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Inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism are widely thought to be distinct explanations for how altruism evolves. Here we show that they rely on the same underlying mechanism. We demonstrate this commonality by applying Hamilton's rule, normally associated with inclusive fitness, to two simple models of reciprocal altruism: one, an iterated prisoner's dilemma model with conditional behavior; the other, a mutualistic symbiosis model where two interacting species differ in conditional behaviors, fitness benefits, and costs. We employ Queller's generalization of Hamilton's rule because the traditional version of this rule does not apply when genotype and phenotype frequencies differ or when fitness effects are nonadditive, both of which are true in classic models of reciprocal altruism. Queller's equation is more general in that it applies to all situations covered by earlier versions of Hamilton's rule but also handles nonadditivity, conditional behavior, and lack of genetic similarity between altruists and recipients. Our results suggest changes to standard interpretations of Hamilton's rule that focus on kinship and indirect fitness. Despite being more than 20 years old, Queller's generalization of Hamilton's rule is not sufficiently appreciated, especially its implications for the unification of the theories of inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism.

Why some social systems form groups composed of kin, while others do not, has gone largely untreated in the literature. Using an individual-based simulation model, we explore the demographic consequences of making kinship a criterion in group formation. We find that systems where social groups consist of one-generation breeding associations may face a serious trade-off between degree of altruism and group size that is largely mediated by their kin composition. On the one hand, restricting groups to close kin allows the evolution of highly altruistic behaviors but may limit group size to suboptimal levels, the more severely so the smaller the intrinsic fecundity of the species and the stricter the kin admission rule. Group size requirements, on the other hand, can be met by admitting nonkin into groups, but not without limiting the degree of altruism that can evolve. As a solution to this conundrum, we show that if helping roles within groups are assigned through a lottery rather than being genetically determined, maximum degrees of altruism can evolve in groups of nonrelatives of any size. Such a "lottery" mechanism may explain reproductive and helping patterns in organisms as varied as the cellular slime molds, pleometrotic ants, and Galapagos hawks.