251. Weight for Stephen Finlay.
- Author
-
Evers D
- Abstract
According to Stephen Finlay, ' A ought to X ' means that X -ing is more conducive to contextually salient ends than relevant alternatives. This in turn is analysed in terms of probability. I show why this theory of 'ought' is hard to square with a theory of a reason's weight which could explain why ' A ought to X ' logically entails that the balance of reasons favours that A X -es. I develop two theories of weight to illustrate my point. I first look at the prospects of a theory of weight based on expected utility theory. I then suggest a simpler theory. Although neither allows that ' A ought to X ' logically entails that the balance of reasons favours that A X -es, this price may be accepted. For there remains a strong pragmatic relation between these claims.
- Published
- 2013
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