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The foundational texts of the Ḥanafī school were first summarized by jurists such as Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321/933) and Karḫī (d. 340/952) into concise texts (muḫtaṣar) based on specific preferences. Subsequently, Ṭaḥāwī’s al-Muḫtaṣar was commented upon by al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981), while Karḫī’s al-Muḫtaṣar was glossed by al-Kudūrī (d. 428/1037). These commentaries served various purposes, such as enriching and expanding the framework set by the foundational texts of the fiqh tradition, establishing connections between legal rulings and their sources, revisiting and updating the propositions in the texts, and analyzing them from various disciplines to clarify their terms and expressions. This study examines the comparison of Šarḥal-Muḫtaṣar al-Ṭaḥāwī and Šarḥal-Muḫtaṣar al-Karḫī within the context of legal proofs (šarʿī dalāʾil). These works were chosen due to their status as the first commentaries written in the Ḥanafī school and their strong representation of the school’s scholarly tradition. Given the extensive nature of the texts, the section on acts of worship (ʿibādāt), where the commentators’ efforts appear more thorough, has been selected as the focus of the study. The aim of this study is to identify the converging and diverging aspects of the two commentaries and to elucidate their contributions to the school’s scholarly tradition and their original value. Achieving this objective will also provide a modest response to contemporary claims regarding the originality of these commentaries. In line with this objective, a comparative analysismethod has been employed. The study is structured into two main sections, aside from the introduction and conclusion. The first section offers brief introductory information about the works under examination. The second section compares how the commentators employed legal proofs in the section on acts of worship, focusing on the extent and effectiveness of their use of such proofs. As a result of the comparison, it was concluded that, while similar proofs were generally utilized to substantiate issues in both commentaries, the approaches to linking these proofs to the rulings differed. This indicates that each commentator, while representing a shared tradition, developed their own methodological approach. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, for example, placed greater emphasis on textual proofs (naqlī dalāʾil) than al-Kudūrī, making more frequent and effective use of proofs such as the Qurʾān, Sunnah, ijmāʿ, and the statements of Companions (ṣaḥābī qawl). In the context of Sunnah, he transmitted numerous narrations with their chains (isnād) and engaged heavily in textual and chain criticism. Moreover, al-Jaṣṣāṣ uniquely referred to the principle of šarʿu man qablana (the law of previous communities). His greater reliance on textual proofs is attributed to his expertise in legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), which he successfully applied to these proofs, combining both textual and rational proofs to present a solid and consistent approach in his commentary. On the other hand, al-Kudūrī relied more extensively on analogical reasoning (qiyās) than al-Jaṣṣāṣ, frequently utilizing intra-school analogies in substantiating issues. His focus, as a jurist (faqīh), was more on the relationship between proofs and rulings, and he sought to reflect the Ḥanafī school’s legal tradition in his commentary. This diversity in the commentators’ approaches to legal proofs highlights that these commentaries are not merely repetitive works; rather, each one offers unique and valuable contributions to the Ḥanafī school’s legal tradition. A comparative study of such commentaries, which played a significant role in the development and institutionalization of the schools of law, not only helps preserve past knowledge for the academic world but also provides an opportunity to assess the current state of Islamic jurisprudential understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of most famous fatwa books written in the Indian subcontinent during the Babur’s period (1526-1858) is al-Fatawa al-Hindiyya. It was written by a commission by the order of the ruler during the reign of Emperor Abu-Muzaffar Muhammed Muhyiddin Awrangzeb (1658-1707). al-Fatava al-Hindiyya was prepared in six volumes. The completed sections of this work were personally discussed on a weekly basis by Emperor Awrangzeb himself. This book differs from other studies on fatwa literature in the two aspects mentioned. al-Fatawa al-Hindiyya is a voluminous book written to serve as source of law in the Babur judicial system facilitate the work of Hanafi jurists and ensure uniform of application in the Indian territories. In the context of the fatwa-sect relationship, this research will attempt to answer the question of whether this book was prepared with the aim of legislating or to base the official sect practice. In addition, it is aimed to examine Fetâvâ-i Hindîyye by taking into consideration its writing process, content and systematics, sources and effects after its completion. The study will provide data to discuss the existence of the IndoHanafi tradition. From its onwards al-Fatawa al-Hindiyya has been widely accepted and as a source in other major centers where Hanafi mazhab prevailed. Providing information about literature developed around al-Fatawa al-Hindiyya is also one main objective of this study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nowadays, in contemporary discourses, it can be said that religious discourses are quite complex and confusing. Especially the concepts of religion, Sharia, and jurisprudence have become obfuscated being used interchangeably. This phenomenon is evident in certain studies where jurisprudence, inherently a scholarly activity of jurists, is perceived as if it was a religion or Sharia directly ordained by the Lawgiver. This conflation fosters various misunderstandings and misjudgments. Essentially, jurisprudence which is a dynamic process aimed at regulating social relationships on the basis of justice and equity is rendered dogmatic by these misinterpretations. Consequently, this misunderstanding naturally reflects on the usage of the term ‘Islam’, causing ambiguity regarding the essence of Islam or what constitutes Islamic principles. Consequently, the solutions produced by Muslim societies in the past within the framework of religious and sources of Sharia are perceived as religion or Sharia itself and equated with religion and Sharia ordained by the Lawgiver. Perceiving the marriage age of Aisha as a requirement or result of religion is a typical example of this misunderstanding. In such case, devout individuals may advocate for early marriage today, believing it to be a religious mandate, while opponents of religion criticize religion based on this acceptance. It is clear that both attitudes are wrong and that this error stems from treating existing data and the opinions of jurists as religious doctrines. While religious injunctions may indeed serve as the core reference in issuing judgments, and jurists might legitimize their everyday life-related rulings through these injunctions, the other pivot of this compass is the customary, the accepted, and functional outcomes of the period. The judgments related to slavery and concubinage are also of this nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mehmet Akif Ersoy, İslam esasları üzerine kurulu bir toplumun gerekliliğini savunmaktadır. Şiirleri aracılığıyla da toplumsal konuları ele almıştır. Safahat adlı şiir külliyatında Türk toplumunun yaşadığı savaşlara, yozlaşmalara, ekonomik sıkıntılara, anlaşmazlıklara ve toplumsal değişmelere yer vermiştir. Mehmet Akif, toplumda meydana gelen bu büyük değişimlerin fazlalığına ve olumsuz yönlerine dikkat çekmektedir. Toplumda mefsedet doğuran durumların sebebinin, İslam’ın hüküm ve kaidelerinden uzaklaşılması olduğunu belirtmiştir. Çözümün ise ancak dini hükümlerin doğru bir şekilde yaşanması olduğunu ifade eder. Akif’e göre bu durumun sağlanabilmesi için dini, insanlara doğru anlatan iyi fıkıh alimlerine ihtiyaç vardır. Toplumda mevcut bulunan din anlayışı; Kur’an, Sünnet ve icmâ temelinde akıl süzgecinden geçirilerek düzeltilmelidir. Keza insanların fıkıh alanındaki yetersiz ve yanlış bilgileri toplumda birçok konuda yozlaşmayı da beraberinde getirir. Dinden uzaklaşmanın getirmiş olduğu kötü sonuçlardan en çok etkilenenler arasında da şüphesiz aile kavramı yer almaktadır. Mehmet Akif’e göre aile hayatı düzgün olmayan toplumlar geri kalmaya mahkumdur. Akif’in yaşadığı dönemde karşılaştığı ve eleştirdiği aile hayatındaki sorunlar günümüzde de geçerliliğini korumaktadır. Bu nedenle çalışmamızda Mehmet Akif Ersoy’un tanık olduğu aile hayatına dair toplumsal sorunlar, örnek olay olarak ele alınıp değerlendirilmiştir. Böylelikle İslam hukuk kaidelerinden uzaklaşmanın aile hayatında oluşturduğu yozlaşma, net bir şekilde ortaya konmak istenmektedir. Konunun kapsamı içinde olmaları sebebiyle Köse İmam, Meyhane ve Asım şiirlerinde aktarılan manzum hikâyeler üzerinde durulmuştur. Şiirlerdeki olay örgülerinde evliliğin hükmü, çeyiz, nafaka, te’addüd-i zevcât, eşler arası münasebet, mal rejimi ve talâk konuları karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Eserde yer alan örnek olaylar ile ilgili Mehmet Akif’in yorumlarına yer verilmiştir. Daha sonrasında ilgili konuya dair açıklama yapılmış ve yanlış bilinen/uygulanan durumlar İslam hukukuna göre kısaca izah edilmiştir. Çalışma sonucunda dinin koymuş olduğu hükümlerin devre dışı bırakılması veya yanlış yorumlanmasının aile hayatı üzerindeki zararını görmekteyiz. Akif’e göre aile hayatında kadına hak ettiği değerin verilmesi, çok evliliğin keyfi bir uygulama olmaktan çıkarılması, boşama konusundaki yanlış algıların düzeltilmesi, evlilik sürecinde kadının mali haklarını elde etmesi ve koruyabilmesi gibi hususlar ancak İslam hukuk kaidelerinin doğru anlaşılması ile mümkündür. Çünkü kadının insan yerine bile konmadığı, aile hayatında belirsizliğin olduğu bir toplumdan asr-ı saadet toplumuna ancak İslamiyet ile ulaşılmıştır. Bu nedenle dinin/fıkhın geri plana atıldığı toplumlarda en çok kadınlar, çocuklar ve aile hayatı zarar görmektedir. Bir milleti ileri taşıyacak neslin yetişmesi ise ancak aileye dair yanlış bilgilerin giderilip, sorunların düzeltilmesi ile mümkündür.

Bu araştırmada 19. yüzyıl Osmanlı Lübnan’ında önemli bir figür olan Abdurrahman b. Muhammed b. Dervîş el-Hût’un hayatı, ilmî şahsiyeti ve İrşâdü’l-avâm ilâ sebîli’s-selâm adlı eseri çerçevesinde dönemin Müslüman halkının güncel fıkhî meseleleri ele alınmıştır. 19. yüzyılda Lübnan tıpkı günümüzdeki gibi farklı kökenlere sahip ve farklı inançları benimseyen toplulukların bir arada yaşadığı bir bölgedir. Müslümanlar ile diğer dinlere mensup gruplar arasındaki sosyokültürel etkileşim, birtakım Müslümanların diğer din mensuplarının âdetlerini benimsemesine neden olmuş, Abdurrahman el-Hût da Müslümanları uyarmaya çalışmıştır. İrşâdü’l-avâm onun bu konuları incelediği; yaşadığı dönemin güncel fıkıh meselelerini ele aldığı eseridir. Müellif bu kitapta faiz alıp vermenin, alışverişte hile yapmanın, çalgılı müzik aletlerini dinlemenin, iskambil, tavla, satranç, domino, modern at yarışı ve benzeri oyunları oynamanın, gazino ve meyhane gibi yerlere gidip eğlenmenin ve dinden çıkaran sözlerin hükmünü ele almıştır. Son kısımda da kadınlarla ilgili; kadınların gidebileceği yerler ve modern tesettür modellerine dair açıklamalar yapmıştır. Araştırma İrşâdü’l-avâm’ın Osmanlı arşivlerindeki matbu nüshası esas alınarak yazıya dökülmüştür. Dönemin Osmanlı halkının dinî yaşantısının ve Abdurrahman el-Hût’un ilmî şahsiyetinin ele alındığı ilk çalışmalardan sayılabilecek bu araştırmada önce onun hayatından ve ilmî kişiliğinden söz edilmiş, akabinde Lübnan’daki siyasî ve sosyal hayattan kısaca bahsedilmiştir. İrşâdü’l-avâm’ın genel özellikleriyle devam eden araştırmada son olarak dönemin güncel fıkhî meselelerine yer verilmiştir. Güncel fıkıh meseleleri incelenirken müellifin görüşleri, ileri sürdüğü bazı delillerle birlikte açıklanmış ve analiz edilmiştir. Araştırma, sosyal çevrenin ve kültürel yaşamın fakihin görüşünün belirginleşmesinde etkili olduğunu göstermesi bakımından önemlidir.

