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In 2020, the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) withdrew support for President Nicolás Maduro even though Washington had recently intensified the "war on Venezuela," which included sanctions and military threats. The PCV's decision was in response to Maduro's business-friendly "defensive strategy" in the face of the imperialist aggression, which was more severe than that directed against other progressive Latin American governments, particularly after 2015. Maduro appeared to view the PCV and other critics on the left through the same lenses that he did critics on the right and, in the process, what Mao called "contradictions among the people" ended up becoming "antagonistic contradictions." There are tools, albeit imprecise ones, to determine whether the type of political retreat engineered by Maduro accorded with existing objective-subjective conditions in Venezuela. Unfavorable objective and subjective conditions also influenced Marx and Lenin to advocate defensive or "non-offensive" strategies at different times in their lifetimes, vehemently rejected by other leftist leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emersberger and Podur are critical of the "mano dura" (216) of Maduro's police (which they contrast unfavorably with Chávez's more lenient approach to crime). One example is the media's repeated references to Washington's assertion that Guaidó was Venezuela's legitimate president while omitting that "there was never any reasonable grounds for taking seriously" such a claim (35). The authors argue that "a direct economic incentive is insufficient" to explain Washington's actions, since the I Chavista i governments "never denied the United States access to its country's oil" (21). [Extracted from the article]

The implications of Marxist state theories developed by Nicos Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband are useful for framing issues related to leftist strategy in twenty first-century Venezuela. A relationship exists between each of the theories and three issues facing the Chavista movement: whether the bourgeoisie (or sectors of it) displays a sense of ‘class-consciousness'; the viability of tactical and strategic alliances between the left and groups linked to the capitalist structure; and whether socialism is to be achieved through stages, abrupt revolutionary changes, or ongoing state radicalisation over a period of time. During Poulantzas's lifetime, his concept of the state as a ‘strategic battlefield' lent itself to the left's promotion of ‘strategic alliances' with parties to its right. The same concept is compatible with the ‘process of change' in Venezuela, in which autonomous movements play a fundamental role in transforming the old state and the construction of new state structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses social and political developments in Venezuela as of March 2014. It focuses on the movement for socialist transformation, in which the radical Chavistas called for the broadening of the revolutionary process. It examines the accomplishments of the governments of former president Hugo Chávez and incumbent President Nicolás Maduro.

The article discusses several accounts of developments in Venezuela that indicate the leadership success of Hugo Chavez as president of the country. It recounts the victory of Chavez as president and his United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) in the October 2012 presidential election. Information is also given the arguments and concerns raised by the political opponents of Chavez against his government.

The ongoing radicalization over an extended period under the presidency of Hugo Chávez contrasts with revolutions elsewhere. The Chávez government has passed through increasingly radical stages beginning with moderate policies in 1999-2000, and leading to widespread expropriations after 2007. Political victories initiated each new stage. The escalations from one stage to the next helped identify 'enemies' of the process of change. Government victories and radicalization infused rank-and-file Chavistas with a sense of optimism. The Venezuelan process recalls the concept of permanent revolution espoused by Leon Trotsky, but there are areas of divergence: First, in contrast to the Venezuelan case, Trotsky insisted that the working class and its vanguard party play the lead role untied to their class enemies. Second, Chávez throughout his 12 years of rule has occasionally accepted compromise arrangements with the adversaries of change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the Chávez government, the incorporation and participation of popular sectors, which is the essence of ‘social-based democracy’, has been quantitatively and qualitatively different from socialist government and welfare-state strategies of the past. Venezuela's social-based democracy focuses on education, job skills, ideology, transformation of values and empowerment, achievements which Chavista leaders consider to be imperatives for socialist development. However, Chavista social programmes have been undermined by institutional weakness, are sometimes not cost-effective, and are politicised. Conflicting views among the Chavistas on the role of the state hinge on the issue of whether initiatives from above in favour of social-based democracy represent a viable strategy for far-reaching change. The Venezuelan government's changing priorities after 2007 have detracted from the primacy of social programmes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The 'Bolivarian Revolution' in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez has reignited debate in Latin America and internationally on the questions of socialism and revolution. This forum brings together six leading intellectuals from different revolutionary traditions and introduces their reflections on class-struggle, the state, imperialism, counter-power, revolutionary parties, community and communes, workplaces, economy, politics, society, culture, race, gender, and the hopes, contradictions, and prospects of 'twenty-first-century socialism' in contemporary Venezuela. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the decision of the administration of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to ration the country's electric power that sparked a series of protest in Caracas. The government suspended the measure when the traffic lights and hospitals are affected by the lack of electricity. This is one of the controversial decisions that affected the support of the people for their president, who has been in office for more than 11 years.

