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Judicial confirmation hearings offer a rare opportunity for senators to engage in a public exchange with current and future members of the federal judiciary. Below the Supreme Court level, however, we know relatively little about how members of the Judiciary Committee use these hearings. In this article, we examine senator mentions of Supreme Court cases at circuit court confirmation hearings between 1993 and 2012 to test whether these hearings serve as a venue for position-taking, as well as for interbranch dialogue. We find evidence that senators do reference decisions in ways that seem motivated by electoral considerations. However, we also find that hearings are frequently used as a forum for interbranch dialogue over Supreme Court cases. When used in this fashion, the dialogue is often focused on cases that challenge congressional power. The results suggest that confirmation hearings are an underappreciated venue for interbranch conversations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Once pigeonholed as a 'feminist artist', Judy Chicago is now seeing her work championed more widely. She talks to Apollo about blazing a trail and how the art world still [...]

Since the appointment of John M. Harlan II in 1955, every Supreme Court nominee has testified in a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing. These hearings provide a fertile ground for senator ideologies, partisanship, and political forces to be on full display. However, little research has systematically analyzed confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominees. In this paper, quantitative sentiment analysis is used on the transcripts of Supreme Court confirmation hearings between 1969 and 2018. By leveraging sentiment analysis, the attitudes of each of the senators during the hearings can be measured. Investigating the correlative impact that variables at the senator, institution, and nomination levels have on sentiment creates a better understanding of the factors that may influence a senator's attitude during the hearings. A positive correlative effect on sentiment was found with an increase in the percentage of the vote the nominating president received during his most recent election in the senator's home state. A positive correlation was also found when the nominating president and a senator were members of the same political party. Additionally, a statistically significant negative correlation was measured when the departing justice was a swing voter and when the hearing was aired on television. This research points to new avenues for using textual data to study partisanship and ideological polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2007, candidates for 50 of the most senior public appointments in the UK have been scrutinised by the relevant House of Commons Select Committee before ministers confirm their appointment. Committees regard pre-appointment scrutiny as a chore, but our research shows it has real impact. Candidates have not been appointed as a result, and others have been forced to resign. Since the Grimstone review in 2016 gave Ministers more scope for political patronage, parliamentary scrutiny is all the more important. Committees could be more effective if they were more selective, but also more systematic in their approach to pre-appointment scrutiny. They could range beyond the Cabinet Office list of the 'top 50' appointments; and they could use questionnaires to candidates to help decide the issues they wish to discuss, or whether to hold a hearing at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are judicial nominees allowed to refuse to answer questions about important issues that could come before the courts? We address this question by examining the information environment surrounding judicial nominations. Using the Supreme Court as our example, we formulate a model that departs from the existing literature by incorporating the fact that the Senate often does not know what type of candidate the President is trying to appoint. Our model shows when the President and Senate are ideologically divergent, low information about nominees’ views results in the Senate occasionally rejecting acceptable nominees. However, when the President and Senate are ideologically close, the President benefits from leaving the process opaque—that is, allowing his nominees to avoid answering tough questions. Thus, even though low information can be costly to both parties, keeping the process nontransparent shields the President from being penalized for selecting more like-minded (and possibly extreme) judges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]