A fundamental tenet of Islamic norm politics and knowledge theory is the distinction between al-ʾuṣūl and al-furūʿ. Scholars of Islamic legal theory have traditionally evaluated this distinction in terms of its benefits and risks. Its contribution to the "disciplined disagreement" theory--which methodological thought has always sought to develop--is its main benefit. On the other hand, it causes hierarchical divisions regarding religious laws, such as "divine and human," "essential and non-essential," and "those that are vital in the degree of certainty and those that are open to possibility." For this reason, some ʾAhl al-Ḥadith scholars, most notably Ibn Taymiyya, considered this distinction to be a "bid'a" that was first developed in Mu'tazilite circles and subsequently introduced into ʾuṣūl al-fiqh along with serious ramifications by certain Ash'arite theoreticians. According to him, the basis of such conceptual divisions' legitimacy has to be the traditions of the original generations. However, the majority of scholars have remained faithful to the metaphor of "the tree of Islamic knowledge," which was most likely used by Shafiʿī first, with many branches [al-furūʿ] that show flexibility as they grow and firmly grounded roots [al-ʾuṣūl]. According to Shāfi'ī, the task of a jurist is to derive those "meanings" that extend from the roots to the branches. Thus, the ruling [ḥukm], or the fruit, would be harvested from the branches and offered to the good of society. Once used in a highly symbolic sense, the distinction between al-ʾuṣūl and al-furūʿ proved to be highly functional and evolved over time to become a fundamental framework for all Islamic sciences. This paper deals with the historical evolution of the distinction by emphasizing its origins, limits, purposes, and standards as well as the criticisms it has encountered, using methods such as literature review, comparison, and process analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Commercial activities are at the forefront of human relationships with other people and with society. For this reason, trade has a long history, as long as the history of mankind. Human beings, as a socio-cultural beings, meet a significant part of their needs through commercial activities, and thus, make achieves an important step towards achieving peace. In other words, the individual who cannot meet his needs becomes unhappy and uncomfortable. This leads to a society consisting of unhappy and restless individuals who also do not create a peaceful and secure environment. Trade therefore, plays a significant role in ensuring peace and security in society. For this reason, all ruling systems have given importance to trade, and they have introduced certain sets of rules which ensure the efficiency and order of commercial activities. Aiming at the happiness of human beings both in this world and in the hereafter, Islam has also laid down certain rules in the relations between man and society and their commercial activities, as well as in the fields of faith, worship, and morality. It is a fact that the Qur'an and the Sunnah, which are the main references to Islam, have important regulations and provisions in the field of trade. These rules and regulations, which represent the basic rules of trade, have over time been transformed into a voluminous accumulation that we can call "Islamic commercial law," in the corpus of fiqh over time. When Islamic precepts and their accumulated interpretation are examined, it is seen that market economy is adopted in Islamic commercial law. One of the important conditions that the market economy naturally requires is undoubtedly the existence of free competition throughout all commercial activities. Although in the classical fiqh corpus, or in modern terms, the subject of commercial competition in Islamic law has not been dealt with separately, the existence of this competition in Islamic commercial law is understood by inductive methods. All of the steps, precautions, and prohibitions focusing on the stability of the market in commercial activities from the beginning lead to this conclusion. In this study, the issue of competition in Islamic commercial law is discussed in general, based on the nass (divine decree) and principles. Based on the analytical method, the study concludes that Islam's understanding of trade is dominated by the free market economy and therefore free competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Recently, consumer boycott has been used as an economic weapon and a tool of passive resistance. There are several dimensions to consumer boycott, which serves as a means for Muslim communities to assert their will and to make their voices heard. This study primarily examines the legal (fiqhi) justifications for consumer boycott. The main objective of the study is to identify the reasons (causes) that lead Muslims to engage in consumer boycott. In addition, a secondary objective of our study is to present the problems that may arise in issuing fatwas in relation to the identified causes and abiding by the consequences of these causes. The qualitative analysis method was used to achieve the objective of the study. This analysis was largely carried out using literature and content analysis techniques. Classical jurisprudential principles (uṣūl al-fiqh), principles of issuing fatwas (uṣūl al-iftā), consideration of consequences (i‛tibār al-ma’ālāt) and principles of Islamic governance (al-siyāsah al-shar‛iyyah) were also highlighted in the research methodology. According to our findings, the concept of boycott is not commonly found in classical jurisprudential sources. The rulings on boycott are more implicitly addressed in issues regulating commercial relations with non-Muslims. As far as contemporary literature is concerned, there are numerous studies on Muslim consumer boycott from different perspectives. However, there is a gap in the literature regarding the identification of the cause of boycott. As a result, four causes of boycott have been identified: “disrespect for Muslim dignity”, “insulting religious values”, “supporting the enemy in a state of war with Muslims”, and “political interests and general welfare of Muslims”. Some issues related to the practical application of these grounds are also discussed. In addition, the author raises the question of whether threatening the ḥalâl and healthy nutrition of Muslim communities is a reason for boycott and suggests it as a topic for further research.

İslam hukuku, gıdalar konusunda helal ve haram olmaları açısından sınırlandırmalarda bulunmuştur. Ortaya çıkan teknolojik yeniliklerle birlikte yiyecek ve içeceklerin muhtevasının değiştirilmesi mümkün kılınmış ve bu gıdaların hükmünün ne olacağı tartışılmıştır. Nitekim bunun somut örneklerinden biri, son yıllarda üretilmeye başlanmış, artan et ihtiyacı sorununun çözümünde sürdürülebilirliği sağlayacak bir tekniğin ürünü olarak sunulan yapay ettir. Literatürde, yapay etin üretim süreçlerini içeren mühendislik çalışmalarına ek olarak yapay etin insan sağlığı açısından olumlu ve olumsuz yönlerine dair çalışmalar bulunmakla birlikte fıkhî yönüne dair çalışmalar kısıtlıdır. Bu çalışmada, yapay etin fıkhî meşrûiyetinin tartışılması amaçlanmıştır. Bu kapsamda öncelikle İslam hukukunun yiyecekler konusundaki helal ve haram kriterleri incelenmiştir. Akabinde yapay etin üretiminde kullanılacak olan kök hücrenin cinsi, üretim süreci ve süreçte kullanılan yöntemler hakkında bilgiler aktarılmış, bu yöntemlerle üretilen yapay etin avantajlı ve dezavantajlı yönleri ortaya konmuştur. Son olarak, İslam hukuku perspektifinden yapay etin üretiminde kullanılan kök hücre, üretim ortamında kullanılan serum ve genel olarak fıkhî ilkeler açısından yapay et değerlendirilmiştir.

Engelli bireylerin ülkemizde ve dünyada karşılaştıkları en önemli ekonomik sorunlardan biri de istihdamdır. Maalesef gelişmiş ülkelerde bile engellilerin istihdamında henüz istenilen seviyeye ulaşılamamıştır. İstihdam/çalışma gibi temel hak ve özgürlükler, insanlık tarihi boyunca hukuk sistemi içerisinde birtakım ilkeler üzerinden meşruiyet zemini kazanmıştır. Nitekim İslam hukukunun temel kaynaklarında yer alan genelde tüm insanlara özelde engelli bireylere yönelik adalet, hak, fırsat eşitliği, liyakat, ayrımcılıkla mücadele ve sosyal sorumluluk gibi ilkeler, istihdam politikalarının geliştirilmesinde referans olmuştur. Bu bağlamda erken dönemden itibaren İslam iktisat politikalarının temel amacı bireyin dünya ve ahiret mutluluğunu sağlamak şeklinde belirlenmiştir. Çalışmada öncelikle modern hukuk sistemlerinde geliştirilen aktif ve pasif istihdam modellerine yer verilmiştir. Bu kapsamda erken dönemden itibaren gerek Hz. Peygamber ve sahâbe uygulamalarında gerekse daha sonraki İslam toplumlarında engellilerin hem aktif hem de pasif olarak istihdam edildiği görülmüştür. Dönemin özelliklerine göre kurumsallaşmanın sağlandığı hatta İslam toplumlarında engellilerin istihdamı konusuna ilişkin gelişmelerin, tahmin edilenden çok daha önce başladığı söylenebilir. Ancak modern anlamda hukuki düzenlemelerin batıya göre daha geç yapıldığını itiraf etmeliyiz. Makalede engellilik olgusu, engellilerin sorunları ve ihtiyaçları bağlamında, istihdam konusunda geçmişten günümüze İslam toplumlarında yapılan çalışmalar ele alınmıştır. Bu kapsamda İslam toplumunda birçok engellinin yeteneklerine göre imamlıktan hâkimliğe, komutanlıktan valiliğe kadar çeşitli devlet kadrolarında aktif olarak istihdam edildikleri görülmüştür. İstihdam edilemeyenlerin ise sağlık, bakım, barınma ihtiyaçlarının karşılanması, maaş bağlanması ve vergi indirimi sağlanması gibi yöntemlerle mağduriyetlerinin giderilmeye çalışıldığı tespit edilmiştir. Ana teması İslam hukukuna göre engellilerin istihdam ilkelerinin belirlenmesi olan çalışmada; maslahat, örf, siyâset-i şer’iyye, liyakat ve sedd-i zerâi’nin, engelli istihdamının fıkhi dayanaklarını oluşturduğu tespit edilmiştir. Bu bağlamda âyet ve hadislerle fürû fıkıh müktesebatında yer almayan sorunların çözümünde, sosyal sorumluluk politikalarının geliştirilmesinde, engellilerin ekonomik bağımsızlığını kazanmasında ve asgari yaşam standardının sağlanmasında maslahat ilkesinin kilit rol üstlendiği, birey, aile, toplum ve devlet için fayda sağladığı ifade edilmiştir. Engellilerin istihdamının günümüzde hem ulusal hem de uluslararası hukuki düzenlemelerin en önemli konularını oluşturduğuna dikkat çekilerek, İslam hukukuna kaynaklık etme kriterlerine uygun olarak örf uygulamalarına dönüştüğü görülmüştür. İslam idare hukukunda engellilerle ilgili aktif ve pasif istihdam politikalarının, hukuki düzenlemelerin ve kurumsal yapının kamu yöneticileri tarafından siyâset-i şer’iyye kapsamında yapıldığı belirlenmiştir. İslam hukukunda idari görev ve kamu hizmeti atamalarının liyakate göre yapılmasının emredildiği, adam kayırma ve iltimasın yasaklandığı vurgulanarak, engelliliğin istihdama mani olmadığı vurgulanmıştır. Son olarak İslam hukukunda engellilerin istihdamıyla ilgili çalışmaların yetersizliğine dikkat çekilerek araştırmaların bu alanlarda yoğunlaştırılması, ayrıca İslam hukukuna göre engelliliğin istismarı konusunun çalışılması önerilmiştir.

