrial centres, were also major naval powers and bases of great merchant fleets. Outside Italy, Ragusa specialized in very large ships for carrying bulky goods, grain, salt and wool. France, growing in unity and prosperity, attracted an increasing volume of Mediterranean traffic into the Rhone Valley by way of Marseilles, with its busy fleet of light lateen-rigged craft.

A study of the dynamic behavior of the Merchant Ship Reactor Pressurized Water Loop was made using the Reactor Controls Analog Facility. Computer curves show the predicted response of the loop temperatures to normal load changes and component failure accidents. Except for complete flow stoppage, which was not investigated here, the safety system was shown to be adequate in curbing loop temperature excursions due to postulated accidents. (auth)

A control system for a pressurized-water reactor for use in a nuclear- powered merchant ship was studied by use of analog simulation techniques. The various components of the reactor and primary-coolant loop, including the boiler, were considered. Each simulated component was examined separately and then coupled into the system. With the existence of a large Doppler coefficient of reactivity, the average system temperature could not be maintained within the required limits without external control. Control of the reactor plant through use of a shim-rod mechanism was proposed. Two control schemes were considered. The first system involved control by means of a temperatureerror signal and a power-demand signal. The second consisted of a closed reactor-loop system. A power-error signal was generated by comparing reactor power with a signal proportional to steam flow plus the error in average system temperature and integral of this temperature error. The first system produced acceptable results for only speccific conditions. The closed-loop system satisfled the criteria for plant control; for this control system to be entirely acceptable, the maneuverability requirements must be made compatible with the allowable control- rod reactivity rates. The maximum rates needed for control under a given steam- load-demand change were established. (auth)

A proposed development program is made for the treatment and disposal of radioactive wastes from Merchant Ship Reactors. Both ion exchange resin and filters are to be used for coolant system cleanup. The development program is concerned with methods of handling and packaging of the spent resin, filter cake and rare gases for safe disposal. (Author)

To provide guidance in the regulation of noise on U.S. merchant ships, noise levels and octave‐band spectra were measured on seven ships of the U.S. Merchant Fleet. Ships selected included tankers, ore carriers, general cargo, and container ships; with steam turbine, gas turbine, and diesel propulsion. They ranged in size from 8000 to 36 000 gross tons and in construction date from the 1920's and 1970's. Locations measured included machinery and engine rooms, passageways, berthing spaces, mess and recreation spaces, bridge, radio room, and offices. Noise exposures based on measured sound levels and time spent in various spaces were calculated for individual crew members in various occupational categories. Exposures are compared with various criteria for hearing conservation, including the 24‐h equivalent continuous sound level (Leq 24). A‐weighted sound levels in other ship spaces are compared with various function‐based criteria, such as speech communication, hearing of warning signals, rest and relaxati...

JUST at the critical time when submarine wolf packs and magnetic mines were sinking Allied ships faster than they could be constructed, merchant ship strandings and collisions were reported to have been caused by the effect of degaussing coil fields on the magnetic compass. The installation of compass compensating coils permitted the immediate and satisfactory resumption of navigation by magnetic compass.

BS>The nuclear-powered merchant ship, Savannah, is a combination passenger-cargo ship of the mariner class. It is 595 feet long, has 78-foot beam, and will have a fully loaded displacement or 21,800 tons. the ship will have a sea speed of 20 knots and a cruising radius in excess of 100,000 miles. With a 124-man crew, and additional space for observers and technicians, she will also be able to carry 60 passengers. The NS Savanaah was launched on July 21, 1959. After a comprehemsive test program and outfitting, sea trials are scheduled for the spring of 1960. The construction of the nuclearpowered ship posed new and unique problems in design and operation. Complete containment, retertion of wastes, and other nuclear and nautical safeguards incorporated to ensure maximum safety are discussed. (C.H.)

The along-track components of current for 55 southward passages between Cape Moreton (27�02'S.) and Sugarloaf Pt (32� 27'S.) on the east Australian coast have been analysed. The currents are predominantly towards the south, but their variability is stressed. At any particular time, departures from the mean current show appreciable correlation for distances up to about 100 km. At a particular latitude, departures from the mean current are positively correlated for time differences up to 20 days, and show a slight negative correlation for time differences of the order of 30 or 40 days, indicating a weak periodicity with periods of the order of 70 days. The connection between these and other estimates of space and time scales for the east Australian current is discussed. No evidence of alongshore movement of current patterns was found.

United Statest. 11,682 14.5 55,071 555 British Empire . 24,054 29.9 21, I67 21.3 Denmark ....... 1,576 2.0 953 I.0 France ......... 2,999 3.7 1,473 I.5 Germany ....... 5,177 6.4 i,i6o 1.2 Greece ......... 2,791 3.5 856 0.9 Italy ......... 3,911 4.9 692 0.7 Japan ......... 7,145 8.9 1,427 1.4 Netherlands .... 3,425 4.2 1,993 2.0 Norway ........ 6,931 8.6 4,197 4.2 Spain 1,052 1.3 1,253 1.3 Sweden. . . . . .... 2,033 2.5 2,204 2.2 U.S.S.R.1 . . . . . . 1,598 2.0 1,69i 1.7 Others ......... 6,228 7.7 5,o84 5.I