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Two Marxist traditions play themselves out in the internal debate in the movement headed by Hugo Chávez. The "realists" favor practical policies to increase production, while the "cultural optimists" are concerned with combating capitalist values. The discussions of wage differentials in worker-run plants and cooperatives recall the Marxist distinction between "to each according to their work" (favored by realists) and "to each according to necessity" (defended by cultural optimists). While Chávez urges cooperatives and community councils to discard the "profit motive" (cultural optimist approach), the realists emphasize effective state controls to avoid misuse of funds. The cultural optimist banner of social justice is best suited to ensure the active support of non-privileged sectors. The realists are most likely to face the hard fact that socialism does not have the whipping boy of poverty to stimulate worker productivity and thus requires alternative mechanisms. Although Trotskyists and others view the realists as defending the class interests of the privileged, a synthesis between the two positions is necessary and possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on community councils in Venezuela. It relates the number of community councils across the country. It discusses the projects of community councils in El Valle in the Venezuelan state of Mérida. It provides a background of the Law of Community Councils, enacted in April 2006. It highlights the distinction of community councils from the Venezuelan worker cooperatives.

The author reflects on international cooperation in developing Venezuela's Orinoco Oil Belt. Iran's participation in the Venezuelan oil industry dates back to September 2006, when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad presided over the initial perforation of a well in Ayacucho 7, one of 27 blocks in the Orinoco Belt. He claims that Venezuela's new partners provide the government of Hugo Chávez with important leverage in its risky strategy of challenging the multinational companies that have traditionally dominated the nation's oil industry.

Discusses the important implications of the ability of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to carry out significant reforms in the face of U.S. hostility and an aggressive U.S.-supported domestic opposition for progressive Latin American struggles. Overview of the reforms and actions of Chávez that have undermined the economic interests of Venezuelan and transnational groups; Support of the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush for the short-lived coup against Chávez in April 2002; Information on two distinct positions concerning the role of national sovereignty according to Michael Hardt, co-author of the book "Empire."

Focuses on the coup that happened in April 9, 2002 in Venezuela that almost overthrow Venezuelan President Hugo Ch á vez from his post. Information on how Chavez responded on the problem; Overview of the armed confrontation that happened during the coup; Political and economic condition of Venezuela after the coup.

Presents an update on the political regime of Venezuelan President Hugo Ch á vez as of May 2002. Actions taken by Ch á vez before and after regaining his presidential authority in Venezuela; Information on the Bolivarian Revolution; Factors that have contributed to the decline in the political popularity of Ch á vez in Venezuela; Contribution of the U.S. administration to the political destabilization in Venezuela.

Deals with the fragmentation and internal conflict in the government of Venezuelan Hugo Chavez Frias. Stance of the Catholic church and Fedecamaras, a business organization; Information on the system created by the pact of Punto Fijo; Elections in Venezuela.

Focuses on the disunity and atomization that characterized the neighborhood movement in Venezuela. Factors the contributed to the early growth of the neighborhood movement; Disparity between the theoretical model of the neighborhood movement and the daily practice of neighborhood associations; Political party interference; Internal contrasts and incohesion.

Analyzes inter-party conflict in Venezuela in the 1970s. Role of party leaders in the failure of democratic government; Details of the conflict between social democratic Acci ó n Democr á tica and the social Christian Copei in Venezuela; Aspects of interparty relations; Areas of inter-party conflict.

Focuses on the debate happening on the political parties of Venezuela over the privatization of forest reserve near the Brazilian border. Significance of the debate; Comments of Walter Marquez, Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) congressman on the help given by Teodoro Petkoff in drafting the privatization decree for the forest reserve; Information about the Imataca reserve forest.

Examines assumptions on political party factionalism and democracy in Venezuela. Economic crisis; Party reform; System of open primaries; Presidential elections; Ambiguities and shifts.

The article presents a report on privatization in Venezuela. The debate over privatization in Venezuela has centered on two strategies. Radical neoliberals favor immediate privatization regardless of the terms, and generally underestimate resultant worker dislocations. In reaction to millennial theories which proclaimed the "end of history," some have argued that the case for globalism has been overstated and that national capital still predominates and national economies in developed nations are still "remarkably isolated." The literature on privatization in developing countries can be placed in this broader context. One camp, which can be labeled "radical neoliberalism," champions massive privatization and envisions far-reaching changes that result from it. An opposite extreme opposes privatization, at least in strategic sectors and basic industry. Just how radical a change privatization represents for workers is the central concern of this article. Although the neoliberal agenda points in the direction of major transformations in the society as a whole, the type of changes privatization presages for the work force is never made clear. Neoliberals have lauded certain labor changes induced by privatization.

This article focuses on the internal debate in the Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS), the largest leftist political party in Venezuela, over the forms of struggle that should be emphasized and adopted by the party. It explains that from ever since the days of Karl Marx, socialist parties have strived to arrive at a correct balance in their political work between collective agitation and diffusion of ideological propaganda. This problem is nowhere true that in the MAS. It details the divisions that arose within MAS as a result of this debate.

Reports on the victory of Hugo Chavez Frias in the December 6, 1998 election in Venezuela. How opponents of Chavez categorized him; Support of Venezuela's poor to Chavez; Details on Chavez's anti-neoliberalism.

Reports on the polls for the 1998 presidential election of Venezuela. How the anti-neoliberal stance of Hugo Chavez distinguishes him from rivals; Controversial aspects of Chavez's campaign platform; How the support of Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) helps the candidacy of Chavez.