This study aims to clarify the rulings of wearing fragrances in Islamic law. Pleasant fragrances have been used throughout history by different communities, including prophets for various purposes such as healing, personal care, or religious reasons. Pleasant fragrances have many benefits for humans, the foremost of which is enhancing memory. Fragrances also directly affect the memory, causing the formation of certain emotions or memories. Another remarkable feature of fragrances is that they can arouse human lust. Fragrant plants exist in nature in different types. They are classified into three categories: those cultivated solely for their fragrance, those cultivated for other purposes, and those cultivated both for their fragrance and for other purposes. This classification is significant in terms of the rulings on wearing fragrance. Islam, aiming to protect the happiness of man in this world and the hereafter, has introduced certain rules regarding fragrances, which have a quality that affects human nature. Our Prophet (peace be upon him) expressed that fragrance has been made dear to him, wore fragrance for daily care, and recommended it to his ummah. Islam considers commendable (mustaḥab) to wear fragrance for Friday and Eid prayers, and before entering the state of iḥrām in order to be clean and well-groomed in gatherings. However, for certain reasons, it is forbidden for those in iḥrām to wear fragrance, for women to wear fragrance in the presence of non-maḥram men, and for women who are in their waiting period due to their husband’s death or a irrevocable divorce. The reason behind these prohibitions for women is to prevent the immorality that might arise due to the sexual attraction that fragrance can provoke. Another reason for the prohibition on women in the waiting period is that grooming and adornment are not improper with mourning. This is because engaging in grooming and beauty enhancing activities during a time of sorrow is not only inherently wrong, but also considered improper behavior by society. Wearing fragrance is also one of the prohibitions of ihram. The reason behind this prohibition is that fragrance is incompatible with spirit of ihram. There are some financial sanctions for violating this prohibition. Fragrances produced in the last century generally contain various additives such as alcohol. Therefore, there is a dispute regarding the impurity of fragrances containing additives such as perfume and cologne. Some scholars state that these substances, being impure, would invalidate acts of worship that require purity from najāsa. Other scholars do not consider these substances impure. The rulings on fragrance use reveal how much importance and value Islam attaches to human nature. Indeed, the encouragement of wearing fragrance in certain cases is based on the wisdom of demanding the benefit that will arise. Conversely, prohibiting the same act in other cases aims to prevent greater harm that may arise. Therefore, analyzing the legal rulings on wearing fragrance reveals the delicate balance observed by Islamic law in issuing its rulings. The rulings on wearing fragrance are found scattered under different topics in classical fiqh works. Although there are few studies conducted on wearing fragrance in the modern era, those addressing the issue from a fiqh perspective are inadequate in terms of quality and scope. Thus, there is a need for a study that addresses the situations where wearing fragrance is recommended, the situations where it is prohibited, and and what are the sanctions for them, together with their evidences, from a fiqh perspective. This study examines the rulings on wearing fragrance according to the four schools, primarily the Ḥanafi school, under various headings. It also analyzes the use of cologne and perfume, which are subject to various disputes due to their additives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In addition to being a guide to salvation for humanity, the Qur'an is a rich source of information. Some of the information provided by the Holy Qur'an is information about the previous nations and the news about beliefs, morals, moral values and legal transactions within this information. In the Qur'anic pa-rables, the normative rules of the earlier nations and divine religions are also discussed in terms of ju-risprudence. The evidence of shar’u men kablena (the shar’u of those before us) has been established. This is because the Qur'an contains information that can be the subject of many branches of science. The bin-ding nature of the legal transactions mentioned in the Qur'anic parables for Muslims has been handled within the scope of shared men kablena, usually in the form of a triple classification: In the first group, there are the sharī'ahs for which there is evidence that they are null and void for Muslims. There is a consensus that they are not binding. The second group includes the Shari'ahs, for which there is eviden-ce that they are valid for Muslims. The third group consists of those Shari'ahs for which there is no evi-dence that they are repealed or binding on Muslims. There is no disagreement among the jurists about the sharī'ah value of the first two groups of sharī'ahs. Still, a dispute arose only over the binding nature of the third group of sharī'ahs, and the scholars of usul have taken two different positions on them: posi-tive and negative. The Mutazilite jurists did not consider any of the previous Sharî'ahs binding on the Prophet (pbuh) and his ummah, either before or after the Prophethood. Although there were differences of opinion among the Shafi'i jurists on the subject, the final opinion of the sect was negative. Abū Ishāq al-Shīrāzī (476/1083), who had embraced the nongenerated shar'u men kablāyah in his earlier works, rejected it in all its forms in his last extant work. Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwaynī (478/1085) and Imam al-Ghazālī (505/1111) seem to have accepted the previous sharī'ah that had not been abrogated. Due to the ambiguity of al-Ghazālī's statements and their openness to different interpretations, his view was presented as negative by later jurists. The views of Shāfiʿī jurists on the subject changed with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (606/1210), and the view that shar'u men kablenān in any of its forms is not binding was adopted and established by his successors al-Sayfeddīn al-Āmidī (631/1233), Ṭāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī (653/1255) and Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī (682/1283). This view was recorded by the later Shafi'i jurists Qāḍī Baydāwī (685/1286) and Ṣāj al-Dīn al-Subkī (771/1370). The Mālikī jurists Ibn al-Hājib (646/1249) and Shahāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (684/1285), as a consequence of the opinion of the imams of the sect, regar-ded the non-generated shar'u men kablāyah as shar'i evidence. Despite the differences of opinion among the mutakallimūn jurists on the subject, the jurists Abu Bakr al-Jassas (370/981), Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī (430/1039), Shams al-eimme al-Sarahsī (483/1090), and Abū alʿUsr Fakhr al-Islam al-Pazdawī (482/1089), as well as Muhammad b. Hasan al-Shaybānī, one of the imams of the sect. Hasan al-Shaybānī (189/805), who is one of the imāms of the sect, they considered the shar'ū men kablāyah, which is included in the nafs but has not been abrogated, as a sharī'ah evidence. The Hanafī jurists Mu-zaffar al-Dīn Ibn al-Sāāṭī (694/1295), Sadr al-Sharī'a al-Sānī al-Bukhārī (747/1346), Ibn al-Humām (861/1457), Ibn 'Amīr al-Hāj al-Khalabī (879/1474), and Muhibbollāh b. 'Abd al-Shāshūr al-Bihārī (1119/1707), who belonged to the memzūj method, adopted the views of the sects on the subject. Altho-ugh there are differences of opinion in the methodology, the works of the sects' furu al-fiqh include the provisions of the Shari'ah of the previous nations, which are included in the Qur'an and for which there is no evidence that they have been abrogated. As such, there are some rulings in the Qur'anic parables. For example, a number of rulings and contracts, such as mujāyah, drawing lots, qisas, bailment, and the contract of ijārah, are based on the sharī'ahs of previous nations. Although there are differences of opi-nion in theory, there is no difference in practice and the differences of opinion remain superficial. While the proponents of the positive view adopted and developed the laws of the previous nations as a new evidence under the name of shar'u men kablena, the opponents of the negative view considered them as part of the Kitāb and Sunnah. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the evolution process of Islamic law, respectively the concepts of "fiqh", "fiqh procedure", "maqasid" and "philosophy of fiqh" have an important place. Although the meanings and usage areas of the concepts in question are different, there is a close relationship between them. While fiqh refers to all the provisions that concern the taxpayer, the fiqh method focuses on the methods of transferring the provisions and inferring them from rational evidence. The theory of maqasid, which is evaluated within the scope of fiqh procedure, refers to the principle of "benefit" and "harm" that are intended to be avoided for people in religious provisions. The principle in question was divided into "necessities, needs and tahsiniyât" and everything that benefits people's life, mind, religion, chastity and property was considered "benefit", and everything that harmed them was considered "maleficence". The theory of maqasid has been expressed from time to time with different concepts such as hıkma, purpose and cause. There is a general opinion that the process pioneered by Juwayni in using maqasid, which is directly or indirectly included in the nas, as a fiqh term, was transformed into a systematic form with Ghazali. The contributions of İzz, Karafî and Şatibi in the later periods are an undeniable fact. Shatibi, who lived in the eighth century Hijri, had a special interest in maqasıd, which led him to be evaluated on an independent basis from the fiqh method in later periods. The concept of philosophy, used in disciplines such as "philosophy of law", "philosophy of religion" and "philosophy of history", examines the epistemological principles of the branch of science to which it is related. The epistemological principles in question are absolute and are not limited to any dimension within their scope. In this regard, the same sensitivity should be observed in the definition of "philosophy of fiqh". Developments in social and cultural life during the transition from the traditional social structure to the social dynamics shaped by the industrial and technological age have paved the way for sciences to gain different horizons. The evolution of the theory of maqasid, updated and developed by Ibn Ashur, into the "philosophy of Islamic law" in the twentieth century also caused maqasid to become a discipline independent of the fiqh procedure. The works of scholars such as Ahmet er-Raysûnî and Allâl el-Fâsî also made serious contributions to the field. The reflections of the tendency to identify maqasid and maslaha with the philosophy of fiqh are seen in Turkey as well as in other Islamic countries. As a matter of fact, it is witnessed that terms such as "philosophy of fiqh" or "philosophy of Islamic law" are mostly used in scientific and academic studies today. However, it is clear that Islamic legal philosophy, as a new branch of science, needs to be evaluated on a broader basis in terms of its nature and scope. Muhammad Mustafawi, one of the contemporary researchers who took this fact into consideration, evaluated the philosophy of fiqh on a broader level by displaying a unique approach in his work titled "Felsefetü'l-fiqh". Accordingly, Islamic legal philosophy focuses on methodological research to be used in fiqh deductions by observing fiqh as a phenomenon from historical, social, political and cultural perspectives. While the philosophy of fiqh makes the necessary analyzes in a critical manner on the conditions surrounding the mujtahid, who is the subject of fiqh, it does not deal with the aspects of inference and inference. According to this approach, the subject of the philosophy of fiqh is the field and limit of fiqh, the effects of modernism on fiqh, the relationship of fiqh with other disciplines, the language of fiqh, the binding nature of fiqh, the problems and solutions of fiqh, and other factors that surround the jurisprudence and affect ijtihad. In this article, it is aimed to closely examine the ideas put forward by Mustafavi, who evaluates the philosophy of fiqh in a more comprehensive way, in his philosophy of fiqh, in contrast to the studies that reduce the philosophy of fiqh to the theory of maqasid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Hanafi school's status against the Mu'tazilites has been the subject of evaluations and sometimes criticisms within the framework of the perspectives of different schools since the early period. It has been claimed that this sect, which is known to have opposed Abū Hanīfa and his disciples in matters of theology, influenced some jurists in Iraq. It is difficult to claim that a concrete Mu'tazilite influence on the group of faqih (jurists) who emerged as Iraqi Hanafies until the fourth century. However, the process that started with two important jurists such as al-Karkhī and al-Jaṣṣās, it is seen that Iraqi Hanafism adopted the ideas of the Muʿtazilites and did not hesitate to reflect this in their works of jurisprudence. When examined the first discussions of usul al-fiqh, it is possible to see the influence of the Muʿtazilite understanding of theology. Although the Muʿtazilites did not engage in jurisprudence, they took an interest in the usul al-fiqh, which formed the basis of their theological conception, using it as a defense method in abstract thought. As a result, some of the arguments put forward by were answered by other theological schools, within time this formed a broad usul al-fiqh literature. In this process, the power they gained both politically and intellectually resulted in their influence on the usul thought of other sects. The Iraqi Hanafī jurists in the same region were deeply influenced by their theological thoughts and the usūl debates that developed as a continuation of their theological principles from the IVth century onwards. Jaṣṣās is a senior name that has been influenced by the Muʿtazilite, fortune that most of his works have reached us today. Al-Jaṣṣās, who does not hesitate to refer to iʿtazilite (dissociation) principles in his own statements, is a serious Muʿtazilite follower not only in theology but also in the usul al-fiqh. The Muʿtazilite influence on his ideas or proposals can be clearly observed not only because he follows the same views but also because he continues almost the same style by referring to the theological principles of the Muʿtazilites. Besides, the fundamental views of usul al-fiqh, it can be said that al-Jaṣṣās was influenced by the Muʿtazilites framework in many views of usul al-fiqh which he then developed upon. This can be acknowledged by the aforementioned basic issues which are the main topics that influence many details of usul al-fiqh opinions in their sub-divisions. However, this study only takes into account the basic method (al-usūl) views, which are also influential on other usul principles. Another indication that supports our claim is the reactions in the Transoxiana region to the Iraqi-Mu'tazilite views of usul, which al-Jaṣṣās adopted in the Vth century AH. The scholars of usul who followed the usul thought of both Samarkand and Bukhara's tradition made some dispositions regarding his preferences without naming names. In the meantime, they drew attention to the proximity of these views to iʿtizālī thought and criticized the aforementioned usul method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main source of Islam is the Holy Qur'ān. Qirā’a is the branch of science that deals with the different ways of reciting the words of the Qur'ān. For this reason, the science of qirā’a has a special place and importance among the basic Islamic sciences. The fact that the Qur'ān ranks first among the primary evidences in Islamic jurisprudence methodology has made it directly related to the science of qirā’a. At the beginning of Islam, the verses revealed were transmitted firsthand by the Prophet (PBUH) to his companions, who in turn would teach these verses to others. The differences in reciting that existed in this process led to the types of qirā’a called 'seven ahruf/letters'. Believers would first learn the different qirā’āt that they heard from the Prophet (PBUH) and then pass them on to the others. However, in addition to the authentic qirā’āt, the unauthentic qirā’āt that emerged over time directly affected the Islamic legal doctrine. Especially the differences in the most accurate understanding of the divine word led to the emergence of differences of opinion among Islamic jurists. This, in turn, was the source of the divergence of jurisprudential groups. These divergences between the groups based on the differences in qirā’a have come to the agenda depending on the issues of Islamic law, sometimes usūl and sometimes furū’. These debates have led to different jurisprudential approaches depending on the different interpretations of the verses, which has led to mental turmoil among Muslims. In this study, the impact of qirā’a differences on Islamic legal doctrine is analyzed. In this context, the issue of intercourse with a woman after menstruation, one of the issues of jurisprudence, is discussed. Regarding this, in the text the concept of qirā’a, its types, and the reasons for the emergence of qirā’a differences are first evaluated. For a better understanding of the issue, the approaches of the four fiqh schools to the differences of qirā’a are also examined in a general way. Then, the jurisprudential aspect of the concept of menstruation, the way it is expressed in the verse, and the differences of qirā’a on the related verse are examined, and the legal consequences that arise due to these different qirā’āt are explained. As far as can be detected in the process, most of the studies in the field of basic Islamic sciences are carried out in the form of subject analysis under a specific discipline. Unlike the general studies in the literature, in this research, a fundamental issue related to Islamic law and qirā’a, which is among the basic disciplines of Islamic sciences, has been addressed, which reveals the strong bond and interaction between the two disciplines. In order to have a better understanding of the subject of the present research, special attention has been given to include the fundamental sources of the science of qirā’a along with Islamic law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abū Naṣr Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, a Shāfi‘ī jurist (d. 771/1370) briefly handles certain taṣawwuf issues at the end of his book Jam al-Jawāmi‘ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh under the section titled Khātima. Various issues such as gnosis of Allāh, nature of the essence, judgments of the actions and their impact on states (aḥwāl), thought impressions, repentance, asking for forgiveness, earning, trust in God are touched upon briefly, without delving into their fiqh aspects. Morever, topics like inspiration (ilhām) is addressed under the title of inference (istidlāl) and excellence (iḥsān) under the title of belief (‘aqīda). Although al-Subkī does not explicitly explain the rationale behind addressing taṣawwuf matters, certain notions and statements mentioned in the book indicate the pivotal connection between fiqh and taṣawwuf and the dual structure that complements each other. The reason why al-Subkī has a positive stance toward taṣawwuf and mentions these subjects in the book is that Imām al-Shāfi‘ī whom alSubkī follows his madhhab has some positive statements about taṣawwuf and his father has conneciton (intisāb) to Ibn ‘Aṭā Allāh al-Iskandarī (d. 709/1309) who was among the pioneers of Shādhaliyya. The focus of this article is the intellectual background behind the inclusion of a chapter at the end of a book on uṣūl al-fiqh that deals with certain taṣawwuf issues. Because, the relationship between two disciplines has been predominantly addressed in the classical taṣawwuf books through the ṣūfīs’ aim to attribute legitimacy to their own path and to present themselves within sharī‘a. Therefore, addressing taṣawwuf issues in a book of uṣūl al-fiqh has significance and originality. This study does not only limit itself to the book and its author, it also encompasses commentaries of the book and its annotations within the context of the relationship between fiqh and taṣawwuf. Fiqh and sharī‘a terms mentioned throughout the article are used to refer to the practical aspect of Islām. The aim of this study is to reveal the relationship between fiqh and taṣawwuf from the perpective of a jurist and analyze al-Subkī’s approach to the topic and by doing so to address two main disciplines, fiqh and taṣawwuf that concern the practical aspect of Islām interdisciplinary. In the study, methods of document analysis and comparative textual analysis have been applied. The primary outcome of the study is that fiqh and taṣawwuf have not been mutually exclusive, despite occasional differences throughout the history of Islamic scholarship; rather, they have converged in the pursuit of the felicity of both worlds, complementing each other and requiring one another for the complete realization of profound religious experience. This purpose will be achieved through knowledge and practice, with the informative aspect of the matter being more related to fiqh, and the ḥāl aspect generated by deeds being more associated with taṣawwuf. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the history of legal thought, various tendencies have emerged in defining the concept of legal validity, according to the adopted criteria. Legal validity has been subjected to axiological, material and formal evaluations as alternatives to each other. Legal validity is reduced to justice (fairness/justness) when evaluated axiologically, to effectiveness (efficacy) when evaluated materially, and to belonging to a certain legal order when evaluated formally. The criteria of justice, effectiveness or belongingness, when taken as alternatives to each other, are not sufficient to define legality (juridicité), that is, to distinguish law from other normative structures, and they also lead to an overlap between the concepts of legality and legal validity. What is just in the natural law doctrine and what is effective in the realist legal doctrine is considered both legal and valid. Positivist legal doctrine, on the other hand, defines legal validity as belonging to a certain legal order, which, in reality, cannot distinguish it from legality. Therefore, legal validity is tried to be comprehended as an additional quality to legality, based on the conditions regarding invalidity. In Islamic jurisprudence, legal validity is accepted as a formal evaluation, not axiological or material. This is a natural and necessary consequence of the principle of shar'iyya, on which the general theory of law is based. Any norm that does not have shar'ī character is not considered valid merely on the grounds that it is just or effective. Determining shar'iyya is a matter of authority and procedure. Tūfī's approach to validity based on maslaha and Ibn Qayyim Jawziyya's approach to validity based on justice, constitute exceptions to the established principle in Islamic jurisprudence. We find a similar exception in the Hanafī approach, which considers the effectiveness of the entire legal order as a condition for the validity of every single norm to be continued. This approach seems to be comparable to the positivist theory, which relates the effectiveness of the legal order as a whole to the validity of norms. In the classical doctrine of Islamic law, an opinion constructed at the theoretical level that a legal norm would lose its validity due to matrūkiyya (desuetudo) was, to the best of our knowledge, defended only by Abū Mansūr Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Samarqandī al-Māturīdī. al-Māturīdī explains his opinion of metrūkiyya as a reason for the invalidity of legal norms on the occasion of the interpretation of the 10th verse of the Sura al-Mumtahina and by taking as evidence the regulations prescribed in the verse, which were annuled by way of desuetudo in time. Desuetudo means that a norm loses its effectiveness. Indeed, al-Māturīdī also defines matrūkiyya as people's abandonment of the norm. al-Māturīdī refers to the invalidation of norms due to matrūkiyya with the term naskh (abrogation), which is used in the classical doctrine of Islamic jurisprudence to mean the invalidation of a norm by the declaration of the Qur'ān or the Sunnah in such a way that it cannot gain validity again. Expressing the concept of invalidity due to matrūkiyya with the term naskh seems to be based on a conscious preference. This is because al-Māturīdī mentions various forms of naskh, and also adds naskh by ijtihād and naskh due to matrūkiyya to the form of naskh, which is almost unanimously accepted in the classical doctrine of Islamic jurisprudence. In al-Māturīdī's theory, although matrūkiyya is a reason for invalidity in terms of legal norms, it is not absolute. The abandonment of the norm, which occurs only under certain conditions, is prescribed as a reason for invalidity, not its mere abandonment. Accordingly, in order for a norm to be considered invalid due to matrūkiyya, the following conditions must occur together for the same norm: a. the absence of a statement in the Kitāb or the Sunnah indicating that the norm is invalidated, b. the rationale (raison d'être) of the norm (the purpose pursued when the norm was legislated) is comprehensible/reasonable (ma'kūl), c. there is an agreement (ijmā) of people to abandon applying the norm or complying with the norm, d. the fact that the norm is about an event with a limited context of social relations (hukm urf: being a special regulation regarding a certain social practice), e. the rationale of the norm has subsequently disappeared. In our opinion, al-Māturīdī's use of the term naskh for the concept of invalidity due to matrūkiyya implies that the relevant norm will not be valid again. For, he considers invalidity due to matrūkiyya to be possible only for norms that regulate events with a limited context of social relations, which confirms the conclusion we have drawn when taken in the sense of norms that are about events that will no longer take place in social life after their disappearance. In al-Māturīdī's theory, naskh due to matrūkiyya represents, in our opinion, a different form of realization of invalidity that cannot be reduced to naskh by ijtihād. Naskh by ijtihād means deciding on the invalidity of a norm through a process open to preference due to the disappearance of the rationale for its legislation over time. Although the norm is still applicable to the social relationship it is about, it is considered invalid because it no longer fulfills the rationale, for which it was legislated. However, naskh due to matrūkiyya is a purely factual type of invalidity. Not only the rationale for which the norm was legislated, but also the context of the social relationship has disappeared. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Muslim jurists have analyzed the prohibitions for a marriage contract under two categories: permanent and temporary. Permanent prohibitions on marriage are divided into three categories: blood, milk siblinghood and consanguinity. There is no dispute among the jurists about the prohibition of blood and milk siblinghood, but there is a dispute about kinship by marriage. This kinship arising from the marriage between the parties is referred to in classical fiqh literature as the intimacy of kinship (hurmat-i musāhara). In this context, it has been a matter of debate among jurists whether adultery, like marriage, requires a prohibition of marriage. The history of this debate goes back to the Companions, the tāâbiīîn and the taba-i tābiīn. This issue, which was a matter of debate among the first three generations, was also debated among the imams of the fiqh schools. Thus, two views have emerged in the doctrine regarding the problem of whether adultery requires hurmat al-musāhara. According to the first view, which is held by the majority of Hanafis, Hanbalis and Shi'a jurists, adultery requires hurmat al-musāharah. According to the second view, advocated by the Shafi'is, Malikis, Zahiris, and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, hurmat al-musahara is not established by adultery. In this case, it is permissible for the parties to marry each other's usūl and furu. In classical fiqh sources, the question of whether it is halal to marry the daughter of adultery is discussed in connection with this issue. According to the jurists who hold that adultery entails the intimacy of consanguinity, it is forbidden for the adulterer to marry his daughter of adultery. According to the jurists who hold this view, sexual intercourse requires prohibition, regardless of whether it is through lawful means, such as nikah, or unlawful means, such as fornication (zina). According to them, in this case, it is the child itself, not the adultery, that requires the intimacy of kinship. Therefore, the cause/sexual intercourse has replaced the causative agent/child. These opinion holders have argued that the existence of the link of juz'iyyah between the adulterer and the daughter resulting from adultery is a proper cause for prohibition. This is because a doubt functions as truth when it comes to necessitating haram. According to the jurists who hold that adultery does not require the intimacy of kinship, it is makrooh but permissible for the adulterer to marry the daughter of adultery. The jurists who hold this view point to the absence of any verse or hadith on the subject, as well as the difference between adultery and nikah. Accordingly, even though the progeny of the daughter resulting from adultery exists by the mother/mazniyahe, the progeny is not considered valid by the adulterous man/zâni. Therefore, there is no juz'iyyah link between the adulterer and the girl who is the product of adultery. The jurists who hold this view have stated that juz'iyyah is not a proper cause for prohibition. One of their main points is that the rulings that are established by marriage, such as linkage and maintenance payment, are not established by adultery. The main purpose of this study is to justify Shafi'i's view that adultery does not require hurmat al-musāharah. As far as we have been able to determine, there is no specific study on the justification of Shafi'i's view on this issue. In addition, it is possible to say that there is no study on how this view defended by Shafi'i was interpreted within the Shafi’i school and what the approaches of Shi'i and Zahiri jurists were on the subject. This study first examines the opinions and justifications of the jurists on whether adultery requires hurmat al-musāharah or not. Then, the opinions and justifications of Shafi'i and Shafi'i jurists on the subject were mentioned, and in this respect, the logic of fiqh defended by Shafi'i was tried to be revealed. The opinions and justifications on the subject were analyzed based on the main fiqh works of each school. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Islamic Law is a legal system based on the Qur'an and Sunnah as its primary sources. In order to interpret these sources, it is essential to determine the meanings attributed to the words that constitute these texts. Therefore, Islamic legal methodology includes special sections on the analysis of words. Specifically, in the Hanafī procedural tradition, issues related to wording are addressed under broad headings and more systematically than in other schools. When examining these classifications made by the Hanafis regarding the words, it is evident that they reflect the process from the assignment of meaning to the word to the derivation of the ruling from a nominal point of view. In this context, the first division concerns the allocation of meaning to the word (wāḍʿ). The second division addresses whether the meaning attributed to the word is clear or ambiguous (wuzūh-hafā). The third division examines whether the word is used with the meaning assigned to it (istiʿmāl), and the fourth concerns the conclusion of the meaning attributed to the word with the ruling (dalālah). However, al-Sadr alSharī'a argued that the division of words in terms of istiʿmāl should be presented before the words in terms of wuzūh-hafā, and this issue is evaluated in the article. The classifications made from the nominal point of view regarding the words are divided into four parts. The article discusses the nature of the perspective determined in each classification and evaluates the compatibility of the subcategories with the relevant perspective. In this respect, the division of words into four categories as hās, ʿām, mushtarak, and muawwal from the early periods continued until the 8th century AH. During this period, al-Sadr al-Sharī'a explicitly stated that the inclusion of muawwal in the classification in terms of wadʿ is not in accordance with the nominal point of view and replaced it with jam‘ al-munakkar. As a justification for this objection, he mentioned that the division of words based on wāḍʿ is the allocation of the word to meaning, that is, the wāḍiʿ's association of meaning with the word. In the case of the type of wording called muawwal, he stated that it is not the wāḍiʿī but the mujtahid’s interpretation. The responses given to these objections by the methodologists who adopted the relevant division are discussed, and the issue of whether or not muawwal is included in the wording in terms of wadʿ has been concluded. Additionally, the approaches to jamʿ munakkar are evaluated in this context. Another area where there is a different approach among jurists regarding the division of words is the types of words in terms of their usage (istiʿmāl). In Hanafī jurisprudence, these types of words are generally divided into four categories: literal, metaphorical, sariḥ, and kināyah. When classifying the words in terms of istiʿmāl, the use of the first meaning of the word by the speaker expresses haqiqah, while the transfer of the word to another meaning by establishing a relationship with the first meaning expresses majaz. In other words, if the use of the word in its first meaning or in a figurative sense is understood by the addressee at the first moment, this is expressed by the concept of sariḥ, while if the understanding of the speaker's intention requires explanation or presumptions, this is called kināyah. Although these types of words are considered to be related to each other, as mentioned, it is stated that there should be certain differences between the types that are related. Therefore, the definitions of sariḥ and kināyah indicate that these two concepts are types of literal and figurative speech. Consequently, the objections and arguments regarding the division of words in terms of istiʿmāl constitute another problematic aspect of the article. Within the framework of these issues, the study first presents the general approaches to wording in the Hanafī procedural tradition and then analyzes the types of wording in terms of wadʿ, including mushtarak-muawwal and sariḥ-kināyah, and the types of wording in terms of istiʿmāl, which constitute the problematic aspect, in line with general acceptance. As a result, different approaches to the types of muawwal, jam‘ munakkar, sariḥ, and kināyah are evaluated, and suggestions are presented on how these types of words should be categorized within the relevant divisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Islamic judicial law, The position of women in the context of witness testimony varies. While the testimony of women in criminal cases was rejected in the nisab division, where the nature of the case was important, their testimony was accepted as valid under certain conditions in civil cases. When they are required to testify in economic transactions, the testimony of two women is requested against one man, and the role of one of the two women is explained as the 'performance of the duty of reminding'. This has led to the entrenched belief in the literature that women are positioned this way in matters of testimony because they are considered relatively weaker in intellectual capabilities compared to men. According to the findings of the science of psychology, women are considered superior to men in matters such as memory and mastery of details. However, their association with 'forgetfulness' in the context of their position in the matter of testimony suggests a problem with the scope of the reasoning of the evidence in Islamic law. The purpose of this study is to make a contribution suggesting that instead of narrowing the ruling solely to women's forgetfulness, it would be more accurate to address the issue within the broader meaning expressed by the text and taking into account the overall effects arising from women's emotions and biology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to determine the position of the qawl al-sahâbî in the hierarchy of evidence of the Hanafī madhhab compared to qiyas. İn the study firstly, the concepts of sahābī and qawl al-sahâbî are discussed, then the views of the founding imams of the Hanafī madhhab and the Hanafī methodologists on this issue are presented. Finally, three issues in which the founding imams are alleged to have taken a contradictory stance on the qawl al-sahâbî and the possible reasons for Abū al-Ḥasan al-Karhī's different view from the Hanafī madhhab on the evidential value of the qawl al-sahâbî are analysed. According to the findings of the study, the founding imams of the Hanafi madhhab took the qawl al-sahâbî as a reference and preferred the qawl al-sahâbî to qiyas in matters that could not be understood by reason and those that could be understood. In the sources, there are many narrations from the founding imams that in both cases, they preferred the qawl al-sahâbî to qiyas. In addition, many Hanafī jurists have stated that this was the approach of the imams towards the qawl al-sahâbî. On the other hand, Hanafī lawyers, like the founding imams, a preferred the qawl alsahâbî to qiyas in both cases. However, al-Karhī put forward a different view on this issue and argued that although the qawl al-sahâbî has evidential value in matters that cannot be understood through reason, it does not have any superiority over qiyas in matters that understood through reason. There is some evidence that Mutazilite thought had an influence on his adoption of this view. In addition, the three issues on which the founding imams are alleged to have exhibited contradictory attitudes can be interpreted in accordance with the narrations showing that they prioritised the qawl al-sahâbî over qiyas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Family is the first place in which our future individuals open their eyes to the world. Family, which is mandatory for the healthy upbringing of future generations, constitutes the most important building block of society. Islam attaches a great importance to the family institution established through a legitimate marriage contract and the continuity of the lineage, and imposes very important responsibilities on parents regarding their children. It is very important for the existence of society which children, who are the guarantee of our future, grow up in a physically, spiritually and emotionally healthy way, away from all dangers. In the words of the Prophet, “Our children are our beloved ones” and they are entrusted to us by Allah. Islam protects the children at all stages of their lives, from the fetal state in the mother's womb until they become adults, and legally secures all their rights. According to Islamic law, minors are deficient in terms of their capacity to act and are limited in their ability to act. Due to their biological helplessness and lack of capacity, minors need the protection of others. From the moment they are born, they do not have the ability to carry out their personal and financial affairs on their own nor do they have the physical, spiritual and mental maturity. The fact that minors need the supervision and protection of someone else arises due to their biological inadequacy and legal necessities. In Islamic law, the personal and financial rights of children are protected through the custody or guardianship system. In legal terms, all rights and interests of minors are protected by parents or guardians. The state is the guardian of those who have no guardian. The place where the most appropriate opportunities and conditions can be provided for a child to grow up in a peaceful, safe and healthy way is undoubtedly his/her own family. The love, compassion and mercy that parents have towards their children require them to prepare the most suitable environment for them. Although it is not appropriate to remove a child from a warm family environment and parents without a necessity, the physical, emotional, economic and sexual abuse that the child is exposed to within the family sometimes makes this necessary. It is a necessity to protect children who are neglected and abused by their parents and other family members, or who are victims of crime. The protection and supervision of children is the responsibility of parents, close relatives and the lawful authorities of the state. When children in need of protection are mentioned in Islamic law, orphans, foundlings or found children usually come to mind. In academic studies conducted on these children, the issues of foster care or adoption are generally discussed. Since our study will focus on children living with their parents and in need of protection, orphans and homeless children will not be addressed. Therefore, the issue of foster family or adoption is not included in the scope of our study. It is hoped that this study will contribute to the field in the context of related issues and shed light on future studies. The article aims to examine the issue of under which cases children living with their parents should be/should not be taken under state protection from the perspective of Islamic law. However, since the topics discussed in this article include many different issues within themselves, the incidents of neglect and abuse that children are exposed to within the family vary, and it is not possible to subject each incident to a special evaluation, the topics have been tried to be explained from a holistic perspective in the light of examples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the surrogacy emerged in the modern era, it is not mentioned in the Quran, hadiths, and the studies of Muslim jurists in the early periods. However, contemporary Muslim jurists and researchers have addressed this new issue and enounce different views on this matter. Purpose of this study to address the different views that arise in determining the lineage of a child born via surrogacy, along with their justifications, and reach a conclusion. This study is important in the current debates in the doctrine regarding the determination of the lineage of a child born via this practice from the perspectives of the mother and father and the viewpoints of the proponents and the evaluating these viewpoints. Since my study is within the scope of Islamic law, the medical aspect of the issue has not been emphasized much, but has been discussed in a general way to constitute the basis for the study. Additionally, since the study is limited to lineage, no topics related to criminal law concerning this issue have been included. In this study, I provided general information about the surrogacy and its various methods. According to the inquisitions, surrogacy is mostly preferred by individuals who want to have children but the woman is unable to conceive for various reasons. In this case, reproductive cells are taken from married couples, fertilized in an artificial environment, then transplanted into the uterus of another woman and eventually birth occurs. After birth, the child is handed over to the couple who applied for this practice. After homologous fertilization occurs, surrogacy is applied. This is what is usually thought of when surrogacy is mentioned. This practice, in which the egg cell taken from one woman is transferred to the uterus of the other woman, can rarely be seen in marriages where the husband has more than one wife. This can also be called intra-marital surrogacy. Additionally, surrogacy can also be performed after fertilization occurs through heterologous methods. In this study, after giving general information about the matter, jurisprudential aspect of the issue is discussed. Because one of the most determining factors regarding the jurisprudence of surrogacy is lineage. To investigate the Islamic legal judgment on this issue, I consulted some contemporary sources of Islamic jurisprudence and understood that there are two different views. Therefore, I understood that the majority of Muslim jurists do not deem this practice permissible because it harms lineage, family and social order and some others consider it permissible to help the couples who do not have children to experience the love of children. Likewise, there are debates about the Islamic legal judgment of the method we call intra-marital surrogacy. It is agreed that the practice of surrogacy using heterologous fertilization methods is not permissible. Since the focus of my study is to address the different views and justifications in determining lineage, I did not go into detail in the Islamic legal judgment. I discussed the parentage of the child born via surrogacy within the scope of the application made with the fetus obtained from the reproductive cells of married couples, as it is the most common method. I have included different situations regarding heterologous insemination and intra-marital surrogacy practices under their own headings. According to my research, there is no consensus on the maternal lineage of the child born via this practice. Majority researchers consider the woman who gets pregnant and gives birth as a mother. Some say that the woman who provides the egg should be considered as the mother. Likewise, it was discussed who the father of the newborn child would be. Some stated that the child legally has its mother and not its father. Some stated that the one who provides the sperm is the father. Some stated that the surrogate mother's husband is the father. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study deals with the examination of the book titled Jihad, the Dynamic of Islam, which deals with the concept of jihad, which has an important place in Islamic law, from a different and broad perspective. This book, which was pen by Saffet Köse, was published by Plural Publications in 2019. The book examined the jihad as all actions performed under the name of glorifying the religion of Allah. This book, which is organised as three main sections other than the introduction section, examined the concept of jihad in the Qur'an and in the life of the Prophet (saas), and responded to them by mentioning the criticisms of the West about the concept of jihad. In the book, he also touched upon the aspects of jihad in fields such as science, economy and culture. He also drew attention to the importance of the representation aspect of the Muslim society in order to ensure this dynamism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Visually impaired individuals may encounter some negative situations in their daily lives, both legally and religiously. While laws deal with the legal aspect, Islamic law deals with the religious aspect. In order to minimize the difficulties that visually impaired people may face in their daily lives, Islamic law has made some flexible provisions based on the principle of facilitation. This work, which we are introducing, deals in detail with the information on the provisions for the visually impaired in ibādāt, muāmalāt, munāqahāt - mufārekāt, ukūbāt and some other issues by including the views of the four major madhhabs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of the abuse of rights, which is subject to legal regulations in contemporary legal systems, has been widely applied in Islamic law since its early periods. Safet Köse addresses this significant concept in the examined work. The author thoroughly examines the concept of the abuse of rights in Islamic law, including the perspectives of different schools of thought. Furthermore, the author provides the reader with the opportunity to compare the historical development and current appearance of the concept in Western law. The work also presents details supporting the notion that the principle of the abuse of rights, which finds application in Islamic law, may have influenced Western law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ijma means the consensus of the mujtahids following the era of the Prophet Muhammad regarding the rulings on a Shari'i-deed issues, and according to almost all of the fuqaha, it is the third of the "adille-i shar'iyya" after the Qur'an and the Sunnah. In the Islamic legal system, the main purpose of the evidence of ijma is considered as fixation, that is, to reveal the constants of religion, which are inviolable and constants. As, if ijma has been made on a subject on which jurisprudence has been made, that issue has ceased to be jurisprudence and the judgment on it has reached the dimension of finality, and it is no longer considered correct to resort to ijtihad again for that issue during that period. As a result, a fixed has arisen for that matter and the judgment on the matter is closed for discussion. In this respect, the re-discussion of such provisions (constants) would mean a discussion of the essence of religion. The subject of ijma, which is so binding for Muslims, has been meticulously examined by Islamic jurists due to its importance and many works have been written on this subject. One of these studies is the book titled "The Theory and Practice of Ijma According to Kâsânî" by Prof. Dr. Ayhan AK, a faculty member of the Department of Islamic Law, Faculty of Theology, Ondokuz Mayıs University. In this article, Ayhan AK's work will be evaluated such as its contribution to the field, its value, strengths, and weaknesses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The institution of waqf has earned a rightful place among the significant matters of Islamic law in many aspects, such as its establishment, functioning, subject, administration and role. One of the most important aims of this study is to make a modest contribution to this literature. Another aim is to bring to the attention of the scholarly world a risāla on irṣādī waqfs, one of the most debated and discussed types of waqfs. This risāla, revealed to have been written in the 11th Hijri century, deals with practice rather than theory. Risālas, which have an important place in the literature of Islamic law, usually deal with a specific subject. They are also important for the insights they provide about the social life of the period in which they were written. The discovery of these works, found among the richest products of manuscript libraries and reflect the practice of Islamic law, is particularly significant in revealing the harmony of theory and practice together. In this sense, this treatise by Ḥamawī, one of the Ḥanafī scholars, which directly reflects the practice regarding some of the waqfs, makes an important contribution to the literature in terms of reflecting the solution of an important problem despite its small volume. In this study, only irṣādī foundations will be discussed within the author’s specified limits in the risāla. This is because, in addition to the waqf institutions, which were mainly established based on individual property, the allocation of real estate’s belonging to the bayt al-māl to charitable organizations and scholars through irṣād contributed significantly to the healthy and orderly execution of religious services. It is possible to see this competence in the field of fiqh in the successful presentation of the legitimacy of irṣādī waqfs within the law of waqf by Ḥamawī, who taught in important madrasas of his time and the region, who was qualified to issue fatwas in Ḥanafī fiqh, and whose fatwas were even collected by his students in a work called al-Fatāwā. In addition, many risāla he wrote in the field of fiqh point to his competence in the science of fiqh in addition to sciences such as tafsīr, hadīth, al-‘aqāīd, lexicography, and manāqib. Although the author is a Ḥanafī, his reference to al-Suyūtī (911/1505), one of the Shāfi’ī scholars of his region (Egypt), shows the scholarly value of the work. Since there is no second copy of the manuscript, it has been published only through textual criticism. In addition, most of the quotations in the risāla have been identified in the works cited and shown in the footnotes. However, some of these citations could not be found in the works mentioned in the risāla. Although it is clearly stated in the risāla that the work belongs to Ḥamawī, there is no information about when and where it was written. We believe that the answer given by the head of state of the period to a question about the legitimacy of the allocation of land belonging to the bayt al-māl in a substantiated manner contributed significantly to the continuation of the tradition of irṣādī waqf in the following years. Although at first glance, the fact that the subject is discussed under the heading of inauthentic waqfs in the sources may give a negative impression against irṣādī waqfs, this does not indicate the invalidity of these waqfs, but rather that the person who made the irṣād was not the true owner of the property. Although some have argued that the allocation in question cannot be a waqf for this reason, the guidance given to those with a right to the bayt al-māl is a waqf, as Ḥamawī points out. However, the fact that the status of the allocations made to those with no right to the bayt al-māl is not mentioned in the risāla seems to be a deficiency. If these allocations, which are mentioned in some other sources as inauthentic irṣād, had been clarified, the objections to this type of waqf would have been slightly less. Despite this deficiency, it can be said that this risāla, which conveys the solution of a practical problem, fills an important gap considering the conditions of its time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The piecing together (talfîq) the recitations (the qirââts) of the Qur’an is a controversial issue in the sciences of the Qur’an recitation and the Islamic law (fiqh). Its effect on prayer is one of the legal dimensions of the discussion. The pronunciations in some Qur’anic recitations may come to be easy for a person compared to other Qur’anic recitations. For the reason of such easiness, the person may read certain verses by transferring to a recitation which is different from the recitation he started at the beginning of the prayer or if he studied the ten recitations of the Qur’an he may make the transition between different recitations by mistake. For the reason of above-mentioned transitions, the problem of the effect of talfîq on prayer occurs. This creates the need for research to clarify the issue. This need is one of the important reasons for writing this article. The article first examines the concept of transition or piecing together between different recitations (talfîq) in terms of the science of the Qur’anic recitation. After mentioning the opinions of the scholars of Qur’anic recitation, the article examines the concept of talfiq and its types. Talfîq between recitations means to read a Qur’anic verse according to one recitation, then continue its recitation accoding to another way of recitation. Talfîq can be done in three ways. These are talfîqs made by changing the letters or vowel marks of the words or just changing only its sounds. The scholars of Qur’anic recitation have disagreed on the ruling of talfîq between recitations. While some of them say that it is absolutely not permissible, others find it permissible on the condition that it does not distort the meaning of the Qur’an. However, the effect of talfîq on prayer is not mentioned in their opinions. The talfîq is divided into two in terms of its effect on prayer. They are talfiqs that may affect prayer or not affect it. The effect of talfiq on prayer depends on its effect on the meaning of the Qur’an. If it changes the meaning of the Qur’an in a way that contradicts it, this kind of the talfîq invalidates the prayer according to Hanafis. However, according to Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbalis, if it changes the meaning of the Quran deliberately in a way that contradicts it, it invalidates the prayer, but if it is done by mistake, it does not invalidate the prayer. If the talfİq does not change the meaning of the Qur’an in a way that contradicts it, it does not invalidate the prayer because it does not lead a contradiction in meaning. However, since the talfîq creates a deficiency in prayer, the person who makes the talfîq commits a disapproved deed and a deficiency in his prayer. If this deficiency occurs in the wajib recitation, that person makes up this deficiency by performing prostration of forgetfulness at the end of the prayer. If the deficiency happens in the sunnah recitation, there is no need to perform the prostration of forgetfulness. The reason why talfîq which changes the meaning of the Qur’anic verse in a way that contradicts it invalidates the prayer is that the words pronounced in the prayer are taken the form of mundane words. Because a word can be either the Qur’an or a prayer or a dhikr. All the words other than these three types are mundane words. When the above-mentioned talfîqs at the level of letters, vowel mark and sounds are examined, it is seen that the talfîq at the level of sound does not change the meaning of the Qur’anic verse. It is observed that some of the talfiqs at the level of letter and vowel mark change the meaning of the recited Qur’anic verse while some others do not change its meaning. However, this change is not at a level that would contradict the meaning of the Qur’anic verse, but at a level that would create a deficiency in the meaning of the verse. For this reason, none of the types of talfîq invalidate the prayer. But some of them create a deficiency in prayer. As a result, it has been determined that the piecing together (talfîq) between mutawâtir recitations has a negative effect on the validity of prayer in some cases, but does not have a negative effect in some other cases. All of these provide an answer to a question that a person may encounter in his life of worship and help him to establish his relationship with God on a more solid basis. This is one of the benefits that makes this article important. While researching the subject, sources were obtained by using the documentation method, and the rulings were tried to be reached by examining particular samples and universal rules within the framework of the rulings of Islamic law by using inductive and deductive methods. By clarifying the rulings of the issue, the article aims to contribute to perform the prayers in a more healthy way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the legal nature of the Hanafī school’s opinion that divorce under duress is valid and its reflections in the Ottoman-era fatwās. Hanafī jurists argue that divorce of the person under duress is valid because he has the volition and legal capacity. According to them, the person under duress has the volition because he prefers the lesser of two evils. Duress is not contrary to the legal capacity established by reason and puberty. Therefore, the irrevocable verbal acts of the person under duress, such as talāq (divorce), are valid. In addition, the divine test of the person under duress continues. The test confirms the legal capacity and responsibility. For this reason, actions of a person under duress, like divorce, must be valid. Hanafī jurists’t theory of divine test seems to be inspired by the words of al-Nakha‘ī, who had a decisive influence on the formation of school’s views, about the person under duress: “If Allah willed, He would test him more severely”. According to this theory, God made his divorce valid because He wanted to test the person under duress. The person who pronounces divorce under duress should be aware that he is under a test and should be patient with the calamity that befalls him. Basing their reasoning on the validity of the divorce under duress along with the lines of volition-legal capacity-responsibility and divine test-legal capacity-responsibility, Hanafī jurists support it with numerous narrations from the Prophet, his companions, and early followers. In these narrations, it is explained that divorce will be valid under duress, cannot be reversed after it has occurred, and is not compatible with unseriousness. Within the school, there is an unchallenged opinion that is well-founded in terms of legal technique, is gained the attribute of worship based on the reasoning of divine testing, and is proven by many narrations. As the divine testing theory implies, this opinion may have consequences that require the devotee to be patient with the awareness of servitude. It may pave the way for consequences that are contrary to the interests of the family institution in general, and the spouses in particular, such as ending the marriage union without consent, and increasing the tahlīl marriages. On the other hand, the theory of divine testing requires that divorce under duress be considered valid at the expense of paving the way for the results contrary to some general and particular interests. Because it necessitates acting in the context of obedience and submission to God. Both situations implied and required by the theory of divine testing in places where the Hanafī madhhab is practiced have reflected in the Islamic legal literature, especially fatwā collections. Due to the madhhab’s gaining dominance to a great extent and the abundance of fatwā collections, Anatolia and Rumelia after the 16th century constitute an extremely convenient observation area. The fatwā collections that constitute the data source of this article contain real life issues that were personally addressed to the Ottoman muftīs. The use of fatwās regarding real life issues experienced in practical legal life as a data source increases the importance of this article in terms of legal history. The issues reflected in the Ottoman fatwā collections indicate that the muftīs strictly adhered to the Hanafī school’s well-established opinion that divorce under duress is valid, even in cases of obvious victimization. The fatwā procedure that requires submission to the uncontroversial opinions of the great Hanafī teachers, and the central authority, which ordered them to issue fatwās based on the authentic opinions of the school, required them to issue fatwās that divorces by the force of executive authorities, bandits and tyrants were valid. Their attitude in this matter describes that they take public interests such as devotion to religion and legal tradition, legal order and stability, into consideration more than some personal ones. They should have advised the victims to accept the material and moral damages they suffered as a test from God and to be patient. On the other hand, it is also a fact that, in order to preserve the marriage union and to protect people against legitimate or illegitimate authorities, they tried to prevent divorces under duress, with the remedies produced in the legal tradition to which they adhered. Besides, since the divorce under duress is a matter of dispute between jurists, there are some muftīs that reminded the statements within the madhhab that regard it valid for judges to decide based on the opinion of other schools, and considered these statements as basis for a fatwā contrary to the Hanafī opinion, and even formulated them as a fatwā. However, this judicial remedy, which could reduce the possible negative consequences of the established opinion that considered the divorce under duress as valid, was not compatible with the official legal policy giving more importance to legal stability. In a way, this judicial remedy was implemented by the Ottoman law of family rights prepared at the beginning of the 20th century. This article provides evidence for the above findings from the main sources of the Hanafī school and Ottoman fatwā collections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to examine the public benefits and interests in determining the causes of the provisions while revealing the things that are in favor or against the person in terms of his deeds/actions by Islamic jurists from detailed/partial evidence in the context of Islamic law. While making the compotent Muslim responsible for the command, the wise Shari' Almighty has primarily taken having the faculty of reason as the basis. In this context, Muslims have also developed some sciences in order to ground religious provisions on a rational basis. The science of hadith methodology was developed for the correct transmission of the textual narrations, and the science of methodology of Islamic jurisprudence was developed for the correct understanding of such narrations. They also determined the sources/origins and evidences of the sciences called fiqh and usul al-fiqh, and the ways and rules of accessing these sciences within the framework of above-mentioned sciences. While in regards to the rulings and their causes, the objectives of Shari’a (maqaṣid) is taken into consideration in terms of Divine Lawmaker, the public interest (maslaha) is taken into consideration in terms of the compotent believers. In this context, although it is essential to worship/serve the Shari'a in prayer, the satisfaction and peace of the soul and heart, the discipline of time and the interests of accountability are taken into consideration for the competent believer. Fasting is obligatory for those who are healthy, zakat is obligatory for those who have the minimum required amount of wealth, and pilgrimage is obligatory upon those who are rich and healthy. As can be seen in these examples, objectives of Shari’a and interests of the public have been considered together. The reason also plays an active role in determining these issues, addressing them, thinking about and understanding them. As a matter of fact, although the determination of causes was not based solely on the perspective of wisdom by the jurists, a rational basis was still sought in every religious ruling. Literally, juristic cause (‘illah) literally means a situation that causes a change in its location. In the conceptual framework, it means the situation that makes it appropriate to impose the provision, the intended result, benefit, clear or stable characteristic of the provision. A person traveling during Ramadan is given the permission not to fast. The interest considered here is to relieve the burden and trouble of the traveler. Being on a journey is taken as the cause of the ruling. The conditions required for the legal cause are that it should be clear, stable, appropriate, and that it should not be specific for a certain situation. In this context, intoxication is the legal cause for the prohibition of wine while being on a journey is the legal cause for shortening of ritual prayers. In addition, when determining the legal cause, the Holy Book and the sunnah of the Prophet are the first sources to look. In the second degree, if there is a consensus among mujtahids in an age regarding that a certain quality was the cause of a religious ruling, this quality was accepted as the cause of that ruling by consensus. In this respect, reason is important in understanding religious provisions. Because when the compotent believer understands the cause existing behind a ruling, he may be more willing to do what is ordered to him by the Shari' Almighty. In this article, we have shown the role of reason and the objectives of Shari’a and the public interest, on which Islamic jurists base their views while deducing the religious provisions of the compotent believers’ actions from the detailed evidences in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah by using the method of textual analysis and the qualitative method within the framework of classical and modern scientific sources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Muslims, inspired by numerous divine principles, have established the culture of infāq by founding charitable institutions in diverse geographies throughout history. One of the most reputable institutions for cultivating this culture is unquestionably endowment. This institution has made great contributions to strengthening the social and economic ties of the believers and to forming their cultural and spiritual identities from the beginning of the asr al-sa‘ādah until today. Therefore, it is vital to update the theoretical understanding of endowments, draw insights from various precedents and improve the effectiveness of practical applications accordingly. There is no verse in the Qur'an explicitly stating the legitimacy of endowments; however, the verses encouraging charity and competing in good deeds form the basis of the institution of endowments. Very few rulings on endowments are determined by the Sunnah; the majority come from the jurisprudence of the jurists, based on the evidence of istiẖsān, istiṣlāẖ and ‘urf. Jurists agree that endowments are legitimate, but their views diverge on which assets may qualify as the subject of an endowment. They unanimously accept that immovable property such as lands, houses, and shops can be endowed. However, they disagree about the endowment of movable properties. Some jurists stipulate the characteristic of "perpetuity". While some jurists deem the endowment of movable properties to be absolutely permitted, others considerit permissible only under specific circumstances. Movable properties are classified into two categories regarding endowment status: “movables that retain their original form after usufruct” even for a certain period, and “movables that do not retain their original form after usufruct”. According to H̱anafī jurists, “perpetuity” is the general rule/reference for endowment. They argue that movables cannot be endowed in absolute terms because they do not conform to this general rule. However, they make three exceptions to this general understanding, and accept the endowment of movables falling under these categories as authentic. Early H̱anafīs deemed the endowment of dīnārs, dirhams, makīlāt, and mawzūnāt to be authentic. Shāfi‘ī scholars state that the condition of “perpetuity” is absolutely attained in properties such as land, and as long as their lifespan in properties such as books, horses, and weapons. From this perspective, they deem it permissible to endow movable properties that can be used for a certain period and do not lose their original qualities immediately. However, they do not accept the endowment of movables such as foodstuffs which are consumed through usufruct and cannot be utilized even for a certain period. The majority of H̱anbalīscholars agree with the Shāfi‘ī jurists. Some H̱anbalīs, however, view the endowment of movable properties whose original qualities are lost by usufruct as legitimate if there exists an established practice and legal precedent. The most comprehensive stance on endowment property is that of Mālikī scholars. They do not stipulate the condition of perpetuity in endowments and recognize that endowments can also be of a temporary nature. Therefore, it is permissible to endow cash, foodstuffs, books, clothes, and similar movable property of both classes. In the case of movable perpetual property, the solution is "istibdâl". The Imamiyya share the same view as the Mālikīs. We observe that the Mālikī view is preferred in legal regulations in the Islamic world and in the decisions of fatwa councils. In this context, the opinions of jurists, decisions of fatwā councils, historical practices and practices in Islamic states are analyzed to present an opinion on making the endowment institution more functional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of a single girl’s marriage, as in the past, remains one of the controversial areas of family law today. Therefore, the marriage of an adult girl continues to maintain its relevance in Islamic family law as well. In this study, the marriage of university female students is discussed comparatively with the views of classical period Islamic jurists and the evaluations of modern jurists. In this context, the discussion has focused on female students currently attending university being married off by their fathers without their knowledge or consent, as well as their ability to marry on their own free will without their parents’ knowledge or consent. The article evaluates the claims of feminist theologians that the religious texts negatively discriminate against women and limit their contractual capacity compared to men, in terms of capacity, socio-cultural background, and the institutional structure of the family. In this context, it is emphasized that university female students can marry of their own free will, but considering and benefiting from parental consent and experience is effective in realizing the expected benefits of marriage. It is concluded that the negative attitude of the majority of jurists stems from interpreting religious texts according to socio-cultural conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Freewill and consent composed of will are the touchstones in causing the legal acts to create results. In connection with the fact that there is a close relationship between freewill and consent as concepts and that there is a fine nuance in the functioning of these concepts in terms of the validity of legal acts, the approaches of the Islamic sects to freewill and consent have been different. In Islamic law, in order that the acts can create provisions, the parties should both have freewill and consent in that issue. However, due to some temporary cases such as abhorrence and anxiety, a divergence may occur between freewill and consent. With this regard, we investigated how the approaches of the sects in terms of the legal validity of an abstract freewill will be in connection with the building of acts, though there was no consent regarding the outcome of the legal acts in this sense. We discussed, in line with the views of Islamic law schools, whether it is possible for the legal validity of the will and consent that are damaged, especially in situations such as abhorrence, anxiety and mistake that cause the will to be dubious. On the other hand, we focused on the relationship between annulment, which is among the provisions of legal acts, and the approaches of the sects regarding the distinction between freewill and consent. In this sense, we discussed the opinions and justifications of the sects whether the decision should be made on the statements of mandatory, evildoer and joker in their verbal acts that are suitable for annulment and those that are not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Primary/shariah evidence accepted by the majority of Islamic legal doctrines and used in deducing judgments are; book, sunnah, ijma and qiyas. However, apart from these primary evidences, it is known that many additional/methodical evidences are also used in the production of religious/legal judgments. Procedural evidences frequently used in Hanafi doctrine are; istihsan, custom, maslahat-i mursal, and the words of the companions. Other methodological evidence used in Islamic law by almost all legal doctrines, including Hanafis, with different intensity and with some additional conditions are; şer'u men kablena, istishâb, istislâh, deeds of the people of Medina, seddi zerâi' etc. can be listed as follows. However, when secondary issues are examined with the inductive method, it is observed that different evidence and methods, apart from the primary and secondary evidence mentioned above, are also used as legal instruments in deriving the verdict. In this context, the present study deals with the issue of "rational inference", which is used in determining the criminal sanction of the crime in the context of Hanafi criminal law, "in the context of the crime of cutting off hands". In the research, it has been determined that in Hanafi criminal law, in addition to the above-mentioned evidence, rational inference was also used as a basis for the decision. Considering the volume of the article, types of inference, evidentiary value and conceptualization process were excluded from the scope of the study. The subject is limited to the rational inferences that are effective in determining the criminal sanction of amputation of hands among effective acts; the crimes of hadd, retaliation for killing and ta'zir are excluded from the scope. In addition, examples of rational reasoning carried out on the issues of hudud and retaliation for killing are pointed out in the footnotes. In Islamic law, the punishment for the crime of cutting off a hand in accordance with retaliation is to cut off the hand of the perpetrator of the crime if he meets the necessary conditions. The focus of this study is on the rational inferences that are effective in determining a different penal sanction instead of the retaliation provision in some special cases for the perpetrator or victim(s). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

God created man in a special form and gave him reason and will. God, who created humans in two different genders, male and female, declared that superiority is not based on gender, but rather based on taqwa (piety). Accordingly, being a man is not a source of pride, nor is being a woman a degrading quality. While God has endowed man with many rights, especially the right to life, it also imposes some responsibilities. Although God considered men and women equal in creation, faith and servitude, established some different provisions regarding responsibility. One of these areas is worship. Islam does not hold women responsible for some practices related to worship. Essentially, this attitude of Islam towards women is not a devaluation or restriction, but rather a valuing and providing positive privileges over men. When we examine prayer and fasting practices closely, we see that women are not only on menstrual and puerperal days, but also on days when they have different obligations such as pregnancy and breastfeeding. Likewise, they were not obliged to perform Friday and Eid prayers by their obligations such as childcare etc. They were also excused from performing regular prayers in congregation in the mosque. It should be noted that Islam's approach to the issue is based on opportunity, need and necessity, not gender. In this context, discourses that Islam and Muslims exclude women and see them as secondclass beings damage the image of Islam and Muslims. However, these accusations are baseless allegations based on distortions of the relevant provisions of Islamic law; These are baseless allegations. Our study is important in that it demonstrates that these accusations are unjustified by focusing on the positive privileges granted to women, whereas they are not granted to men. To reveal these privileges, only prayer and fasting practices have been examined within the limitation of these study and the relevant issues have been tried to be processed with evidence by making use of the basic sources of the sects. The content of the subject has been enriched within the framework of sectarian views, and current studies on the subject have been tried to be analysed. References have been to the views of the High Board of Religious Affairs. This study has refuted the unfair accusations of anti-Islamic discourses and contemporary feminist thoughts, which accuse Islam of not respecting women's rights and restricting women in the field of worship, as in many areas. Contrary to these claims, this study revealed that Islam gives women duties in accordance with their nature and exempts them from duties that would be burdensome for them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study, which examines the conceptual framework of the universal rules in Ahl alSunnah and Shīʿa fiqh, is the first review on the subject. This article aims to outline the differences between the principles that are considered as universal principles in both schools of thought. However, it is even possible to study each principle independently. In this context, it has been tried to show to what extent the characteristics of the universal principles determined by Ahl al-Sunnah are taken into consideration in Shīʿa jurisprudence. In addition, an effort has been made to determine in general terms what are the prominent issues in the universal rules in Shīʿa jurisprudence. As a result of the research, it has been determined that there are many differences between Shīʿa and Ahl al-Sunnah jurisprudence in the context of universal principles, which are accepted as logical propositions, as well as in the tradition of belief. The fact that universal rules are a sub-discipline of fiqh and methodological differences can be found in fur ūʿ al-fiqh (substantive fiqh). As a matter of fact, the four Sunni sects have dealt with these principles within their own systematics and ruled accordingly. On the other hand, there are dozens of universal principles on which the four Sunnite sects agree. However, it is understood that Shīʿa interprets the universal principles differently with ideological constructs and exhibits a very different approach from Ahl al-Sunnah. Due to the vastness of the subject, the study is centered on the work of Durūs fi al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya, which was compiled by Shi’ite scholars in the recent period. In the context of the aforementioned work, other Shīʿa qawāʿid al-qulliyyah have been frequently referred to. The characteristics of the Shia regarding the universal principles are discussed under six main headings in the article. It is clear that Shīʿa ignores the hadith and fiqh sources of Ahl al-Sunnah regarding universal rules. The theory of innocent imams, which is seen as an integral part of Shīʿa theology, is also extensively used in universal rules. In addition, the attitude towards the companions, which is one of the sharp differences between Ahl al-Sunnah and Shīʿa, is far from being objective in Shīʿa and they exhibit an ideological approach towards the Companions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article covers the aspects of the 1917 Ottoman Family Law Decree that differ from the classical Ottoman family law. It is important in terms of being the first law prepared in the field of family law in the Ottoman Empire and some other Islamic countries, carrying radical changes in the field. As in all legal systems, family law has an important place and an important role in Islamic and Ottoman law. With regard to Ottoman family law, it can be stated that it essentially consists of six centuries of practice of Islamic family law. This practice was insufficient due to change of circumstances and other factors. Following the Tanzimat, a new regulation was needed in family law, as in other areas of law. As a result of this need, the 1917 Ottoman Family Law Decree was drawn up through reference and historical experience. In terms of its general features and special provisions, the Decree differs from the Ottoman common law, which we call classical law. This study uses the textual analysis technique of the qualitative method to reveal and examine differences between the classical fiqh and the 1917 Family Law Decree, which is one of the last examples of the legalisation movements that started immediately after the Tanzimat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the radical political and legal changes that occured in the Muslim world in the 19th and 20th centuries, very limited areas of Islamic law are now practised in Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The most common of these is family law. The intense codification movement that began in the 19th century eventually included this area, which contains the most detailed provisions of Islamic law. This process, which began with the Ottoman Law of Family Rights (OLFR) of 1917, gained momentum with the laws of the states that gained independence in the second half of the 20th century. In the current century, the process continues with the family laws first enacted in the Gulf States (the United Arab Emirates in 2005, Qatar in 2006 and Bahrain in 2009) and most recently in Saudi Arabia in 2022 (Nizam al-Ahwal al-Syakhsiyyah 1443 H), as well as ongoing reforms to existing laws, such as the 2004 reforms to the Moroccan Personal Status Code, the 2005 amendments to the Algerian Family Code and the 2010 reforms to the Jordanian Personal Status Code. The present study discusses this process, which began with the codification of Islamic family law in the Ottoman Empire, in terms of the stages it went through, the demands and scope of reform, the motives for reform and the methods used. In this context, the emerging models are evaluated within the socio-political context of the laws and reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Mutakallimun proceduralists based the issues they dealt with regarding the method of fiqh on their understanding of language and kalam; for this reason, kalami and language considerations were significantly emphasized in the works of the Mutakallimun proceduralists. The command-willpower relationship is one of the topics discussed in the fiqh sources, based on the kalami understanding of the sects and revealing the mental codes of the sects. In general, Mu'tazili usul scholars argued that the command requires the willpower of the one who commands; on the other hand, other usul scholars, who constitute the majority, argued that the command does not require the willpower of the one who commands. This study clarifies Qadi Abd al-Jabbar's (d. 415/1025) view that command requires and discusses the place and justification of this issue within the Mu'tazili paradigm. Then, on the basis of his views on the relationship between command and willpower, Qadi Abd al-Jabbir's approach to the issues related to the evidence of absolute command is revealed. The effect of the Mu'tazilites' distinctive views of taklif, God's justice, and the understanding of husun-kubuh on the justification of these issues was revealed. This study aims to determine the place of the issue of God's justice, which is a theological principle, in the justification of the procedural issues discussed within the framework of the relationship between the command and the will and the evidence of the command. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the intersection of microeconomic theory and Islamic jurisprudence. We analyze three legal disputes from Islamic history that can be conceived as fair division problems in microeconomics. The solutions proposed by jurists of that time are scrutinized and compared with answers posited by classical division rules. The effected comparisons highlight the similarities and differences between Islamic and conventional economic resolutions. We use the axiomatic approach to define generalizable rules based on the solutions offered by eminent Islamic jurists Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf. Our analysis reveals that Abu Hanifa's methodology and the concede-and-divide rule are identical. Moreover, Abu Yusuf's approach mirrors the constrained Ibn Ezra rule. We examine the principles characterizing the concede-and-divide and Ibn Ezra rules and find these doctrines compatible with Islamic tenets. In conclusion, our study connects Islamic law with microeconomic theory through its unique exploration of legal disputes perceived through the lens of fair division problems. Our findings contribute to the scholarly understanding of how established division rules can be adapted to align with Islamic values and how Islamic allocation methods can be illustrated using an axiomatic approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Money: It is a means of exchanging and accumulating goods and services and determining their value. From past to present, commodities such as wheat, dates, hides, spears, and axes; metals such as iron, copper, gold and silver, negotiable instruments such as suftece, papers such as banknotes, and digital assets have been used as money. While these money kinds used throughout history are generally classified as commodity money, metallic money, receipt money and fiat money in the economic literature, they are classified as hilqaten/created money and ıstılahî/terminologically money in fiqh literature. Hilqaten money are currency that have a dual nature as both goods and money, as they derive their value from their own intrinsic value. Those minted from gold were used in circulation as dinars, those minted from silver as dirhams, and those with a low contribution of other metals in these coins were used in circulation as magşuş (mağlûbu'l-gış) money. Istılahî money is money that has become a measure of value when people say, "This is money" and derives its real value from an external value, not from its own intrinsic value. Those minted from metals other than gold and silver were used in circulation under the names of fülûs and those with a more contribution of other metals in these coins were used in circulation as magşuş (ğâlibu'l-gış) and settûka. Paper money, which became widespread in the 19th century, was built within a system by the economically and politically powerful states of the period, and the way in which paper money would be put into circulation was determined by international principles. In this context, from the beginning, the world paper money system generally went through four phases and took its current form. These are respectively; pre-1875 bimetallism gold and silver standard; monometallism only gold standard from 1875-1944; between 1944 and 1973 it was the gold exchange standard and after 1973 it was only the paper money standard. Before 1875, paper money in bimetallism standard system, that is, banknotes, was put into circulation as representative money in exchange for gold and silver. In the monometallism standard between 1875 and 1944, banknotes were put into circulation as representative money only in exchange for gold. In the gold exchange standard between 1944 and 1973, known as the Bretton Woods system, paper money was put into circulation in exchange for the dollar, which derived its value from gold. Thus, banknotes were traded in the markets as representative money, taking their value directly from dollars and indirectly from gold. In the current paper money standard, which is called the flexible exchange rate system after 1973, paper money is used in circulation as fiat money, deriving its value from its purchasing power only to the extent of the power of the authority that puts it into circulation. In this context quality of being measure of value, structure and kind of banknotes which emerged and spread more recently than others are explicit at many points in the economic literature, they are controversial in Islamic law. In this article, it is examined whether banknotes qualify as money according to Islamic law and, if so, what type and structure of money they are. In this context, the history, theory, and types of money have been analyzed in the economics and Fiqh literature and banknotes was substantiated in Islamic law with consideration the international monetary system. As a result, banknotes are ıstılahî a measure of value, should be subject to ijtihad according to the way it is put into circulation and it has been determined that it is a separate money as paper money, unlike dinar, dirham, fulūs etc. In this respect, paper money, which was put into circulation as receipt money directly or indirectly in exchange for gold, silver or both before 1973, should be evaluated as ıstılahî money in terms of value measure but is hilqaten money in terms of provision; after 1973, namely today, paper money that is put into circulation as fiat money in a way that derives its value from the power of the authority that puts it into circulation should be evaluated as ıstılahî money in terms of both value measure and provision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Turkish Journal of Religious Education Studies / Türkiye Din Eğitimi Araştırmaları Dergisi is the property of Turkish Journal of Religious Education Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)